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ABSTRACT 
Christina B. Carroll: Defining the French Empire: Memory, Politics, and National Identity, 1860-
1900 
(Under the direction of Lloyd Kramer) 
This dissertation explores the debates waged over the meaning and value of “empire” in 
Second Empire and Third Republic France. More specifically, I examine the shifting role played 
by “Napoleonic” or “continental” imperial models in the contested construction of France’s 
expansive colonial empire. I argue that for much of this period, French writers and politicians 
saw continental and colonial empire as related political formations. I employ a range of sources, 
including government policies, newspapers, journals, pamphlets, treatises, textbooks, and novels, 
to show that the memory of these older continental imperial models in fact shaped republican 
understandings of and justifications for the colonial empire they were building.  
The relationship between “continental” and “colonial” empire, I contend, became 
particularly fraught in the wake of the Second Empire’s collapse during the Franco-Prussian War 
because popular publications came to associate the term “empire” with decadence, effeminacy, 
division, and defeat. In fact, the republican government that came to power in the shadow of the 
defeat defended its legitimacy by defining itself against the empire that preceded it. As a result, 
when republicans embarked on their own project of overseas expansion in the years that 
followed, they found “empire’s” negative associations troubling. Over the course of the next 
thirty years, they struggled to redefine empire, free it from its Napoleonic legacy, and justify 
their colonial ambitions.  
 iv 
My work focuses on the cultural and political transitions during the early years of the 
Third Republic that made “empire” acceptable in new terms. Its analysis demonstrates the ways 
in which discourses of European racial superiority over colonial others intersected with older 
arguments about the organization of the French state, and reveals how the conversation about 
empire became entangled in the ongoing struggle over France’s politics and national identity. 
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 1 
INTRODUCTION: EMPIRES, REPUBLICS, AND FRENCH POLITICAL CULTURE IN 
THE LONG NINETEENTH CENTURY 
 
During the Third Republic, France embarked on a major project of colonial conquest, 
vastly increasing its territorial holdings in Asia and Africa.1 The government invested 
considerable resources in this expansion, but reservations about the wisdom of having an empire 
persisted, especially in the new Republic’s early years. During the 1873 revolt in Cochinchina 
and Cambodia, a number of politicians from across the political spectrum even maintained that 
France should give up both colonies, and they expressed misgivings about increasing French 
investment in the area.2 The reasons for these misgivings varied according to political leaning: 
while some radical republicans worried that maintaining an empire might undermine the 
principles of the new republican state, right-wing nationalists believed at least initially that 
pursuing an empire would distract the country from more pressing revenge against Germany in 
the wake of the Franco-Prussian War.3 It was only in the early decades of the twentieth century 
that the new colonial empire became widely accepted, and even then, there was little agreement 
about the empire’s purpose, its administration, or its implications for French national identity.4 
                                               
1 Although the beginnings of the second colonial empire are usually dated to the 1830 invasion of Algeria, France 
did not acquire most of its overseas territories until after the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71. See Charles 
Sowerwine, France Since 1870: Culture, Politics and Society (New York: Palgrave, 2001), 89. 
2 Gilles de Gantès, “Migration to Indochina: Proof of the Popularity of Colonial Empire?” in Promoting the Colonial 
Idea: Propaganda and Visions of Empire in France, ed. by Tony Chafer and Amanda Sakur (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2002), 16. 
3 J. P. Daughton, An Empire Divided: Religion, Republicanism, and the Making of French Colonialism, 1880-1914 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 9. 
4 Robert Aldrich, Greater France: A History of French Overseas Expansion (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 
1996), 100. 
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These disagreements about France’s empire partially stemmed from the early French 
Republic’s deep political and ideological rifts. But they also resulted from the fact that the very 
idea of “empire” had an ambiguous history that was bound up in political divisions and turmoil. 
Different writers, intellectuals, and politicians could link the concept to multiple governmental 
regimes and use it to signify either a particular political system within the territories of 
continental France or the state’s relationship to conquered, colonized territories overseas.1  
 The memory of the Napoleonic empires – and especially the Second Empire – in many 
ways lay at the center of these tangled understandings of “empire” in the early Third Republic. 
Over the course of his reign, Napoleon III sought to provide shape and substance to his imperial 
regime by developing and popularizing a new “theory of empire.” In the early years of his rule, 
Napoleon III usually described empire as an internal form of political organization that drew on 
the legacy of the Revolution but tempered that legacy with the promise of order and security.2 He 
thus treated “the French Empire” as functionally equivalent to “the French nation.” But in the 
1860s, Napoleon III began to take a greater interest in France’s overseas territories. He tried to 
expand France’s foothold in North America by setting up a proxy emperor in Mexico, extended 
France’s investment in Indochina, and became interested in the conditions of his Arab subjects in 
Algeria. In the late 1860s, he began to describe Algeria as a “royaume arabe” – an Algerian 
                                               
1 The French monarchy had carved out the first overseas colonial empire in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, 
which France lost in the later eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries to wars with Britain, revolution, and 
Napoleonic disinterest. But even as Napoleon sold French territory in North America, he attempted to establish a 
new European empire, which he hoped would extend into Egypt. He was eventually defeated, and the victorious 
powers replaced the empire with a monarchy. Later political leaders in search of popular support sometimes 
attempted to associate themselves with his myth: notably, when the July Monarchy invaded Algeria in 1830, the 
king self-consciously drew on the imagery of Napoleonic conquest and victory. And when Napoleon III declared 
himself Emperor in 1851, he too attempted to lay claim to his uncle’s reputation – not only through political 
propaganda, but also through colonial conquest. See Sudhir Hazareesingh, “Napoleonic Memory in Nineteenth-
Century France,” MLN 120.4 (2005), 757. 
2 Sudhir Hazareesingh, From Subject to Citizen: The Second Empire and the Emergence of Modern French 
Democracy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998), 27. 
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kingdom with a culture distinct from France. This kingdom, he implied, was its own nation with 
its own national identity; it was not part of France.3 Instead, both Algeria and France were both 
subsidiary parts of a multinational multiethnic Napoleonic Empire, and he, at its head, was the 
emperor of both the French and the Arabs. This model – which proved deeply unpopular among 
settlers in Algeria and republicans in France – reconfigured the meaning of empire; it functioned 
as both as a specific kind of political system and as a way of organizing territories. Napoleon III 
thus merged “continental” empire with “colonial empire” – if not necessarily in an equal way. 
 The legacy of Napoleon III’s vision of empire was thus problematic for republicans in the 
early years of the Third Republic. France’s defeat in the Franco-Prussian War had tarnished 
Bonapartism generally and Napoleon III in particular in the eyes of much of the population.4 
Despite its relatively brief duration, the conflict left France territorially dismembered and in debt 
to Germany, but it also brought about a political revolution and a subsequent civil war that left 
deep internal divisions. In the wake of this destruction, numerous popular publications and much 
of the press came to associate the very word “empire” with weakness, decadence, internal strife, 
and defeat. Indeed, the republican government that came to power in the wake of 1870-71 
defended its legitimacy by defining itself explicitly against the imperial government that 
preceded it.5 As the republicans embarked on their own overseas empire-building project in the 
years that followed, the ambiguity of “empire” and its referents therefore became increasingly 
troubling – especially since their political opponents often made use of the ambiguities inherent 
                                               
3 Annie Rey-Goldzeiguer, Le Royaume Arabe La Politique Algerienne de Napoléon III, 1861-1870 (Alger: Societe 
Nationale d'Edition et de Diffusion, 1977), 10. 
4 Venita Datta, “‘L’appel au soldat’: Visions of the Napoleonic Legend in Popular Culture of the Belle Epoque,” 
French Historical Studies 28.1 (2005), 2. 
5 In the aftermath, the republicans that came to power linked empire not only with authoritarianism but also with 
decadence, effeminacy, and decay. See Karine Varley, Under the Shadow of Defeat: The War of 1870-71 in French 
Memory (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2008), 84. 
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in republicanism’s relationship to empire when they criticized republican-driven colonial 
expansion. Questions about the relationship between continental and colonial empire thus 
intersected with and complicated republicans’ attempts to solidify their political platforms and 
positions. Over the course of the next thirty years, they struggled to redefine empire, free it from 
its Napoleonic legacy, and justify their republican colonial ambitions. This project was, on the 
whole, successful: by the early decades of the twentieth century, the colonial empire became 
widely accepted across most levels of French society.6 
 This dissertation focuses on the cultural and political transitions during the early years of 
the Third Republic that helped make “empire” acceptable by defining colonial actions in new 
terms. It treats “empire” as a contested category in French public discourse, which individuals of 
different political and ideological persuasions attempted to define against one another by 
appealing to an array of models and historical memories. It focuses specifically on the 
relationship between continental and colonial understandings of empire, and considers how the 
memory of Bonapartist continental empire influenced and challenged beliefs about overseas 
empire in Third Republic France. It traces how these understandings shifted over time in 
response to political changes within France itself and to the expansion of French holdings 
overseas. These transitions show that “continental empire” and “colonial empire” were far from 
clearly defined concepts in late nineteenth-century France. French writers, intellectuals, and 
politicians disagreed just as fervently about their individual content and significance as they did 
about the nature of their similarities and differences. Indeed, especially under Napoleon III and 
in subsequent years, not everyone even agreed that they were distinct ideas. I thus do not treat 
“continental” and “colonial” visions of empire as two inherently separate models. Instead, I 
                                               
6 Aldrich, Greater France, 100. 
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analyze how these two visions became separate models during the late nineteenth century and 
trace the way that “colonial” empire gained increasing support even as “continental” empire lost 
its appeal in response to changes within both France and its overseas territories. 
This process of defining empire was not only important because of its effects on French 
republican ideology and French colonial policy. It also became entangled in highly politicized 
debates about French national identity that had become especially pressing after the military 
disaster and subsequent civil war of 1870-71.7 As socialists, radicals, republicans, legitimists, 
and Orleanists searched for ways to define France in the wake of defeat, empire, because of its 
semantic, historical, and political ambiguity, came to operate as a shared discursive field that all 
groups attempted to appropriate for their respective visions of what it meant (or did not mean) to 
be French. As a result, defining “empire” and interpreting its meaning in specific colonial 
contacts became an important component of the debates about the nation and national identity.  
I examine this conversation about empire and its relationship to national identity as it 
transpired in the Third Republic’s overlapping political, intellectual, and popular circles. This 
analysis is in dialogue with the insights of post-structuralism and the new intellectual history, 
which, as Elizabeth Clark explains, “explores the material embeddedness of ideas and their 
relation to power… [and] appeals to climates of opinion, literary movements, ideologies and 
their diffusion, and to an anthropologically infused notion of culture.”8 By analyzing a mixture of 
official political speeches, newspaper and journal articles, theoretical treatises, academic 
histories, political propaganda, novels, and short stories, I unearth the themes and tensions that 
                                               
7 Karine Varley, Under the Shadow of Defeat; Wolfgang Schivelbusch and Jefferson S. Chase, The Culture of 
Defeat, (New York: Macmillan, 2003); Pierre Nora, “Entre Mémoire et Histoire,” in Les Lieux de mémoire: La 
République, v. 1, ed. Pierre Nora (Paris: Gallimard, 1984). 
8 Elizabeth Clark, History, Theory, Text: Historians and the Linguistic Turn (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 2004), 110. 
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characterized debates about the meaning of “empire” and trace how these debates shifted over 
the course of the late Second Empire and the early Third Republic. I also show how this ongoing 
public negotiation over the meanings of empire became intertwined with political power 
struggles and came to inform elite and popular culture. 
In order to analyze the intersection of empire, republicanism, and national identity in late 
nineteenth-century French popular discourse, this dissertation poses three sets of questions. First, 
how did different writers, intellectuals, and politicians attempt to define the meanings and value 
of empire across this period? How, for example, did they envision the specific relationship 
between continental and colonial empire? Second, how did these contested understandings of 
empire intersect with the changing internal configurations of French politics? Which political 
groups, for example, mobilized particular definitions of empire, and for what reasons? How did 
these arguments for or against empire change as republican colonial expansion gained speed? 
Third, how did different views of empire share or reflect particular visions of the French nation? 
By addressing these questions, this dissertation contributes to several different 
historiographical conversations. On the most basic level, it is in dialogue with the ever-growing 
body of work on the French colonial empire and its influence on the metropole. Over the past 
thirty years, a range of political scientists, post-colonial theorists, literary scholars, and 
historians, arguing against the idea that imperialism and colonialism only affected colonized 
subjects, have demonstrated that imperial expansion and encounters with non-European peoples 
deeply influenced French elite and popular cultures during the Third Republic.9 Moreover, they 
                                               
9 This scholarship has, for the most part, focused on a different aspect of empire than my own work; it tends to 
examine French representations of the “other” instead of looking at how these representations intersected with 
French memories of earlier empires. See, for example, Tony Chafer and Amanda Shakur, “Introduction,” in 
Promoting the Colonial Idea: Propaganda and Visions of Empire in France, ed. by. Tony Chafer and Amanda 
Shakur (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2002), 3; Eric Jennings, “Visions and Representations of French Empire,” 
The Journal of Modern History 77.3 (September 2005), 701-721; William Schneider, An Empire for the Masses: 
 
 7 
have shown how, despite their apolitical pretentions, French scholarship, literature, and art often 
legitimized and perhaps even drove French imperial expansion. Writers and social scientists in 
particular played an important role in developing an array of ideological tools to solidify and 
justify French rule over colonized peoples.10 Popular writers and elite scholars thus were not 
only affected by France’s colonial empire; they also played an active role in shaping the 
republic’s colonial policies. This dissertation draws on these insights, but it also considers how 
polarized political debates within the metropole itself influenced political, literary, and academic 
visions of empire and imperial expansion. 
Some scholars have looked more specifically at the content of republican justifications 
for empire and considered the nature of their relationship to French republican ideals. Much of 
this work has focused specifically on the idea of the “civilizing mission,” which, many historians 
have claimed, played a critical role in reconciling the republican commitment to equality and 
                                               
The French Popular Image of Africa (London: Greenwood Press, 1982); Alec G. Hargreaves, The Colonial 
Experience in French Fiction (London: Macmillan, 1983); Sylviane Leprun, Le Théâtre des colonies: 
Scénographies, acteurs et discours de l’imaginaire dans les expositions, 1855-1937 (Paris, 1986); Catherine Hodeir 
and Michel Pierre, L’Exposition coloniale (Paris, 1991); Annie E. Coombes, Reinventing Africa: Museums, Material 
Culture and Popular Imagination (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994); Todd Porterfield, The Allure of 
Empire: Art in the Service of French Imperialism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998); Anne Maxwell, 
Colonial Photography and Exhibitions (London: Leicester University Press, 1999); Patricia A. Morton, Hybrid 
Modernities: Architecture and Representation at the 1931 Colonial Exposition, Paris (Cambridge, MA: 2000); Jean-
Christophe Mabire, L’Exposition universelle de 1900 (Paris, 2000); Darcy Grimaldo Grigsby, Extremities: Painting 
Empire in Post-Revolutionary France (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2002); Roger Benjamin, Orientalist 
Aesthetics: Art, Colonialism, and French North Africa, 1880-1930 (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 
2003); Martin Evans, ed., Empire and Culture: The French Experience, 1830-1940 (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2004); Martin Thomas, ed. The French Colonial Mind: Mental Maps of Empire and Colonial 
Encounters (Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press, 2011); Daniel Sherman, French Primitivism and 
the Ends of Empire, 1945-1975 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011); Sandrine Lemaire and Pascal 
Blanchard, eds, Colonial Culture in France since the Revolution (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2014);  
10 See, for example, Patricia M. Lorcin, Imperial Identities: Stereotyping, Prejudice, and Race in Colonial Algeria 
(London and New York: I. B. Tauris Publishers, 1995); Jennifer Pitts, A Turn to Empire: The Rise of Imperial 
Liberalism in Britain and France (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005); George R. Trumball IV, An 
Empire of Facts: Colonial Power, Cultural Knowledge, and Islam in Algeria (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2009); Pierre Singaravélou, Professer l’Empire: Les ‘sciences coloniales’ en France sous la IIIe République 
(Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne, 2011) 
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democratic politics with the practice of colonial domination.11 Alice Conklin’s A Mission to 
Civilize, for example, argues that French republicans’ embrace of the civilizing mission 
“obscure[d] the fundamental contradiction between democracy and the forcible acquisition of 
empire.”12 According to Conklin, republicans justified conquering other peoples by claiming that 
France would end the “barbarism, poverty, and isolation” of African (and other colonized) 
peoples and bring them the benefits of technology, medicine, education, and legal practices. At 
the same time, they promised to grant colonized political rights once they had transformed into 
rational, republican citizens. However, as Conklin points out, the republic never fulfilled its 
promise of equality. And French republicans themselves were slow to see “the discrepancy 
between ideal and reality” at least in part because “French racism often worked hand-in-glove 
with more progressive values.”13 Conklin thus argues that the contradictory conflation of 
scientific racism and republican universalism made the practice of republican empire possible 
and stresses a process of ideological reconciliation during the Third Republic. 
                                               
11 See, for example, Raoul Girardet, L’idée coloniale en France de 1871 à 1962 (Paris: La Table ronde, 1972); 
Nicolas Bancel, Pascal Blanchard, and Françoise Verges, eds., La République coloniale: essai sur une utopie (Paris: 
Albin Michel, 2003); Claude Liauzu and Gilles Manceron, eds., La Colonisation, la Loi et l’Histoire (Paris: 
Syllepse, 2006); Frederick Cooper, “Provincializing France,” in Imperial Formations, ed. Ann Stoler, Carol 
McGranahan and Peter Perdu (Santa Fe: School for Advanced Studies, 2007), 343-356; Dino Constantini, Mission 
civilisatrice: le rôle de l’histoire coloniale dans la construction de l’identité politique française (Paris: Éditions la 
découverte, 2008); Daughton, An Empire Divided; Benedikt Stuchtey, “The Europeanization of the World: Colonial 
Discourses in the French Third Republic,” in The Fuzzy Logic of Encounter: New Perspectives on Cultural Contact, 
ed. Sünne Juterczenka (New York: Waxmann Verlag, 2009), 98-117. 
12 According to Conklin, this civilizing mission had become the “official ideology of the Third Republic’s vast new 
empire” by 1895 – although its roots predated the Third Republic. It “rested on certain fundamental assumptions 
about the superiority of French culture and the perfectability of mankind. It implied that France’s colonial subjects 
were too primitive to rule themselves, but were capable of being uplifted. It intimated that the French were 
particularly suited, by temperament and by virtue of their revolutionary past and current industrial strength, to carry 
out this task. Last but not least, it assumed that the Third Republic had a duty and a right to remake ‘primitive’ 
cultures along the lines inspired by the cultural, political, and economic development of France.” See Alice Conklin, 
A Mission to Civilize: The Republican Idea of Empire in France and West Africa, 1895-1930 (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1997), 1-2. 
13 Ibid., 256. 
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   Other scholars have taken issue with this argument that colonialism “contradicted” 
republican ideals. In The French Imperial Nation-State, Gary Wilder contends that “racism and 
colonialism” should not be treated as “signs of the absence or failure of republicanism 
understood one-sidedly as universalism.”14 Instead, he insists, French republicanism always 
incorporated both universalist and particularist dimensions and that both intersected with 
colonial discourses in complex ways.15 As a result, even if colonial conquest, institutionalized 
racism, and authoritarian bureaucratic rule contradicted some republican ideals, these practices 
did not contradict republicanism itself.16 This dissertation draws on this understanding of the 
dual nature of French republicanism. At the same time, however, it demonstrates that even if 
republicanism could accommodate colonial conquest, many republicans in the 1870s were 
concerned that the two were contradictory because of the associations between “empire” and 
authoritarian government. Republicans’ attempt to fashion a specifically republican model of 
empire was thus not only shaped by the contradictory legacy of the Revolution but also against 
the legacy of continental empire.  
   Wilder’s work does not only seek to reframe the conversation about French 
republicanism’s relationship to colonialism; it also articulates a new understanding of the 
relationship between the republic, the nation, and the empire. The republic, he insists, was not 
                                               
14 Gary Wilder, The French Imperial Nation-State: Negritude and Colonial Humanism between Two World Wars 
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2005), 6. 
15 He contends that this dual character of French republicanism dates to the Revolution, which insisted that “‘men 
are born and remain free and equal in rights’ even as it also announced that ‘the principle of sovereignty rests 
essentially in the nation.’” Wilder identifies this moment as “the founding antimony between universality and 
particularity” because it simultaneously invested all men with rights and tied rights to membership in a specific 
group. This antimony, he argues, was embodied in “the citizen,” which not only distinguished between “national” 
and “foreigner” but distinguished between members of the nation who could access political rights and those 
deemed incapable of meeting the “criteria of individuality, rationality, and autonomy.” See ibid., 16. 
16 According to Wilder, this was not simply because particularism undermined the republican ideal of universalism. 
Instead, they often worked together to constitute racist practices and ideas. See ibid., 19. 
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simply affected by its overseas colonies; it was “articulated with its administrative empire to 
compose an expanded and disjointed political formation.”17 This colonial formation was neither 
strictly an empire or a nation but an “imperial nation-state” that served as a complicated 
constellation of both. Wilder thus situates republicanism and colonialism within a discussion 
about the connections between empire and nation – a subject that remains, despite some recent 
scholarly attention, understudied.18 Most of the existing scholarship devoted to the subject has 
focused on the intersections between empire, nation, and politics in formerly colonized countries, 
such as India.19 As a result, modern “empire” has often been understood as a transitional form of 
political organization that precedes and ultimately leads into the self-contained nation-state. 
However, as scholars such as Jane Burbank and Frederick Cooper have made clear, the 
relationship between empire and nation is infinitely complex; nations build empires, and states 
move between imperial and national configurations.20 Moreover, as scholars focusing especially 
on Britain have repeatedly shown, “empire” can become a central component of national identity 
itself.21 Wilder contends that in France, empire and nation also merged into “a political form 
                                               
17 Ibid., 2. 
18 There are some works that consider the relationship between empire and nation in nineteenth-century France. For 
examples, see Michael Evans, ed. Empire and Culture: The French Experience, 1830-1940 (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2004); Daughton, An Empire Divided. For a twentieth-century example, see Charles-Robert Ageron, 
“L’exposition coloniale de 1931: mythe républicain ou mythe impériale?” in Pierre Nora, ed., Les Lieux de 
Mémoire, vol. 1 (Paris: Gallimard Quarto, 1997). 
19 Partha Chatterjee, “Whose Imagined Community?” in Empire and Nation (New York: Columbia University Press, 
2010), 32. 
20 They argue that nations and empires are structured differently from one another. While empires are “large political 
units, expansionist or with the memory of power extended over space, polities that maintain distinction and 
hierarchy as they incorporate new people,” nation-states are “based on the idea of a single people in a single territory 
constituting itself as a unique political community. The nation-state proclaims the commonality of its people… 
while the empire-state declares the non-equivalence of multiple populations. The concept of empire presumes that 
different peoples within the polity will be governed differently.” See Jane Burbank and Frederick Cooper, Empires 
in World History: Power and the Politics of Difference (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010), 9. 
21Ann Laura Stoler and Frederick Cooper, “Between Metropole and Colony: Rethinking a Research Agenda,” in 
Tensions of Empire: Colonial Cultures in a Bourgeois World, edited by Frederick Cooper and Ann Laura Stoler 
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founded upon the antimony of universality and particularity that must nevertheless be analyzed 
in relation to political economy and in historically specific contexts.”22 He thus argues that the 
“imperial nation-state” did not remain static. But at the same time, linking “empire” directly to 
“nation” and placing them into a unitary (if disjointed) configuration makes it difficult to see 
how the content of each term and the relationship between them changed over time. This 
dissertation demonstrates that in fact, for much of the nineteenth century, “empire,” “nation,” 
and “republic” were shifting conceptual categories that sometimes referred to state structure and 
at other times referred simply to particular political practices. Collapsing them into one structure 
– however complex - obscures the complicated ways that politicians, writers, and theorists 
articulated these ideas in the last decades of nineteenth-century France. 
                                               
(Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1997): 1-56; A. G. Hopkins, Globalization in World 
History (New York: W. W. Norton, 2002), 25; Krishan Kumar, "Nation-states as empires, empires as nation-states: 
two principles, one practice?" Theory and Society 39. 2 (2010): 119-43. Timothy Baycroft has looked at this 
relationship more specifically in France. His article, “The Empire and the Nation,” examines representations of the 
empire in the images and identity of the French nation and in French republican discourse. These representations, he 
maintains, were both omnipresent – by the early twentieth century, nearly every portrayals of the nation included 
them – and at the same time highly marginalized. Baycroft ties this simultaneous omnipresence and marginality 
specifically to French republicanism. The Third Republic had sought to acquire colonies above all to “increase the 
greatness of the French nation”; most people who supported colonial expansion thus saw them above all as a symbol 
for others. They thus became bound up with Republican attempts to spread “Frenchness” during the early years of 
the Third Republic. He notes that beginning in 1870, the Opportunist Republicans “sought to consolidate their hold 
on power and to spread republican and national values to the population through compulsory schools, military 
service, and the increased presence and prominence of republican national symbols and prominence of improvement 
of the communication networks within France.” The colonial policy was also bent on spreading national 
Enlightenment and republican values – in fact, Baycroft contends, internal regions and colonies were treated 
similarly. These republicans hoped that by inculcating these values, they could improve France’s political and 
economic position, and simultaneously civilize internal and external “others” by bringing them liberty and 
Enlightenment. The colonies were thus often treated as an extension of France itself. At the same time, the policies 
directed at metropolitan France were much more widely accepted than those directed towards empire, the latter of 
which was mostly just supported by the republican elite. As a result, there were far more resources to implement 
them in metropolitan France than in the colonies themselves. This different level of support affected their 
implementation, their success, and the legacies that they left behind. These haphazard attempts to institute policy 
were tied to the ways in which the empire (failed) to become part of French identity; “Greater France,” according to 
Baycroft, became part of French consciousness, but not an integral part of its self-perception. See Timothy Baycroft, 
“The Empire and the Nation: The Places of Colonial Images in the Republican Visions of the French nation,” in 
Martin Evans, ed. Empire and Culture: The French Experience 1830-1940 (New York: Palgrave, 2004), 148-160. 
22 Wilder, The French Imperial Nation-State, 10. 
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My dissertation also connects these scholarly debates about French republicanism, 
empire, and nation to another historiography that considers the role of memory in late 
nineteenth-century political culture and understandings of national identity. Much of this 
scholarship has focused on the legacy and memory of Napoleon, the Napoleonic Empire, and the 
Napoleonic Wars and has clearly demonstrated that this memory loomed over France for much 
of the nineteenth century.23 A growing body of historiography has also looked at the complex 
ways that the memory of the Franco-Prussian War shaped republican identities and politics after 
1870, but it has not focused on the specific position of Napoleon III in this memory. It also has 
not considered how the Franco-Prussian War and Napoleon III’s embarrassing defeat 
complicated the memory of the first Napoleonic Empire during this period.24 As Venita Datta has 
pointed out, in fact, most of the work on Napoleonic memory ends its analysis either before or 
with the fall of the Second Empire in 1870.25 As a result, this scholarship ignores the complex 
                                               
23 Scholarship about the “cult” of Napoleon actually predates the recent turn towards memory; literary scholars in 
particular have been examining the effects of the legacy of Napoleon in French literature since the 1960s. See J. 
Lucas-Dubreton, Le culte de Napoléon, 1815-1848 (Paris, 1960); Jean Tulard, L’Anti-Napoléon: La légende noire 
de l’empereur (Paris, 1965) and Le Mythe de Napoléon (Paris: 1971).More recent work has taken a more critical 
approach to the concept of “memory.” See, for example, Robert Gildea, The Past in French History (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1996); Nathalie Petiteau, Napoléon: De la mythologie à l’histoire (Paris, 1999); Gérard de 
Puymège, “Le soldat Chauvin,” in Les Lieux de Mémoire, vol. 2, ed. Pierre Nora (Paris, 1997): 1699-1728; Jean 
Charbonnier, “Le code civil,” in Nora, Les lieux de mémoire, vol. 1: 1331-52; Jean Tulard, “Le retour des cendres,” 
in Nora, Les lieux de mémoire, vol. 2: 1729-54; Annie Jourdan, Napoléon: Héros, imperator et mécène (Paris, 
1998); Sudhir Hazareesingh, “Napoleonic Memory in Nineteenth-Century France: The Making of a Liberal 
Legend.” MLN 120.4 (2005); Alan Forrest, The legacy of the French Revolutionary Wars: the nation-in-arms in 
French republican memory (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009);  
24 See, for example, Charlotte Tacke, Denkmal im sozialen Raum: nationale Symbole in Deutschland und 
Frankreich im 19. Jahrhundert (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprech 1995); Jakob Vogel, Nationen im 
Gleichschritt: Der Kult der "Nation in Waffen" in Deutschland und Frankreich, 1871-1914 (Gottingen: 
Vandenhoeck und Ruprech, 1997); Catharine Savage Brosman, Visions of War in France: Fiction, Art, Ideology 
(Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1999); Wolfgang Schivelbusch, The Culture of Defeat: On 
National Trauma, Mourning, and Recovery (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2004); Michele Martin, Images at 
War: Illustrated Periodicals and Constructed Nations (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2006); Karine Varley, 
Under the Shadow of Defeat: The War of 1870-71 in French Memory (New York: Palgrave, 2008). 
25 See Datta, “L’appel au soldat,” 2. It is worth noting that Roger Gildea traces the Napoleonic legacy into the 
twentieth century, but he focuses most of his attention on its manifestations before 1870. 
 13 
ways in which the memory of both Napoleonic Empires affected French culture and politics in 
the late nineteenth century. 
By highlighting the connections between these late nineteenth-century discourses about 
“colonial empire” and the memory of older Napoleonic models of “continental empire,” my 
dissertation reframes current scholarly discussions about “empire” in France.26 While scholars 
have usually studied French overseas empires separately from French continental empires, I 
demonstrate that they were often perceived as interconnected in the mid-nineteenth century. By 
analyzing their relationship, this dissertation shows the degree to which French representations 
of empire were ensconced in longstanding internal political conflicts and highlight the ways in 
which discourses of European racial superiority over colonial others intersected with older 
arguments about the ideal organization of the French state. I also shed light on how French 
republicans eventually succeeded in differentiating transoceanic from continental empire and 
creating a new model of republican colonial empire. This new model of colonial empire, I argue, 
was itself shaped by a complicated set of influences, including the memory of both Napoleons, 
republican ideological values, political conflict within France, concerns about the French nation, 
international competition, racial science, and specific events in the colonies.  
 
II. Defining the Nation: French Revolutionary Republicanism and Napoleonic Imperialism 
 In the early years of the Third Republic, the legacy of Napoleon III and his vision of 
empire was problematic for republicans because of its associations with the memory of French 
                                               
26 Most of the existing scholarship has focused on the intersections between empire, nation, and politics in formerly 
colonized countries. As a result, “empire” has often been conceived of as a form of political organization that 
precedes and ultimately leads to the self-contained nation-state. However, as scholars such as Burbank and Cooper 
have made clear, the relationship between empire and nation is complex; nations build empires, and states move 
between imperial and national configurations. See Jane Burbank and Frederick Cooper, Empires in World History 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010), 9. 
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defeat during the Franco-Prussian War.  More generally, however, this legacy also intersected 
with ongoing debates about the nature of the French nation, the Second Empire’s relationship to 
French republicanism and later French imperialism, and the implications of this relationship for 
colonized people who lived under French imperial rule. These debates were deeply embedded in 
the long history of French continental and overseas empire, which stretched back at least to the 
seventeenth century, when the French monarchy conquered what would later come to be known 
as France’s “First Colonial Empire.”27 France lost much of this empire in the late eighteenth 
century, but during the French Revolution, the remaining colonies came under scrutiny as 
republicans sought to redefine the French state by describing it as a united republican nation.  
 Although scholars have shown that the French Revolution’s project of nationalization had 
a limited reach, it is clear that revolutionaries saw unified nationhood as the basis for the new 
political order that they were establishing.28 Instead of locating political authority in a monarch 
or a set of elites, republicans grounded political sovereignty theoretically in what they referred to 
as the “French people” who collectively made up the “French nation.”29 So while from our own 
                                               
27 The majority of this empire was located in North America, but the French also had holdings in Senegal, India, and 
most profitably, the West Indies. See Pierre Pluchon, Histoire de la colonization français, v. 1: Le premier empire 
(Paris: Fayard, 1991), 774. 
28 It would be misleading to argue that most people living within the borders of France during the revolutionary 
period understood themselves in a specific way as “French,” let alone as belonging to a “French nation.” But the 
idea first began to gain currency during this period among revolutionaries and elites. See Eugen Weber, Peasants 
into Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural France, 1870-1914 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1976), 96. 
29 Scholars of nationalism continue to disagree about how exactly to define a “nation,” and they have shown that 
French revolutionaries did not share a unified understanding of “nation,” either. The earliest theorists of nationalism 
– Johann Gottlieb Fichte, Johann Gottfried von Herder, and, somewhat later, Ernest Renan - emerged in the wake of 
the revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars. As Claude Nicolet has demonstrated, the word “nation” changed its 
meaning in French political thought over time. But, as a number of scholars have shown, the word began to take on 
some of its modern meanings when Abbé Sièyes identified “the nation” as the Third Estate and linked it to popular 
sovereignty. See Claude Nicolet, l’Idée républicaine en France (Paris: Gallimard, 1982), 16-18; Jeremy Jennings, 
Revolution and the Republic: A History of Political Thought in France since the Eighteenth Century (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2011), 75, 77, 200-202; Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Empire (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 2000), 101. For a summary of more contemporary debates about nationalism, see Geoff 
Eley and Ronald Grigor Suny, eds., Becoming National: A Reader (London: Oxford University Press, 1996). 
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historical perspective, it is clear that nationalism and democratic traditions have not always been 
linked (and have often been in tension), revolutionaries saw the French nation and the republic as 
inextricably bound up in one another. To speak of the nation after 1792 was to invoke republican 
values of political participation and political equality. As a result, many republicans positioned 
the republic as the natural political expression of the nation itself. 
This interweaving of “republic” and “nation” was complicated by the fact that 
revolutionaries did not consistently define who belonged to the nation.30 On a fundamental level, 
most revolutionaries understood the “people” to consist of political-rights-bearing French men – 
but such an explanation did not designate who was “French” and who was not.31 Those perceived 
as outsiders – Jews, immigrants, ethnic minorities, and inhabitants of overseas colonies – thus 
occupied an ambiguous place in the new French republic. Their ability to exercise political rights 
or lay claim to republican citizenship remained an ongoing subject of debate, but many such 
groups did gain at least some rights during the First Republic.32 
                                               
30 As Brubaker and others have made clear, the question of who belonged to the nation was much more important 
beneath the Republic than it had been beneath the monarchy. And while citizenship was granted liberally in the early 
years of the revolution, suspicion of “foreigners” or “outsiders” grew as republicans went to war. See Rogers 
Brubaker, “The French Revolution and the Invention of Citizenship,” French Politics and Society 7 (1989), 43; 
Jennings, Revolution and the Republic, 203; Michael Rapport, Nationality and Citizenship in Revolutionary France: 
The Treatment of Foreigners 1789-1799 (London: Oxford University Press, 2000), 13; Suzanne Desan, “Foreigners, 
Cosmopolitanism, and French Revolutionary Universalism,” in The French Revolution in Global Perspective, ed. 
Suzanne Desan, Lynn Hunt, and William Max Nelson (New York: Cornell University Press, 2013), 86. 
31 This explanation also made the relationship of women to both the nation and the body-politic ambiguous and 
contradictory. See Joan Landes, Women and the Public Sphere in the Age of the French Revolution (Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press, 1988); Lynn Hunt, The Family Romance of the French Revolution (Berkeley, CA: 
University of California Press, 1992); Joan Scott, Only Paradoxes to Offer: French Feminists and the Rights of Man 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996); Viktoria Schmidt-Lisenhoff, “Male Alterity in the French 
Revolution,” Gendered Nations: Nationalisms and Gender Order in the Long Nineteenth Century, ed. Ida Blom, 
Karen Hagemann, and Catherine Hall (Oxford: 2000), 97.  
32 It is worth noting that this debate continued largely because of the persistence of excluded peoples who were 
demanding access to political participation. See Jean Meyer, Jean Tarrade, Annie Rey-Goldzeigeur, Jacques Thobie, 
Histoire de la France coloniale des origines à 1914 (Paris: Armand Colin, 1991), 282; Laurent Dubois, A Colony of 
Citizens: Revolution and Slave Emancipation in the French Caribbean, 1787-1804 (Chapel Hill, NC: University of 
North Carolina Press, 2004). 
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The ambiguities that attended this interweaving of “nation” with “republic” became 
particularly clear when revolutionaries debated the place of France’s colonial holdings in the 
new political order. Just as revolutionaries sought to redefine the nature of the relationship 
between the French people and the state, they also attempted to transform the relationship of 
those living overseas to the French nation. Were those living abroad French, and therefore 
entitled to the same political rights granted to men in France? If they were not French, what was 
their relationship to the nation? Could the French Republic rule over them, or was such an 
arrangement a violation of revolutionary principles? Should inhabitants of overseas colonies 
form their own nations instead? Revolutionaries asked these questions, but had no clear answers 
to them: they debated about whether they should leave the colonies alone, integrate them into the 
French nation, or grant them autonomy. Even those who embraced the idea that France should 
integrate the colonies into the French nation disagreed about the meaning and consequences of 
this decision.33 Some argued that all of the different inhabitants of integrated overseas territories 
should enjoy the rights that accompanied French citizenship, but others maintained that France 
should assimilate some inhabitants while leaving others – especially slaves and people of mixed 
race – on the outside.34 
                                               
33 The argument for “assimilation” was most in line with the ways in which revolutionaries approached others 
perceived as outside the nation-state. See Suzanne Desan, “Foreigners, Cosmopolitanism, and French Revolutionary 
Universalism,” in The French Revolution in Global Perspective, ed. Suzanne Desan, Lynn Hunt, and William Max 
Nelson (New York: Cornell University Press, 2013), 87. 
34 It is worth noting that these debates did not take place in an ideological vacuum. They were also tied into pressing 
economic and political issues at the time. As Robert Forster among others has shown, the planters of Saint-
Domingue and French merchants launched a successful campaign early in the Revolution to preserve slavery, which 
successfully delayed legislation for several years. The campaign for civil rights for free people of color was less 
controversial, largely because there were fewer economic risks associated with it. Even so, it seems that 
revolutionaries were concerned about upsetting the white population in Saint-Domingue, and thus unwilling to take 
definitive action to secure voting rights for people of color. It was only after the execution of Vincent Ogé - who had 
been a member of the unofficial delegation of people of color to the National Assembly in 1790 and returned in 
frustration to lead a revolt against slave owners - at Cap Français in 1791 that led revolutionaries to take the first 
steps towards establishing civil rights for freedmen. Even then, they wavered, and revoked the law in the face of 
planter resistance, which led to a widespread slave revolt. Arguably, therefore, the decision in 1794 to grant equal 
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 In 1794 and 1795, the Convention resolved this ongoing argument by decreeing that all 
slaves in French colonies were free and that all residents of French overseas holdings could 
exercise French citizenship rights.35 As Jeremy Popkin and other scholars have shown, these 
decisions were not simply an ideological response that sought to resolve the contradictions 
between republican ideals and colonial realities. Instead, they emerged out of ongoing political 
disputes within France, the slave revolt in Saint-Domingue, and conflicts in Cap Français.36 The 
revolutionaries were thus responding to immediate political and military crises. Moreover, the 
promise of revolutionary citizenship was never fully realized in most of France’s colonies during 
this period.37 The decision to assimilate the colonies into the French nation was also short-lived – 
Napoleon I revoked it immediately when he became Emperor and in fact reinstituted slavery. 
Despite these limitations, however, the revolutionaries’ decision to declare overseas subjects 
French citizens set an important precedent in French imperial administration. This precedent 
would never disappear from some of the subsequent accounts of French imperial history. 
Indeed, “assimilationism” – the colonial policy and political theory that both emerged out 
of and helped justify the policies that the republicans introduced - became a key component of 
                                               
rights to all people in the colonies had as much to do with contemporary political exigencies – the revolutionaries 
were trying to hold on to the colonies they had, and thought that they would be better able to do this if they freed the 
slaves - as it had to do with revolutionary ideology. See Robert Forster, “The French Revolution, people of color, 
and slavery,” in The Global Ramifications of the French Revolution, ed. by Joseph Klaits and Michael H. Haltzel 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 90 & 98.  
35 Robert Aldrich, A History of French Overseas Expansion (New York: Palgrave, 1996), 18; Dubois, A Colony of 
Citizens, 172. 
36 Jeremy Popkin, You Are All Free: The Haitian Revolution and the Abolition of Slavery (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2010), 16, 351. For more literature on the French Revolution and the colonies, see also Yves 
Bénot, La revolution française et la fin des colonies (Paris: La Découverte, 1987); C. L. R. James, The Black 
Jacobins: Toussaint L’Ouverture and the San Domingo Revolution (New York: Vintage, 1989). 
37 As Miranda Spieler has shown, most colonial regimes remained remarkably “despotic.” These regimes did not, 
she argues, “simply arise from local circumstances, wartime exigency, or the whimsy of administrators.” Instead, 
“Metropolitan assemblies thwarted the construction of colonial citizenship in the postemancipation era.” See 
Miranda Frances Spieler, “The Legal Structure of Colonial Rule during the French Revolution,” The William and 
Mary Quarterly 66:2 (April 2009), 374. 
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republican understandings of France’s overseas territories in the following years.38 Its longevity 
was due in part to its ties with the universalist ideals that defined French revolutionary 
republicanism. These ideals held that “human nature… was a universal impervious to cultural 
and historical difference,” and as a result, all men should have access to certain equal universal 
rights.39 Revolutionaries contended that human history consisted of slow progress towards global 
recognition of human equality and the political reorganization of the world into nation-states that 
would guarantee their citizens the “natural” rights they had been born with. They saw republican 
France as the “model nation” or torchbearer in this global march towards equality, and claimed 
that it would help lead other nations towards enlightenment.40 But as revolutionaries increasingly 
portrayed France as the embodiment of “universal” political rights and policies, they also began 
to identify the French language and culture with “universalism” itself. In other words, they 
believed that to gain enlightenment, other peoples needed to adopt cultural markers of 
Frenchness as well as “universal” French political ideas about human nature or human rights.41 
The tensions surrounding the French nation’s claim to embody “universal” political rights 
also characterized the “assimilationist” political and cultural thinking that emerged during the 
                                               
38 It would be misleading, however, to claim that the French monarchy never pursued “assimilationist” overseas 
policies. Royal edicts passed in 1635 and 1642 specifically declared that natives in North America, at least, would 
be considered “national Frenchmen” if they converted to Catholicism. But the kind of assimilation that the 
revolutionaries proposed was of a different order, and based on republican, not Christian, universalism. It also 
became a much larger component of French colonial policy during the Revolution. See Raymond T. Betts, 
Assimilation and Association in French Colonial Theory (New York: Columbia University Press, 1961), 12. 
39 Universalism itself had a long history in French political thought. Naomi Schor dates it back to the medieval 
belief that because France was the “elder daughter of the Church” it was the site of Christian universalism. During 
the eighteenth century, the sense that France represented the “universal” country was compounded by the use of the 
French language across European courts. When French revolutionaries argued that France was the national 
embodiment of universal human virtue, they were thus building on a long tradition. See Naomi Schor, “The Crisis of 
French Universalism,” Yale French Studies, no. 100 (2001), 46. 
40 This belief that France was a “model” nation pervaded Republican thought throughout much of the nineteenth 
century, even as the country slipped back into imperial and monarchical forms of government. See Claude Digeon, 
La Crise Allemande de la Pensée Française, 1870-1914 (Paris: Presses Universitaires de la France, 1959), 11. 
41 Robert Aldrich, Greater France: A History of French Overseas Expansion (New York: Palgrave, 1996), 110. 
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French Revolution. Because of their tendency to locate enlightenment, human rights, and human 
progress in the French nation-state, many revolutionaries came to believe that to exclude the 
inhabitants in overseas colonies from French citizenship would be to deny them access to human 
liberation. But at the same time, they also worried that some overseas inhabitants – especially 
slaves and freed people of color – were insufficiently French to belong equally within the 
political and cultural life of the nation. In order to participate in the revolutionary political 
project, revolutionaries expected those living in overseas territories to drop their differences and 
assimilate into French culture. This tension – between France as the bearer of “universal” rights 
and France as a particular nation-state composed of a “people” who embodied cultural practices 
and assumptions – would haunt both French republicanism and French imperialism throughout 
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.42  
These conversations about French universality, the French nation, and the assimilation of 
other peoples did not end with the rise of Napoleon. In part because Napoleon I incorporated 
republican ideas into the new imperial structure, they carried over into the new administration.43 
But these ideas were further complicated by the fact that the French nation was now situated in a 
broader French Empire that incorporated a large number of other tributary states. If anything, 
Napoleon’s European conquests highly magnified the problem faced by revolutionaries trying to 
define their relationship to a finite number of overseas colonies. Napoleon himself tended to 
                                               
42 Notably, this attitude shared a number of commonalities with the revolutionary attitude towards Jews. See J. 
Godechot, “La Révolution française et les juifs,” Annales historiques de la Révolution française, 48 (1976), 56; 
Lynn Hunt, ed., The French Revolution and Human Rights: A Brief Documentary History (New York: Bedford/St. 
Martin’s Press, 1996), 48; Joan Scott, Politics of the Veil (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2007), 13. 
43 Scholars continue to argue about the degree to which Napoleon carried on the revolutionary ethos. He did 
continue “to reform and rationalize the functions of the French state…” but at the same time, he introduced a strong 
sense of social hierarchy: he consolidated power into his own hands, and established an imperial elite drawn largely 
from the old aristocracy. See Philip G. Dwyer and Alan Forrest, eds., Napoleon and His Empire: Europe, 1804-1814 
(New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 3. 
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deny that his imperial rule was defined by a coherent political philosophy – he claimed to rule 
“flexibly” and “practically,” and denounced the Revolution for its adherence to “ideologies." But 
his empire nevertheless set forth a particular vision of the nature of the French nation, the French 
Empire and the relationship of both to “universal” ideas or values.44 
The Napoleonic Empire used aspects of republican universalizing discourse to describe 
the nature of its relationship to the territories it conquered. Imperial officials portrayed these 
states and territories as technologically, politically, or culturally “backward,” and claimed that 
France was spreading French enlightenment and “universal principles” to them.45 The Empire 
exported many of the ideals of the French revolutionary government, at least across Europe, and 
restructured the administration systems of conquered countries along “enlightened” lines – 
abolishing seigniorial privileges and streamlining hierarchies.46 Napoleon I also took some 
measures to “assimilate” the European territory he conquered into his empire. He established a 
universal law code that he intended to enforce equally across all states and incorporated the elites 
of conquered territories into an “imperial” nobility.47 However, even if he brought these states 
into the administrative, political, and economic systems of the French Empire, he did not attempt 
                                               
44 As Geoffrey Ellis has argued, Napoleon himself never expressed this vision in its totality; indeed, he tended to 
contradict himself, and usually acted opportunistically and strategically. But the patterns of his actions and the 
policies he set in place made use of political ideas and thus left a set of (often contradictory) political legacies. See 
Ellis, “The Nature of Napoleonic Imperialism,” 100; David P. Jordan, “Napoleon as Revolutionary,” in Napoleon 
and his Empire: Europe, 1804-1814 (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2007), 34. 
45 Stuart Woolf, “French Civilization and Ethnicity in the Napoleonic Empire,” Past and Present 124 (1989), 107. 
Most scholars agree that the French claims to have “modernized” Europe as they conquered it were dubious, at best. 
While in some places, the French rationalized administrative systems, centralized authority, and established the 
beginnings of the notion of equality before the law for men, in other places, they strengthened the hold of elites over 
the peasantry. See Ellis, “The Nature of Napoleonic Imperialism,” 102. 
46 Some scholars have also argued that the Napoleonic empire inadvertently exported revolutionary nationalism to 
these territories, as a byproduct of the wider revolutionary ethos – and thus helped facilitate the growth of 
widespread resistance to the empire in places like the German states that ultimately helped lead to its downfall. See 
Charles Esdaille, ed, Popular Resistance in the French Wars (Basingstroke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005). 
47 Isser Woloch, “The Napoleonic Regime and French Society,” in Napoleon and Europe, ed. by Philip G. Dwyer 
(London: Pearson Education Limited, 2001), 70. 
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to assimilate the people into the French nation as republicans had done during the Revolution.48 
The borderland territory that the revolutionaries had conquered remained part of France. But the 
other, more distant territories became imperial instead of national holdings, ruled indirectly from 
the imperial center. At the heads of some of these states, he placed tributary rulers who were 
often his own family members. Other states kept their traditional elites and even to some degree 
their traditional privileges.49 
The empire also did not treat all of the states that it conquered in the same way – even 
within Europe itself. Instead, the empire governed people differently according to various criteria 
– including when their particular state was conquered, where it was located, and the types of 
resources that the Emperor hoped to extract from it.50 And while the empire applied the same law 
codes and roughly similar administrative systems to each territory, no one state occupied a place 
that was exactly equal to the others. Each was subject to a distinct set of military obligations and 
tariffs and given different levels of latitude in selecting their own administration.51 All, 
moreover, were beneath France in the political hierarchy.52 As a number of scholars have shown, 
                                               
48 The French Republican regime had itself conquered a great deal of territory, often with Napoleon as its general. 
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the imperial conquests were thus peripheral to most of the interior life of the French nation, and 
imperial territories remained distinct from the French nation even as they were subjugated to it. 
Napoleon’s treatment of the Empire’s overseas territories differed from his treatment of 
his European territories. On the most basic level, Napoleon was far less interested in France’s 
overseas colonies than in his European conquests. After all, he sold Louisiana to the United 
States in an attempt to raise money for his European wars, and he let the English pick off French 
holdings in India and the West Indies.53 But it is also clear that he had even more mixed feelings 
about applying revolutionary ideals of liberty, equality, brotherhood, and human rights to the 
overseas empire than he did about invoking them in Europe. Despite the fact that Napoleon 
abolished old privileges in Europe, he reinstituted slavery in French colonies – partly because he 
wanted to reinvigorate the once-lucrative sugar trade that had dwindled after emancipation.54  
Napoleon’s reinstitution of slavery – and indeed, his wider attitudes towards overseas 
territories - did not simply mark a return to Old Regime policies. Instead, Napoleon’s encounters 
with peoples outside Europe marked a shift in French understandings of their relationship with 
non-European people – especially during the Egyptian campaign.55 Napoleon’s campaign itself 
was in many respects quite distinct from his later campaigns in Europe and from other, earlier 
French campaigns in North Africa. He brought with him a whole host of Orientalists, 
archaeologists, and painters. In addition to fighting battles with Egyptian troops, he visited key 
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cultural landmarks so these experts could acquire information about Egypt.56 The specialists 
approached Egypt with a profound self-confidence about the French ability to label and 
categorize this non-European culture. Moreover, both they and their critical audience described 
the French invasion as an encounter between civilization and barbarism: they emphasized 
France’s technical dominance and posited France as the true heir to ancient Egypt.57 Some even 
suggested that France, coming into Egypt, might be able to “restore” the decadent race and return 
Egypt to its former glory better than the true Egyptians. As a result of these claims, many 
scholars link the emergence of the “civilizing mission” – which would later become central to 
French colonial ideology - to Napoleon’s Egyptian campaign.58 
It would be difficult to contend that French attitudes during and after the Egyptian 
campaign represent the Napoleonic attitude towards all of its overseas territory during this 
period. Napoleon was more interested in Egypt than in the other overseas territory that France 
laid claim to at the time – in part because Egypt connected to his dream of re-establishing the 
Roman Empire.59 However, if Napoleon’s attitude towards Egypt was distinct from his attitude 
towards France’s other overseas territories, it also differed from his approach to his later 
European conquests. It is true that the discourses about France’s ability to help the Egyptians 
“progress” were also often used to describe the French Empire’s relationship with its European 
                                               
56 Napoleon brought these scholars along because he had long been fascinated by Orientalist texts and writings; he 
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subjects.60 But whereas the Empire promised to bring “enlightenment” and “liberty” to 
Europeans, it claimed that it would bring “civilization” to North Africans – an important 
distinction. Indeed, a number of scholars have contended that this vision of Egypt formed the 
basis of “an Orientalizing habit” of thought that would characterize French interactions with the 
inhabitants of North Africa for years to come.61  
The Napoleonic Empire thus both maintained and transformed revolutionary 
universalism and ideas about “assimilation” in its imperial policies and structure. It laid claim to 
revolutionary beliefs that France was a vanguard nation, destined to lead the world towards 
enlightenment and prosperity. Arguably, it institutionalized those beliefs by incorporating huge 
swaths of territory beneath its rule, “rationalizing” their administrative systems and law codes, 
and bringing revolutionary ideas to their people. However, while Napoleon undeniably 
assimilated these territories into the broad administrative system of his empire, he made no effort 
to assimilate them into the French nation. Each of the territories beneath his rule retained some 
elements (however illusory) of self-governance, and the people living within them were not 
described as “French.” Moreover, even as Napoleon espoused dreams of rebuilding and 
expanding the Roman Empire on the territory it had once occupied, new ways of understanding 
parts of that territory – namely, the parts in North Africa – were clearly emerging. 
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Arguably, the fact that Napoleon, unlike the revolutionaries, did not assimilate conquered 
populations into the French nation and tended to treat diverse populations differently reflects the 
fact that he was trying to construct an empire. As Jane Burbank and Frederick Cooper have 
argued, nations and empires are usually constituted quite differently from one another. While a 
nation tries to integrate its members into one political body, empires incorporate diverse sets of 
populations beneath their rule. They also place these diverse populations into a hierarchical 
structure.62 Napoleon, however, was not simply trying to build an empire; he was trying to build 
an empire around the French nation-state. As a result, his rule – like many other empires in the 
modern world – placed “empire” and “nation” into a direct relationship with one another. 
The Napoleonic Empire’s relationship with nationalism was complex. Notably, although 
the Empire broke away from republican ideas about popular sovereignty within France, it 
preserved and exported republican ideas about the nation across its new territories. This usage 
rejected the revolutionary association of “nation” with “republic.” Under the empire, “nation” 
became a term not necessarily associated with any specific kind of political organization: indeed, 
the French nation, like the rest of the empire, was subject to authoritarian imperial political 
authority, which claimed to embody national sovereignty.63 France became a privileged nation 
surrounded by a set of affiliated territories that had access to different kinds of rights and 
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operated under French administrative systems to various degrees. Napoleon himself was the 
Emperor of the French, but was equally Emperor over western and central Europe. By removing 
sovereignty from the French people and consolidating it in his own hands, he was thus able to 
overcome the republican dilemma about how to deal with “outsiders” or those who were not 
clearly French. They could be integrated into the wider French Empire without needing to be 
integrated into France. Conquered people were subjects of the Napoleonic Empire rather than 
citizens of a French republic. 
According to Burbank and Cooper, empire differs from nation based on the way that it 
deals with “problems of difference;” neither refers to a particular political doctrine.64 But under 
Napoleon, the French “empire” did not operate in opposition to the French “nation.” Instead, 
“empire” came primarily to function in opposition to the “republic” or the “monarchy”: it 
referred to a specific kind of political organization within France. At the same time, however, it 
also came to describe the way in which the French nation dealt with conquered territory. This 
method of dealing with conquered territory was itself based on a modified and partial version of 
republican ideas about “assimilation.” Napoleon thus created an alternate model for France’s 
political organization, its relationship to conquered territories, and its national identity that would 
continue to inform French debates about conquest for much of the nineteenth century. 
In fact, both the republican model of “assimilation” and the Napoleonic model of setting 
up proxy subordinate states and incorporating them unequally into a broader imperial structure 
both played an important role in later French colonial policy. When the July Monarchy 
established French rule in Algeria in the 1830s, it invoked the rudimentary government 
established during the Napoleonic Egyptian campaign as a precedent for the structure of its 
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administration.65 In 1848, on the other hand, the revolutionary government’s decision to change 
French “colonies” into “territories” and give them representation in the French national assembly 
directly built on the model of assimilation established during the French Revolution.66 When 
Napoleon III declared himself Emperor of France in 1852, both revolutionary and Napoleonic 
understandings of the relationship between empire, republic, and nation thus continued to 
circulate in political and intellectual discourse. At the same time, questions about whether France 
should assimilate its subjugated territories or treat them as separate dependent states also 
continued to have a political charge in the metropole. To insist that overseas territories should be 
integrated politically or even culturally into the French nation was to some degree to align with 
French republican principles. To contend, on the other hand, that these territories should remain 
distinct or separate from France was to align with the Napoleonic imperial model – although 
administrative assimilation was certainly part of the Bonapartist legacy as well. Napoleon III’s 
attempt to transform the Napoleonic imperial model would only further complicate these 
longstanding debates over the relationship between the administration of overseas territories and 
the political organization of France. 
 
III. Themes of the Dissertation 
This dissertation traces the evolving conversation about empire, its meanings, and its 
implications for France as it developed across political, intellectual, and popular spheres from the 
1860’s into the early twentieth century. Each chapter focuses on a major event that excited 
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discussion about empire among the French public. It uses those events as windows into the 
shifting views of empire over the course of this period. I do not argue that these events caused 
these shifts in understanding, but instead use them to examine how discursive patterns intersect 
with sudden conflicts at particular historical moments. Some of these key events took place in 
metropolitan France, but others emerged out of France’s colonies. This event-centered approach 
thus helps highlight the interconnectedness of colony and metropole in French debates about 
empire by showing how colonized peoples could affect metropolitan political discourses. 
The first chapter begins by examining competing ideas about empire in the last decade of 
Napoleon III’s rule, focusing on his attempt to restructure Algeria and its relationship to France 
when he reimagined the territory as a “royaume arabe.”  It looks at the connections between this 
reimagining of Algeria and the Emperor’s broader project of redefining the Second Empire in the 
early 1860s. It focuses especially on the shifting complex relationship between “continental” and 
“colonial” models of empire and considers why Napoleon III’s attempt to combine these models 
met so much resistance within both Algeria and France. Finally, it reflects on why, despite the 
fact that most of his policies were never effectively implemented, his conflation of these two 
imperial models remained so troubling to republicans in the years after his regime’s collapse. 
The second chapter discusses the transformation that occurred in understandings of 
empire after the Franco-Prussian War. It considers how struggles over the memory of defeat and 
the political organization of the new government affected understandings of “empire” and its 
relationship to the “republic” between 1871 and 1879. It argues that the disagreements over the 
events of the année terrible and their significance helped solidify a diametrical opposition 
between the concepts of empire and republic–even if the French continued to disagree about the 
meaning of the two terms. Through political pamphlets, newspaper articles, and popular stories, 
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moreover, republican writers, intellectuals, and politicians largely established their interpretation 
of this dichotomy in French political culture. They popularized a discourse that defined “empire” 
as problematic system of government that contradicted France’s republican political practices 
and values. This interpretation of empire helped shore up the legitimacy of the new and different 
republican government, but it also left open the question of how republican France would now 
define its imperial relationship with its overseas colonies. 
The third chapter then considers how this solidifying vision of the differences between 
empire and republic affected France’s relationship with its colonies in the 1870s – especially 
Algeria. It demonstrates that in the early years of the Third Republic, intellectuals, politicians, 
and colonists engaged in a widespread debate about the nature of Algeria, its place in the new 
republic, and its relationship to the French nation. This debate was informed by both colonists’ 
demands to be attached to the new French republic and by the republicans’ successful campaign 
within France to discredit “empire” as a form of political organization. Notably, during this 
period, almost no republican thinkers used the term “empire” to refer to Algeria – or to any of 
France’s other colonial possessions. The chapter thus shows that throughout the 1870’s, 
republicans differentiated between empire and colonization to explain why overseas domination 
did not contradict republican values. At the same time, they tried to show why their model of 
overseas “republican” colonization was superior to its Bonapartist predecessors.  
The fourth chapter turns away from North Africa to examine how the conquest of 
Indochina in the mid-1880s once again altered French popular and political conversations about 
empire and its meanings. It looks specifically at the emergence of a new term to describe 
colonial expansion – politique coloniale – and considers how the conversation about this term 
intersected with broader contemporary political debates about the meaning, value, and history of 
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“empire” in the modern French republic. Its analysis shows how the memory of Napoleon III and 
France’s defeat during the Franco-Prussian War continued to play an important role in shaping 
the republican conversation about colonial expansion into the 1880s. For much of this period, 
critics of politique coloniale were still able to mobilize their hostility for the memory of 
Napoleon III to criticize their opponents’ ideas – partly because he was largely responsible for 
investing France in Indochina during the 1860s. In response to these critics, those who defended 
politique coloniale sought to develop a new political vocabulary and historical lineage to 
legitimize the idea of empire in republican France. By examining the connections between these 
disputes over Indochina and ongoing arguments about the political organization of the French 
state, the chapter highlights the ways in which the memory of the Second Empire helped shape a 
specifically republican discourse about colonial expansion. 
The fifth chapter focuses on the ramifications of the French conquest of Madagascar and 
the Boulanger Affair in the mid-1890s. It looks at the emergence of the newly defined conceptual 
category of “colonial empire” as the key linguistic and conceptual framework for understanding 
French overseas conquests during this period. It argues that the re-emergence of “empire” as an 
organizing concept in republican colonial thought only became viable when the possibility of a 
metropolitan imperial restoration faded. However, it also demonstrates that France’s changing, 
post-Napoleonic political climate was not solely responsible for making  “empire” a safe 
conceptual category for republicans to embrace. In fact, this chapter stresses that colonial and 
continental empire could be neatly separated in this period because of increasingly sophisticated 
racialized and racist thought, which made non-European people seem very different and 
suggested that the political connections between continent and colony were remote. As a result, 
concerns about “empire” as a form of political organization became irrelevant within France 
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insofar as “empire” referred solely to non-European races and colonized people in France’s 
overseas territories. In fact, the colonial empire became increasingly integral as the essential 
other that helped nationalist thinkers define the French nation-state (at home) as a Republic. 
This dissertation therefore sheds light on the connections between continental and 
colonial understandings of empire during this period of political transition and overseas imperial 
expansion. It argues that the French found new ways to be both republicans and imperialists, but 
it also suggests that the tensions between these ideas never entirely disappeared. This was in part 
because republicans continued to struggle to disassociate “empire” from its relationship with 
political despotism. But it was also because republican colonialism represented a contradictory 
reconciliation between the ideal of universal political rights, commitment to national 
sovereignty, belief in scientific racism, and embrace of overseas domination. My study of this 
republican/imperial tension also contributes to an ever-growing body of scholarly literature about 
conceptions of empire in the metropole, the nature and operations of collective memory, and the 
role of different kinds of cultural productions in shaping and reflecting contemporary political 
opinion. Moreover, by elucidating the connections between empire, republicanism, and national 
identity, the dissertation offers new insights into each of these key conceptual categories, 
especially as they appeared in late nineteenth-century France.
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CHAPTER 1: IMPERIAL IDEOLOGIES IN THE SECOND EMPIRE: THE 
"ROYAUME ARABE" 
 
 On April 29, 1865, Emperor Napoleon III named his wife regent and left Paris for a 
highly publicized trip to Algeria. He travelled with an entourage that included the Generals 
Fleury and Castelnau, as well as Ismaël Urbain, the vocal advocate for indigenous Algerian 
rights, whom he had engaged as his translator.1 He left without public ceremony or escort, 
though most metropolitan newspapers printed evocative descriptions of his farewell to the Prince 
imperial and to the Empress. The imperial ship set sail from Marseille on May 1st, and landed in 
Algiers on May 3rd, where the Emperor was saluted by canon fire and welcomed by a large 
crowd on the docks, composed largely of French colonists.2 The mayor greeted the Emperor as 
he stepped off the boat, offering him the keys to the city and expressing the joy that the people of 
Algiers felt at his arrival. He predicted that the Emperor’s visit would serve as the “base for 
Algeria’s future grandeur.”3  
The Emperor accepted the keys, and made a speech to the gathered crowd. He began by 
noting that he had travelled to Algeria in order to learn more about his subjects’ needs, as well as 
to assure them that they had the protection of the metropole behind them. He acknowledged their 
struggles with both the land and its indigenous inhabitants, and promised them that Algeria had 
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better days ahead of it. He encouraged them to “have faith in the future; attach yourselves to the 
soil that you cultivate as a new fatherland.” 4 The colonists, he implied, would come to “belong” 
to Algeria as they worked its soil, and, in collaboration with the metropole, they would bring 
prosperity to the territory. He then introduced a new note, asking colonists to “treat the Arabs in 
your midst as compatriots. We are necessarily the masters, because we are the most civilized; we 
should be generous, because we are the strongest.”5 He finished by urging the colonists in the 
audience to “justify” French conquest of Algeria in 1830 by cultivating an attitude towards the 
indigenous based on “peace” and “charity.”6 The speech thus praised the colonists and implied 
that Algeria would become their homeland. But at the same time, it also highlighted the 
centrality of the indigenous population to the French imperial project – and implied that French 
claims to Algeria rested on France’s guarantee of their happiness. The speech thus sought to 
balance settler interests with indigenous rights, depicting the settlers as allies in the French 
government’s attempt to secure the prosperity of the conquered indigenous peoples.7 
Napoleon III’s attempt to lay out a vision of the colonists’ and indigenous’ respective 
roles in Algeria was part of his desire to rethink the territory and the nature of its relationship 
with France. In the face of growing popular frustration with France’s domestic and foreign 
politics, the emperor began to search for opportunities to define the Second Empire, affirm its 
importance, and secure its popularity in a new way.8 Beginning in the 1860s, he looked overseas 
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for opportunities to increase his empire’s prestige at home and abroad. He tried to expand 
France’s foothold in North America by setting up a proxy emperor in Mexico, and, more 
successfully, extended France’s investment in Indochina.9 But it was in Algeria that Napoleon III 
made the most concerted effort to articulate a new model of French empire. Ultimately, 
Napoleon III hoped that this empire would have a strong link to both the first Napoleonic Empire 
and Roman imperial history and incorporate a number of different territories beneath it. In the 
meantime, however, Algeria would serve as the example of its future administrative system, 
while displaying the strength and liberal character of Napoleon III’s redefined empire.  
Napoleon III’s visit to the territory in 1865 helped crystallize his new vision, while 
simultaneously revealing the depth of the political opposition to it. In both Algeria and France, 
this opposition did not focus, at least at first, on Napoleon III’s larger vision of empire. Instead, it 
was directed primarily against Napoleon III’s understanding of the respective positions of French 
colonists and indigenous subjects in the imperial model that he was developing – the very issue 
that he addressed in his speech to the colonists upon his arrival. The colonists did not object 
directly to the model of settler-indigenous relationships that Napoleon III laid out in his opening 
speech. 10 In fact, they spent most of the Emperor’s forty-day journey across the country 
applauding him and composing songs in his honor.11 But it is clear that despite their apparent 
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enthusiasm, many people in the colony were already suspicious of the Emperor’s intentions 
towards Algeria.12 They were concerned that he was inclined to privilege the needs of the 
indigenous population and the military over those of European settlers.13 His decision to choose 
Ismaël Urbain as his translator – an intellectual whom the settler community viewed as a 
troublemaker responsible for eliciting misguided and uninformed sympathy for indigenous 
Algerians within metropolitan France – accentuated the issue.14 But the concern was primarily 
inspired by the long history of Napoleon III’s policies towards the colony. Many believed that 
ever since Napoleon III had become Emperor, he had systematically worked against the settlers 
by limiting colonization, depriving them of political rights, and keeping them under the rule of 
the military instead of assimilating them into the metropolitan administration. The new vision of 
empire that he began to articulate in the 1860s only strengthened these beliefs. 
Colonist discontent had its roots in Napoleon III’s decision to revoke many policies 
passed by the Second Republic when he became emperor. The Second Republic declared Algeria 
an “integral” part of France, divided it into three départements, introduced a civil administration, 
and invested French colonists with the right to elect representatives to the National Assembly.15 
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  36 
The French government also made land more available to interested colonists by declaring that 
all Arab land without tribal deeds belonged to the state, which could distribute it at will. It 
simultaneously weakened the authority of the much-hated bureaux arabes - army officers 
stationed amidst tribes in the Algerian countryside who served as the local arm of the French 
state among indigenous peoples - and incorporated the territories and indigenous tribes under 
their control into a centralized civil administration.16 In 1851, Napoleon III undid most of this 
legislation: he again placed the colony under a military governor, rescinded the electoral rights of 
colonists, and restored the authority of the bureaux arabes.17 He also proposed and pushed 
forward a law that made it more difficult for the state to sell tribal lands to settlers, slowing down 
colonization.18 Many colonists linked these measures – which they saw as oppressive – to the 
fact that the Algerian settlers had failed to endorse the plebiscite that made him emperor. The 
Emperor, they felt, was prejudiced against them because of their initial opposition to his rule.19 
It is unclear whether Napoleon III resented French colonists for their lukewarm support 
of his bid for imperial power. Throughout much of the early part of his reign, he ignored the 
                                               
European citizens, along with indigenous Algerians living within French communes, certain electoral rights in local 
elections. However, indigenous electoral rights were quickly deemed both impractical and unnecessary. This policy 
stands in contrast to the policy taken in France’s vielles colonies, where all male inhabitants were granted French 
citizenship. See Guy Pervillé, La France en Algérie, 1830-1954 (Paris: Vendémiaire Éditions, 2012), 46. 
16 Army officers in the bureaux arabes were usually versed in local languages and customs. In territory inhabited by 
both colonists and tribes, they were supposed ensure order and security in their territories.  As a rule, they were 
independent groups of officers, subject to little state regulation. This lack of regulation, many colonists at the time 
claimed, led to abuse. See Rey-Goldzeiguer, Le Royaume Arabe, 78. 
17 He divided Algeria into two kinds of territories – civil and military. While the “civil” territories – which contained 
the largest numbers of French settlers – continued to be governed according to French administrative practices, the 
“military” territories – which contained more Arabs – were restored to the authority of the bureaux arabes. 
18 This law, passed on July 16, 1851, declared both indigenous and European property rights inviolable. See Georges 
Spillman, Napoleon III et le royaume arabe. (Paris: Académie des Sciences d’Outre-Mer, 1975), 16. 
19 In 1851, Napoleon III, then president of the Second Republic, issued a plebiscite asking whether the French 
wanted to declare himself Emperor. In metropolitan France, more than 80% answered “yes,” while in Algeria, 
barely 50% of the population agreed. See Rey-Goldzeiguer, Le Royaume Arabe, 123. 
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territory, and in 1857, he even experimented once again with a civil administration.20 It was only 
after three years of civilian administration failed to resolve the colony’s conflicts that Napoleon 
III took a personal interest. 21 He decided to visit Algeria for the first time to see what could be 
done about the colony that he continued to describe as a ball and chain attached to the French 
metropole.22 The trip itself was a small affair, because the death of the Empress’ elder sister cut 
it short after three days.23 The Emperor stayed in Algiers, visited key landmarks, including the 
city cathedral and the Kasbah, met with important colonial officials, inspected Christian 
orphanages, and watched an Arab fantasie.24 But the experience – however brief - reoriented his 
attitude towards the colony. 25 
                                               
20 The Emperor’s decision to restore the civil administration was tied in part to the subjugation of Kabylie in 1857. 
He was also responding to a scandal surrounding the Doineau trial in Oran. In 1857, a French court tried and 
condemned Auguste-Edouard Doineau, an officer of the bureaux arabes, for killing Si-Mohammed-ben-Abdallah, 
the agha of the Beni-Snouss tribe. This trial led to the further discrediting of the Algerian military system, even 
within the French metropole. See Kimberly Bowler, “’It is Not in a Day That a Man Abandons His Morals and 
Habits:’ The Arab Bureau, Land Policy, and the Doineau Trial in French Algeria, 1830-1870,” (dissertation, Duke 
University, 2011). 
21 In 1857, Napoleon III replaced the position of governor-general with a new ministry of Algeria and the colonies, 
appointing his cousin, prince Napoleon-Jérôme, as its head. As minister, Jérôme allowed for freedom of the press, 
and loosened the laws around property transaction. He also proposed to “assimilate” the Muslim populations by 
breaking down the tribal structure, undermining the authority of tribal leaders, and encouraging individual property 
ownership. Finally, he expanded the land open to settlers by resettling the tribes that lived there. But he had never 
visited Algeria, and knew little about the country. He managed to alienate large sections of the extant colonial 
administration – especially the military and the bureaux arabes. Scarcely more than a year after he took the position, 
with rising anger among the indigenous population and the threat of revolts on the horizon, the prince resigned. His 
successor, Chasseloup-Laubet, continued many of the same policies. See Georges Spillman, Napoleon III et le 
royaume arabe (Paris: Académie des Sciences d’Outre-Mer, 1975), 19; Guy Pervillé, La France en Algérie, 1830-
1954 (Paris: Vendémiaire Éditions, 2012), 52. 
22 Voyage de leurs majestés en Algérie, Septembre 1860 (Paris: Au Bureau de l'Illustration, 1860), 15. 
23 Rey-Goldzeiguer, Le Royaume Arabe, 126. 
24 Voyage de leurs majestés en Algérie, Septembre 1860 (Paris: Au Bureau de l'Illustration, 1860), 36. 
25 Even at the time, Napoleon III’s speeches made it clear that he was deeply preoccupied with the Arab population. 
When speaking to M. de Vaulx, the president of the Cour Impérial, he began by noting that the French “first duty 
was to occupy ourselves with the well-being of the three million Arabs that the outcome of battle has moved beneath 
our dominion. Providence asks us to spread the benefits of civilization across this territory… We must elevate the 
Arabs to free men, spread instruction among them while respecting their religion, improve their existence while 
developing their resources…” He continued, however, by emphasizing that the colonists would be able to help in 
this process. See “19 septembre 1860” in Voyage de leurs majestés en Algérie, Septembre 1860 (Paris: Au Bureau 
de l'Illustration, 1860), 39. 
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Napoleon III’s response to his 1860 trip to Algeria took several forms – each of them 
controversial. First, much to the chagrin of the colonists, he decided to restore the military 
regime.26 Even more problematically, at least as far as the settlers were concerned, was his 
announcement in 1863 that the French government could not repurpose the land in indigenous 
possession for use by French settlers. At his instigation, the Senate passed the Imperial Act of 
April 22, 1863, which at least ostensibly protected the tribes’ claims to the land that they 
inhabited.27 In his speech promoting the act, Napoleon III went so far as to condemn earlier 
attempts by the French state to attract colonists to Algeria. He contended that the French could 
use immigrants to build up Algeria’s infrastructure, but that farming – which was the main 
occupation of most settlers – was better left to the indigenous, who were better acclimated to the 
climate and soil. The Emperor did not go so far as to contend that the French colonist population 
should leave Algeria – but he made it clear that in the future, the government should limit 
immigration to technicians and skilled laborers.28 
In addition to these policy changes, Napoleon III also published a letter in 1863 
explaining his vision of Algeria and the nature of its relationship to France. Originally addressed 
to General Pélissier during the Senate’s debates over indigenous land in Algeria, it created even 
                                               
26 On November 26, 1860, he thus suppressed the ministry of Algeria and the colonies. And indeed, it is clear that he 
based his decision to revoke the civilian regime in part on his impression that its policy of “assimilation” served 
primarily to strip the indigenous population of their lands, consequently fomenting resentment among them. See 
Guy Pervillé, La France en Algérie, 1830-1954 (Paris: Vendémiaire Éditions, 2012), 53. 
27 There has been some debate about the exact implications of this Senate decree. As Guignard makes clear in his 
article, while many have claimed that the decree was passed to protect indigenous property rights, others have 
maintained that it was simply conceived of as yet another strategy to dispossess the tribes of their territory. The act 
defined different kinds of territory, differentiating between the territory that had belonged to the Ottoman Emperor, 
forests, religious establishments, the public domain, private individuals, and “tribes.” It did not restore territory that 
had already been confiscated to its original holders. The Emperor may have posited himself as the “friend” of the 
Arabs but it is unclear that this law succeeded in preserving Arab land one way or another. See Didier Guignard, “Le 
Senate de 1863: la dislocation programmée de la société rurale algérienne,” in Histoire de l’Algérie à la période 
coloniale (Paris and Algiers: Éditions Barzakh, 2012), 77. 
28 Georges Spillmann, Napoleon III et le royaume arabe. (Paris: Académie des Sciences d’Outre-Mer, 1975), 31. 
  39 
more of a stir than the new land policies. The letter reiterated his earlier controversial 
condemnation of European colonization. But it was the emperor’s conclusions, even more than 
his land policies, which upset the colonists. After laying out his vision of Algeria’s future, he 
sought to redefine the territory, arguing, “Algeria is not technically a colony, but a royaume 
arabe.”29 For obvious reasons, perhaps, the colonists objected to the Emperor’s claim that 
Algeria was not really a colony. But they objected even more strenuously to his contention that 
instead, France should understand and treat Algeria as an “Arab kingdom.” 30 If the new laws and 
regulations might hinder the settlers’ immediate financial prospects, this terminology took a step 
towards delegitimizing their position, rights, and presence in Algeria. Most Algerian newspapers 
and journals did not go so far as to criticize the Emperor directly – even with the liberalizing 
press laws, that kind of direct criticism was dangerous in 1863. But many did imply that his 
policies were misguided, and that poor advisors combined with the Emperor’s own relative lack 
of familiarity with the colony had led him astray.31 
Subsequent events further heightened the conflict over Algeria’s identity and future. A 
widespread revolt by a number of Arab tribes in 1864 led by the Ouled Sidi Cheikh tribe in 
southern Oran resulted in a lengthy and frustrating military campaign, and ended with expensive 
restitution agreements to reimburse colonists whose property and livelihoods had been 
                                               
29 “Lettre au gouverner d’Algérie – 6 février 1863,” in La Politique Impériale exposée par les discours et 
proclamation de l'Empereur Napoleon III (Paris: Henri Plon, 1865), 394. 
30 According to a contemporary source, the letter, though “hailed” in France, had excited riots in Algeria itself. “The 
agitation became severe in Algeria… public squares were invaded… by a passionate crowd passing around a 
petition whose sense and implications escaped the majority of those who signed it; posters proclaimed Algeria in 
danger… a torrent of violent brochures emerged, all repeating the cry ‘save yourself’… All because of the 
Emperor’s letter.” See Frédéric Lacroix, L’Algérie et la Lettre de l’Empereur (Paris: Librairie de Firmin Didot 
Frères, 1863), 2. 
31 Jules Duval, Reflexions sur la Politique de l'Empereur en Algerie (Paris: Challamel Ainé, Commissionnaire pour 
l'Algérie et l'Étranger, 1866), 2. 
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damaged.32 In the midst of this chaos, the military governor of Algeria – the General Pélissier – 
died of a stroke. Napoleon III replaced him with General Mac-Mahon several months later, but 
the early part of the new governor’s rule was very rocky. The fourth governor in six years, he 
struggled to streamline a colonial administration that had already been restructured too many 
times.33 He also had trouble suppressing the cycles of the revolts that continued to envelop the 
countryside. Moreover, less than a year after assuming the position, he had already made it clear 
that he disagreed with many of the Emperor’s colonial policies in Algeria – especially the 
Emperor’s vision of the royaume arabe.34 
The Emperor’s visit to Algeria in 1865 was thus deeply imbued with political conflict – 
especially as his public speeches made it clear that he had not abandoned his ideas of 1863.35 The 
day after his arrival, he travelled to Sidi-Ferruch. At this highly symbolic site of the French 
                                               
32 According to a contemporary report to the Ministry of War by Count Randon, there were several causes behind 
the revolt. First, religious “fanaticism” had encouraged the countryside to go into revolt. But the switch to a civil 
administration in 1858, Randon maintained, was really to blame. After scarcely having subdued the Algerian 
countryside, the government launched into an entirely different policy than the one they had pursued before, leaving 
the indigenous peoples and their leaders confused, wary, and ultimately angry. The French government began 
“attacking the chiefs as exploiters of their tribes’ resources, and threatening them with a revocation of their rights… 
The ideas of cantonnement, of resettling tribes, became the order of the day, and even began to be set into 
execution.” See Randon, “Rapport sur l’insurrection de l’Algérie en 1864” in Conquête et Colonisation, 1864-1865, 
F80/1679. Fonds Ministériales, Archives Nationales d’Outre-Mer, Aix-en-Provence, France. 
33 Charles-Robert Ageron, Modern Algeria: A History from 1830 to the Present. Trans. by Michael Brett. Trenton, 
NJ: Africa World Press, 1991), 39. 
34 Jean-Pierre Peyroulou, Ouanassa Siari Tengour, Sylvie Thénault, “1830-1880: la conquête colonial et la résistance 
des Algériens,” in Histoire de l’Algérie à la période colonial, ed. By Abderrahmane Bouchène, Jean-Pierre 
Peyroulou, Ouanassa Siari Tengour, Sylvie Thénault (Paris & Alger: Éditions La Découverte, 2012), 39. 
35 A number of pamphlets published after the Emperor’s visit referred to anxiety surrounding the visit. In the weeks 
before his arrival, an Algerian publicist, Le Metayer des Planches, published a pamphlet titled “L’Empereur en 
Algérie,” which explicitly laid out what he saw as the key challenges currently faced by the colony. He did not go so 
far as to criticize the Emperor’s standing policies towards the colony, but he suggested a list of improvements that 
were fundamentally at odds with the policies pursued over the past several years. Le Metayer des Planches 
especially highlighted Algeria’s pressing need for new European colonists, and suggested several ways to recruit 
them. He also indicated that the governance of Algeria needed to be handed over to a civil administration once more, 
and decentralized from the metropole. He concluded on an ambivalent note: “The presence of the Emperor in 
Algeria opens up the possibility for vast hopes. They will not fail to be realized – if he is presented with the truth.” 
Le Metayer des Planches, L'Empereur en Algérie (Alger: Bouyer, 1865), 5, 20.  
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debarcation in 1830, he held an audience with Arab leaders.36 He began his speech by noting that 
thirty-five years before, the French had come to Algeria to liberate the Arabs from Turkish 
oppressors. Nevertheless, the Arabs had opposed French occupation. This, he felt, was fair  – 
indeed, the Emperor even went so far as to indicate that he admired the Arabs’ “warrior dignity.” 
But now, he insisted, God had decided that the French should win, and according to the Koran, 
they needed to swear obedience to the French. Two thousand years ago, he noted, the ancestors 
of the French had also “courageously” defended themselves against the Romans, but eventually, 
the two civilizations had commingled, creating contemporary France – a civilization, he did not 
fail to point out, that was currently conquering much of the world. If the Arabs managed to 
escape from their “fanaticism” and “ignorance” by incorporating aspects of French culture into 
their civilization, they too might one day become a great nation.37 His speech did not once 
mention the “royaume arabe,” but he did promise his listeners, “France is not here to destroy the 
national identity of a people… [but] to increase your wellbeing.”38 This reference to the 
indigenous’ “national identity” solidified colonists’ suspicions that the Emperor intended to 
transform Algeria into an Arab nation subject to France – in which they would have no place. 
In 1865, the Emperor had arrived in Algeria hoping to learn more about the overseas 
conflict-ridden land that was part of his domain, and to gain insight into the tensions that 
structured the relationship between the military, the bureaux arabes, the colonists, and the Arab 
tribes. At the same time, he was hoping to further develop the new policy towards Algeria that he 
had been working on ever since his 1860 visit: the reconstitution of the colony as a royaume 
                                               
36 This speech was widely reprinted. For Algerian examples, see Le Moniteur d’Algérie. For metropolitan examples, 
see the Journal des débats politiques et littéraires (10 May 1865), 1. 
37 Saint-Félix, Le Voyage de S. M. L'Empereur Napoleon III en Algérie, 109. 
38Ibid., 110. 
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arabe. This reconstitution was important to him because he saw the transformation of the colony 
into an Arab kingdom as a first step towards rebranding the Second Napoleonic Empire, thereby 
securing its domestic and international prestige at a moment when that prestige seemed to be 
faltering. However, his model of Algeria and its relationship with France proved fatally at odds 
with the vision of most colonists. This chapter examines how Napoleon III sought to both restore 
faith in his empire and resolve the ongoing conflicts between settlers and the indigenous over 
Algeria by redefining both “Algeria” and “empire.” It looks at the ways in which a variety of 
intellectual legacies – from Napoleonic imperialism and revolutionary nationalism to the Saint-
Simonian theory of racial progress – helped give shape to the new understanding of empire and 
Algeria that he proposed. It considers why this model of empire became deeply associated in 
republican circles with his rule in the final years of his reign even though the colonists’ fierce 
opposition made it impossible for the emperor to implement or enforce it. And finally, it reflects 
on how Napoleon III’s imperial vision affected republican understandings of colonial empire, its 
relationship to metropolitan politics, and its implications for French national identity – even after 
the Second Empire collapsed. 
 
II. Napoleon III’s Imperial Vision: Defining the French Empire 
From the beginning of his rule, Napoleon III had sought to provide a theoretical 
backbone to the Second Empire that would legitimize it politically. Even in the early years of his 
political career as a revolutionary and a republican politician, he had worked to develop a 
“theory of empire” in dialogue with the history of his uncle’s rule, whose legacy he both drew 
upon and distanced himself from.39 During his presidential campaign in 1848, Louis Napoleon 
                                               
39 Napoleon III spent his early years in exile. He achieved notoriety by becoming involved with the Carbonari, an 
Italian nationalist group. In 1836, he tried to stage a coup against the July Monarchy in Strasbourg. He was arrested 
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made explicit reference to his connection to Napoleon I as evidence of his fitness to lead the 
country – even as he promised that he would, unlike his uncle, uphold the values of the 
republican constitution and preserve the republican state.40 In a speech to the national assembly 
in the early part of his presidency, he went even farther, explicitly allying himself with what he 
identified as his uncle’s politics, maintaining, “The name Napoleon is itself a program. It says: in 
the interior, order, authority, religion, the well being of the people: on the exterior, national 
dignity. This is the politics that I have enacted with the support of the Assembly since my 
election.”41 Of course, this assessment of Napoleon I’s political program failed to mention the 
authoritarian nature of the former Emperor’s rule, and made only oblique reference to the 
extensive military campaigns that characterized it. But the quote shows how from the beginning, 
Louis Napoleon drew on aspects of Napoleon I’s imperial model to create his own vision of 
empire, centered on a commitment to order, the suppression of political radicalism, and the 
guarantee of economic and social security for all classes of society.  
After the coup d’état, Napoleon III’s references to his uncle became more frequent and 
more direct.42 In the new constitution, he based the government’s organization on Napoleon I’s 
                                               
and exiled. In 1840, he tried to stage a second, equally unsuccessful coup. The government sentenced him to 
imprisonment. During his imprisonment, he wrote L’extinction de pauperisme, a progressive text that endorsed 
certain Saint-Simonian principles of labor organization. In 1846, he escaped and fled to England. He returned during 
the Revolution of 1848. While he had little to do with the Revolution itself, in December he was elected president of 
the new republic as part of a broad reaction against the instability that had characterized French politics over the past 
year. On December 2, 1851 he staged a successful coup d’état against the republican regime, and assumed 
dictatorial powers. One year later, he established the Second Empire. See Fenton Bresler, Napoleon III: A Life (New 
York: Carroll & Graff Publishers, 1999), 235-251.  
40 He also promised to protect the freedom of religion and thought to the middle classes and the priests, he reassured 
landholders that they would keep hold of their possessions, and he promised the laboring classes work and 
prosperity. See Édouard Leduc, Louis-Napoleon Bonaparte: le dernier Empereur (Paris: Publibook, 2010), 46. 
41 Napoleon III, “Message à l’Assemblée legislatif, 31 octobre 1849” in Oeuvres de Napoleon III: mélanges (Paris: 
Henri Plon et Amyot, 1862), 305. 
42 He employed these allusions to Napoleon in his declaration of empire. He maintained, “I say: if you want to 
continue on in this state of malaise that degrades you and compromises our future, choose another… If, on the 
contrary, you have confidence in me, give me the means to accomplish a grand mission... It consists of closing the 
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administrative, military, judicial, financial, and religious institutions – even though he still 
claimed that he was not restoring the empire.43 But even as he continued to rely upon his uncle’s 
prestige, he worked systematically to redefine Napoleon I’s legacy. He was particularly 
interested in refuting the popular republican claim that “the empire means war.” In a speech to 
the people of Bordeaux in 1852, he went so far as to assure his listeners that “the empire means 
peace.”44 According to Napoleon III, in other words, Napoleon I’s attempt to conquer Europe 
was not central to his empire; in any event, the Second Empire would not repeat it. In fact, 
Napoleon I’s importance lay not in his external wars but in the internal peace he established.45 
Only under the First Empire, Napoleon III maintained, had the French people set aside their 
ideological differences and worked for their common interest.46  
                                               
era of revolutions by satisfying the legitimate needs of the people while protecting them from subversive passions. It 
consists of creating institutions that will live beyond men… This system, created by the First Consul… has already 
given France rest and prosperity; it will assure them once again.” See Napoleon III, “Proclamation du Président de la 
République: Appel au people, 2 décember 1851” in Oeuvres de Napoleon III: mélanges (Paris: Henri Plon et Amyot, 
1862), 329-331.  
43 Napoleon III, “Préambule de la constitution, 14 janvier 1852” in Oeuvres de Napoleon III: mélanges (Paris: Henri 
Plon et Amyot, 1862), 334. 
44 This statement was a direct refutation of the republican criticism of Napoleon I during the years of expansion. 
Napoleon III downplayed this legacy, and argued that this new empire would focus on a primarily domestic agenda: 
“I admit that I will, like the Emperor, have a number of conquests. Like him, I want to conquer dissident parties and 
conciliate them… We have immense uncultivated territories to cultivate, roads to open, ports to build, rivers to 
render navigable, canals to finish, our network of railroads to finish. We have a vast kingdom facing Marseille to 
assimilate to France. We have our great doors to the west to connect to the American continent by communications 
that we still lack. That is how I understand the Empire if the Empire must be re-established.” As quoted in Gaël 
Nofri, Napoleon III, Visionnaire de l’Europe des Nations (Paris: Éditions François-Xavier de Guibert, 2010), 183. 
45 In his description of Napoleon I’s relationship to the French Revolution, Napoleon III noted, “The great 
movement of 1789 had two distinct characteristics, one social and the other political. The social revolution 
triumphed despite our reverses, while the political revolution failed despite the victories of the people... At the 
beginning of the nineteenth century the great figure of Napoleon appeared, and society transformed. Popular anger 
was appeased, ruins disappeared, and one saw with surprise order and prosperity emerge from the same crater that 
had almost engulfed us... He worked hardily… to transition between old and new interests; he established the grand 
foundations that assured the triumph of the political and social revolution in France. But once the Empire fell the 
discord reappeared.” See Napoleon III, “Les idées Napoleoniennes” in Oeuvres de Napoleon III: mélanges (Paris: 
Henri Plon et Amyot, 1862), 7-8. 
46 Ibid., 10. 
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According to Napoleon III, the new empire would follow the Bonapartist legacy of 
domestic peace by outlawing fractious political parties, even as it extended suffrage. Without 
these parties, elections would no longer cause division; instead, the population would come 
together to vote on the Emperor’s plebiscites.47 Like the first Napoleonic Empire, the second 
Napoleonic Empire would thus leave the appearance of democratic principles and practices in 
their place – even as it depoliticized the population and put an end to social strife.48 This 
depoliticization, Napoleon III claimed, would enable a return to stability and prosperity for rich 
and poor alike.49 Napoleon III thus defined the “Napoleonic Empire” as the combination of the 
“best” aspects of the Revolution – its belief in democratic principles, political expression, and 
human progress – with the guarantee of order and security.50 
If Napoleon III drew on Napoleon I to define the Second Empire domestically, his 
attempt to articulate the Empire’s position, identity, and purpose on the international stage was 
more complicated. In the early years, two interrelated goals drove this process of articulation: he 
                                               
47 Sudhir Hazareesingh has argued that the Second Empire’s guarantee of male universal suffrage in fact marked the 
beginnings of the politicization of France. It was under Napoleon III, he maintains, that French men became used to 
publically participating in the political process. Of course, during the majority of his reign, the extent of individual 
political power was limited in scope. The Empire’s policy of “official candidature” – in which the state would 
consistently sponsor one of the candidates running – meant that for many years, only officials connected to the 
Bonapartists could find their way into office. See Sudhir Hazareesingh, From Subject to Citizen: The Second Empire 
and the Emergence of Modern French Democracy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998), 27. 
48 Napoleon III claimed that his legitimacy as the ruler of France stemmed from the fact that his coup d’état and 
declaration of empire was supported by the majority of the population in the 1852 plebiscite. See David Baguley, 
Napoleon III and his Regime: An Extravaganza (New Orleans: Louisiana State University Press, 2000), 19. 
49 Napoleon III’s ideas about poverty reform were influenced by Saint-Simonian thought, though they drew from 
liberal and paternalistic traditions as well. He believed that labor needed to be organized and disciplined, and 
thought that industrialization would alleviate the plight of the poor. See Nofri, Napoleon III, Visionnaire de l’Europe 
des Nations, 236. 
50 Over time, the argument that the empire would bring internal and external peace became a lynchpin in the 
theoretical justification of Napoleon III’s reign. The Emperor commissioned songs and pictures to celebrate this 
commitment, some of which were published in multiple illustrated editions throughout the 1850s. For examples of 
celebratory poetry and songs, see Arsène Houssaye, “L’Empire, c’est la paix” (Paris: Plon frères, 1852); Céline 
Domény, “L’Empire, c’est la paix” (Paris: Heu, 1852); Hector Bonnetat, “L’Empire, c’est la paix” (Paris: 
Imprimerie Typographie de Bureau, 1852). 
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wanted to restore France’s position in Europe and secure the Napoleonic Empire’s international 
prestige.51 He sought to accomplish these objectives in two contradictory ways. On the one hand, 
he tried to reassure both his subjects and his neighbors that he would not attempt to dominate 
Europe, or incorporate large parts of it beneath French rule. But on the other hand, he attempted 
to restore the myth of French imperial grandeur - a myth based largely on Napoleon I’s military 
prowess.52 He tried to resolve the contradictions between these strategies by positioning the 
French Empire as the defender of nationalities in Europe. Drawing on romantic nationalism, 
Napoleon III insisted that Europe would only see peace when each group of “people” had its own 
state.53 The French Empire would help institute this widespread peace and prosperity by 
supporting nationalist movements across Europe as they sought independence from the large 
empires to which they were beholden. 
In the early years of his reign, Napoleon III thus consistently pursued what he described 
as the “politics of nationality” or “the liberation of peoples” in conflicts across Europe. In Italy in 
particular, he deployed French troops to support the independence movement led by Victor-
Emmanuel against the Austro-Hungarian Empire.54 He criticized European empires like Austro-
Hungary as both outdated and oppressive, and claimed that their incorporation of large numbers 
of diverse peoples, combined with their subsequent failure to rule these peoples in a centralized 
or systematic way, both impeded historical progress and oppressed the “national minorities” who 
                                               
51 He was also determined to end the strictures imposed on France in the “dishonorable peace” of 1815. See 
Napoleon III, “Les idées Napoleoniennes,” 325. 
52 Jean Meyer, Jean Tarrade, Annie Rey-Goldzeiguer, Jacques Thobie, Histoire de la France Coloniale des origines 
à 1914 (Paris: Armand Colin, 1991), 480. 
53 This commitment to nationalist beliefs predated his reign; they underlay his youthful involvement in the Italian 
revolutionary movement against the Austrians. See Nofri, Napoleon III, Visionnaire de l’Europe des Nations, 288. 
54 Napoleon III, La Politique Impériale, 199. 
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lived beneath their yoke.55 By casting the French Empire as the defender of these minorities, 
Napoleon III defined it as a “progressive” force in European politics, helping to spread freedom 
and construct future peace in Europe. He thus borrowed directly from the revolutionary 
conviction that France was a “vanguard” nation, meant to lead other nations in the path of human 
progress towards the ultimate goals of freedom, equality, and rights for all. 56 But at the same 
time, he distanced himself and the French Empire from revolutionary democratic politics; while 
he supported Victor-Emmanuel’s attempt to reconfigure Italy into an independent monarchical 
state, he suppressed the Italian republican movement. Napoleon III thus made it clear that he 
sought to spread not a new set of political ideas but a specific model of state organization. A 
Europe composed of nation-states, he maintained, would both “found a solid system of European 
association” and “satisfy the general interests” of the different European peoples.57 By 
contending that the French Empire intended to bring about this future, Napoleon III defined it as 
a progressive force, bent not on conquest or inciting revolution, but on liberating subject peoples 
and enforcing international justice.58  
                                               
55 Napoleon III, “Les idées Napoleoniennes,” 22. 
56 By positioning himself as the champion of “nationalities,” Napoleon III was laying claim to the French 
Revolutionary tradition. Revolutionary Republicanism had in fact conflated the idea of “nation” with the ideals of 
widespread political participation: for Republicans, the Republic was the natural expression of the nation itself. 
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57 He noted, “We want the peoples to be enfranchised… such that each nation, happy with its independence, 
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benefits of independence, peace, and liberty.” See Napoleon III, “Les idées Napoleoniennes,” 84. 
58 Ibid., 70. It is worth noting that despite his insistence that France was uninterested in conquering European 
territory, Napoleon III employed the logic of “nationality” to argue for the incorporation of Nice and Savoy into the 
French state in the wake of the Italian Wars. See Sylvie Aprile, La Deuxième République et le Second Empire, 1848-
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Throughout the 1850s, Napoleon III thus sought to define the French Second Empire as a 
unique kind of state. 59 Internally, it integrated revolutionary principles with the need for stability 
and security. Externally, it spread its progressive ideology to its European neighbors without 
threatening their sovereignty or promoting radical democratic movements. In this vision, 
“empire” thus came to signify above all a mixture of liberal and repressive policies within 
metropolitan France and a foreign policy agenda based on a messianic understanding of France’s 
place in the world. However, Napoleon III did not define the French Empire as a grouping of 
multiple states – in part because he was positioning it against multiethnic empires like Russia 
and Austria-Hungary. In fact, during the first decade of Napoleon III’s reign, the Emperor 
usually treated the “French Empire” as functionally equivalent to the “French nation.”60 
During the early 1860s, the Second Empire moved into a period of political transition. 
The first decade of Napoleon III’s reign had been marked by increased economic prosperity, a 
series of successful European wars, and centralized, authoritarian control.61 But by the end of 
that decade, there were several shifts that incited Napoleon III to modify the Second Empire’s 
structure and political identity, and ultimately, to try to recast it entirely.62 The most important of 
these shifts was the growing cost and unpopularity of France’s ongoing wars supporting Victor-
                                               
59 He thought it was only comparable to the ancient Roman Empire. Napoleon III was fond of comparing Napoleon I 
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to fit a new set of political conditions. See Napoleon III, “Les idées Napoleoniennes,” 31. 
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Emmanuel II’s nationalist movement in Italy.63 By the end of the 1850s, Napoleon III’s attempt 
to help secure Italian independence had met with frustration: the nationalist movement seemed to 
have taken on republican overtones that he strongly opposed, his Italian allies often seemed to be 
acting against the interests of France, his armies were expensive, and he seemed to have 
accomplished little other than alienating the revolutionaries, the Pope and conservative French 
Catholics alike.64 When ongoing high military spending caused the nation’s prosperity to 
contract, the French population became “politicized” once more. Napoleon III’s internal and 
external model of French Empire came under attack from increasingly vocal opposition groups 
within France on both the right and the left.65  
Out of this frustration, Napoleon III began to envision a different identity and shape for 
the French Empire – one that departed from his earlier policies of promoting national movements 
across Europe, but that would both secure French glory abroad, appease dissenters at home, and 
secure France’s influence in the face of expanding competition from England and Germany. On 
the one hand, he passed a series of measures to “liberalize” the empire. He relaxed censorship, 
allowed the debates of the Senate to be published, and even fostered the creation of political 
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parties, at least to some degree.66 At the same time, Napoleon III also decided that he would 
extend the borders of the French Empire – not in complicated Europe, but overseas. 
The most notorious example of Napoleon III’s attempts to extend French influence 
overseas was his failed attempt to establish Ferdinand Maximilian as the Emperor of Mexico. 
This endeavor to interfere in Mexico and establish a government there that would be friendly to 
French interests began in 1862. France initially entered Mexico as part of a coalition that 
included England and Spain. Officially, all three powers were reacting to the then-president 
Benito Juarez’s decision to stop paying the interest on the loans that the three powers had given 
to Mexico. Napoleon III officially led the expedition in the name of free trade; he claimed that he 
wanted a government in Mexico that would be open to trading with Europe. But he also hoped 
that extending French influence in Mexico would extend “Latin” influence across the globe.67 
The venture was initially successful – the French troops managed to defeat the Mexican armies, 
secure hold of the capital, and rigged an election that at least made it appear that the Mexican 
people themselves had chosen Maximilian.68 But it quickly became clear that Maximilian had 
little support from the Mexican populace; he was too liberal for the conservatives, and too 
monarchical for the liberals. Moreover, by 1864, the population in the French metropole grew 
increasingly unsupportive of the war, and in the face of these frustrations, Napoleon III began to 
withdraw French troops. Without French support, the regime quickly collapsed, and both 
Maximilian and his wife were executed by the Republican troops in a turn of events that 
discredited the French state. 
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67 See Michele Cunningham, Mexico and the Foreign Policy of Napoleon III (New York: Palgrave, 2001), 9. 
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If Napoleon III sought to extend French influence and markets overseas in Mexico, he 
also, starting in approximately 1860, began to harbor dreams of supplanting the position that the 
Ottoman Empire held in the western Mediterranean by taking over its territories and reorganizing 
the peoples beneath its rule.69 By establishing its hold over the Mediterranean Sea, Napoleon III 
believed, France could create an alternative center of power, entrenching itself in a strong 
position against the encroaching reach of the expanding British colonial empire and the growing 
ambitions of Prussia.70 At the same time, the rising internal conflicts within France itself would 
diminish as the French people worked together to expand the empire’s frontiers. But while this 
empire would incorporate a large number of diverse groups of people, it would be quite distinct 
from the Russian, Austro-Hungarian, and Ottoman Empires that Napoleon III had spent much of 
his political career criticizing. Instead of oppressing the different groups of people that would fall 
beneath its command, the French Second Empire, like the first, would help them progress. In the 
process, the French Empire would become a center of wealth, stability, culture, and prosperity. 
As Emperor, Napoleon III would stand at the center of this network bridging France with the 
“Arab nations,” uniting them in a common purpose and leading them towards a common goal.71 
By looking outside of Europe, Napoleon III would thus be able to live up to Napoleon I’s legacy 
of expanding French borders without inciting a widespread European war. 
Napoleon III did not try to fulfill this ambition by seeking war overseas, either, though 
beginning in the late 1850s, he pursued a number of paths to increase French influence in 
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territories held by the Ottoman Empire. He intervened in the Crimean War to reassert his 
position as the protectors of Christians beneath Turkish rule. He sent a series of ambassadors to 
Tunisia, attempting to court the affection and loyalty of the bey.72 He intervened in Syria during 
the massacre of the Christian population while the Ottoman administration stood by, re-
establishing France’s old position as the protector of Christians in the Ottoman Empire. At the 
same time, he also secured the autonomy of Libya from Syria.73 And in Egypt – a highly 
significant territory in light of its Napoleonic legacy - he sponsored the construction of the Suez 
Canal, and worked to spread French influence in the Egyptian administration and among its 
high-ranking inhabitants.74 However, he focused most of his attention on Algeria, which he 
hoped to turn into the model Arab state for the new empire that he was attempting to construct.  
Napoleon III’s vision for Algeria and the wider imperial network he hoped to establish 
around it thus emerged out of a set of specific growing domestic and international pressures. But 
it also was heavily influenced by the tensions and contradictions surrounding understandings of 
empire and nation in nineteenth-century France. Indeed, Napoleon III’s expansionary ambitions 
presented a number of problems for an Emperor who defined himself as the champion of 
“nationality” in Europe. How could a France ostensibly devoted to liberating peoples and 
guiding them on the path to self-determination justify ruling – let alone conquering – non-French 
                                               
72 Ibid.,  476. 
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peoples? Neither Napoleon III nor the coterie of advisors around him had a clear answer. But the 
set of solutions he proposed was deeply influenced not only by political problems in 
metropolitan France, but also by the ongoing conflict in Algeria between the colonist and 
indigenous populations. 
 
III. France africaine or Algérie française 
Napoleon III’s policies towards Algeria and his new vision of empire were also shaped 
by ongoing debates within the territory about how to govern its different inhabitants. Even before 
the French conquest, Algeria’s population included a number of ethnic groups who followed 
distinct customs, engaged in a variety of religious practices, and structured their lives according 
to different rules.75 But from the French perspective, it was the presence of a growing number of 
European colonists that complicated the territory’s administration.76 French government 
officials, administrators, and colonists alike disagreed about the roles the different populations 
should play, the respective rights that each should be afforded, and the nature of the institutions 
that should administer them. Some contended that the military was best suited to enforce order in 
a colony that was often beset by indigenous revolts, and that both the colonists and the 
indigenous should be subjected to its rule. Others maintained that metropolitan institutions and 
laws should govern the colonists, while a separate set of laws and institutions should govern the 
indigenous. Still others argued that colonists and indigenous alike should be integrated into the 
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metropolitan administration. Disagreements about how to procure land for the colonists to 
cultivate further complicated these negotiations. Most colonists went to Algeria to farm, but 
indigenous peoples already inhabited most of the arable land. In the ensuing struggle over 
property ownership, settlers quickly began to feel that their interests were radically at odds with 
those of Algeria’s original inhabitants.77 
These ongoing arguments about the relationship between the settlers and the indigenous, 
their respective positions in the colony, and their connections to the French metropole often took 
shape as debates about “assimilation” and “association.” In the historiography of nineteenth-
century French overseas imperialism, scholars long contended that the French mostly ruled their 
colonies according to the logic of “assimilation.” Historians contrasted policies to those enacted 
by the British colonial administration, which, they claimed, largely relied on “association.”78 In 
recent years, scholars have come to challenge this model. They have shown that the French 
colonial administration vacillated between the two policies, especially in the period between 
1814 and 1870.79 This vacillation, however, was not politically benign for either the indigenous 
subjected to shifting policies or the administrators debating them. Both ideas carried with them a 
political charge, as they were enmeshed in contradictory republican and imperial discourses.80 
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“Assimilation” could have multiple meanings in nineteenth-century France. Republicans 
during the Revolution used it to refer to the incorporation of overseas territories into the French 
metropole: colonies would be ruled by the same laws, marked by the same political institutions, 
and subject to the same commercial tariffs as the metropole. At the same time, their inhabitants 
would have the same civil rights as the inhabitants of metropolitan France.81 However, when 
Algerian colonists demanded that the French government transform Algeria into a France 
africaine or “African France” by “assimilating” it into the French metropole, they usually wanted 
the European population to be granted the same civil rights and ruled by the same institutions as 
those who lived in France itself. They were less clear on the fate of the indigenous – but they did 
not expect the government to incorporate them into the new regime, or endow them with the 
same rights as Europeans.82 Many argued that France should force the indigenous to assimilate 
into French culture by undermining tribal leaders, enforcing individual land ownership, banning 
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Levallois, Ismaÿl Urbain, Royaume Arabe ou Algérie franco-musulmane: 1848-1870 (Paris: Riveneuve éditions, 
2012), 230. 
  56 
polygamy and sharia law, and subjecting the indigenous Algerians to the French justice system.83 
But even as they proposed to subject the Algerians to French law and authority, they did not plan 
to grant them French civil rights.84 Colonists thus modified the principles behind the 
revolutionary “assimilationist” model – which had been based at least in part on the idea that it 
was politically problematic for a republican state to rule over a subject population that did not 
have civil rights - even as they made use of its discourses.  
“Association,” on the other hand, was championed by a cadre of officers and officials 
who had a diverse set of ties to Algeria, including General Émile Fleury, the Algerian 
administrator and historian Fréderic Lacroix, Colonel Ferdinand Lapasset, and Ismaël Urbain, an 
administrator of Arab affairs. These figures would come to shape Napoleon III’s approach to 
Algeria and ultimately influence his vision of empire in the 1860s.85 Broadly speaking, they 
contended that France should not seek to directly integrate the indigenous – or to exile or 
exterminate them, as other colonists proposed - but should preserve the structure of their 
societies while slowly pushing them to “progress.”86 These figures called themselves 
“arabophiles” and in many publications – from journals like the Revue de l'Orient et de l'Algérie, 
La Revue de Paris, and La Revue orientale et algérienne, to brochures and scholarly treatises – 
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they advocated for a French policy towards Algeria that protected the rights of the indigenous 
against the European settler population.87 Although they rose to political prominence in the late 
1850s and 1860s, when Napoleon III’s attention turned more concretely to the Algerian colony, 
many of them had been working on what they saw as the behalf of the Arabs since the 1840s. 
The “Arabophile” movement – at least in part because of the influential participation of 
Ismaël Urbain - was grounded in the political principles of Saint-Simonianism, an intellectual 
and political movement in the 1820s and 30s that was popular among the elites. An early 
socialist group, Saint-Simonians embraced science and technology as the keys to fixing what 
they saw as the social problems of their time.88 Saint-Simonians were also notable for their 
rejection of early nineteenth-century racial theory that insisted that humans emerged out of 
separate, unequal races: instead, Saint-Simonians insisted that all humans had a common origin, 
but that they progressed at different rates through stages of social organization in response to 
particular historical circumstances. All races, cultures, and societies could reach the same 
advanced level of civilization, but at any given point, some would be ahead of others. Thus, the 
Saint-Simonians did contend that Europeans were superior to Africans and Asians, if not 
                                               
87 Levallois, Ismaÿl Urbain, Royaume Arabe ou Algérie franco-musulmane, 135. 
88 Henri de Saint-Simon (1760-1825) was a late-eighteenth century political theorist who influenced nineteenth-
century socialist thought. He did not produce a unifying theory of socialism as later thinkers did, and indeed, many 
of his writings were contradictory. But in summation, he contended that humans “naturally” cooperated with one 
another for the benefit of the whole, but that the form of this cooperation – or the shape of “society” – changed over 
time. He held that there were three stages of social organization: the “theological,” the “metaphysical,” and the 
“scientific.” During the middle ages or “metaphysical” stage, cooperation had taken shape within the feudal system, 
in which the feudal aristocracy and religious elites exercised power over the lower classes. But by the eighteenth 
century, new technology had broken this system, leading to widespread disarray, because the technologies and 
systems of thought that had disrupted feudal and religious authority had not yet produced a new system of social 
organization. As a result, French society was marked by disunity, division, and dislocation. But ultimately, he and 
his followers believed, France would reorganize itself. This new society would substitute the production of industry 
for feudal power, and “positive scientific capacity” would replace spiritual power. This new society would take the 
form of a utopian socialist state. Hierarchies would not disappear, but they would be based on merit and education: 
industrialists, scientists, and intellectuals would lead the other classes of society into a productive future. See Robert 
B. Carlisle, “The Birth of Technocracy: Science, Society, and Saint-Simonians,” Journal of the History of Ideas, v. 
35, no. 3 (1974), 447; Naomi Andrews, “D'Eichthal and Urbain's Lettres sur la race noire et la race blanche: Race, 
Gender, and Reconciliation after Slave Emancipation” Nineteenth-Century French Studies (2011), 246. 
  58 
necessarily permanently so. They also did not oppose European imperial expansion: in fact, 
Prosper Enfantin, the movement’s de facto leader in the 1830s, even contended that by 
intervening in the affairs of “inferior races,” Europeans could improve them and push them 
towards civilization.89 In Saint-Simonian thought, imperial relationships with “inferior” peoples 
were thus not only morally defensible, but a potentially positive force to bring “backwards” 
peoples into the historical present.90   
Following the conquest of Algeria, Saint-Simonians became increasingly interested in 
“the Orient” as a site in which they could set their theories of progress in motion. The French had 
already decided that they were going to restructure Algeria; by involving themselves in the 
process, the Saint-Simonians saw an opportunity to help give shape to a new society. 91 Enfantin 
even argued that Algeria would be an excellent “testing ground (lieu d’essai)” for social policies 
that could later be enacted in France once their success was proven in the colony.92 He suggested 
that the French should transport a population of Europeans to Algeria to work in commerce, 
build industry, and develop agricultural infrastructure alongside an indigenous population of 
agricultural workers. By cooperating with the indigenous, the European colonists would educate 
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moved on to the new French colony of Algeria, leaving de Lesseps behind to build the canal. See Mary Pickering, 
“Auguste Comte and the Saint-Simonians,” French Historical Studies, vol. 18, no. 1 (1993), 218. 
92 Prosper Enfantin, Colonisation de l’Algérie (Paris: P. Bertrand, 1843), 488. 
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“backwards” and “despotic” Arab peoples with French science and technology.93 Together, they 
would ultimately come to form an ideal modern society without the constraints of outdated 
European laws.  
In the 1830s and 40s, a number of Saint-Simonians moved to Algeria, where they became 
administrators and technocrats.94 As Osama Abi-Mershed has shown, even if they were not able 
to structure the Algerian colony according to their ideals, they came to shape the “dissenting 
voice” of the colonial administration in the years that followed.95 They argued that the French 
government should not transform Algeria into a France africaine but should instead try to create 
an Algérie française, articulating a colonial vision of “association” in which the European 
administration would “modernize” the indigenous populations without forcing them to accept 
French laws or customs.96 At the same time, they worked to protect indigenous property rights, 
maintaining that it was unjust, uneconomical, and impractical to strip the tribes of their land to 
benefit a handful of European colonists. This set of attitudes put them in conflict with ambitious 
settlers searching for more land, as well as with those who retained republican sympathies and 
remained invested in the principles of assimilation. 
Of all the Saint-Simonians, Ismaël Urbain arguably came to exert the most influence over 
the Emperor’s political thought about the colony. He was born in French Guyana to a merchant 
                                               
93 Enfantin explicitly noted that France should structure their relationship with Algeria in the same way that the 
ancient Romans did. He claimed that the Romans did not actually “cultivate” African soil – though to some degree 
they owned land and introduced advanced agrarian techniques. Instead, they brought them “a grand intellectual 
culture by forcing the defeated to learn the universal language of the conquerors and placing before their eyes 
unknown marvels of the arts.” See Prosper Enfantin, Colonisation de l’Algérie (Paris: P. Bertrand, 1843), 22. 
94 Meyer, Tarrade, Rey-Goldzeigueur, Thobie, Histoire de la France Coloniale des origines à 1914, 333. 
95 Abi-Mershed, Apostles of Modernity, 32. 
96 Even though the Saint-Simonians believed that the indigenous were “backwards,” they did not think they needed 
to become French. Instead, they insisted that all peoples would become modern within the context of their own 
“particular institutional structures.” See Michel Levallois, Ismaÿl Urbain: Une Autre Conquête de l’Algérie, vol. 1 
(Paris: Maisonneuve et Larose, 2001), 634. 
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from Marseille and a free woman of color.97 Educated in Marseille, he joined the Saint-
Simonians and accompanied them when they went to Egypt. There, he learned Arabic and 
converted to Islam; in 1840, he applied for the position of military interpreter in Algeria, where 
he met and married an indigenous Algerian woman.98 During the 1840s and 1850s, he became an 
increasingly vocal advocate for indigenous rights in Algeria and came to occupy ever-more 
important positions in the Algerian colonial administration. Over time, he became frustrated with 
the treatment of Arabs in Algeria, especially after the installation of the civilian government in 
1858, which he felt served as little more than a thin veil over the promotion of settler interests. 99 
But after Napoleon III’s visit to Algeria in 1860 and his widely circulated pronouncement that 
France’s primary obligation in Algeria was to see to the needs of the Arab population it had 
conquered, Urbain began to believe that the French government might listen to his ideas. As a 
result, in 1861 and in 1862, with the help of Frédéric Lacroix, he decided to publish two 
pamphlets outlining his vision of Algeria, the future of its different inhabitants, and the nature of 
its relationship to the French state.100  
Several days after Napoleon III’s decrees returning Algeria to a military administration 
appeared, Ismaël Urbain’s L’Algérie pour les Algériens circulated in both Algeria and Paris. 
Published under the pseudonym of Georges Voisin, the pamphlet began by announcing that its 
                                               
97 Ibid., 32. 
98 Ibid., 212. 
99 He published about this frustration anonymously, partly through government reports. His Rapport au président de 
la République traced the history of French Algeria and the Bureaux Arabes, defended the military administration, 
and pleaded against republican assimilationist policies. See Ismaÿl Urbain, “Rapport au president de la République 
sur le gouvernement et l’administration des tribus de l’Algérie,” Le Moniteur (25 January 1851).  
100 While steeped in Saint-Simonian thought, Urbain’s position on Algerian policy did not necessarily intersect with 
other Saint-Simonians’. While most Saint-Simonians believed progressive history and colonial association, they 
often differed on how policies should be implemented. Prosper Enfantin contended in the 1840s that the military 
administration should be replaced quickly with a civilian one, because he believed it would hinder the growth of the 
colony. But in time, many of his former followers like Urbain came to believe that the military administration would 
protect Arab rights more effectively than a civilian one. See Abi-Mershed, Apostles of Modernity, 96. 
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author wrote “under the patronage” of the speech given by the Emperor upon his arrival in 
Algiers in 1860.101 In his preface, titled “The Conversion of the Muslims of Algeria to 
Civilization,” he defended the Muslims against charges that they were “fatalists” and “fanatics” 
incapable of change or progress.102 These attitudes, he maintained, were “reactionary”: progress 
was a “human law,” so everyone, including Muslims, was capable of it. But “progress” for 
Muslims would not necessarily mean that they would become French. Urbain cajoled his readers 
to abandon their dreams to  
…arrive at a general uniformity for all, with the same religion, the same 
customs, and the same habits. No, the dream of monarchies and universal 
religions do not belong to our time: association is the new formula… 
Tolerance of one for the other… No nation, no religion can have the arrogance 
to present themselves as the model of progress… no one can say: my political 
law, my social organization, my customs represent for humanity the greatest 
expression of progress…103 
 
In other words, the French could expect Muslims to progress beyond their current state. But they 
could not assume that indigenous peoples would adopt the French model of modernity as they 
became “civilized” or even maintain that the French model of modernity was superior to another 
culture’s alternative.104 Urbain believed that the French could facilitate progress in Algeria. 
                                               
101 Urbain had many reasons for using a pseudonym, but on the most basic level, he employed one because his 
superiors disagreed with him. See Levallois, Ismayl Urbain (1812-1882): Une autre conquête d'Algérie, 613. 
102 Much of this discourse emerged in response to the slaughter of the Christian population in Syria. This event had 
produced an outcry against Islam in France; some writers even suggested that the French should invade the Middle 
East and burn down Mecca, and drive the Muslim Algerian population into the desert. See Levallois, Ismaÿl Urbain, 
Royaume Arabe ou Algérie franco-musulmane, 255. Urbain insisted that the Muslims in Algeria had nothing to do 
with the events in Syria. See Ismayl Urbain, L'Algérie pour les algériens (Paris: Michel Lévy Frères, 1861), 5. This 
was not the first time he had defended Muslims against such charges. See “De la tolerance dans l’islamisme,” Revue 
de Paris (April 1, 1856). 
103 Ismayl Urbain, L'Algérie pour les algériens (Paris: Michel Lévy Frères, 1861), 11. 
104 He also cautioned his readers that progress was necessarily slow and painstaking – “evolution” rather than 
“revolution” - and that it would necessarily encounter resistance. See ibid., 16. 
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However, he also believed that progress would only be possible if the French acknowledged the 
distinctiveness of Algerian culture and approached the Muslims on their own terms.105 
 Even with the right policies, Urbain made clear that the process of “civilizing” Algeria 
would have its challenges: it would require the French state to attract both the fear and respect of 
its Muslim subjects. Urbain contended that the French military administration would be best 
equipped to accomplish these goals. While he praised the work of French civil administrators in 
France, he insisted that the system did not translate well to Algeria. Instead of prefects and 
councils, Algeria needed military administrators who could act swiftly and decisively, calling on 
the authority of armed force when they needed it.106 Moreover, he maintained, the Algerians 
obeyed the French army more willingly than civil authority, because they respected its military 
prowess.107 Civil authority could continue to administer the European population, but elsewhere, 
the military needed free rein.  
Urbain also insisted that France needed to combine military force with measures to 
reconcile the Algerian population to French rule and facilitate its historical progress. He 
contended that the French should codify measures of toleration that were currently only enforced 
sporadically: they especially needed to ensure that administrators respected the jurisdiction of 
Muslim law in cases that only involved the indigenous. They could further garner Muslim 
goodwill by creating social support systems for the indigenous, building hospitals to treat the 
sick, and creating a transparent, universal tax code. At the same time, the French also needed to 
                                               
105 He also insisted that the French government was making more progress at improving the Arab population than 
colonist critics often implied. He insisted that the only place that the French government was really making 
insufficient progress was in Arab population and in the establishment of an Arab civil state. See ibid., 138. 
106 The structure of the French state tended to “enfranchise” individuals; this would only create chaos in Algeria, 
where the indigenous needed to be centralized beneath the authority of the French state. See Ibid., 144, 146. 
107 Moreover, he insisted, Algeria acted as a field on which the French army could practice their technique, remain 
active, and retain their competitiveness. Urbain insisted that using military authority in exceptional circumstances 
was well within the French legal tradition, and by far the most practical solution.  See Ibid., 148. 
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expand the primary school system, develop the Arab-French normal schools, and improve the 
extant Franco-Arab college.108 The state could extend these educational efforts into the adult 
population by printing French texts in Arabic. Finally, Urbain emphasized the importance of 
practical education, and maintained that the French should teach agricultural skills and 
techniques by creating model farms in tribal lands. These policies, Urbain insisted, would not 
only benefit the Muslim population: they would also benefit the French state. The indigenous 
population outnumbered the colonist population: with French guidance, they would also be far 
better suited to develop agriculture in the colony. Investing in their education and attracting their 
goodwill would therefore be the easiest way to secure Algeria’s prosperity.109 
Urbain concluded his pamphlet by insisting that the French government also needed to 
recognize that the indigenous inhabitants of Algeria were culturally, socially, politically, and 
racially diverse, and could not all be treated the same way. By recognizing the strengths and 
weaknesses of the different groups that inhabited Algeria, he maintained, the French could 
simultaneously garner more good will from the indigenous, help each group “progress” towards 
civilization at a faster rate, and make the French possession more productive and wealthier at the 
same time. The French should thus teach the Berbers living on open plains to improve their 
farming and grazing techniques, encourage the Berbers that lived in the mountains to develop 
small industries and crafts, and push the Arabs to expand, extend, and improve their trading 
networks – instead of expecting each group to pick up new professions.110 Finally, the French 
                                               
108 Urbain also insisted that in the civil territories, “fusion” between European and Algerian races needed to be 
sought by slowly granting the Algerians civil equality, freedom of religion, and respect for their customs. These 
measures, more than any others, would bring the Arabs living amidst Europeans into the European fold. He thus did 
support more immediate measures of “assimilation,” in some situations. See Ibid., 154, 156. 
109 Ibid., 135, 189. 
110 Ibid., 27. It is worth noting that Urbain’s attempt to “classify” the different peoples who lived in Algeria was in 
no way unique; even during the Second Empire, colonists and European anthropologists sought to classify them in 
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should solidify their hold on the loyalty of each group by drafting all young men into military 
service, where they would serve alongside the sons of European colonists.111 Through these 
measures, he promised, the French state would both facilitate the indigenous’ historical progress 
and assure the prosperity of the territory. 
 In 1862, Urbain both expanded upon these ideas and modified them in his second 
pamphlet, titled L'Algérie française: Indigènes et immigrants. If his first pamphlet laid out the 
policies that the French Empire should adopt towards Muslims, the second dealt with the legal 
position of the indigenous and colonist populations in French Algeria.112 Urbain began by 
explaining the ambiguities of the indigenous position. He noted that after the French annexed 
Algeria in 1848, the country was no longer a “conquered” territory. As a result, he insisted, the 
indigenous Arabs could not be treated as a “vanquished” people or as foreigners: they needed 
some kind of official status. But thus far, their position remained unspecified and their 
relationship to the French nation unclear.113 As a result, indigenous Algerians were subjected to 
French rule without having access to any of the rights afforded by the French state.114 The 
French had an interest in clarifying the ambiguities of their legal position, Urbain insisted, 
                                               
similar ways. During the Third Republic, the government explicitly made use of these kinds of classifications – 
which were largely constructed by the French – to better rule over the indigenous. Urbain’s treatment here is 
somewhat different because he classified the indigenous both by “racial group” and geographic location, but it 
clearly partakes in the same tradition. For a lengthy treatment of racial classification in Algeria, see Patricia Lorcin, 
Imperial Identities: Stereotyping, Prejudice, and Race in Colonial Algeria (New York: IB Tauris & Co., 1995). 
111 This joint service, Urbain maintained, would weaken the antipathy between the two groups, while simultaneously 
strengthening both the Arabs’ patriotic resolve and the French army. See Ibid., 158. 
112 Ismayl Urbain, L'Algérie française: Indigènes et immigrants (Paris: Challamel Ainé, 1862), vi. 
113 He notes “Up until the moment that the territory was annexed to France, it was possible to consider the 
indigenous as vanquished… But when the land became French, the situation changed radically, because our political 
code could not admit that in a part of the Empire there existed a population that was neither national nor foreign, 
whose rights could not be guaranteed by our ‘pacte fundamentale’…” See ibid., 4. 
114 Urbain notes that they are not enslaved, nor have they for the most part been stripped of their wealth. Indeed, they 
are equal in French law in that they are entitled to French protection for their belongings, their property, and their 
religion. But they have no civil rights, or even clearly defined position in the French state. He indicates that this kind 
of inequality is in certain ways similar to the legal inequality between the sexes in the metropole. See ibid., 9. 
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because such a move would attract indigenous loyalty.115 This process of clarification, however, 
would not be entirely straightforward. Indeed, Urbain indicated that France could not give 
Muslims French citizenship because their laws and social structures were mutually 
incompatible.116 Instead, Urbain proposed that the state should declare the indigenous 
“régnicoles” – a term drawn from the jurisprudence of the ancien régime that referred to the 
inhabitants of a particular kingdom or area. As “régnicoles,” Algerians would be entitled to the 
protection of the French state – unlike foreigners or conquered peoples.  But at the same time, 
they would have neither the rights nor responsibilities of French citizenship.117 
Urbain acknowledged that this status would mark the Algerians as distinct from and 
indeed technically inferior to the Europeans in Algeria, many of whom did have the right to 
French citizenship. But he insisted that legal inferiority of the indigenous should only lie in the 
rights afforded to them – not in the degree to which they would be protected by the state.118 In 
                                               
115 Here, Urbain reiterated his arguments about the potential contributions that the Muslims, if loyal, could make to 
the empire: namely, they could cultivate the land and help fill out the ranks of the French army. See ibid., 79. 
116 Urbain tied this incompatibility largely to the role that religion played in the lives of indigenous peoples – even if 
he did not locate directly in Islam itself. He argued, “As long as the indigenous cannot separate the spiritual and 
temporal realms, as long as their religion and their religious laws remain in contradiction with our Codes, they 
cannot be invested with the title of “French citizen.” The Koran must become a purely religious book, without effect 
on civil legislation.” He went on to note that this progress was not impossible. See ibid., 6. 
117 “Régnicole” is a judicial term from the ancien regime, originally used to designate the inhabitants or natives of a 
kingdom. It was used in contradistinction to “aubain” or foreigner. By the eighteenth century, however, it was 
sometimes used to refer to Jews and Protestants – religious minorities who could not exercise full rights in France. It 
is noteworthy that Urbain used this term instead of describing them as either French citizens or French nationals – 
more common terms in the mid-nineteenth century. By using “regnicole,” however, he could locate the Arab 
population within the French state without either declaring them French citizens or French nationals. See ibid., 6. 
118 “We have stated that the indigenous, from the point of view of civil rights, are only the clients… of France. But 
these restrictions do not place them in a position of subalternity, nor of inferiority, in their relationship with the 
French who inhabit Algeria… The indigenous are equal, as régnicoles, to the French who come from Europe, in the 
sense that they have the right to the same state protection for their liberty, property, and religion. The inequality that 
exists… is an abstract inequality… that no individual could prevail upon for his personal profit to make an 
indigenous person feel inferior. The Algerian indigène and the French immigrant are both subjects of the French 
state – to different degrees and with different titles: but the supremacy of the state to the indigenous cannot be 
invoked by other French subjects… The incapacity that temporarily affects the indigène cannot be used against him 
to exploit him…” See ibid., 10. 
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fact, Urbain reiterated his contention in his first pamphlet that the state should try harder to 
defend the interests of the indigenous peoples in the colony.119 Moreover, he proposed to resolve 
this inequality with a set of policies that diverged even farther from his first pamphlet’s ideals. 
He insisted that the French state should work to induce the indigenous population to adopt 
enough French cultural, social, and political values that they would become eligible for French 
citizenship - thus permanently resolving the problem of their ambiguous status in the French 
Empire, and rendering a large “settler” population redundant.120 Urbain concluded with a 
warning that this process of integration would be slow. But the second pamphlet nevertheless 
broke from the first by implying that the indigenous Algerians would become “French” as they 
progressed - instead of finding their own version of “civilization.” 
 Both of Urbain’s pamphlets emphasized the cultural and social differences between the 
French and the indigenous Algerians, and argued that while the French civilization was the more 
advanced, it was not immutably superior.121 His pamphlets also both insisted that the French 
should not force the indigenous to abandon their cultural practices and assimilate into French 
society overnight. To push them to do so would only create resistance and social chaos. Instead, 
France should try to court the affection of the indigenous and help them “progress” on their own 
terms. 122 But if Urbain clearly laid out the policies that he felt the French needed to follow to 
                                               
119 Insisting that the French needed to separate “the interests of the French nation from the interests of French 
individuals,” Urbain maintained that the French Empire needed to stop funding the land-grabbing policies promoted 
by some colonists that only served to alienate the Algerians further. Urbain went on to imply that the colonizers 
themselves had precipitated this apparent conflation of interests in their propaganda. See ibid., 9. 
120 Urbain insisted that the tribal chiefs should be left in place and that property should remain collective, at least for 
now. “Revolutionizing” Arab society would only create chaos. Moreover, the seeds of democratic thought were 
already present in Arab culture; the French should nurture these sentiments, not overthrow the society. See ibid., 45. 
121 It is also worth noting that while Urbain criticized the indigenous society, he insisted that their culture and 
religion were not inferior to the French. See Ismaël Urbain, “Chrétiens et musulmans, Français et Algériens” Revue 
de l'Orient et de l'Algérie (Oct.-Nov. 1847) vol. II, 359. (Also published in volume form by J. Rouvier in 1848.  
122 Ismayl Urbain, L'Algérie pour les algériens, 89; L'Algérie française: Indigènes et immigrants, 71. 
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reconcile the indigenous and “improve” them, his understanding of the end goal of such policies 
was more opaque. In his first pamphlet, he implied that the indigenous would continue to 
maintain their own distinct social, cultural, and political identity even as they moved forward and 
became “civilized” under French guidance. The Algerians would contribute to the French 
Empire, but they would not become “French,” or assimilate into the French nation. But if this 
model explained the indigenous’ temporary position in the French empire, it left their ultimate 
political fate undecided. Once the French completed their civilizing project and succeeded in 
bringing the indigenous to the same stage of historical progress as the French, what role would 
the Algerians play in the French Empire? If they were “civilized” but not French, what kind of 
political rights would they have?  
Urbain sought to answer these questions in his second pamphlet. Notably, the only way 
that Urbain could find for the indigenous population to lay claim to the rights of political 
participation in the confines of the French Empire was to have access to French citizenship. But 
for Urbain, the rights of French citizenship were deeply intertwined with membership in the 
French nation.123 So for the Algerians to be eligible for citizenship, they not only had to become 
“civilized,” they also needed to become at least partly “French.” Urbain did not endorse the 
“assimilationist” policies championed by the settlers – he insisted that early French initiatives 
should be gradual, and focus on education and practical instruction rather than the disruption of 
Muslim custom or law. The ultimate goal of these efforts, however, would be incorporation, not 
permanent respect of difference. The second pamphlet thus proposed a clear resolution to the 
ambiguities surrounding the indigenous’ position within the French Empire, and laid out a path 
                                               
123 Urbain’s understanding of “nationality” and “citizenship” as fundamentally intertwined had its origins in the 
revolutionary claim that political sovereignty rested in a nation of citizens. See Geoff Eley and Ronald Suny, 
“Introduction,” in Becoming National: A Reader (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 8. 
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towards their political enfranchisement. But it reopened the question of the nature of their 
relationship with the French nation – would Algeria ultimately become a North African 
extension of France? It failed to explain the degree to which the indigenous would need to 
assimilate to gain access to these promised political rights.  
Urbain’s defense of the “associationalist” position – with its attendant ambiguities – 
made wide rounds in political circles in both Algeria and metropolitan France. Though based in 
Algiers, his correspondence with Frédéric Lacroix – who worked in the central colonial 
administration in Paris - kept Urbain connected with a wider network of Parisian administrators 
and governmental officials who were sympathetic to the “Arabophile” position. Lacroix also 
ensured that copies of Urbain’s pamphlets reached all members of the Senate, along with key 
members of Napoleon III’s court. He also pushed to have the pamphlets – which were 
controversial enough to attract attention – republished cheaply so that they circulated widely.124  
While Urbain’s pamphlets generated an outcry among settlers and sparked conversation 
in the Senate, they had their greatest effect on Napoleon III. Beginning in the late 1850s, Lacroix 
communicated Urbain’s ideas about Algeria to the Emperor – who found them appealing in part 
due to the newfound interest he had taken in Saint-Simonian principles as he sought to 
“liberalize” the imperial regime.125 After Lacroix handed Napoleon III L’Algérie pour les 
algériens in 1861, the Emperor’s engagement with Urbain’s thought further increased.126 Shortly 
after the pamphlet’s release, he wrote a letter to the Governor of Algeria Pélissier that clearly 
drew directly on Urbain’s work, noting, “…We must convince the Arabs that we have not come 
                                               
124 Meyer, Tarrade, Rey-Goldzeigueur, Thobie, Histoire de la France Coloniale des origines à 1914, 464. 
125 Napoleon III had been introduced to the ideas of Saint-Simonianism by his tutor, Narcisse Vieillard. Saint-
Simonian ideas also ran through his early political pamphlets. See Hazareesingh, From Subject to Citizen, 25.  
126 Napoleon III began communicating with Urbain – first through Lacroix, and then, after Lacroix’s death in 1863, 
directly. See Abi-Mershed, Apostles of Modernity, 167. 
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to Algeria to despoil them, but to bring them the benefits of civilization… The Arabs are vital to 
colonization.”127 Over the course of the next few years, Lacroix, Lapasset and Urbain would 
work alongside prominent figures like the Baron Jérôme David to convince the Emperor that 
France needed to protect indigenous property, court the affection of its Algerian subjects, and 
allow the military to administer the territory.128 In return, the Emperor began to act. In 1863, he 
pushed the Senate to pass the bill defending indigenous property rights.129 At the same time, he 
published a second letter to Pélissier that redefined Algeria and its place in the French Empire. 
The Emperor’s intervention in these longstanding, vitriolic debates about Algeria, its 
administration, and the rights of its different populations, brought the arguments surrounding the 
French territory into a new key. 
 
IV. Le Royaume Arabe 
While Napoleon III developed his vision of the royaume arabe over the course of several 
years, he recorded his lengthiest reflections on the subject in two letters addressed to the 
governor-general of Algeria, which he published and circulated in the Moniteur universel and in 
pamphlet form. The first appeared in 1863 during the Senate’s debates over indigenous property 
rights, and the second in 1865, several months after his return from his long trip to North Africa. 
Both letters drew upon the memory of the Napoleonic Empire, Saint-Simonian thought about 
                                               
127 By “colonization,” Napoleon III was referring to agricultural development. Pélissier, needless to say, was 
somewhat unimpressed with this statement. In his reply on November 25th, he agreed that Arab colonization was 
important, but insisted that it needed to be complemented by European efforts. See Napoleon III, “Letter to Pélissier, 
1 November 1861,” cited from Spillmann, Napoleon III et le royaume arabe d’Algérie, 26. 
128 Jérôme David was the grandson of the painter of Jacques-Louis David and the godson of Jérôme Bonaparte. 
Early in 1863, he published an influential book titled Réflexions et discours sur la propriété chez les Arabes. 
Influenced by Urbain, he defended his views about Arab property. In fact, many people at court thought that he was 
the author of Urbain’s anonymous pamphlets. See Levallois, Ismaÿl Urbain, Royaume Arabe ou Algérie franco-
musulmane, 338. 
129 Meyer, Tarrade, Rey-Goldzeigueur, Thobie, Histoire de la France Coloniale des origines à 1914, 466. 
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Algeria, and ongoing uncertainties about the connections between empire, nation, and colony 
that dated back to the Revolution. In each, Napoleon III laid out a vision of Algeria, while 
simultaneously reflecting on the nature of the French Empire, its purpose, and its relationship to 
the different peoples beneath its rule. Each time, he also provoked an angry response in colonist 
circles that ultimately extended to the Republican opposition in the metropole. In fact, it was the 
virulence of this response more than Napoleon III’s half-enforced policy changes that would 
come to shape popular understandings of his model of empire during the last years of his reign 
and the early Third Republic. 
Napoleon III began his 1863 letter with a lengthy exposition on the flaws of the current 
Algerian administration. He noted that despite ongoing complaints that the land available to 
settlers was insufficient, European colonists were actually cultivating only a small percentage of 
the territory set aside for them. The government had far more available land than colonists 
interested in farming it.130 French colonists’ inability to make Algeria prosperous therefore 
resulted not from too many restrictions on property purchases, but from the fact that the 
European colonialist project was doomed from the start. There were relatively few Europeans 
interested in emigrating, and those that arrived were ill suited to the climate, unfamiliar with the 
soil, and bewildered by the indigenous population.131 To make the territory viable, Napoleon III 
thus believed, the French needed to invest not in European settlers, but in the Arabs themselves. 
With encouragement, he argued, the nomadic tribes that roamed the countryside could be 
induced to settle down and farm the soil. Drawing the Arabs towards farm work would be the 
fastest and least expensive way to improve and enrich Algeria. But to encourage the Arab 
                                               
130 “Lettre au gouverner d’Algérie – 6 février 1863,” in La Politique Impériale, 391. 
131 Ibid., 391. 
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population to buy into this plan, he maintained, the French needed to “convince the Arabs that 
we have not arrived to oppress or despoil them, but to bring them the benefits of civilization.”132 
To convey this message, the French should assure the indigenous population of their rights to 
their land. Any further talk of cantonnement or “resettling” the tribes would only serve to 
alienate the very people critical to the territory’s success.133 
Napoleon III did not claim that French colonists had no place in Algeria. But he insisted 
that the colonists would never form the bulk of the population, and therefore could not make 
Algeria a prosperous agricultural state.134 Instead of trying to claim land from the more 
numerous indigenous, who were better suited for farming it, he contended that Europeans should 
work as technicians and skilled laborers. By building up the Algerian infrastructure, clearing 
forests, irrigating farmland, and teaching farming techniques, they could facilitate the imperial 
project of “improving” the Algerian population and reconciling the indigenous to French rule.135 
The indigenous and colonist populations would thus complement one another instead of 
competing with one another. 
After laying out the roles of both the colonists and the indigenous in Algeria, Napoleon 
III’s letter went on to redefine the territory itself by declaring that it was “not a colony” but a 
royaume arabe. Napoleon III’s insistence that Algeria should not be described as a colony was 
based on the belief that the term “colony” did not just signify a state’s overseas territory; it 
specifically referred to a territory that the state intended to populate primarily with its own 
                                               
132 Ibid., 392. 
133 Ibid., 391. 
134 The Emperor emphasized that there were three million indigenous Algerians in Algeria in comparison to 200,000 
Europeans and 20,000 French citizens. See Ibid., 392. 
135 “Lettre au gouverner d’Algérie – 6 février 1863,” in La Politique Impériale, 393. 
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citizens.136 Because Napoleon III thought that the indigenous would remain the primary 
population of Algeria, he believed that calling it a “colony” would be misleading. His contention 
that the territory should instead be understood as a royaume arabe or “Arab kingdom,” on the 
other hand, emerged from his commitment to the “politics of nationality.” 137 Especially in light 
of his promise to a group of Arab listeners in 1865 that France did not invade Algeria “to destroy 
the nationality of a people,” it seems clear that Napoleon III saw Algeria as a country of Arabs 
who had a cohesive sense of identity.138 By calling Algeria a royaume arabe, Napoleon III was 
thus not only emphasizing the importance of the Arab population in the territory, but also 
describing Algeria as an Arab nation. 
Napoleon’s vision of the indigenous’ and colonists’ respective positions in the new 
Algeria closely paralleled the ideas laid out in Ismaël Urbain’s pamphlets.139 Both Urbain and 
Napoleon III agreed that the indigenous, and not the colonists, would be central to Algeria’s 
success or failure. They also proposed similar economic roles for the indigenous and colonist 
                                               
136 Later in the century, colonial theorists would argue that all overseas territories should be referred to as 
“colonies,” and that only some of said colonies were “settler colonies.” But it is clear that for Napoleon III, “colony” 
and “settler colony” were synonymous terms. Here, Napoleon III seems to have been drawing on the thought of 
Ismael Urbain, who argued that to call Algeria a “colony” was to emphasize the importance of the colonists living 
there over the importance of the indigenous. See Levallois, Ismaÿl Urbain, Royaume Arabe ou Algérie franco-
musulmane, 322. 
137 Napoleon III first used the term in his unpublished letter to Pélissier in 1861, which concluded with the exact 
same statement that he published in 1863: “Algeria is not technically a colony, but a royaume arabe.” See Napoleon 
III, “Lettre à Pélissier, 11 January 1861.” Found in Jean Martin, L'Empire Renaissant, 1789-1871. (Paris: Denoel, 
1987), 306-308. 
138 Napoleon III had gone on to compare the Arabs to the position of the Gauls in the Roman Empire. He noted that 
the Gauls had fought the Romans, but eventually incorporated Roman ideas and practices into their forms of social 
organization. Even after the collapse of Rome, the French nation – which had emerged out of this confluence of 
Gaulish and Roman culture and ideas – continued to thrive. He promised that French rule would bring a similar set 
of advantages to the Arabs; it would preserve their cultural identity while helping them progress. See René de Saint-
Félix, Le Voyage de S. M. L'Empereur Napoleon III en Algérie et la Régence de S. M. Impératrice. Rédigé d'après 
les documents officiels. Précédé d'une notice historique et suivi de biographies (Paris: Eug. Pick, Grande Librairie 
Napoleonienne, 1865), 110. 
139 Urbain claimed that the Emperor confessed to “pillaging his pamphlet to write his letter.” See Levallois, Ismayl 
Urbain (1812-1882): Une autre conquête d'Algérie, 620. 
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populations. The differences between their proposals lay in the way in which they described the 
indigenous themselves. Napoleon III, unlike Urbain, did not differentiate between the 
populations inhabiting the territory.140 Ismaël Urbain had divided the indigenous population into 
the Kabyles, the Arabs, the Moors, the Turks, and the Jews; he insisted that they all had unique 
talents and proclivities and would contribute in different ways to Algeria’s prosperity. Napoleon 
III, on the other hand, referred to all inhabitants of Algeria as Arabs. His understanding of the 
indigenous as a single, unified ethnic group was important because it was what enabled him to 
assume that the territory had a “national” coherence and to classify it as a royaume arabe.141 
The conclusion of Napoleon III’s letter both reinforced the centrality of the indigenous to 
Algeria and underlined his vision of the territory as an Arab nation. He noted: “the natives have 
the same right to my protection as the colonists do, and I am as much the Emperor of the Arabs 
as I am the Emperor of the French.”142 The first half of the statement clearly indicated that 
indigenous and colonist interests were equal in the eyes of the French state. Again, it drew on 
Urbain’s contention in his 1863 pamphlet that the indigenous deserved protection and 
consideration equal to that of the French colonists – even if they exercised different levels of 
political rights. The second half of the statement, however, once again broke away from Urbain. 
On one level, it was a simple extension of the idea that the Arabs had the same rights to the 
                                               
140 There were some differences in the details too. Unlike Urbain, Napoleon III did not indicate that the indigenous 
would play a key role in the empire’s North African Army. He also devoted less space and attention to the question 
of how France should educate its Algerian subjects. 
141 Ismaël Urbain never described Algeria as either an “Arab kingdom” or an “Arab nation” – at least in part because 
he recognized that not all of its inhabitants identified as Arabs. He had pleaded for the French state to recognize the 
indigenous’ cultural differences – but not to treat Algeria as a unified, self-identified nation. But it is worth noting 
that Urbain’s attempt to “classify” the indigenous Algerian population into different groups was not necessarily less 
problematic than Napoleon III’s decision to treat them as one, united and undifferentiated group of people. Both of 
these visions of Algeria were more reflective of European norms, customs, and ideas about the “Orient” than of 
Algerian people per se. See Patricia Lorcin, Imperial Identities: Stereotyping, Prejudice, and Race in Colonial 
Algeria (New York: IB Tauris & Co., 1995), 17. 
142 “Lettre au gouverner d’Algérie – 6 février 1863,” in La Politique Impériale, 394. 
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Emperor’s attention as the colonists did. But it had wider-reaching implications when deployed 
alongside the idea that Algeria was a royaume arabe. If, as the letter contended, Napoleon III 
was equally the Emperor of both the French and the Arabs, it followed that he was also the 
Emperor of both the French and Algerian or Arab nations.143 This formulation proposed to re-
orient understandings of the North African territory, its relationship to the French nation, and the 
position of both France and Algeria in the French Empire.  
Napoleon III proposed this formulation at least in part to resolve the ongoing debates 
about Algeria’s status that dated back to the 1848 republican decision to classify the French 
overseas holding as a “French territory” and divide it into three French departments. These 
measures transformed Algeria, at least from an administrative perspective, into an overseas 
extension of the French nation-state.144 But during the subsequent fifteen years, colonists, 
administrators, and the military had argued over the degree and scope of its integration into 
France. Napoleon III sought to end this debate by insisting that Algeria constituted a separate, 
Arab nation that was not part of France at all, nor subject to the authority of French citizens or 
colonists. Instead, it was part of the French Empire and subject to the authority of the Emperor 
and his administration. 
Napoleon III’s contention that Algeria was an “Arab nation” distinct from the “French 
nation” marked a deviation from the vision of the Second Empire that he had long promoted. 
Early in his reign, Napoleon III had treated the “French nation” and the “French Empire” as 
functional equivalents: he had used the term “empire” to designate a specific kind of political 
program in France, mobilizing it in opposition to “republic” or “kingdom.” But according to this 
                                               
143 Napoleon III’s official title was “Emperor of the French” – a designation that dated back to the French 
Revolution and emphasized the political sovereignty of the French people organized into the French nation.  
144 Guy Pervillé, La France en Algérie, 45. 
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new model, the Empire was a multinational entity, composed of a set of distinct nations ruled by 
the same central administration. Beneath this new regime, “empire” would refer both to a form 
of metropolitan political organization and to a way of ordering and relating different peoples 
beneath one governing body. The model thus collapsed “metropolitan” policies and France’s 
relationship to “overseas” territories together into one overarching imperial entity. It also 
extended the reach of Napoleon III’s faltering empire, casting it as larger than the nation itself. 
France would continue to occupy the privileged position in this constellation of nations, but it 
would stand beneath a wider imperial structure. Moreover, by symbolically extending his 
empire’s reach, Napoleon III associated his position with the conquests and expansionary vision 
of Napoleon I, who had sought to reorganize all of Europe beneath his rule.145  
If Napoleon III’s desire to reformulate the meaning of “empire” to signify both a 
metropolitan system of government and a multinational governing organization testified to his 
increasing desire to connect his reign with his uncle’s legacy, his new vision of empire remained 
different from that of Napoleon I in at least one key way. While Napoleon I certainly drew upon 
and made use of nationalist discourses in France itself to justify his rule and draw support for his 
military campaigns, he did not treat the other areas of Europe he conquered as “nations.”146 
While he negotiated with the local political leaders of certain states, he did not see the peoples he 
conquered as groups with distinct identities that needed to be respected.147 France was thus the 
                                               
145 Algeria was a particularly convenient site for this reformulation of French imperial identity, since the French had 
already conquered it. By emphasizing the importance of the territory, instead of ignoring it, as he had done in the 
early years of his reign, Napoleon III could expand his empire without actually conquering new territory. 
146 Indeed, most scholars agree that nationalism was an “accidental” export of the Napoleonic Empire. See Charles 
Esdaille, ed, Popular Resistance in the French Wars (Basingstroke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005). 
147 He based his decisions about how to assimilate each of the conquered areas into the French infrastructure and 
French law on an assessment of each area’s potential resources, its strategic position, and the tractability of local 
elites – not on any acknowledgement of its “identity.” See Geoffrey Ellis, “The Nature of Napoleonic Imperialism,” 
in Napoleon and Europe, ed. by Philip G. Dwyer (London: Pearson Education Limited, 2001), 100. 
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only “nation” in the first Napoleonic Empire, and if France was not synonymous with the French 
Empire, the Empire nevertheless operated as an extension of the French nation-state. In other 
words, even as Napoleon III tried to bolster his prestige by drawing on Napoleon I’s expansive 
vision of the French Empire, he also sought to modify that vision. He proposed to establish a 
new kind of overarching political organization that could include multiple nations within its rule. 
Napoleon III’s attempt to reconcile a “politics of nationality” with his desire to construct 
a larger empire was an inherently contradictory undertaking. He specifically criticized the 
Russian, Austrian, and Ottoman empires because they failed to respect the rights of different 
peoples to rule themselves, and called, at least privately, for their dissolution into nation-
states.148 How, then, could he claim that an expansive French empire would be able to respect the 
rights of nationalities, if other European empires could not? In his letters and speeches, Napoleon 
III reconciled this apparent contradiction by describing the French Empire’s expansionary 
project as exceptional, since it was both “civilizing” and “progressive.”149 By indicating that the 
French Empire would help the Arab people “regenerate” just as the Romans under Julius Caesar 
enabled the Gauls to “develop” into a great people, Napoleon III positioned the French Empire as 
the catalyst that would enable Arab nationality to emerge.150 The French Empire’s control over 
Algeria – and, presumably, the other countries in North Africa that Napoleon III hoped 
ultimately to annex – would therefore not oppress Arab nationality, but “liberate” it. Napoleon 
III resisted calling the French Empire “colonial,” and his model of empire collapsed metropolitan 
                                               
148 Napoleon III, “Les idées Napoleoniennes,” 70. 
149 In his proclamation to the inhabitants of Algeria in 1865, Napoleon III noted, “We must be the masters, because 
we are the more civilized; we must be generous, because we are the stronger. We must justify the glorious act of my 
predecessors… by fostering the growth of civilization...” See “Proclamation aux habitants de l’Algérie (3 mai 
1865)” in La Politique Impériale, 436. 
150 See Saint-Félix, Le Voyage de S. M. L'Empereur Napoleon III en Algérie, 110. 
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and overseas models of empire on top of each other by employing the discourse of nationality. 
But the model he proposed was nevertheless predicated on the racist logic that had come to 
characterize European interactions with North Africa ever since Napoleon I’s Egyptian 
campaign. Napoleon III’s multinational empire was intellectually possible because it 
incorporated the widely shared belief that Algeria was “behind” France. In other words, even as 
Napoleon III positioned himself as the “protector of the Arabs,” he reified contemporary 
understandings of North Africans as inferior to Europeans.151 
Napoleon III’s letter to Pélissier, which newspapers across France and Algeria published 
on 6 February 1863, drew widespread attention. Its argumentation, combined with concerns 
about the Senate’s pending ruling on indigenous property, set off a wave of anger across Algeria 
that spread to the metropole. The colonists wrote petitions, protested in journals, posted placards 
on public buildings, and gathered in public squares to protest both the letter and the measure.152 
In a letter to Lacroix dated on February 21, Ismaël Urbain noted that even administrators had 
joined the protest: “In Philippeville… the mayor of Saint-Charles sent a policeman to get each 
colonist to sign a petition while asking them whether they would prefer to stay French or become 
Arab.”153 Over the following weeks, administrators, journalists, and ordinary colonists voiced 
their objections to Napoleon III’s attempt to redefine the position of the colonists in Algeria and 
reconceptualize the territory, its relationship to France, and its place in the French Empire. Even 
                                               
151 This is worth emphasizing at least in part because much of the scholarly literature written about Napoleon III’s 
royaume arabe in the 1970s tended to portray the Emperor and his advisors as the early predecessors to later anti-
colonialist movements. It is clear that both Napoleon III and his advisors believed in the French imperial project, 
even if they defined it differently than the colonists and metropolitan republicans did. Moreover, while Napoleon III 
certainly positioned himself as the defender of Arab rights, he did very little to protect these “rights.” See, for 
example, Spillman, Napoléon III et le Royaume Arabe en Algérie. 
152 Meyer, Tarrade, Rey-Goldzeigueur, Thobie, Histoire de la France Coloniale des origines à 1914, 467. 
153 Urbain à Lacroix, 21 February 1863, CAOM 1X 3/184, found in Levallois, Ismaÿl Urbain, Royaume Arabe. 
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the Governor-General Pélissier expressed grave doubts about Napoleon III’s new plans in his 
private letters.154 
Napoleon III’s claim that Algeria was “not a colony” but a “royaume arabe” especially 
attracted colonist anger. A petition in Bône published in a local newspaper on February 27 with 
400 signatures condemned the royaume arabe as “a nation without nationality, an agglomeration 
of savage hordes, all enemies of one another.”155 It thus insisted that Algeria could not be a 
nation because none of its people felt united; its peoples were too “savage” to identify with one 
another. As a result, it implied, the Emperor’s dream of reconstituting the colony as a kingdom-
nation was fundamentally impossible. Other colonists were more concerned about the effect that 
Napoleon III’s declaration would have on colonists’ status in the territory. On 17 February 1863, 
the Indépendent de Constantine pronounced, “It has been decided! We are the subjects of a 
royaume arabe and not the apostles of civilization, the initiators of progress among a barbarian 
and ignorant people. The moral and material consequences of this declaration are immense.”156 
By categorizing Algeria as a royaume arabe, the anonymous journalist thus insisted, the 
Emperor was threatening colonist identity. Instead of treating the colonists as civilizers of 
barbarians, the declaration collapsed the differences between colonists and colonized, subsuming 
the European population into the indigenous one. On February 13, Le Courrier d’Algérie put it 
even more provocatively: “It is no longer the Arabs who will become French but the French who 
                                               
154 Pélissier criticized the roles Napoleon III laid out for colonists and indigenous in the colony. While he 
acknowledged that the indigenous might help develop Algerian agriculture, he insisted that European colonist-
farmers were necessary too. He maintained that colonists would serve as good examples to the Arabs, and help 
encourage them towards civilization. He insisted that instead of reducing the number of colonists, the government 
needed to expand its efforts to attract new colonists to Algeria. See Aimable Jean-Jacques Pélissier, “Rapport à 
l’Empereur,” CAOM GGA 1EE26 
155 As quoted in Charles Ageron, Bulletin de l’Académie du second Empire, no. 8 (January-February, 1993). 
156 The newspaper went on to note that the colonists in the three provinces were petitioning to send a delegation to 
Paris to contest this appellation and the decree on Arab property in front of the Senate. See “Lettre de l’Empereur,” 
Indépendant de Constantine (17 February 1863), as quoted in Levallois, Ismaÿl Urbain, Royaume Arabe, 369. 
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will become Arabs.”157 From these reactions, it is clear that many colonists saw the Emperor’s 
attempt to reimagine Algeria’s relationship with France and the French Empire as misguided. 
Some claimed that it simply would not work; others maintained that it would be tantamount to 
abandoning France’s civilizing project and forcing the colonists to merge with the indigenous 
population, all while allowing the indigenous to lapse back into “savagery.” 
Settlers did not only express their discontent in the colonial press. Over the course of the 
weeks following the publication of the Emperor’s letter, several prominent settlers produced 
pamphlets published both in Algeria and in Paris that sought to make a case against Napoleon 
III’s reconfiguration of Algeria to a metropolitan audience. Because they were seeking a wide 
audience and wanted to escape political censorship laws, many of these writers did not criticize 
the Emperor and his letter directly.158 Instead, they blamed Ismaël Urbain’s pamphlets for 
misrepresenting the situation in Algeria to the metropole.159 These pamphleteers took upon 
themselves the task of demonstrating to the Emperor and the metropole that, contrary to 
                                               
157 La Gironde repeated the same claim approximately a week later. See La Gironde (23 February 1863); Le 
Courrier d’Algérie (13 February 1863); La Presse (24 February 1863). 
158 It was one thing to publish inflammatory reactions in local papers; but to publish responses that attacked the 
Emperor in the metropolitan press edged towards political opposition – which, even in this era of liberalizing press 
laws, was dangerous. In fact, some ocolonists, like Jules Vinet, specifically tried to differentiate their position from 
those of colonists that they felt came dangerously close to crossing into political opposition. See Jules Vinet, La 
Crise algérienne: Quelques mots sur la colonisation. La Lettre de Sa Majesté l'Empereur (Paris: E. Dentu, 1863), 4. 
159 Urbain’s pamphlet played a ubiquitous role in this literature. Bordet, the editor of l’Akhbar, published a brochure 
called L’Algérie: Immigrants et Indigènes, whose title clearly played off Urbain’s to emphasize the centrality of 
colonists, instead of the indigenous, to the colony. Many pamphlets condemned his work directly. Marcel Lucet, the 
president of the Agricultural Committee of Constantine, began his defense of European colonization by condemning 
“the deplorable tendencies of the pamphlet Indigènes et immigrants,” claiming that it was responsible for misleading 
the Emperor. Réméon Pescheux went a step farther, and argued that the pamphlet’s “anti-French” writer was 
responsible for threatening the metropole’s very ability to hold on to its overseas territory by convincing the 
Emperor to entrust the Arabs instead of the colonists with Algeria’s future. He noted that many Algerian journals – 
including 'Akbhar, le Courrier de l'Algérie, L'Écho and le Courrier d'Oran, l'Observateur de Blidah, le Courrier de 
Tlemcen, l'Écho de Setif, le Zéramna, L'Africain, l'Indépendant, la Seybouse – also had voiced a similar opinion. See 
Bordet, l’Algérie: Immigrants et Indigènes (Alger; Paris: Challamel, 1863); Marcel Lucet, Colonisation européenne 
en Algérie: Légitime Défense (Constantine: Marle; Paris: Challamel Ainé, 1863), 5, 11. See Réméon Pescheux, 
Réfutation algérienne: Vive l'Algérie! malgré la brochure "Indigènes et immigrants" (Constantine: La Librairie 
Guende; Alger: M. Tissier; Paris: Challamel, 1863), 5. 
  80 
“Arabophile claims,” French colonization in Algeria was not a failed project.160 By explaining 
the promise of European colonization and highlighting the untrustworthiness of the indigenous, 
they sought to convince the Emperor that reorganizing Algeria as a royaume arabe would be 
unnecessary and destructive – without virulently attacking his letter.  
Most of these pamphlets began by defending European colonization. Some writers, like 
Jules Vinet, did not deny that it had been unsuccessful. Vinet, however, was quick to insist that 
the project’s problems stemmed not from its impossibility, but from its mismanagement. He 
compared French colonization in Algeria to American colonization in the west, and noted that 
the difference between the regimes was that the Algerian colonists “lacked liberty” and 
“stability.” The American government attracted colonists by investing them with political rights, 
giving them tax exemptions, and supporting their endeavors with state funds. In Algeria, on the 
other hand, the French government consistently neglected the colonists, subjected them to 
military rule, and failed to grant them a constitution – and as a result, colonists’ efforts had 
stuttered to a halt.161 Auguste-Hubert Warnier, on the other hand, was less willing to claim that 
French colonization thus far had failed. Instead, he insisted that the colonists had accomplished 
remarkable feats considering how little support they had received from the French state.162 In 
three highly visible pamphlets published between 1863 and 1865, he sought to demonstrate to 
metropolitan audiences that the colonists’ endeavors in Algeria had in fact been the only fruitful 
                                               
160 Auguste-Hubert Warnier, who eventually became one of the key colonist voices in the debate over the future of 
Algeria, similarly condemned the “anonymous author” who had “falsified” the statistics and made the colonist 
project look less successful than it was. Warnier was a former Saint-Simonian who had become increasingly 
sympathetic to the colonist position during his time in Algeria. This pamphlet was originally published as a series of 
letters in the metropolitan journal l’Opinion nationale. See Auguste-Hubert Warnier, L'Algérie devant le Sénat, 
indigènes et immigrants (Paris: Dubuisson, 1863), 26. 
161 Jules Vinet, La Crise algérienne, 3. 
162 He insisted that French colonists had no more rights than the indigenous did, and received less attention from the 
state. He noted, “French citizens who inhabit the colony have no rights, either in France or in Algeria…” See 
Auguste-Hubert Warnier, L'Algérie devant le Sénat, indigènes et immigrants (Paris: Dubuisson, 1863), 4, 45. 
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outcome of all French intervention in the territory thus far.163 But if he disagreed with Vinet 
about the state of European colonization in Algeria, his criticisms of French policy were quite 
similar: he argued that the French state had threatened the territory’s viability by 
disenfranchising the settlers, failing to give them a constitution, and forcing them to contend with 
unclear laws surrounding property ownership. These problems, he argued, would remain as long 
as the military continued to administer the territory, as the military was interested in enforcing 
discipline and security, not in protecting colonists’ rights.164 To enable the colonists to transform 
Algeria into a peaceful and prosperous place, the territory needed to be reorganized permanently 
under a civil administration.165 The government also needed to make more land available to 
colonists, while extending the rights of French citizenship to them.166  
Vinet, Warnier and Réméon Pescheux all also expressed reservations about the 
Emperor’s desire to entrust Algeria’s colonization to the indigenous. Pescheux dismissed the 
indigenous as “savages” who could never serve the interests of France.167 Vinet did not contend 
that the indigenous would never be able to contribute to the colony’s prosperity, but he insisted 
that they were unsuited for agricultural work. He claimed that they were “not a people, but a 
permanent army, with all of the benefits and weaknesses of real warriors... [they are] miserable 
slaves, poor farmers…”168 Warnier too argued that the Arabs were incompetent farmers, and 
maintained that the French government had wasted all the money it had invested in them over the 
                                               
163 He deployed statistics to support his celebration of the colonist agricultural and construction projects. See ibid., 9. 
164 Auguste-Hubert Warnier, L'Algérie devant l'opinion publique. (Alger: Molot, 1864), 161. 
165 Warnier insisted that the Prince Napoleon, despite the fact that he had never actually lived in Algeria, was by far 
the most effective and enlightened leader that Algeria had ever had. See Warnier, L'Algérie devant le Sénat, 2. 
166 He insisted, like many other colonists, that the land did not really belong to the indigenous anyway. See ibid., 78. 
167 Réméon Pescheux, Réfutation algérienne: Vive l'Algérie! malgré la brochure "Indigènes et immigrants" 
(Constantine: La Librairie Guende; Alger: M. Tissier; Paris: Challamel, 1863), 7. 
168 Jules Vinet, La Crise algérienne, 8. 
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past thirty years.169 Unlike Vinet, however, Warnier did not argue that the indigenous would 
never be able to farm. Instead, he maintained that the indigenous’ inability to learn better 
agricultural techniques stemmed from France’s policy of isolating them from the colonial 
population. Warnier insisted that the government would never succeed in educating the 
indigenous until native Algerians were forced to work with colonists.170 By attempting to curb 
European colonization, the government was thus effectively ensuring that the indigenous would 
remain incompetent agriculturalists indefinitely. 171 
The pamphlet-writers used these expositions of the benefits of French colonization to 
launch pointed criticisms of the Emperor’s attempt to recategorize Algeria as a “royaume arabe.” 
Vinet insisted that because indigenous were “children,” France could not entrust them with 
Algeria’s future. Instead of separating Algeria from France, he maintained, the Emperor should 
assimilate the territory into the metropole.172 Warnier went even farther, insisting that Napoleon 
III’s “royaume arabe” was based on a fundamental misunderstanding of the indigenous 
population. It made no sense, he insisted, to transform Algeria into a “royaume arabe” in the 
name of indigenous rights when not all of the indigenous were Arabs.173 Not only was the 
indigenous population multiethnic, moreover: it also had no unity of any kind – let alone a sense 
                                               
169 He employed a series of charts to support this point. He also insisted that the colonists were not stealing the 
Arabs’ land, because under Muslim law, the Arabs had no right to it. See Auguste-Hubert Warnier, L'Algérie devant 
l'opinion publique. Pour faire suite à L'Algérie devant le Sénat, indigènes et immigrant (Alger: Molot, 1864), 3. 
170 Auguste-Hubert Warnier, L'Algérie devant le Sénat, indigènes et immigrants (Paris: Dubuisson, 1863), 56. 
171 He noted that the government was consistently afraid that the colonists would exploit the Algerians, but claimed 
that Algeria’s past had shown that colonists and Algerians could work well together. See ibid., 67. 
172 He concluded: “Algeria is not a simple colony; it is the continuation of France…” Vinet, La Crise algérienne, 16. 
173 In fact, he insisted, the “real” indigenous of Algeria were not Arabs at all – they were Berbers or Kabyles. These 
Kabyles, he insisted, “are much closer to our civilization than the Arab; a very serious error has been committed up 
to this day in failing to distinguish between these two different peoples…" The fact that the Berbers were the “true 
indigenous,” moreover, meant that their assimilation would be easy. The Berbers had once been subjects of Rome; 
while they currently practiced Islam, they were once Christians. Moreover, their family life and civil organization 
was inherently democratic. As a result, they would assimilate easily into French society as long as they could follow 
colonist examples. See Auguste-Hubert Warnier, L'Algérie devant L'Empereur (Paris: Challamel aîné, 1865), 4-18. 
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of national identity.174 As a result, the Emperor should not promise to preserve an “Arab” or any 
other kind of indigenous identity within the wider French empire – no such identity existed.175 
Warnier and Vinet thus both condemned not only the Emperor’s plan to reduce European 
colonization; they also attacked the intellectual structure behind that plan. They maintained that 
Algeria needed to be incorporated into France, not treated as a separate “nation” loosely 
connected to it through an overarching imperial structure. 
Vinet and Warnier, along with other pamphlet-writers who worked hard to publish in 
Parisian journals and newspapers, succeeded in bringing the debates about colonization, the 
indigenous, and Napoleon III’s royaume arabe into the metropole.176 They found particular 
success in spreading their ideas among ever-more-vocal opposition republican groups in 
France.177 Republican newspapers were sympathetic to the colonist position in part because they 
were ready to endorse any complaints that cast Napoleon III in a bad light.178 But the affinity 
between the groups was also due to the fact that most colonists who sought publication in the 
metropole drew on republican language to reject Napoleon III’s vision of the French Empire and 
to propose a different model for Algeria’s future.179 Pamphleteers mobilized the republican 
                                               
174 Ibid., 5. 
175 Its colonist population should be immediately granted the same civil rights as the ones French citizens exercised 
in the metropole, while the Arab population should be slowly assimilated beneath French rule. See Ibid., 289. 
176 The fact that many journals were published in Paris shows that the colonists were seeking out a metropolitan 
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discourse of assimilation to position the colonists as underdogs in a fight against imperial 
despotism. The colonists, they maintained, were clamoring for assimilation in order to secure 
civil rights from a repressive administration that continued to deny them.180 Assimilation, they 
insisted, would also liberate the indigenous by freeing them from their despotic chiefs and 
religion.181 If Napoleon III remade the territory into a “royaume arabe,” on the other hand, and 
refused to rule it according to French law and custom, both the settlers and the indigenous would 
continue to live in oppression.182  
For the most part, prominent republican journals in France did not specifically intervene 
in this ongoing debate about Algeria’s future.183 They did, however, find the colonists 
convincing enough to consistently offer their publications as a platform for their cause. This was 
at least in part because printing colonist opinions about Algeria served as a convenient way to 
criticize imperial policy without directly attacking Napoleon III.184 But as a result, even by the 
end of 1863, opposition to the royaume arabe was becoming a component of metropolitan 
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republican thought.185 The colonists’ delegation to the Senate’s debates over Arab property 
further extended attention to the colonist cause in the metropole, even outside of republican 
circles.186 Debates about Algeria’s future – and its implications for the wider French Empire – 
were not front-page news in Paris. But Napoleon III’s policies in Algeria increasingly became 
one of the targets of the political opposition. 
Even in 1863, pamphleteers like Warnier, Vinet, and Bordet had been successful enough 
at attracting Parisian attention that Frédéric Lacroix took it upon himself to defend Napoleon 
III’s letter and condemn the colonists’ position after the vote of the Senate.187 In his pamphlet, he 
attempted to break the new republican-colonist alliance by contesting the colonists’ claims that 
they were acting in the name of “civil rights” and “liberation” for the settlers and the indigenous 
alike. In fact, he maintained, the colonists were acting “hysterically” and “selfishly”: they 
objected to the Emperor’s proposals not because those proposals were unjust, he maintained, but 
because they threatened the colonists’ self-interest.188 To make matters worse, they had 
responded to Napoleon III’s letter by unleashing a flood of racial prejudice against the 
indigenous in the colonial press. They had even attempted to spread their racial hatred across the 
Mediterranean by publishing it in Paris.189 This incident, he insisted, had proven more clearly 
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than ever that the colonists did not have the interests of the indigenous at heart, and showed the 
indigenous needed state protection.190  
After condemning the colonists’ response to the Emperor’s letter, Lacroix then turned to 
critiquing their description of Algeria, along with the model of its future that they had proposed. 
First, he insisted that despite their claims to the contrary, organizing Algeria’s economic system 
around European farmers was a fundamentally unsound idea. In their vitriolic response to the 
Emperor, the colonists had wildly overestimated the success of the colonization project.191 Many 
settlers in Algeria continued to die of fever, most of the lands they cultivated proved to be 
infertile, and thus far, most colonists had failed to produce enough food to even nourish 
themselves.192 To make matters worse, they had seriously hindered France’s project of civilizing 
the indigenous and convincing them to accept French rule. Not only had the colonists alienated 
the indigenous by attempting to steal their land, they had also passed along French vices to 
them.193 He insisted that in the future, the colonists needed, if anything, to be kept further away 
from the native Algerians. 
Lacroix also contended that the colonists had misled metropolitan audiences about 
indigenous Algerians. He began by condemning their contention that the indigenous “lacked a 
nationality,” and compared the colonist position on the subject to the Austrian empire’s failure to 
recognize the national identity of Italy. In other words, the colonists only denied the existence of 
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an Arab national identity because it was convenient.194 He also objected to the circulating claim 
that the Arabs were fundamentally weak, and could therefore only benefit from being assimilated 
into French society. He insisted that with guidance, the Arabs could in fact regain their strength 
and re-establish themselves.195 However, he warned, this progress would become impossible if 
the colonists succeeding in abolishing the tribal structure and establishing individual property.196 
Such measures would only succeed in disrupting and alienating the indigenous population. At 
least for the present moment, the indigenous needed to retain their autonomous institutions.197  
Lacroix approached the debates surrounding Napoleon III’s royaume arabe more 
cautiously. In fact, he only used the term once in the entire ninety-two page pamphlet - to note 
that Algeria was a “royaume arabe… as India is a royaume indien.”198 By comparing the 
Emperor’s conception of Algeria as a royaume arabe to the British system in India, Lacroix 
simultaneously defended the Emperor’s use of the term, discredited colonist interpretations of it, 
and domesticated its implications. If both Algeria and India could be called “royaumes,” as 
Lacroix contended, then all the term really signified was a territory where the most important 
population was made up of indigenous peoples. It did not imply, as some colonists had argued, 
that the Emperor would eliminate the French colonist population, or force them to “become 
Arab” in some way. According to Lacroix’s pamphlet, the Emperor’s decision to call Algeria a 
“royaume arabe” was thus neither radical nor misguided; it was a simple reflection of the 
territory’s demographic composition.  
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Of course, this defense of the Emperor’s use of the term “royaume arabe” necessarily 
undercut the radical nature of Napoleon III’s vision of an empire that would span across nations. 
First, by placing Algeria alongside a territory that the British consistently described as a colony 
and claiming they were both “royaumes,” Lacroix undermined the Emperor’s juxtaposition of 
“colony” with “royaume arabe.” According to Lacroix, a “royaume arabe” was just a particular 
type of colony, not a fundamentally different kind of political organization. Most notably, it was 
not tied to any conception of “nation.” Indeed, Lacroix made it clear that he thought that Algeria 
would only temporarily remain a “royaume arabe." He strongly implied that Algeria would one 
day become more assimilated into France – even if he disagreed with the colonizers about the 
pace and methods of the assimilation process. In other words, while Lacroix’s pamphlet shared 
the Emperor’s belief in an Arab national identity, he was not committed to guaranteeing 
Algeria’s status as a discrete nation.199 
As Lacroix’s treatment of the term royaume arabe makes clear, even he – one of the 
“Arabophiles” who had helped shape Napoleon III’s thought on Algeria – had hesitations about 
the Emperor’s vision of Algeria as an Arab nation ruled by a multinational French Empire. This 
hesitation stemmed in part from Lacroix’s underlying belief that the goal of “association” was to 
reconcile the indigenous to French rule – however slowly. By 1863, even Urbain had begun to 
think that the indigenous would eventually have to be assimilated into French society to some 
degree in order to exercise real political rights in the French Empire. Napoleon III’s vision of 
empire did not seem to leave room for this kind of future assimilation, which left both Lacroix 
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and Urbain concerned about how the Arabs would ever come to be equal to the French in the 
eyes of the state.200 But much of Urbain’s and Lacroix’s frustration with the term seems to have 
stemmed from the fact that it simply aroused too much opposition. 201 For both thinkers, it was 
more important to secure the rights of the indigenous than to secure their national identity.202 
They did not share the Emperor’s interest in trying to redefine the French Empire itself as an 
expansive multinational entity, but simply wanted to protect the indigenous from the colonizers. 
Napoleon III’s vision of colonization, Algeria, and the French Empire thus attracted very 
minimal support in either Algeria or France. 203 And even after the Senate passed the decree 
protecting Arab property, the Governor-General Pélissier and the colonial administration did 
very little to put any of its measures in place.204 Napoleon III wrote the Governor-General a 
strongly worded letter about this inaction in 1864 and criticized the way the Algerian 
administration had handled ongoing colonist protests. The Emperor noted that he was “less 
surprised at the unfortunate [reaction] from the most impassioned section of the Algerian 
population, than at the administration’s tolerance that let that reaction gain strength.”205 He 
admonished the Governor-General that it was his responsibility as the representative of France in 
Algeria to correct widely circulating misconceptions about the Emperor’s letter, and maintained 
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that he had consistently failed to do so. The Emperor also criticized the Governor-General’s 
unwillingness to protect the indigenous from the excesses of colonist anger.206 Despite this 
apparent disappointment, however, the Emperor did not remove Pélissier from his position – at 
least in part because events elsewhere had once again distracted him. The Prussian victory over 
Denmark, the ongoing conflict in Poland, and the unfolding disaster in Mexico all seemed more 
pressing than the ongoing quarrels in Algeria. Expanding Prussian ambition and increasing 
expenses abroad also made Napoleon III’s dream of reconstituting the French Empire as a 
multinational entity bridging the Mediterranean increasingly remote.207 To make matters more 
complex, a widespread Arab revolt led by Ouled Sidi Cheikh broke out in southern Oran during 
the summer of 1864. The Emperor’s supporters connected the revolt to the colonial 
administration’s failure to enforce the policies passed by the Senate. However, the colonists used 
the opportunity to contend that the indigenous were entirely untrustworthy – and thus rendered 
the idea of the “royaume arabe” even more unpopular.208 
After Pélissier died at the end of 1864, the Emperor replaced him with Patrice de Mac-
Mahon, a French general popular for his military success in Crimea and Italy. Mac-Mahon 
proved equally unwilling, however, to enforce the Senate’s decrees, let alone to popularize the 
Emperor’s vision of Algeria – even if he did not defy the Emperor’s wishes as directly as 
Pélissier had. Faced with this continued hesitation and delay and spurred on by a desire to ignore 
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the rising discontent in the metropole over the wars in Italy, Napoleon III decided to return to 
Algeria in 1865 and resolve the seemingly endless conflict.209 There – with Ismaël Urbain as his 
translator - he met with colonial officials, ordinary colonists, military officials, and indigenous 
leaders. In spite of the violent reaction against his 1863 letter, he encountered a remarkable 
amount of public acclaim. The colonial administration, determined to make a good impression 
and shift the Emperor’s position on Algeria’s future, excited the colonists’ enthusiasm for the 
trip while steering the Emperor towards prosperous towns and impressive public works. At the 
same time, they tried to limit the amount of time he spent among the indigenous.210 
It is unclear what changed Napoleon III’s mind about Algeria – the trip, the ongoing 
opposition to his ideas about the territory, or his mercurial disposition. But upon his return to 
France, he drafted a second letter about Algeria, this time addressed to Mac-Mahon.211 In this 
letter, which he published on November 8, 1865, he backed away from a number of the positions 
he had laid out in his first letter to Pélissier – even as he made a series of proposals that were 
more concrete than those he had outlined earlier. He began by establishing his position as 
pragmatic: he noted that France had possessed Algeria for thirty-five years, and that it was time 
that the colony began to increase France’s wealth, prestige, and strength – instead of weakening 
it. In order to accomplish this goal, he maintained, the ongoing conflict over the nature of the 
territory had to be resolved.212 As it stood, its inhabitants were divided into two camps: one 
“supported the expansion of European colonialism” while the other “defended the sacred rights 
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of the indigenous.” His 1863 letter had attempted to reconcile these positions, he claimed, and 
create harmony between the colonists and the indigenous – but the conflict had continued. 
Compromise was essential to the territory’s success, the Emperor insisted, because it had three 
identities at once: it was “at the same time a royaume arabe, a European colony, and a French 
military camp.”213 To secure Algeria’s future, all of these factions would need to learn to work 
together, because they depended on one another.  
To some degree, the letter’s description of the respective positions of indigenous 
Algerians and European colonists echoed the one that Napoleon III had laid out in 1863. The 
differences lay in the emphasis; in 1865, Napoleon III saw the colonists as much more important 
to Algeria’s future than he had two years earlier. Even though he continued to insist that the 
territory should be understood as a “royaume arabe,” he transformed the implications of the term 
by claiming that Algeria was additionally a colony and a camp. Within the context of this 
trifecta, the “royaume arabe” no longer implied that the Arabs in Algeria constituted their own 
nation. Instead, the term came to operate more in the way that it had in Lacroix’s exegesis of 
1863; it simply referred to the parts of Algeria that were mostly inhabited by Arabs. Napoleon III 
did not withdraw his earlier contention that the Arabs had their own nationality.214 But instead of 
promising to preserve that nationality, the Emperor indicated that the French needed to “justify 
the dependence in which they were obligated to keep the Arab people… by enabling them to 
enjoy the benefits of civilization, and call them to a better existence.”215 In other words, the 
French could suppress indigenous nationality as long as the administration was actively engaged 
in civilizing and improving the Arab people. 
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Not only did Napoleon III retreat from his position that it was necessary to respect the 
indigenous Algerians’ national identity, he also took steps to assimilate the indigenous into the 
French nation. He embraced these measures because he was seeking to regularize the official 
position of the Arabs in the Empire and keep them from being treated as a “defeated people.” But 
like Urbain in 1863, he found that the only clear way to give the indigenous rights in the Empire 
was to invest them with the status of French nationals. He thus declared that for the sake of 
future peace in Algeria, “…the Algerians [must be] declared French, because Algeria is a French 
territory.”216 This did not mean, he noted, that the indigenous would have to accept French law 
or traditions. They could continue to follow their own customs, unless they asked to become 
citizens of France.217 But at the same time, the Emperor also tried to attach all native Algerians 
more firmly to the French state. He opened up military and civil positions in the Algerian 
administration to them, argued for greater supervision of the indigenous justice system, and 
called for the development of indigenous public instruction at all levels.218 Even as he allowed 
indigenous peoples to live within their traditional social structures and according to their own 
laws, he thereby ensured that many would find contact with French institutions inescapable.219 
These measures did not indicate that Napoleon III had simply switched to an 
“assimilationist” or “colonist” position.220 His letter also insisted that Arab tribes needed to be 
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left intact, that communally owned land could not be broken up, and that the indigenous should 
remain under military administration.221 But the letter does reveal the degree to which Napoleon 
III had abandoned the vision of French Empire that he had endorsed in his first letter. In 1863, 
the Emperor had sought to increase his empire’s prestige and redefine its meaning by expanding 
its reach beyond France. He began to describe “empire” not only as a form of political 
organization in the metropole, but also as a way of ordering different peoples beneath one 
governing structure. By incorporating Algeria (and perhaps other North African nations) into the 
empire while preserving its distinct identity, he had hoped to associate his rule with that of his 
uncle while preserving his reputation as a “champion of nationalities.” But under the 1865 
model, indigenous Algerians would not, ultimately, retain a separate identity. Instead, they 
would be slowly assimilated – not just into the French Empire, but also into the French nation. 
Napoleon III’s letter explicitly laid out the hope that over time, increasingly more Arabs would 
see the benefit of French liberties and law and choose to adopt French citizenship for themselves. 
As a result, the “royaume arabe” would start to disappear as Algeria merged with France. This 
vision of Algeria’s future invested the indigenous with a clearer position and a firmer set of 
rights than the first one had. But it also collapsed Napoleon III’s earlier distinction between 
“nation” and “empire.” The French Empire again became contiguous with the French nation: it 
only signified a particular way of ruling France. Algeria became a temporary anomaly on the 
nation’s borders, eventually destined to merge with it. 
Napoleon III’s second letter was met with more enthusiasm than the first. He found a 
champion in the author Ernest Feydeau, who promoted the letter in the metropolitan newspaper 
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l’Époque.222 Some colonists also expressed their approval of the Emperor’s new position: 
Charles Richard, a retired administrator of Arab affairs in Algeria, contended that the letter’s 
measures would help create peace and prosperity in the territory.223 Warnier even took the 
Emperor’s insistence that the indigenous should be made into French nationals as evidence that 
he was slowly coming around to the colonists’ side.224 However, throughout Algeria, most 
settlers objected to the Emperor’s failure to secure more land for European colonization, his 
“undue attention” to the indigenous, and, most importantly, his continued use of the term 
“royaume arabe.” They did not riot as they had in 1863, but they signed petitions and wrote 
angry newspaper articles.225 Joseph Guérin, the editor of l’Akhbar, claimed, for example, that the 
Emperor’s letter – especially his description of Algeria as a “royaume arabe” - was dangerous, 
because it would lead “inevitably to the declaration of Arab nationality.” He maintained that the 
very idea of the “royaume arabe” was fundamentally incompatible with Algeria’s status as a 
French territory.226 This response – and others like it - makes it clear that most colonists did not 
distinguish between the Emperor’s positions in 1863 and 1865. 
The letter also generated a second wave of criticism aimed at metropolitan audiences. 
Some of this criticism was new, and took issue specifically with Napoleon III’s decision to 
declare the indigenous French nationals.227 A group of colonists sent a series of petitions to the 
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Senate arguing that while the Europeans in Algeria needed to be assimilated into the 
metropolitan French administrative and legal systems, the Emperor’s decision to make the 
indigenous French nationals made no sense. They were too fundamentally alien in terms of their 
customs, religion, social structure, race, and law. Before they could be invested with French 
nationality or citizenship, they needed to be assimilated into French culture. The indigenous 
should be forced to abandon their uncivilized way of life before the French government began to 
endow them with French rights.228 
For the most part, however, these new critiques were drowned out by pamphlets whose 
complaints largely echoed those of 1863. These writers continued to take issue with Napoleon 
III’s “royaume arabe” and demanded voting rights, a constitution, a civil administration, and 
more land.229 The most virulent of these new critics was Jules Duval – the editor of l’Économiste 
française who defended colonist interests in front of the Senate in 1863.230 Like others before 
him, he condemned many of the Emperor’s administrative policies.231 And like Warnier, he 
maintained that the term “royaume arabe” was both technically inaccurate and potentially 
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Henry Didier, Le Gouvernement militaire et la colonisation en Algérie (Paris: E. Dentu, 1865); Alexandre 
Duvernois, Le Régime civil en Algérie, urgence et possibilité de son application immediate (Paris: J. Rouvier, 1865) 
230 Duval, like Warnier and others before him, couched his criticism in an insistence that he was not writing to 
defend the perspective of any particular party, but simply to enlighten the Emperor, who continued to be led astray 
by poor advisors. He noted that he was quite disappointed that the Emperor had failed to ask either his or Warnier’s 
about Algeria before publishing another letter on the subject, as they had “special competence” on the subject. The 
Emperor’s authorities, he maintained, were suspect at best – he particularly highlighted the negative influence of 
Georges Voisin, who he thought was “not really a Christian.” See Jules Duval, Reflexions sur la Politique de 
l'Empereur en Algerie (Paris: Challamel Ainé, Commissionnaire pour l'Algérie et l'Étranger, 1866), 4. 
231 He attacked the Emperor’s continued reliance on a military administration to rule Algeria, and contended that 
Algeria would only become prosperous when the government centered its attention not on the indigenous but on the 
colonists – the only population in Algeria that could be trusted. He also repeated the oft-repeated claim that in order 
to attract more colonists, Algeria needed not only to be placed beneath a civil administration. See Ibid., 13. 
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dangerous.232 But he took his criticism of the Emperor a step farther by contending that 
Napoleon III’s ongoing attempt to redefine the territory was not only misguided, but also 
reflected the fundamental incompatibility of “empire” and “colony.” Duval maintained that all 
absolutist governments – whether monarchies or empires – were inherently unable to understand 
or operate colonies.233 To thrive, he argued, colonists needed “complete liberty” – a guarantee 
that absolutist governments were unable to provide. Duval thus blamed “colonial Caesarism” for 
the failures of Napoleon III’s Algerian policies.234 For Algeria to succeed as a colony, Duval 
argued, France needed a different kind of government altogether – not a Bonapartist empire, but 
a republican regime that would allow for greater freedom of initiative. His critique thus sought to 
pull apart Napoleon III’s association of “metropolitan empire” with “colonial empire,” implying 
that they were intrinsically opposed enterprises that required distinct sets of political institutions. 
As these responses make clear, despite the fact that Napoleon III’s second letter backed 
away from the claims of his first in several important ways, colonists and republicans alike 
continued to criticize it – and seem to have found the Emperor’s new ideas very similar to his old 
ones. They continued to condemn Napoleon III’s notion of a “royaume arabe” and his belief in 
Arab nationality – even though his second letter took measures to assimilate the indigenous 
                                               
232 Duval was also much more insistent about the insurmountable inferiority of many aspects of indigenous culture, 
religious practice, and society. He contended that most of the indigenous were morally corrupt, inclined to thievery, 
slaves to their chiefs, and abusers of women. To overcome these inferiorities, he maintained, the French state needed 
to take radical steps. He advocated for the dissolution of tribes and the removal of Arab chiefs, but also maintained 
that the Emperor needed to suppress Islamic radicalism, and punish Arab misdemeanors more harshly. Most 
importantly, the state needed to place the indigenous in continuous contact with civilized colonists. Only when 
Muslim children went to school with French children, and Muslim farmers worked alongside their colonist 
counterparts, would their society begin to change. See Ibid., 29, 30, 96 
233 Ibid., 170. 
234 He noted that Caesar had a mixed legacy in European history; on the one hand, he “personified genius, superior 
thought, strong initiative, firm execution, democratic sentiment, commitment to social progress.” To others, 
however, he symbolized “intelligent despotism, tutelary patronage, popular power, and sovereign autocracy.” But 
while such a person was an effective conqueror of colonies, he could not rule them effectively. See ibid., 172. 
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population into France. They claimed that he was not doing enough to support colonists’ efforts, 
and that the indigenous still occupied too much of his attention.235 Duval’s condemnation of both 
Napoleon III’s “royaume arabe” and his vision of empire further consolidated colonist and 
republican opinions about this new imperial model. Duval propagated an interpretation of 
Napoleon III’s empire that described its character as inherently oppressive and anti-progressive – 
a claim that proved popular in an era of rising discontent. And his insistence that Napoleon III’s 
empire was incompatible with the colonial project itself – which he implicitly portrayed as a 
republican undertaking – introduced a division between “metropolitan” and “colonial” empire 
that the Emperor had sought to reject. 236  
Napoleon III would remain in power in France for the next five years, but after 1865, 
what remained of his desire to restructure Algeria and establish a “royaume arabe” in the 
territory disappeared. Even after the Senate’s decrees in 1865, Mac-Mahon and the other 
members of the Algerian administration largely failed to put the Emperor’s reforms into place 
out of a desire not to upset colonist interests. The Emperor had little time or energy to enforce 
these measures, as he became increasingly caught up in European politics and the French 
military disaster in Mexico; he also became increasingly ill. Moreover, between 1865 and 1868, 
Algeria was struck by a series of natural disasters – earthquakes, fire, and famine. 237 What little 
attention Napoleon III devoted to Algeria during this period was limited to disaster relief. While 
the military administration and the Bureaux Arabes would remain in place until the end of his 
reign, Napoleon III’s plans to improve schooling, modernize farming practices, alleviate poverty, 
                                               
235 Ironically, Napoleon III’s declaration that the indigenous were French nationals was taken by some opponents as 
another sign of his excessive interest in their well-being and not as a concession to settler demands for assimilation. 
236 Duval ignored native Algerians: “Algeria will be and must be a royaume française and not a royaume arabe; a 
French colony and not a European colony; a French garrison and not a French military camp.” See ibid., 176. 
237 Meyer, Tarrade, Rey-Goldzeigueur, Thobie, Histoire de la France Coloniale des origines à 1914, 476. 
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and “liberate” the indigenous largely evaporated. His dreams to construct a new kind of French 
empire also disappeared. At the same time, however, both colonists and opposition members 
continued to associate Napoleon III with the royaume arabe that he had lost interest in. In 
Algeria in particular, the term became equivalent with the Second Empire itself – although not 
quite in the way that Napoleon III had originally hoped. 
  
V. Conclusion: Napoleon III’s Legacy and Other Models of Empire 
Napoleon III, his Bonapartist allies, Saint-Simonians, and Algerian colonists were not the 
only voices in this ongoing conversation about the meaning and significance of Algeria and its 
place in the French Empire. During the 1860s, a renewed interest in Algeria led to a new wave of 
increasingly popular writing about the territory that was less connected to debates surrounding 
policy decisions. Some – like Lucien-Anatole Prévost-Paradol’s La France Nouvelle – still 
aspired to make an explicit political intervention in the French treatment of the colony. But many 
of these writers - like Eugène Fromentin and Ernest Feydeau – instead sought primarily to 
transmit impressions of indigenous peoples to the metropole, or to use Algeria as an orientalized 
backdrop against which they could heighten their stories’ dramatic tension. Of course, their 
portrayals of Algeria ultimately had political implications – even if they did not speak directly to 
the ongoing arguments about how the colony should be organized. Instead, these works helped to 
consolidate metropolitan impressions of Algeria as a half-savage, mystical, exotic place where 
the French encountered strange people – depicted, variously, as barely civilized, innately wise, 
uneducated, violent, or racially inferior. These writers’ visions of Algeria became popular during 
the last years of the Second Empire. But they would become even more influential after the 
Franco-Prussian War and the establishment of the Third Republic, as their representations of 
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Algeria and the people that lived there would help legitimize a new idea of empire, untainted by 
Napoleon III and his royaume arabe. 
Prévost-Paradol’s La France Nouvelle, aimed primarily at highly educated, elite 
audiences, became an influential critique of France, French society, and French politics during 
the last years of the nineteenth century.238 In this study of French political history, he insisted 
that mid-nineteenth century France had begun to suffer from “decadence.” He blamed this 
problem above all on the country’s political organization, which he insisted bred demagogy and 
despotism in equal measure.239 He warned his readers that this decadence was particularly 
dangerous in light of growing Prussian influence over the German states in central Europe and 
the size of the British Empire.240 Together, Prussia and Britain would slowly make France, 
“confined within its traditional boundaries,” into a second-rate power.241 The solution to these 
internal and external threats, Prévost-Paradol maintained, was to extend the country’s borders 
and increase its population. Because France had limited opportunities for expansion in Europe, it 
would have to follow Britain’s example and increase its reach overseas.242 He highlighted 
                                               
238 Prévost Paradol was a journalist and a moderate liberal during the Second Empire. His book’s popularity was due 
at least in part to the fact that much of it focused on highlighting the danger that a unifying Germany posed to 
France – a warning that seemed very prescient after the French defeat during the Franco-Prussian War. 
239 Prévost-Paradol insisted that France’s tendency to veer between demagogy and despotism ever since the 
Revolution had caused its social order to fray. He implied that if France did not adopt a balanced political system 
and patch the holes in its social fabric it would meet the same fate as Poland. To fix the problem, he insisted that 
France needed to secure its democratic rights but establish political institutions to keep those rights in check. While 
this analysis condemned Napoleon III’s politics, it did not insist that monarchy was a problem. Instead, Prévost-
Paradol insisted that “democracy” referred to the structure of a society, while “monarchy” or “republic” referred to 
its government. Either a republic or a monarchy could thus be democratic. He did not address “empire” as a political 
organization. See Lucien-Anatole Prévost-Paradol, La France Nouvelle (Paris: Michel Lévy Frères, 1869), 349, 68. 
240 He devoted the book to a scathing attack on Napoleon III’s “politics of nationality” which, he insisted, were 
contrary to France’s interests. France could not use this policy to accumulate more land in Europe, while it enabled 
both Prussia and Russia – two of France’s key rivals – to amass ever-growing amounts of territory. See ibid., 378. 
241 He noted that France was in danger of meeting with the same fate as Athens under the Roman Empire. It would 
remain, he noted an “intellectual” example, but it would cease to be relevant politically. See ibid., 386. 
242 He advised his readers to “take up a map of the world, study it in its totality with intelligent attention… and ask 
yourself… what France’s part in it is.” See ibid., 397. 
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Algeria in particular as the point from which the French could begin their expansion. France, he 
insisted, needed to settle large numbers of its inhabitants to Algeria to transform it into a France 
africaine. Once its citizens had established themselves, they could then extend their reach farther 
into North Africa, towards Tunisia and Morocco. Together, these holdings would enable France 
to secure a position as the primary power in the Mediterranean.243 In some ways, Prévost-
Paradol’s vision of France’s Mediterranean empire was similar to Napoleon III’s desire to extend 
the Second Empire into North Africa. However, Prévost-Paradol’s French empire would be 
based not on French imperial control over a set of Arab nations, but on the extension of the 
French population over new territories. Both Prévost-Paradol’s fear for the French “race,” 
language, and culture and his concerns about international competition would become more 
widespread in the wake of the Second Empire’s collapse. His concomitant hope for French 
national redemption through Algerian colonization would also become an influential alternative 
to Napoleon III’s discredited imperial model.  
Fromentin and Feydeau, on the other hand, were less concerned with intervening in 
colonial politics.244 Instead, both positioned themselves as “experts” on Algeria whose 
knowledge about the colony stemmed from the fact that they themselves had visited it: they 
proposed to educate metropolitan audiences about the territory. Fromentin’s popular Un été dans 
le Sahara and Une année dans le Sahel, published in the late 1850s, were above all travelogues: 
they described his impressions of the desert and the people he encountered there.245 Both works 
                                               
243 He acknowledged that the population that already lived there posed something of a problem to these ambitions, 
but did not offer any clear opinions as to how the French should deal with them. See ibid., 416. 
244 Feydeau did defend some of the principles behind Napoleon III’s royaume arabe. He insisted that indigenous 
peoples were better off separated from the European population, because the Europeans threatened Arab identity and 
undermined their morality. See Ernest Feydeau, Alger: Étude (Paris: Michel Lévy Frères, 1862), 177. 
245 Eugène Fromentin was both a painter and a writer; his work on Algeria was primarily concerned with the regard. 
Painterly qualities and impressions infuse Sahara and Sahel; much of their attention focuses on describing the light 
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positioned the narrator as an explorer, encountering and cataloguing the beauty and strangeness 
of a semi-populated landscape that he found foreign. Fromentin was not interested in the project 
of French colonization, or even really in questions surrounding Algeria’s administration. He saw 
Algeria as a place where the French could go to encounter “the sublime”: it represented a chance 
to see nature in its most uninhibited form, manifested in both the landscape and its inhabitants.246  
Feydeau, on the other hand, published a series of novels about French colonists and their 
encounters with the indigenous population set in Algeria.247 Feydeau’s work was critical of many 
French colonists and their desire to remake Algeria in the image of France.248 He saw French 
colonists as disruptive of Arab society and life, and felt that the French colonial project 
diminished Algeria’s appeal and charm – though he did believe there was room in Algeria for 
enlightened Europeans who could guide the Arab tribes towards civilization without oppressing 
them.249 If his work was ambivalent about the benefits of French rule, however, its 
representations of indigenous people were deeply shaped by Orientalist tropes.250 He described 
                                               
and color of the desert. See Anne-Marie Christin and Richard Berrong, “Space and Convention in Eugène 
Fromentin: The Algerian Experience,” New Literary History, vol. 15, no. 4 (1984), 561. 
246 Eugène Fromentin, Sahara et Sahel: Un Été dans le Sahara et Une Année dans le Sahel (Paris: E. Plon, Nourrit, 
1887). 
247 Feydeau was a novelist whose interest in Algeria seems to have been sparked by Gustave Flaubert’s Salammbô 
and Théophile Gautier’s 1845 Voyage en Algérie. See Rey-Goldzeiguer, Le Royaume Arabe, 119. 
248 He particularly decried the way in which colonists had torn down parts of the city of Algiers to build European-
style building complexes in their place. He noted that “Algiers has become less impressive today, and unfortunately, 
it will continue to diminish in the future. The French city, with its six-city houses, gray walls… takes over, step by 
step… Note that I do not blame our compatriots who are trying to make themselves at ease… I simply reproach 
them for destroying beautiful things...” See Feydeau, Alger: Étude, 25. 
249 In his lengthy Le Secret du Bonheur, for example, Feydeau described a French settler family who became the 
protectors of an Arab tribe called the Beni-Haoua whose lands were threatened by a greedy French investor from 
overseas. The patriarch of the family, who the Arabs call the “kebbir” is a wise man who manages to defray the 
conflict and keep the tribes who lived near his family from revolting. He also saves their land by purchasing it for 
himself and giving it back to the tribe. See Ernest Feydeau, Le Secret de Bonheur (Paris: Michel Lévy Frères, 1862). 
250 Alger: une étude participates the most directly in the Orientalist project of describing the different racial groups 
that inhabited Algeria, and categorizing them according to their different “strengths” and weaknesses.” Still, he 
maintained, the worst groups were “types degraded by a mix of indigenous character and a kind of poorly 
understood primary education….” See Feydeau, Alger: Étude, 148-149. 
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the indigenous as “discouraged” and “enervated” races that could not be regenerated but only 
broken or destroyed.251 Fromentin and Feydeau might have been more sympathetic to the 
indigenous than Prévost-Paradol, who largely chose to ignore their existence. But the increasing 
visibility of this kind of orientalizing popular literature in the 1860s and 1870s would also 
contribute to a new discourse of empire that could operate independently from Napoleon III’s 
models, based at least in part on a new vision of the “civilizing mission.” 
In the 1860s, a second conversation also emerged around the meaning of “empire” that 
was only indirectly tied to Algeria or any French overseas territory at all. Instead, it emerged 
from liberal and republican groups who sought to discredit the Napoleonic regime. These groups 
attacked “empire” as a fundamentally flawed and corrupt way of organizing power within France 
itself. While these republican writers received somewhat limited press during the 1860s, the 
vision of the Empire that they developed would solidify after its collapse in the 1870s. The 
dominant voices participating in this attempt to condemn empire did not necessarily belong to 
politicians, but to journalists and novelists writing on the edges of the political sector. The first 
and most influential of these texts was Victor Hugo’s 1852 Napoleon le Petit. This political 
pamphlet not only attacked the character of Napoleon III and condemned his 1851 coup d’état; it 
also sought to discredit the very idea of “empire” itself as a form of political organization in 
France. Empire, Hugo claimed, was inherently despotic; it necessarily bred either corruption or 
indifference and disengagement.252 
                                               
251 See ibid., 281. 
252 Hugo noted, “The first Bonaparte wanted to reconstruct the empire of the West, make Europe a vassal, dominate 
the continent in its strength and the dazzle of its grandeur … Napoleon was a master of the world.” Napoleon III, he 
went on to insist, also had dreams of domination. He noted that he was already “master, cadi, mufti, bey, dey, 
sultan… cousin of the sun… Paris is no longer Paris, it is Baghdad… M. Bonaparte can do what he likes with 
property, families, people…” See Victor Hugo, Napoleon le Pétit. (Paris: Actes Sud, 2007), 69, 118. 
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Perhaps even more than Victor Hugo, the writers Émile Erckmann and Alexandre 
Chatrian worked to condemn not only Napoleon III but his uncle, Napoleon I as well. Through a 
long series of popular, widely distributed novels, they sought to retell the narrative of the First 
Napoleonic Empire through the eyes of the ordinary people who had lived through it. Taken 
together, these stories presented the French Empire in clear, unstintingly negative terms. Their 
extremely popular Histoire d’un conscrit de 1813 and Waterloo, published in 1864 and 1865, 
respectively, followed a young, partially lame young soldier as he followed Napoleon I’s army 
across Europe, encountering a variety of horrors along the way.253 This work, in addition to their 
many others, reiterated a set of key themes. First, Erckmann-Chatrian insisted that Empire in all 
its conditions was equivalent to endless war. It attracted the uneducated through a series of 
rousing public ceremonies, and the greedy through the promise of profit from unending conflict. 
It thus appealed to the basest instincts of the French population, all while stripping the country of 
its assets to fund its enormous armies.254 To find peace, prosperity, and political justice, the 
authors insisted, France needed to renounce empire entirely and re-establish the Republic.255  
In the face of diminishing support within France and increasing threats to France’s 
position in Europe, Napoleon III sought to redefine the Second Empire by associating it with 
Napoleon I’s powerful legacy of expansion. His early definition of “empire” – as a political 
program emphasizing order and stability within France and the liberation of nations outside of it 
– was no longer sufficient to capture the imagination and loyalty of his subjects. He therefore 
                                               
253 Histoire d’un conscrit sold 100,000 editions in the months after its 1864 publication. See Erckmann-Chatrian, Le 
Conscrit de 1813 et Waterloo. Contes et Romans Nationaux et Populaires. Vol. 4 (Paris: J.-J. Pauvert, 1962). 
254 Erckmann-Chatrian, Le Conscrit de 1813 et Waterloo, 241. 
255 The authors indicated that the French people only allowed Napoleon to take over in the first place was due to the 
absence of education in the countryside. In order to avoid lapsing into despotism in the future, the “people” and the 
bourgeoisie needed to unite together against reactionary forces, and institute primary schooling across France. See 
Erckmann-Chatrian, Histoire d’un Paysan. Contes et Romans nationaux et populaire. Vol. 1 (Paris: J.-J. Pauvert, 
1962), 519. 
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tried to expand the meaning of imperial identity, and to reconstitute the French Empire as both a 
French political program and a multinational entity. This new “French Empire” would be 
simultaneously metropolitan and overseas, and it would incorporate different nationalities 
beneath its rule even as it transcended all of them. Eyeing the weakening Ottoman Empire on the 
other side of the Mediterranean, Napoleon III dreamed of expanding his imperial reach into 
North African territories that had long ago belonged to Rome. Using Algeria as his test subject, 
Napoleon III positioned the French Empire as both a protector of Arab nationality and as a 
“civilizing force” among the backwards people there. But in the process, he attracted the wrath 
of the colonist population. Their agitation about his new imperial model spread discontent to 
metropolitan France itself – and especially to republican circles.  
Because of this ongoing opposition, Napoleon III never managed to restructure Algeria, 
let alone establish a new Mediterranean Empire. But ironically, the model of “empire” he 
proposed was so unpopular that it proved to have a lasting legacy: republicans continued to react 
against it long after the Second Empire’s collapse during the Franco-Prussian War. It owed its 
metropolitan longevity partly to the links that the colonists formed with Parisian opposition 
leaders in the 1860s. These opposition leaders brought Napoleon III’s Algerian policies to 
France’s attention by citing them as another example of the Second Empire’s flaws. But its 
enduring place in French memory also testifies to the degree to which Napoleon III’s attempt to 
collapse metropolitan and colonial empire together into one unified theory of “empire” 
succeeded on a discursive level. In the 1860s, when republican authors began to condemn empire 
as a “decadent,” “militaristic,” “corrupt,” and “oppressive” form of political organization, they 
did not differentiate between Napoleon III’s metropolitan and overseas empire any more than he 
did. The legacy of this conflation would trouble politicians in the Third Republic as they looked 
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overseas to restore French military prestige in the wake of the Franco-Prussian War. For many 
years, they would struggle to untangle these two kinds of empire so that they could promote a 
new kind of republican colonial expansion that remained untainted by Napoleon III.256 This new 
vision of republican empire emerged out of the colonist publications, republican journals, and 
writings by people like Prévost-Paradol, and it defined itself in opposition to the Napoleonic 
vision of empire that preceded it. 
Napoleon III’s understanding of Algeria, its relationship to the French nation, and its 
position in the French Empire had been deeply influenced by the double legacy of French 
Republicanism and Napoleonic imperialism, along with Saint-Simonian thought and romantic 
nationalism. And indeed, Napoleon III’s vision of a Mediterranean empire shared its intellectual 
predecessors’ hesitations and contradictions surrounding the connections between empire, 
nation, overseas territory, and citizenship. These ongoing questions would also come to shape 
Republican attempts to explain and justify the expansion of French overseas territory in the 
1870s and 1880s – and they would be further complicated by the troubling legacy of Napoleon 
III himself.
                                               
256 Intellectuals and novelists like Prévost-Paradol, Fromentin, and Feydeau who had begun to popularize a 
specifically “colonialist” vision of empire in the 1860s helped make this process of disentangling possible. 
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CHAPTER 2: WAR, REVOLUTION AND EMPIRE’S COLLAPSE: THE FRANCO-
PRUSSIAN WAR AND ITS AFTER-EFFECTS 
 
 
The Franco-Prussian War lasted barely more than half a year – France declared war 
against Prussia in July of 1870, and by late January of 1871 it had been disastrously defeated. 
Violence and division sputtered on in the form of internal revolution and civil war for several 
months, but even this second, more divisive wave of conflict ended by May. Despite its 
relatively brief duration, however, the war and the Commune that followed it deeply fractured 
the French political landscape. The defeat brought an end to the empire that had ruled the 
country for twenty years, but the republic that replaced it did not emerge out of national 
consensus: it remained intact largely because the Legitimists, Orleanists, and Bonapartists failed 
to agree on how to set up another kind of state. Over the course of the next ten years, 
intellectuals, writers, artists, and politicians worked to fill the void left by the empire’s collapse 
by attempting to popularize alternative models of political organization and visions of the French 
nation – often in direct competition with one another.1 
The collective memory of the war and the Commune played an important role in the 
attempt to redefine the French nation, its politics, and its relationship to its colonies in the wake 
of the Empire’s collapse. In the years following the année terrible, politicians, writers, artists and 
journalists produced innumerable monuments, museums, novels, and histories devoted to 
                                               
1 The exact structure of the new government was only worked out in 1875, and until 1877, it was dominated by 
Legitimists and Orleanists, who hoped to restore the monarchy. It was not until the President Mac-Mahon attempted 
and failed to stage a coup d’état in 1877 that public opinion swung definitively in favor of republicanism. See 
Bertrand Taithe, Citizenship and Wars: France in Turmoil, 1870-1871 (New York: Psychology Press, 2001), 172. 
  108 
explaining the events of 1870-71.2 These cultural productions however, did not interpret the 
year’s events or significance in the same way. The different authors, intellectuals, and artists 
crafted works that advanced their own understandings of its meaning, which were often tied to 
their respective ideological positions, personal experiences, and aesthetic preferences. Securing 
specific interpretations of the collective memories of the war and Commune in turn became 
central to the ways in which intellectuals and politicians of different stripes attempted to 
articulate their vision for the French nation. These representations thus worked both with and 
against each other in broader public discourse, and they competed to give shape to the French 
collective memory, political organization, national identity, and understandings of empire. 
This chapter examines the way that these different popular narratives – published in 
newspapers, political pamphlets, short stories, and novels – sought to make sense of the events of 
the année terrible. It focuses on how these narratives about the war and the Commune 
interpreted both events’ relationship to the Second Empire and the new Third Republic. It argues 
that authors often used the events to articulate judgments about the relative value of both 
“empire” and “republic” as forms of political organization. These narratives were thus politicized 
and deeply contested. Republican writers, politicians, intellectuals, and artists attempted to 
mobilize private memories of 1870-71 into a collective discourse that would unite the French 
beneath the new Republican state while their Bonapartist counterparts wove alternative 
narratives to discredit it and celebrate the empire in its place. Monarchists and socialists tried to 
use the war’s events to discredit both republic and empire alike. The chapter demonstrates that 
                                               
2 In 1896, Barthelémy-Edmond Palat published a bibliography of all of the novels, histories, and memoirs published 
after the war. It came to over six hundred pages. See Barthelémy-Edmond Palat, Bibliographie générale de la 
guerre de 1870-1871 (Paris: Berger-Levrault, 1896). 
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this ongoing argument over the meaning of the war and its implications for the French nation 
served over time to redefine the meaning of “empire” in French political discourse. 
The divisiveness of this conversation about the Empire, the Republic, the war, and the 
Commune was at least partially due to the complex way that the events of 1870-71 intersected 
with ongoing political tensions and problems.3 The conflict with Prussia had at first attracted 
widespread popular support – enough so that the Prefect of Police would later claim that it was 
the French populace and not the government that had driven the country to war.4 That may have 
been partly true, but during the weeks and days leading up to the outbreak of fighting, the 
bellicose mood was not universal: a number of prominent figures and journals – including the 
republican Le Siècle and Le Rappel, the socialist Le Reveil, and the liberal Temps and Journal 
des Débats - advocated for a pacific outcome to the crisis with Prussia.5 But once war seemed 
inevitable, even many of those who initially expressed hesitation articulated their support.6 
                                               
3 The Franco-Prussian War emerged from a conflict between France and Prussia over the candidate for succession to 
the Spanish throne, which Bismarck used as a pretext to provoke Napoleon III. War was declared on July 19, 1870. 
For more information, see Michael Howard, The Franco-Prussian War; the German Invasion of France, 1870-1871 
(New York: Routledge, 1961); Stéphane Audoin-Rouzeau, 1870: La France dans la Guerre (Paris: Éditions 
Armand Colin, 1989); François Roth, La Guerre de 1870 (Paris: Hachette, 1990); Geoffrey Wawro, The Franco-
Prussian War: The German Conquest of France in 1870-1871 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003). 
4 This support was in part a consequence of French concerns about the growing power and prestige of Prussia. These 
concerns had become particularly heightened after the Prussian victory against Austria at Sadowa in 1866, which 
enabled Prussia to annex Austria’s former allies. Many French politicians and intellectuals saw Sadowa as the 
beginning of a march towards a unified Germany that would threaten French borders. See Quintin Barry, The 
Franco-Prussian War, 1870-71. Volume 1. (Solihull, England: Helion & Company, 2007), 17. Some members of the 
opposition saw the growing strength of Germany as Napoleon III’s fault, because he had promoted the politics of 
“nationalities” in Europe. Le Temps remarked, “…we never had any illusions about the inevitable dangers of having 
two large military monarchies neighboring each other… The military empire [Germany] that we have combatted 
from the beginning… is, for the most part, of our making… Military success is probable; we must hope, and we 
believe that we can hope without being mistaken. But the political results will be, we believe, illusory… we will 
never bring Germany back to its old state of division and weakness.” See A. Neptune, Le Temps (16 July 1870), 1.  
5 Even on July 13th, much of the Cabinet still sought a way to resolve the crisis over the Spanish succession 
pacifically. See Le Gaulois, n. 738 (13 July 1870), 1. 
6 Le Temps, A. Neptune remarked grudgingly: “…We will not ever regret having pleaded the cause of peace until 
the last moment, and we will add even that our efforts would have been more energetic if they had been supported 
by more hope.” See A. Neptune, Le Temps (16 July 1870, 1). For the Journal de Débat’s argument for peace, see F. 
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Writers, politicians, and intellectuals from across the political spectrum vocally defended the 
declaration of war, leading the Petit Journal to claim: “there has never been a war undertaken 
amidst such enthusiasm.”7 This enthusiasm was not limited to the elite – crowds in Paris in 
particular took to the streets to demonstrate their patriotic fervor. Le Gaulois reported that on 
July 17, two days before war was declared, the crowds swarmed through different parts of the 
city, shouting, “Down with Prussia! Long live France!”8 Those that advocated against the war – 
like the liberal deputy Adolphe Thiers – were widely condemned as cowards and even possible 
traitors by the more enthusiastic parts of the Parisian press.9 The only prominent dissident voices 
in the days when the war seemed certain were those who advocated against what they saw as 
French overconfidence. Catholic journals such as l’Univers and liberal ones such as the Journal 
des Débats argued that “popular” publications had made the population arrogant and led them to 
underestimate the Prussians. But even those authors who warned that the war would be more 
difficult than many seemed to expect did not second-guess the wisdom of undertaking it.10  
                                               
David, “France,” Journal des Débats politiques et littéraires (15 July 1870, 1); for its declaration of war, see Eugène 
Dufeuille, “France,” Journal des Débats politiques et littéraires (17 July 1870), 1. 
7 The article continued: “The soldiers head towards the frontier with an élan that will be irresistible; the recently 
created mobile national guard gathers beneath the flags with a bellicose ardor that augurs only for the best; the 
number of volunteers is very considerable. The population accompanies our valorous soldiers with acclamations and 
shows them that all of France is ready to rise to support them. It is a marvelous spectacle and a gage of coming 
victory.” See “La Guerre: L’entrée en champagne,” Le Petit Journal, n. 2,755 (18 July 1870), 1. 
8 “Les Manifestations,” Le Gaulois, n. 742 (17 July 1870), 1. 
9 Thiers objected to the declaration of war in the Corps Législatif: “…I would like to explain that I did not rise with 
the majority of the Chamber because I love my country…. I consider this war very imprudent… I am certain that 
there will be days where you regret your participation…” As reported in Le Temps, 3rd edition (16 July 1870), 1. 
10 The Catholic newspaper l’Univers noted, “many journals have expressed praiseworthy patriotic sentiments, but 
have expressed them in the wrong tone. They speak of crossing the Rhine as if it is the same as crossing the Seine by 
strolling across the pont des Arts, and say that the campaign against Prussia will consist of little more than a 
promenade towards Berlin… This boastful and bragging talk, this insolence incites pity and embarrassment. It is 
ridiculous to apply it to Prussia, and odious to permit it in the name of France… What good does it do to 
dissimulate… Prussia, which before Sadowa was a grand military power, has become over the past four years the 
most redoubtable enemy that we could encounter… This war will be difficult and will demand great sacrifices, great 
effort, and perhaps also great perseverance.” See Eugène Vauillot, “France,” L’Univers (16 July 1870), 1. 
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In fact, the first weeks of the war were marked by a rush of patriotic fervor that also 
produced a mood of political consensus. According to contemporary sources, the streets of Paris 
resounded with cries of “Vive l’empereur!” as often as with cries of “Down with Prussia!”11 
Ordinary people and popular publications alike rallied around both the Emperor and the Empire 
in the last weeks of July 1870. Even many members of political opposition groups argued that 
the French needed to put aside their political differences for the length of this conflict. The 
liberal Journal de débats opined, “All political dissent must disappear in France at this hour in 
the face of the grave events that are underway in Europe.”12 Fears of political dissent translating 
into disloyalty thus remained. More conservative journals like Le Figaro went out of their way to 
condemn those who they felt were placing their distaste for the Empire before their patriotic duty 
to France, warning against radical republican deputies like Léon Gambetta who, they claimed, 
would prefer to have “two Waterloos instead of the Empire.”13 But the general enthusiasm for 
the war and the government’s policies lent little basis to these fears that political differences 
would undermine the French war effort, at least in the early days.14 
These sentiments – while perhaps common in wartime – marked a shift away from the 
political climate that had defined the last few years of Napoleon III’s regime. Beginning in the 
early 1860s, left-leaning political opposition groups in France had become increasingly critical 
of the Empire’s policies and institutions and of Napoleon III in particular. With the looser press 
                                               
11 This was particularly surprising, as the departement of the Seine had voted almost entirely against imperial 
candidates in the last round of elections. See Louis Girard, Napoleon III (Paris: Arthème Fayard, 1986), 426. 
12 Eugène Dufeuille, “France,” Journal des Débats politiques et littéraires (17 July 1870), 1. 
13 Le Figaro argued that the opposition was “perpetually accusing the Empire, either of accepting German 
unification as a fait accompli, or of resisting the invading pretentions of Prussia. What does it matter to these people 
if France receives blows as long as their party overcomes its current humiliation? …[they] cry ‘Two Waterloos 
instead of the Empire!’” See “Corps Législatif,” Le Figaro (17 July 1870), 1. 
14 William Smith, The Second Empire and the Commune (Essex: Longman Group, 1994), 55. 
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laws established in the early years of the “liberal” empire, members of these groups were able to 
popularize their opinions by publishing them in newspapers.15 With more open elections, 
opposition groups were also able to elect more deputies to the Corps Législatif – a trend 
culminating in 1869, when members of the opposition won the majority of votes in cities across 
France. Napoleon III’s disastrous intervention in Mexico, combined with his unpopular efforts in 
Italy and his policies in Algeria, had gone a long way towards undermining the credibility and 
popularity that he had built up in the first years of his reign.16 In the face of this rising 
opposition, the Emperor found it increasingly difficult to impose his personal will on government 
policy – as the mixed results of his attempt to establish a royaume arabe in Algeria made clear.  
Despite the growing opposition, however, Napoleon III’s rule was far from the verge of 
collapse. In response to the agitation from the left-leaning opposition during the elections, he 
issued a series of liberal reforms in September of 1869 meant to win over moderates and distance 
them from their more radical counterparts.17 These reforms were in many ways successful; a 
number of renowned liberals came to serve the regime, including Émile Ollivier, who agreed to 
serve as Prime Minister.18 In 1870, the Emperor issued a plebiscite asking the people whether 
they supported these reforms and the new constitution – an implicit referendum on the regime. 
Outside of Paris, the response was very positive: the vast majority of voters voted in favor of the 
                                               
15 Roger Price, The French Second Empire: An Anatomy of Political Power (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2001), 348. 
16 Michele Cunningham, Mexico and the Foreign Policy of Napoleon III (New York: Palgrave, 2001), 9. 
17 Napoleon III played off the fears of moderates by stressing the dangers of radicals and the social revolution that 
they might incite. On April 23rd, he proclaimed that “by voting for the plebiscite, the French would forestall the 
threat of revolution, put order and liberty on a solid base, and make it easier for the crown to be transferred to my 
son.” See Napoleon III, Proclamation de l’Empereur (23 April 1870); Price, The French Second Empire, 397. 
18 The elections of 1869 brought great victories to the opposition; 4,600,000 people voted for imperial candidates, 
but 3,300,000 people voted for either republican or Orleanist candidates. See Girard, Napoleon III, 426. 
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Empire, including many moderates and liberals, who had been won over by the reforms.19 The 
most negative responses to the plebiscite came in fact from Algeria, where most colonists – who 
continued to resent and distrust Napoleon III’s attitude towards them - voted against it.20 The 
resounding success of the plebiscite enabled the emperor to reestablish the legitimacy of his 
regime in the face of the 1869 elections that had elected so many members of the opposition.21 In 
the eyes of much of the population, he had successfully redefined the French Empire, separating 
it from the militarized imperial regime of Napoleon I by recasting the evolving system as a 
domestic political model that allowed for some democratic political participation and even 
increased overt political dissent, but continued to combine “liberty” with “order.”22  
The imperial system was still somewhat authoritarian, but the political mood within 
France had shifted profoundly over the past five years. The political opposition had become 
noisier and republican radicals like Léon Gambetta who refused to acknowledge the regime’s 
legitimacy had joined moderate liberal and republican deputies in the Corps Législative.23 
Napoleon III himself was older and growing physically weaker, suffering from the illness that 
would kill him several years later. His authority had diminished in the eyes of his opponents, he 
was no longer able to act unilaterally, and his vision of the political meaning of “empire” 
encountered ever-more challenges from dissidents seeking to discredit him.24 The political 
                                               
19 Napoleon III only failed to win the majority of the vote in the Seine, the Bouches-du-Rhône, and Algeria, where 
the majority of the colonists voted against him. See Price, The French Second Empire, 397. 
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22 Napoleon III, Proclamation de l’Empereur (23 April 1870) 
23 Roger Price, The French Second Empire, 383. 
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consensus that marked the beginning of the war was a rare and final break away from this trend 
towards growing political fragmentation and dissent. 
This consensus, however, only lasted as long as French prospects in the war seemed 
good. As soon as the French troops lost the Battle of Wissembourg on August 4, it began to 
fray.25 In the days that followed, it quickly became clear that the French loss was not a fluke, and 
that the Prussians outmatched the French: the French army had a poorly structured command 
system, fewer soldiers, disorganized supply lines, and an insufficient number of railroads to 
move the troops to the front quickly enough.26 Defeat followed defeat, forcing Napoleon III to 
concede his military authority to General Mac-Mahon on August 31, little more than a month 
after he had assumed command of the armies.27 After the disastrous battle of Sedan on 
September 2, Mac-Mahon and Napoleon III were forced to surrender, placing themselves and 
100,000 French troops into Prussian custody.  
When news of the devastating defeat at Sedan and the Emperor’s personal surrender 
spread, the Empire immediately lost what credibility it had left. Napoleon III’s popularity had 
always depended on the myth of his uncle’s military greatness, and this display of immense 
military incompetence completely shattered the mythic links.28 Much of the population in Paris, 
Lyon, and Marseilles took to the streets, demanding the immediate overthrow of the government 
                                               
25 Even the initial losses at the battle of Wissembourg had political ramifications; the Empress-Regent overthrew 
Ollivier’s ministry and replaced it with one headed by the Comte de Palikao on August 9th. The Emperor did not 
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and the institution of a new Republic. On September 4, the liberal opposition in the Corps 
Législatif staged a coup d’état in Paris – at least in part to prevent the popular, more radical 
revolution that seemed to be brewing in the city - and proclaimed the beginning of the Third 
Republic.29 The new provisional government primarily included moderate republicans, who 
quickly organized themselves into the Government of National Defense.30  
If the French loss at Sedan marked the end of the Empire, it did not signal an auspicious 
beginning for the newly formed republic. Although the majority of the population – reeling from 
news of the French defeat at Sedan – resigned themselves to the revolution, most people did not 
support it. The population in the French countryside, the wealthy, and the religious accepted the 
Republic only as a temporary measure because the country was in crisis.31 The new Government 
of National Defense even struggled to maintain the support of the urban groups that had brought 
it into power because they wanted more radical reforms than the ministers were prepared to 
offer. In part in order to refrain from alienating this base, the government chose to continue the 
fight against the Germans despite the fact that most of the French army was out of commission.32 
This decision – which the government’s desire to demonstrate the military superiority of the 
republican model of the nation-at-arms also drove – proved disastrous.33 The new government’s 
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efforts to continue the war had no real success against the Prussian armies. On September 19, the 
Germans laid siege to the city of Paris and over the next months occupied most of the French 
countryside. The new republican government was forced to flee to Tours. While the Parisians 
managed to keep the Prussians from entering the city for several months, in January 1871 the 
government was forced to surrender.34  
In February of 1871, the Government of National Defense organized the Republic’s first 
elections in order to ensure that a popularly legitimized government would be in place to sign the 
peace treaty.35 The elections returned a majority of Legitimist and Orleanist candidates, drawn 
from primarily rural areas.36 The Third Republic’s first elected legislature was thus primarily 
composed of deputies who disapproved of republicanism – a composition that hardly seemed to 
assure the Republic’s future. Anti-republican deputies would dominate the Republic’s legislature 
until 1879. These electoral results satisfied neither republicans nor the different conservative 
groups who felt confined within a political system they disliked.37 Shortly after assuming office, 
the newly elected government signed the unpopular peace treaty that included expensive war 
reparations and the surrender of Alsace and Lorraine. The first major act of the republic’s elected 
government thus provoked widespread discontent across the country. This treaty also allowed the 
Prussian army to march through Paris, an event that irritated much of the Parisian population.38 
The new government’s decision to convene in Versailles rather than Paris – based in part on its 
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deputies’ suspicion of the republican and radical groups that had precipitated the September 4 
Revolution in France’s capital  - consolidated the Parisians’ resentment.39 
The Parisian left, increasingly convinced that the Third Republic’s government was 
“republican” in name only, denounced the new leadership and proclaimed the beginning of the 
Paris Commune in March of 1871.40 The Commune lasted barely more than two months, but its 
legacy, like the war’s, left a profound mark on France and on the new Republic’s government. 
The Commune was itself complex: it included a number of different political movements and 
impulses. Its elected government included deputies whose political allegiances ranged from 
moderate republican, to neo-Jacobin, to Saint-Simonian, to socialist. This government embraced 
several reform projects, most of which emerged directly out of Republican and even Bonapartist 
traditions – they established workers’ cooperatives, nationalized Church property, tried to 
improve the economic and legal position of women, and established institutions of secular 
education.41 Despite the fact that French progressives had long advocated for and even embarked 
on less ambitious versions of these projects, Communard actions incensed the government in 
Versailles. It convinced the Prussians to release the French army from prisoner-of-war camps so 
that it could crush the revolutionaries. During the “Bloody Week” in May, the newly 
reconstituted army slaughtered at least 20,000 Parisians and arrested nearly 50,000 more. Many 
of those arrested were incarcerated in work camps in Paris or in New Caledonia.42 
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If the early Republic’s government was tainted by the fact that it was forced to sign a 
wildly unpopular peace treaty, a major uprising represented even more of a potential threat to its 
reputation. The government did everything it could to delegitimize the movement: it unleashed a 
torrent of propaganda painting the Communards as socialists, criminals, and foreign conspirators 
bent on seducing the working classes, promoting a culture of laziness, and undermining France.43 
As Gay Gullickson has made clear, the government also tried to portray the Communards as 
simply evil by mobilizing the image of the petroleuse – Communard women accused of setting 
fire to the city. They portrayed these women as unnatural viragos who posed a profound threat to 
the French social order, and used their image to help transform the popular image of the 
Commune itself.44 This propaganda campaign was largely successful: in the years after the année 
terrible it was Communard atrocities – not government ones - that lived on in the French popular 
memory, despite the fact that the government had indisputably killed far more people than the 
revolutionaries they crushed.45  
While a conservative government spearheaded the campaign to crush the Commune, 
Republican deputies also participated in it. Many were eager to portray Communards as either 
socialist radicals or social degenerates in order to disassociate themselves from the uprising. This 
move to disavow the Communards did not take place among politicians alone. Even after Le 
Temps was suspended for nearly a month by the government in Versailles for “supporting the 
civil war,” it opened its first new edition with a note condemning the Communards as “despots” 
who would have “brought back the proceedings and traditions of the empire.” Only the National 
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Assembly, it maintained, could secure the country’s republican liberties.46 Given that most 
members of the National Assembly at the time were opposed to republican liberties in most 
forms, this claim was contradictory at best. But it shows that moderate and even radical 
republicans saw the Commune’s legacy as a threat to their own reputation. After all, the 
Communards had described themselves as republicans and claimed the French revolutionary 
tradition as their own.47 The moderate republicans who only elected a minority of representatives 
to the new conservative government did not want to be associated with a failed political uprising. 
As a result, the fact that they shared some of the Communards’ beliefs and views made them all 
the more desirous of distancing themselves from it. And despite the fact that this propaganda 
campaign largely succeeded – most of the population remembered the Commune as a socialist, 
not republican uprising – it is nevertheless clear that some Communard policies and decisions 
continued to haunt republican memory and politics throughout the late nineteenth century. It 
further complicated republicans’ relationship to the French Revolution and undermined the 
strength of some long-held republican beliefs, including the vision of the levée en masse or a 
nation-at-arms.48 Finally, it convinced many moderate republicans that in order to succeed 
politically they would have to embrace a relatively conservative set of political platforms. 
As political historians have made clear, the French spent the thirty years following the 
Commune working out exactly what the new French “republic” meant and how it should be 
organized. Conservative and liberal republican politicians struggled among themselves and with 
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other political parties to define their newly constituted government in contradistinction to the 
defeated Second Empire and the Paris Commune. At the same time, monarchists and 
Bonapartists sought to undermine the new government’s legitimacy in the hopes of replacing it 
with a different form of political organization. All of these groups drew, in different ways, on the 
contested memories of the année terrible in order to defend their political beliefs and to 
articulate alternative visions of French political and national identity. Despite their critiques of 
both the Commune and socialism, however, these different groups themselves lacked unity, and 
they did not articulate coherent political positions. Republicans, for example, navigated between 
democratic impulses, fear of the mob, belief in the guiding power of educated elites, and concern 
about the continued appeal of monarchism, Bonapartism, and the Catholic Church. The content 
of their ideology thus remained fluid and evolving.49  Monarchists, on the other hand, were 
divided between supporters of different Bourbon descendants and on the question of the French 
Revolution, while Bonapartists disagreed about whether to defend Napoleon III and his vision of 
Empire. These different groups worked out their political ideologies as they debated with one 
another in the decades following the Franco-Prussian War. 
This chapter examines the way that ongoing struggles over politics and memory affected 
understandings of “empire” and the nature of its relationship to the “republic” between 1871 and 
1879. It argues that the disagreements over the events of the année terrible and their significance 
helped solidify a diametrical opposition between the concepts of empire and republic–even if the 
French continued to disagree about the content, value, and significance of the two terms. This 
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dichotomy soon created political problems and conceptual tensions for republican intellectuals 
who believed that the new republic should expand its colonial empire.  
This chapter’s analysis of the debates about “empire,” “republic,” and the legacy of the 
année terrible focuses on three questions. First, how did intellectuals of different political 
affiliations articulate and defend their visions of France’s ideal political organization and its 
national identity in the early years of the Third Republic? Second, what role did the memory of 
the Franco-Prussian War and the Commune play in their political understandings? Third, how 
did these debates affect popular understandings of “empire” in the first decade of the new 
republic? The chapter considers these questions by examining how these debates played out 
across newspapers, political pamphlets, and novels published in the early years of the Third 
Republic. It begins by focusing on debates within metropolitan France before expanding the 
analysis to consider the role that these debates played in popular understandings of France’s 
relationship to Algeria and its other colonies. 
 
II. Visions of Empire in the New Republic 
In the wake of defeat and civil war, politicians, intellectuals, and writers of a variety of 
ideological stripes sought to determine the cause for France’s embarrassing defeat and 
destructive civil war. These attempts were controversial – not least because many blamed the 
defeat not on German tactics, but on different groups or trends in French society. Some held the 
army responsible, while others charged only its generals or administrators. Others blamed 
Napoleon III, or the Second Empire, while some held the Government of National Defense at 
fault for the final devastation. Still others maintained that there was something deeply wrong 
with the French nation itself. Due in part to these wide differences in opinion, even by 1880 the 
French had not reached a clear consensus on the causes for defeat. But if these debates remained 
  122 
unresolved, they nevertheless shaped the new ways that French intellectuals and politicians 
thought about the meaning and significance of “empire” and “republic” – even if they continued 
to disagree about the value and valence of both terms. 
This debate over the political and national implications of French defeat took place in a 
number of different spheres – including newspapers, political pamphlets, almanacs, and 
literature. These types of writing had different purposes and were often intended for different 
audiences: some were aimed at the highly educated, while others sought to have a more mass 
appeal.50 Some were intended to rally those who shared beliefs similar to those of the author, 
while others were intended to convince those who were politically on the fence. The writers 
themselves had different relationships to French politics: some were immersed in the political 
sphere, while others were not politicians at all. Although these different attempts to influence 
popular understandings of the Franco-Prussian War and its relationship to French politics thus 
did not operate in the same way and did not necessarily circulate among the same people, they all 
contributed to an uneven conversation about the nation’s past and its future. 
This conversation also evolved over the 1870s as writers responded to each other’s 
arguments and reacted to political events. Between 1871 and 1873, the republic was particularly 
unstable. The Orleanist and Legitimist deputies who dominated the National Assembly openly 
worked together to restore the monarchy and crown the Comte de Chambord King of France.51 
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At the same time, the threat of a Bonapartist resurgence seemed remote, and Bonapartist 
sympathizers remained quiet.52 In the earliest years, monarchists and republicans were thus 
poised primarily against one another, and they invoked particular visions of the Second Empire 
to discredit each other and promote different forms of political organization. The nature of the 
debates over the war and the Empire changed in 1873, when the likelihood of a monarchical 
restoration receded and the Bonapartists re-entered the conversation, and once again in 1875, 
when the deputies took the first steps to consolidate the republican regime.53 
 
Republicans 
Although no political groups articulated coherent interpretations of the war and the 
Commune, there were common concerns that fell along political lines. Republican politicians 
and intellectuals in particular blamed the Empire and its high-ranking officials for the outbreak 
of the Franco-Prussian War and France’s eventual defeat. By delegitimizing the Empire – and to 
some extent, the monarchy as well – they hoped to defend the new republican government from 
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the conservative majorities that threatened to overthrow it by proving that the republic was not 
responsible for any of France’s misfortunes. This argument emerged early on. In the weeks 
following the September 4 Revolution, a number of politicians, intellectuals, and journalists from 
across the political spectrum published vehement critiques of Napoleon III, his military 
strategies, and his political institutions. These critiques only became more numerous in the face 
of the elections that took place on 17 February 1871, when the republicans faced a strong 
conservative opposition in the wake of the highly unpopular peace treaty.54 But if republican 
thinkers agreed that the Empire was largely to blame for defeat and civil war, they often 
articulated different ideas about why the Empire was to blame – and in fact defined the meaning 
of both “Empire” and “Republic” in diverse, sometimes contradictory ways. They also adopted 
different strategies for drawing the connections between empire and defeat. 
Some pamphleteers focused their critique of the Empire on Napoleon III himself, and 
sought to demonstrate that he was personally responsible for the events of 1870-71.55 Eugène 
Spuller, a republican writer and politician, contended, for example, that because Napoleon III 
was a dictator who decided French policy from above, he alone could be held to account for the 
war’s events.56 He argued that Napoleon III’s pattern of placing his own desires and interests 
over the needs of the country had weakened France, and left it unprepared for war with Prussia 
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when it came.57 The republican politician Émile Dehau echoed the contention that Napoleon III’s 
selfishness that led to the defeat in his pamphlet “Napoleon III or National Shame” published in 
early 1871. He claimed that contemporary France’s weak political and military position was the 
result of Napoleon III’s decision to try to increase his personal prestige by embarking on a series 
of unjustified wars in the country’s name.58  
Even as these authors condemned Napoleon III as selfish, they argued that Napoleon III’s 
incompetence as a military commander was the most important factor in French defeat. This 
focus on his military abilities in part reflected republicans’ concern about the continued power of 
the Napoleonic myth of military greatness. Many republicans saw this myth as responsible for 
Napoleon III’s rise, and they feared that he might be able to make his way back into power if it 
remained intact.59 Some writers attempted to dismantle the myth by attacking the legacy of 
Napoleon I. 60 But most did not contest Napoleon I’s military greatness; instead, they argued that 
Napoleon III had not inherited his talents. Eugène Spuller claimed that Napoleon III was simply 
too corrupt to be an effective military commander. He charged that Napoleon III – in an attempt 
to enrich himself – had purposefully diverted the funds he had requested to maintain and arm his 
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soldiers into his personal accounts. He thus contended that the French army had lost primarily 
because it was criminally underfunded and underequipped.61 Émile Dehau took a more systemic 
approach: he declared that Napoleon III’s attempt to create an army that was both loyal to and 
dependent upon him had had devastating effects on the military’s ability to effectively fight 
wars. By limiting enrollment and refusing to create a national army out of fear that such an army 
might turn against him, he had failed to recruit and train enough soldiers to defend France.62 
Most authors went beyond personal failure, however, and insisted that the defeat did not 
just stem from Napoleon III’s personal, political, or military weaknesses, but from the fact that 
the Empire itself was a fundamentally flawed political institution. The critics thus challenged the 
legitimacy of the whole imperial system. They did not necessarily agree, however, about why the 
empire was inherently problematic. Some took a structural approach, arguing that the Empire 
was an inherently contradictory form of political administration. Achille Eyraud, a well-known 
writer and journalist, argued that Napoleon III sought to be both a “demagogue” and a “despot” – 
and that as a result, he was unable to create consistent domestic or foreign policies.63 Léon Feer, 
on the other hand, agreed that the Empire represented both demagogy and despotism, but denied 
that these two tendencies were contradictory: instead, he maintained, that they were “two allies” 
that had worked together beneath Napoleon III’s rule to undermine France.64 Others pointed to 
the Empire’s political culture: Le Petit Journal implied that the empire’s key fault lay in its 
tendency to promote loyalty over competence. It particularly condemned the use of official 
candidature, which, it contended, helped create an administrative culture based on conformity 
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and personal connections. Such an incompetent administration could not adequately govern the 
country nor meet the demands of waging a war.65  
Other authors charged that the Empire’s failures lay primarily in the fact that it was a 
fundamentally corrupt form of political organization, which promoted a decadent, immoral 
culture.66 If Eugène Spuller had argued that this corruption stemmed from the Emperor himself, 
others described it as a systemic problem that spread throughout the entire administration and 
degraded the French nation.67 In an open letter to Gambetta, Jean-Baptiste Vitteaut implied that 
Napoleon III had spread this corruption deliberately because he had feared an uprising and had 
therefore undermined the religious and national ties that naturally bound the French people 
together by promoting an egotistical culture.68 Without those ties, they had been unable to unite 
in the face of a common enemy and defend themselves against the Germans. Le Siècle agreed 
with this diagnosis, maintaining that the Empire was “only a despotism and an orgy. It did not 
and it could not leave anything behind it other than ruin and shame. We have not had anything 
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but an immoral comedy in France for the past twenty years…”69 Like Vitteaut, the author thus 
tied what he saw as the Empire’s moral failures to the outcome of the conflict with Prussia, and 
implied that the government had been destined to end in disaster.  
While some republican pamphlet-writers defined the Empire as a unique form of political 
organization and attempted to discredit it alone, others tied its failures to older conservative 
forms of government. Some linked the Empire explicitly to the French monarchy by describing 
the empire as a “type” of monarchy – and then argued that all forms of monarchy were equally 
intrinsically despotic.70 Raymond d’Aiguy, an officer at Lyon’s court of appeals, for example, 
described the Bonapartists, the Legitimists, and the Orleanists, as “three monarchies” and held 
them all responsible for “dishonoring [the nation’s] name, debasing its flag, and plunging it into 
an abyss of ruin and devastation.”71 While G. Barthélemy, a republican politician, did distinguish 
between Bonapartists, Legitimists, and Orleanists, he maintained that the differences between 
them were ultimately negligible, because all three were “synonymous with tyranny, absolutism, 
and despotism” and each would ultimately bring ruin to the French nation.72 A third anonymous 
writer acknowledged that Bonapartists, Legitimists, and Orleanists represented three distinct 
political ideals.73 But he went on to claim that all “were equally false and equally bad.”74  
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The naturalist E. Jourdeuil tied the Empire and older forms of monarchy together in a 
somewhat different way. He did not argue that the Empire was a form of monarchy; instead, he 
alleged that with the advent of Louis XIV, the monarchy itself had come to operate as a type of 
“Caesarism.” Caesarism, he asserted, “was dictatorship transformed into a permanent system of 
government; discretionary sovereignty… establishing regular power in the interests of the rulers 
and not the ruled… it is violence governing opinion, and force violating right… it is everything 
that one wants, except for what is liberal, what is noble, and what is just.”75 In other words, the 
empire was not a form of monarchy; the monarchy had become a form of empire. As a result, if 
imperialism represented a fundamentally illegitimate way of organizing power, the monarchy 
shared all of its problems. And while Jourdeuil acknowledged that the monarchists had little 
directly to do with the defeat of 1870-71, he promised that if they came to power, it would only 
be a matter of time before the country encountered another disaster. 
If Republican writers sought to use the events of the war and the Commune to discredit 
the empire – and often the monarchy as well – they simultaneously promoted the republic as the 
form of government that would rebuild France through its opposition to the hated Empire. 
However, they did not necessarily describe its solution to France’s problems in the same way. 
The republican opportunist Louis Andrieux, for example, promised that unlike Napoleon III, the 
new republic would bring peace and prosperity to France and to Europe.76 Moreover, he claimed, 
by spreading the message of fraternity to all people, it would succeed in “invading” Europe, 
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undermine all remaining Empires, and enable France to recover the territory lost to Germany.77 
In this vision, the new government would solve France’s problems by embracing and promoting 
a progressive ideology based on equality and pacifism. Raymond d’Aiguy, on the other hand, 
contended that the republic would solve France’s problems by “sweeping away everything that 
makes us blush… We will not see again that unbridled luxury… or odious speculation… we will 
not see money reigning as master… we will not see corruption descending from on high to 
spread everywhere…”78 D’Aiguy thus promoted a vision of the republic as a sober, morally pure 
form of political organization that would eliminate the “decadence” and materiality that had 
characterized imperial France. In addition to insisting that the republic would purify French 
society and culture, moreover, he argued that it would also create a more effective army by 
instituting a universal draft.79 This message was thus less pacifistic than Andrieux’s; both 
maintained that the republic would enable France to regain its lost territory, but d’Aiguy implied 
that France would do so with a more effective army – not by spreading its ideology across 
Europe. Both agreed, however, that the new republic would be able to foster the development of 
progress and prosperity in the way that less representative forms of rule would not. 
Many writers tried to reach across political divides to their conservative counterparts and 
disassociate the republic from the Commune by describing the new government as a 
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conservative political institution that could best promote order and stem the rising tide of 
radicalism. In order to defend this point, these writers explicitly divorced the Republic – and 
democratic forms of political organization – from social and political radicalism as well as from 
the Empire. F. Boussenot thus claimed that it was the Second Empire, and not the new republic, 
that was responsible for the Commune. He contended that the empire had allowed “radicals” of 
all types to flourish, and that these radicals had simply seized the opportunity offered by the 
Empire’s defeat to revolt.80 The republic, on the other hand, had crushed this uprising – putting 
an end to the radical politics that the Empire had allowed to flourish.81 Other authors took a more 
theoretical approach, and tried to redefine popular understandings of the relationship between 
republicanism and radicalism. One anonymous writer argued that the republic was a political 
regime defined by restraint. He condemned the way that conservative writers “confused [the 
Republic] with the Terror and the Commune,” and claimed that it had little more than nominal 
connections to either revolutionary movement. 82 Both were tied not to the Republic, but to the 
monarchy and the empire. On the most basic level, the Terror, the Commune, the monarchy, and 
the empire were united because they were all equally defined by “excess.” Moreover, he insisted, 
the monarchy and the empire necessarily led to revolt because they were fundamentally unjust 
and “raised to the status of dogma imposed, like Islam, by the sword.”83 Oppressive personal rule 
necessarily led to resentment and anger, which in turn resulted in uprisings and in legal, moral, 
and material disorder. He insisted that the Third Republic would not have these problems. 
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Because all parties were included in the government, they were forced to cooperate with one 
another and work for the higher good of the nation. As a result, parties could not either oppress 
or undermine one another. The Republic, he thus concluded, enforced moderation and order.84  
Although this anonymous writer’s description of the relationship between monarchy, 
empire, and revolution was laid out in unusual detail, many other republicans echoed his general 
contention that monarchy, empire, and revolution were bound together. E. Jourdeuil, for 
example, maintained that the republic represented “the rule of law.” All other forms of 
government, on the other hand, were on some level “arbitrary,” which inevitably stirred 
resentment and distrust among the people. Only a well-run republic based on the collective will 
of the national population, he argued, would be effective in convincing people to live according 
to the rules of a well-run society. 85 Eugène Bazin took the argument even farther: he asserted 
that the republic would be best able to suppress radical and degenerate movements because only 
democratically-organized societies promoted an atmosphere of “public virtue” in which such 
movements would be unable to thrive.86 Eugène Courmeaux, on the other hand, insisted that the 
Republic was the only form of government that could prevent revolution because it alone was 
not exclusionary: both the monarchy and the empire were in “perpetual conflict with national 
sovereignty.”87 Achille Eyraud similarly promised that the republic would bring peace because it 
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alone could represent the different wishes from people across the country; the monarchy and the 
empire, on the other hand, were by nature exclusionary and thus bred discontent. 88  
These differing portraits of the empire and its relationship to the military defeat, the 
Commune, and other forms of monarchical government highlight some of the divisions within 
the emergent republican coalition in the early 1870s. They reveal the diversity of republicans’ 
concerns in the wake of defeat, and demonstrate their contradictory ideas about what the new 
republic should look like. Even as these writers invoked similar tropes, they often interpreted 
them in distinct ways. Some authors who condemned Napoleon III’s military strategies thus 
replaced the Napoleonic military model with the republican ideal of the nation at arms, while 
others replaced it with a vision of a universal peaceful republic.89 Authors who painted the 
Empire as an inherently despotic institution usually underlined the democratic nature of the 
Third Republic and avowed that it alone could represent the nation.90 But others, like Léon Feer, 
contended that the Empire had been despotic because it had relied on the “demagogic” practice 
of universal suffrage, and they claimed that the new republic would ensure order precisely 
because it would be less democratic and would rely on indirect suffrage.91 Some writers who 
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emphasized Napoleon III’s corruption presented the republic as a conservative type of political 
organization that would preserve order in France.92 But some also used the spectacle they painted 
of imperial decay to promote a vision of the republic as an open society that would promote 
public virtue by giving everyone a voice.93 These pamphlets thus reflected the disagreements 
between republican factions in the early years of the republic. The moderate republicans were 
concerned about the legacy of both the Revolution and the Commune and wanted to win liberals 
and Orleanists over to their cause, whereas the radical republicans were more concerned about 
establishing representative political institutions that reflected republican values.94  
There was nevertheless considerable overlap between these republican pamphlets. All 
sought to discredit the Second Empire by tying it to the events of 1870-71. Perhaps most notably, 
many republicans used a negative vision of the Second Empire to condemn monarchical systems 
by tying the two kinds of political regimes together. If the Empire was responsible for the defeat 
and civil war, and it shared many commonalities with the monarchy, then republicans could 
argue that the monarchy – much like the Empire – would lead the country to disaster. As a result, 
many did not define the Empire as a unique political regime, but tried to convince their readers 
that it was merely one example of authoritarian government. At the same time, they promised 
their readers that the republic would heal the wounds of the past and ensure its future greatness. 
 
Monarchists 
Monarchist voices – and especially Legitimist ones - also joined in this pamphlet war 
over the meaning of the war and its relationship to both the Empire and the Republic in the early 
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1870s, although they framed their arguments differently. If republicans tied the Empire to the 
defeat and the Commune and then used that constellation to discredit the monarchy, most 
monarchists were less concerned with the empire’s role in the war and the Commune than with 
the emergence of the new republic. Many implicated both the Second Empire and the Third 
Republic in the events of 1870-1871, but they usually focused on discrediting the September 4 
regime. This orientation reflected the political organization of France in the aftermath of the war. 
In those years, the chances of a Bonapartist resurgence were remote, but the republic was the de 
facto government of France.95 As a result, monarchists had an immediate interest in discrediting 
the republican regime, especially in the years leading up to 1873, when they still hoped to restore 
the monarchy.96 However, there was more than one “monarchist” position on the war, empire, 
and republic after 1870-71: the monarchists were, if anything, even more divided than the 
republicans – between Legitimists and Orleanists as well as Ultras and moderates.97 
In the weeks immediately following the declaration of the republic, some monarchists 
threw their support behind the new regime and, much like the republicans, held the Empire 
responsible for France’s problems. In early 1871, Alfred de la Guéronnière published a pamphlet 
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that condemned the Empire in terms that would have been familiar to many republicans. He 
argued that Napoleon III was a “degenerate Caesar” who “illuminated chimeric mirages for the 
crowds. But the reality [of his rule] was only a reaping of crimes, revenge, proscriptions, and 
spoliation followed by a final ruin.”98 In other words, Napoleon III had manipulated ordinary 
French people into believing in the greatness of his rule, all while he persecuted his enemies and 
personally enriched himself. De la Guéronnière then went on to declare, somewhat mystically, 
that this immoral behavior, combined with the fact that the Second Empire “began with a crime,” 
doomed Napoleon III’s reign to end in disaster. In other words, France’s defeat in the war was 
essentially a punishment for Napoleon III’s evil actions.99 De la Guéronnière’s language was 
more religiously charged than that of his republican counterparts – he compared Napoleon III to 
Satan and described his regime as an “abomination” – but his vision of the Emperor as a corrupt 
puppet master who led France into disaster had much in common with their judgments. The fact 
that he ended his pamphlet with a call to support Adolphe Thiers to ward off the Bonapartist 
threat demonstrates the diversity of monarchist responses to the events of 1870-71.100 
Most monarchist pamphlets, however, did not stress the evils of Napoleon III. They 
sought instead to show the limitations of the republic by linking it to the events of 1870-71 and 
sometimes to the Empire itself. Some of the most conservative monarchists averred that the 
empire and the republic were similar types of government that had been equally discredited by 
recent events. The Marquis Renaud d’Allen maintained that it was “Napoleon III and the 
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republican party that had brought the country to its unfortunate position.”101 He argued that many 
of Napoleon III’s most reprehensible decisions – his wars with Italy, his invasion of Mexico, and 
his refusal to stop Prussian expansion – were made at the behest of the republicans. These 
decisions, he insisted, led to French defeat.102 He thus concluded, “The monarchy of St. Louis, of 
Henry IV and of Louis XIV made us the greatest people on earth, and gave us magnificent 
conquests; the Republic and the Bonapartists, however, brought us the scaffold, massacres, civil 
war, ruin, and invasion.”103 In other words, the monarchy was responsible for France’s once-
powerful position in Europe, while the Republic and the Empire had dismantled that position. An 
anonymous Catholic pamphlet writer took the parallels between Empire and Republic even 
farther: he held that Napoleon III represented a simple outgrowth of the Revolution because (like 
the revolutionaries) he supported radical groups and ideas, persecuted the Church, and showed 
“satanic tendencies.” The Empire’s resulting disorder and immorality, he alleged, led directly to 
a French defeat that had permanently discredited both Empire and Republic.104 
Most monarchist pamphlet-writers, however, drew distinctions between empire and 
republic, and in some cases, they were more critical of the empire than of the republic. Henri de 
la Broise, for example, described the empire as a fundamentally illegitimate form of government 
because, unlike both the monarchy and the republic, it did not rest on a “principle.”105 C. 
Cambier similarly argued that the empire was essentially a “dictatorship… condemned by its 
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origins.” He denounced Napoleon III by claiming, “on the exterior, he unified the enemies of 
France; on the interior, he favored socialism and divided society. After unifying Italy, his 
penchant for unifying foreign peoples became a true passion.” 106 He also declared that Napoleon 
III’s “theory of nationalities” was largely responsible for Prussia’s growing size and strength, 
thereby suggesting that the empire was directly responsible for the German victory. 
If both de la Broise and Cambier dismissed the Empire out of hand, their discussion of 
the “republic” was more nuanced. Neither maintained that all republics were bad but instead 
tried to show that the republican system was unsuited for France. De la Broise contended that the 
republic could be an acceptable form of political organization but claimed that in France it was 
tied to a violent revolutionary legacy. “The republic in France,” he argued, “is only the 
production of the Revolution and its most complete expression.” Because he saw the Revolution 
as a destructive movement that emphasized individualism and undermined authority, de la Broise 
believed that adopting the republic would unsettle society.107 Cambier agreed that countries like 
the United States were suited to republican government. However, he asserted, the republic had 
no place in France, because the monarchy had brought it centuries of prosperity. As a result, 
French republicans were malcontents who wanted a government based on “the distrust of law, 
the abandonment of work, the right to guns and copious drinking, and also the right to rise up 
periodically….”108 Like de la Boise, Cambier thus argued that French republicanism was 
disorderly and led to disasters like the Revolution and the Commune.109  
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Many authors echoed de la Broise’s and Cambier’s critiques of French republicanism’s 
radicalism and violence.110 But some described republicanism’s position in France differently, 
arguing that the key issue lay in the fact that republican values were not compatible with those of 
the French nation. One anonymous writer claimed, “Each people… has its character, as each 
individual has his temperament… Temperament modifies with age, but it never changes totally. 
What is the character of France? Its habits, one could even say its needs are the result of a 
monarchical constitution that has lasted for more than one thousand years.”111 He maintained that 
France’s inability to fend off its invaders and its weakening position in Europe resulted from its 
adoption of an ill-suited republican government that would produce similar disasters in the future 
if France did not accept the monarchy. A. Labat agreed, declaring that the French nation could 
not morally support a republican form of government. He declared, “The republicans… proclaim 
themselves socialists or regenerators of society, but every time they touch the social edifice, they 
shake its foundations.”112 Instead of remaking the French nation, republicans had thus only 
proven able to unsettle the one they encountered. Labat insisted that France needed a monarchy 
to avert “social destruction” and to avoid the fate that had befallen Poland.113  
If monarchists thus argued that both the empire and the republic had led France into 
disaster, some also claimed that the monarchy could incorporate republican principles. Most of 
these pamphlet-writers were Legitimists rather than Orleanists, but they painted Legitimism as a 
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moderate political movement.114 Labat insisted, for example, that while both the empire and the 
republic had weakened France and left it without European allies, a monarchy could preserve 
France’s social fabric by uniting the country with its “glorious past, [and] bringing back its 
traditions while keeping all of the conquests of its first revolution.”115 This new monarchy, he 
explained, would be a constitutional regime that would enable France to move forward by 
uniting its diverse political traditions. At the same time, such a monarchy would strengthen 
France’s position vis-à-vis the rest of Europe by “creating alliances.”116 Henri de la Boise had 
similarly condemned the republic and maintained that the monarchy alone would regenerate 
France because it could ensure the nation’s stability, restore its internal order and combat certain 
republican political traditions such as centralization and factionalism. He nevertheless claimed 
that the monarchy would establish a constitution and work in concert with a National Assembly 
to rule the country. 117 Even conservative monarchists recognized by the 1870s that they had to 
accept some republican ideas. One anonymous supporter of divine-right monarchy, for example, 
condemned the republic in no uncertain terms - noting, “the republican form of government is so 
ill-suited to us that the word “republic” is seen as the synonym to disorder in the thought of the 
multitudes.” Yet this vehemently anti-republican author also conceded that divine right 
monarchy would necessarily have to incorporate a system of national representation.118 
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Monarchists’ pamphlets thus echoed some republican critiques of the Second Empire: 
most held the Empire responsible for the French defeat – if not for the Commune. Several even 
went so far as to condemn the Empire as a form of political organization in terms that would 
have been familiar to many republicans. There were nevertheless important differences between 
the two groups. In general, monarchists focused less on the failings of the Empire or even on the 
war itself: they tended to condemn Napoleon III and his military strategies out of hand before 
devoting most of their attention to the republic and its relationship to the Commune. They thus 
consistently linked the republic to radical movements and social disorder. Some even condemned 
republicans as “enemies of France” and the republic as “diabolical.”119 But for the most part, the 
monarchists took a conciliatory tone towards at least some republican ideas as they attempted to 
attract undecided Orleanist monarchists. They described the Legitimist candidate to the throne as 
a constitutionally-minded monarch who would respect some republican traditions while setting 
the most destructive ones to rest – even as they continued to describe his claim to the throne as 
based on divine right.120 This strategy would break down in 1873 when the Comte de Chambord 
refused to rule constitutionally. Even in 1871, these pamphlets reflected sharp disagreements. 
Some moderates such as Alfred de la Guéronnière advocated for a temporary acceptance of the 
republic, while others discounted the idea of popular suffrage completely.121 These divisions 
would crystallize among the increasingly marginalized monarchists over the rest of the decade. 
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Although republicans and monarchists alike connected the empire to the disastrous events 
of 1870-71, both groups were most interested in defending their forms of political organization 
against each other. The republicans thus constructed a negative vision of the Second Empire in 
order to highlight its connections to other monarchical systems and thereby demonstrate the 
virtues of the new republic. Monarchists, on the other hand, condemned both the empire and 
republic in order to promote a monarchical restoration. Both groups nevertheless rejected the 
official understandings of “Empire” promulgated by Napoleon III throughout his reign. 
Napoleon III had described the empire as the moderate way between republic and monarchy. He 
had maintained that it balanced liberty with order and security, based its legitimacy on the 
support of the people, and ensured the development of both peace and prosperity. The republican 
and monarchist pamphlets dismissed these claims by highlighting the empire’s incompetence and 
corruption. At the same time, critics on both left and right co-opted his contention that the empire 
represented a “middle” political way, arguing that their own conceptions of the republic or the 
monarchy were actually more moderate. This rhetoric would become stronger in the middle of 
the decade, when the Bonapartists began to be perceived as a new threat. 
 
III. Napoleon IV and the Declaration of Chislehurst 
For the most part, the Bonapartists did not participate in the first wave of this pamphlet 
war over the memory of 1870-71 and its relationship to the Empire and the Commune.122 This 
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was in part because the party was scattered. Napoleon III was in exile and increasingly ill: there 
was also no organized imperialist organization within France itself.123 The situation shifted in the 
mid-1870s. In 1873, Napoleon III died after a failed surgery to remove the kidney stones that had 
been plaguing him for years.124 And in March of 1874, the Prince Napoleon reached the age of 
majority in a highly publicized ceremony in Chislehurst, England.125 The Bonapartists thus were 
able to replace a candidate tainted by the events of the war with a charismatic young man. In the 
wake of this event, a number of Bonapartists mobilized to reclaim the empire and restore its 
reputation. Eugène Rouher founded the group L’Appel au peuple that worked (rather 
successfully) to elect Bonapartist candidates to the National Assembly – a surge made possible in 
part by the growing sense that a monarchical restoration was unlikely. He and his followers 
began to advocate within the Chamber for a national plebiscite that would allow the French 
people to choose between the republic, the monarchy, and the empire.126 At the same time, a 
number of new imperialist publications tried to popularize Bonapartist ideas and promote the 
Bonapartist cause. By 1877, there were 104 Bonapartist deputies in the National Assembly.127 
In response to these developments, monarchists and especially republicans mobilized 
against what they saw as the rising threat of a Bonapartist restoration.128 Ultimately, their 
concerns proved unfounded – Napoleon IV had trouble unifying his supporters, and he was never 
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able to mobilize his popularity before dying fighting the Zulu in Africa in 1879.129 But between 
1874 and 1876, a second wave of political writing about the Franco-Prussian War, the 
Commune, the empire, and the republic emerged.130 This second wave of debate took a 
somewhat different form than the first: it was dominated by republican and Bonapartist writers, 
both of whom attempted to construct a vision of French politics largely in opposition to one 
another. And perhaps most importantly, it was this second wave of conflicts over the relationship 
between the empire, the war, and the republic that would solidify republican understandings of 
“empire” as a form of government. This vision of empire would ultimately also help shape how 
the republicans discussed the new republic’s relationship to France’s overseas colonies. 
Bonapartist pamphleteers writing in the mid-1870s sought above all to reframe the 
conversation about the Empire, its virtues, and its relationship to the war. They wanted to combat 
republican and monarchist claims about imperial culpability and promote a more positive vision 
of empire. They employed a number of different strategies to accomplish this task. Some 
challenged the contention that the Empire was responsible for France’s entry into the war and for 
its ultimate defeat. Paul de Cassagnac, one of the most influential Bonapartist deputies in the 
Third Republic, argued that Napoleon III did not desire to go to war with Prussia at all, but was 
forced into it by republican deputies. France proved unable to withstand the force of the Prussian 
army, so after putting up a valiant fight, Napoleon III sacrificed himself by surrendering in order 
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to save his soldiers’ lives.131 Cassagnac thus described the Prussian army as a force of nature – 
an insurmountable threat that the French could not turn back - and depicted Napoleon III as a 
valiant man with few choices. At the same time, he implied that the republicans were ultimately 
responsible for the defeat, because they had started a war that the country was unable to win. 
Alfred d’Alembert took the argument about the republicans’ responsibility for French 
defeat a step further. Unlike Cassagnac, he did not claim that Napoleon III was opposed to the 
war: instead, he maintained that while the Emperor did not seek war with Prussia, he saw that the 
conflict was unavoidable.132 When Napoleon III sought to prepare the country for a confrontation 
by building a large army and putting away reserves, however, the republican-dominated 
Chamber of Deputies refused to allocate funds for such an enterprise.133 As a result, France was 
unprepared when the conflict erupted. Radicals in Paris took advantage of Napoleon III’s defeat 
– which they themselves were largely responsible for precipitating – to stage a revolution. 
D’Alembert argued that the revolution’s success reflected Parisian opinions rather than the views 
of most French people, who continued to support the Empire.134 He thus blamed the outcome of 
the war on decisions made by the republicans and portrayed the republicans as radicals who 
imposed their will on the French people from above and lacked popular legitimacy.135 He 
asserted that the very idea that Napoleon III had “betrayed” France or that he was personally 
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responsible for defeat was little more than republican propaganda.136 Although D’Alembert’s 
long exposition on republican politics during the last years of the Second Empire was somewhat 
unusual, a number of other authors echoed his and Cassagnac’s contention that it was the 
republic, and not the empire, that was most responsible for French defeat.137 
Most Bonapartist writers, however, chose not to dwell on the legacy of the war. Even 
writers like Cassagnac and d’Alembert tended to reframe the narrative of the 1871 defeat by 
placing it within a longer narrative of a glorious imperial history dating back to the Napoleonic 
conquests of the eighteenth century. Many writers alternatively tried to restore the Second 
Empire’s reputation by emphasizing the non-military aspects of Napoleon III’s record. In an 
1873 pamphlet, for example, Constant Perrin argued that the prevailing French view of Napoleon 
III was inaccurate because it focused on his “unhappy struggle” but failed to remember the great 
things he had brought to France, including “universal suffrage, the Grand Exposition, the major 
thoroughfares constructed in cities, the axe brought against pauperism, the respect and glory 
acquired by the flag.”138 This amnesia, he maintained, was the result of “ingratitude,” and it was 
dangerous to France’s future because it endangered the country’s best hope for recovery - the 
young Prince Napoleon.139 If Perrin emphasized Napoleon III’s political reforms and cultural 
achievements, the Comte de la Chapelle highlighted his economic record by pointing to the 
prosperity that the Emperor had brought to ordinary people. He asserted that this record showed 
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that Bonapartists alone could represent the country’s economic interests.140 Both writers thus 
reminded their readers of what they saw as Napoleon III’s greatest accomplishments and argued 
that the Empire was the form of political organization best suited to contemporary France. 
Many of these Bonapartist pamphlets did not focus on Napoleon III’s personal record, but 
instead defined “Empire” abstractly as a system of government that could solve France’s present-
day problems. Albert Duruy, for example, stated that France was not suited to either monarchy or 
republic because its kings were prone to “abuses” and its republics to “excesses.”141 The Empire, 
he declared, curbed both problems because it “borrowed the monarchy’s strength of resistance 
and the republic’s strength of initiative… [and was] simultaneously authoritarian and 
democratic.”142 It thus provided a middle way between two extremes that had long torn the 
country in opposite directions. Duruy argued that the Empire was poised to take this middle way 
in industry as well as politics because it alone could navigate between the needs of industrialists 
and workers. The republic, conversely, failed to meet the needs of either economic group 
because the forces of “anarchy” and “oppression” determined its policies.143 This state of affairs 
was not destined to last long, Duruy predicted, because the people were turning back to the 
Empire and to Napoleon IV, its obvious torchbearer.144 Duruy’s defense of empire thus avoided 
referring to Napoleon III and instead attempted to show how Bonapartism could solve 
contemporary problems. But his idea of empire as the “middle way” was not new: it borrowed 
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heavily from Napoleon III’s attempts to give theoretical shape to the imperial system early in his 
reign. And in fact, Napoleon III’s vision of empire as the “middle way” appeared in many 
Bonapartist pamphlets: much as he had in the 1850s, they argued that the empire promised both 
popular sovereignty and political order in state institutions, as well as economic prosperity for 
workers, farmers, artisans, and the bourgeoisie alike.145 For the most part, Bonapartists thus 
defended older ideas about empire instead of offering new ones. 
Many of these pamphlets grounded their portrayals of empire in the figure of Napoleon 
IV, whom they described as the embodiment of the virtues of the Bonapartist tradition. They 
provided very little information about his individual character or actions, and instead used him as 
a symbol or cipher for imperial values.146 They assured their readers that he was a thoughtful, 
mature, highly masculine young man who was wise beyond his years, thus combatting the notion 
that he might be too young to serve as head of state.147 They also sought to locate him firmly in 
the Bonapartist tradition. Léonce Dupont explicitly linked him to his great-uncle, noting that he 
“evoked… the great figure of Napoleon I… The prince imperial has not in any way worn out the 
prestige that is attached to the founder of his race.”148 Alexis Doinet took a less genealogical 
approach, instead emphasizing the prince’s ideological purity by describing him as the 
“incarnation of the imperial regime,” and promising that he would rule “a government 
regimented by a Constitution with a democratic base… controlled by an elective Assembly, and 
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contained by a second Assembly.”149 Doinet thus promised that the young heir would continue 
the Napoleonic tradition of promoting national suffrage, while simultaneously upholding order 
through authoritarian measures. The pamphlets’ rhetorical strategy of tying the prince explicitly 
to his forebears and their traditions contributed to the broader Bonapartist strategy of 
reinvigorating the model of Empire that Napoleon III had promoted. 
Bonapartist pamphlets were not solely defensive, however. If some sought to discredit the 
republic by linking it to defeat, others went farther and argued that the republic was not a 
legitimate government. Writers like Fernand Giraudeau contended that the republicans’ claim to 
represent the people was disingenuous, because they refused to organize a referendum on 
France’s political organization. Until the republicans allowed the people to decide whether they 
wanted a monarchy, republic, or empire, he declared, they could not claim that the republic was 
based on universal suffrage.150 Adolphe Caillé compared the republicans’ unwillingness to 
organize such a vote to Napoleon III’s decision to allow the people to ratify the Empire by 
plebiscite.151 Gustave Cuneo d’Orant even insisted, “Of all of the regimes that have been tried in 
France, the Empire has always been founded by the people. Only the Emperor has always 
recognized the sovereignty of the people and the unique source of all legitimacy.”152 The 
Republic, he argued, had always been imposed on the people by a minority.153 The fact that the 
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republicans would not agree to organize a plebiscite simply revealed that they knew they did not 
have the will of the people behind them.154 
In the mid-1870s, most Bonapartists thus sought to restore the vision of Empire that 
Napoleon III had promulgated early in his reign – at least in terms of his internal politics. They 
portrayed the Bonapartist Empire as a regime that expressed the will of the people, combined 
“liberty” with “order,” and kept anarchy at bay. They also emphasized the economic prosperity 
that France had experienced under the Second Empire, maintaining that the Empire embraced the 
tenets of economic liberalism without ignoring workers and the poor. They connected this vision 
of a restored Empire to the young prince Napoleon, who would use his youth to regenerate the 
nation.155 Rhetorically, the pamphlets thus primarily served a defensive purpose – even as they 
criticized the republican state: they did not put forth a new vision of empire, but tried to restore 
its reputation in the face of republican and monarchist attacks.  
Like both the republicans and monarchists, however, the Bonapartists struggled to sustain 
a united front. Writers such as the Comte de la Chapelle and Gustave Cuneo d’Orant portrayed 
the Empire as a fundamentally democratic regime, based on popular suffrage.156 Others such as 
Alexis Doinet and the Comte H. de Charency instead portrayed it as a regime that emphasized 
order and security.157 Still others - A. Bradier and Charles Blachier, for example - argued that the 
Empire would support economic growth by adopting the economically liberal policies of free 
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trade and colonial reform.158 Their claims were at odds with A. Chatel and Paul de Cassagnac’s, 
who described the Empire as an economic regime that embarked on great public works to add to 
ordinary people’s prosperity.159 These differences represented the fundamental tensions that 
emerged from the divergent positions that Napoleon III himself had embraced during his regime. 
In the 1850s and early 1860s, he had ruled as an authoritarian leader, but by the late 1860s, he 
had transformed the Second Empire into a kind of constitutional monarchy.160 He also 
abandoned much of his earlier economic protectionism as he turned towards free trade.161 In 
other words, even as Bonapartists defended Napoleon III’s Empire against attacks, they did not 
necessarily agree on which aspects of his regime to endorse. 
 
New Critiques of Bonapartism: Monarchists and Republicans 
This new wave of Bonapartist defense of the Empire set off a second conversation about 
the war and its connections to contemporary French politics among republicans and monarchists. 
The monarchist pamphlets published in the wake of Napoleon III’s death and Napoleon IV’s 
coming-of-age differed from earlier monarchist writings because they treated the Bonapartists as 
a direct threat, even when they contended that imperialism’s apparent rise in popularity was only 
a “mirage.”162 They also concentrated less on the connections between the Empire and the war. 
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Instead, they focused on the possible reasons behind this surge in Bonapartist popularity and then 
worked to disabuse their readers of any remaining affection they might have for the Empire.  
Most monarchist writers – like some of their republican counterparts writing in 1871-72 -
attributed the new popularity of Bonapartism to the enduring power of what they called the 
Napoleonic myth. They did not agree, however, on either the myth’s content or the reasons it 
remained so powerful. One anonymous writer simply stated that Bonapartist prestige persisted 
because the French remembered Napoleon I’s great victories and little else about either him or 
his nephew.163 Another anonymous commentator insisted that the Bonapartist myth consisted 
really of two myths: the myth of military grandeur, which was drawn from the first empire, and 
the myth of economic prosperity, which was drawn from the second. Both of these myths, he 
argued, were actually untrue: the First Empire led to military defeats, not victory, and the relative 
prosperity that characterized Napoleon III’s years was a legacy of policy decisions undertaken by 
earlier monarchical governments.164 Despite their inaccuracy, he warned, these myths remained 
dangerous because they appealed to the French “imagination” and “egoism.”165  
If some monarchists found the persistence of the Napoleonic myth dangerous, for the 
most part they did not focus on criticizing either Napoleon I or Napoleon III.166 In fact, some 
even went so far as to defend Napoleon III’s personal character (if not his political institutions) 
                                               
as ridiculous – one article in particular insisted that the party was sending peasants pictures of Napoleon IV and 
professing that they were gifts from the prince himself – they were clearly concerned enough to pay attention to 
them. See Francis Magnard, “La déposition de M. Rénault,” Le Figaro (28 February 1875), 1-2. 
163 Les doctrines et les faits de l'Empire proposés à la méditation des catholiques bonapartistes (Agen: Imprimerie 
Demeaux, 1876), 35. 
164 La Majorité du prince imperial et l’appel au peuple, 28. 
165 Le parti Bonapartiste et ses hommes par un conservateur (Paris: Librairie André Sagnier, 1875), 7.  
166 There were some exceptions to this: one writer sought to warn Catholics away from imperialism and convince 
them to turn to Legitimism iby depicting Bonapartism as an atheistic and immoral political creed. See Les doctrines 
et les faits de l'Empire proposés à la méditation des catholiques bonapartistes (Agen: Imprimerie Demeaux, 1876). 
  153 
in the face of republican attacks.167 Instead, they criticized the contemporary Bonapartist party 
and claimed that it could not effectively rule France – a tactic that the monarchists had also used 
against the republicans in the early 1870s. One anonymous writer thus highlighted the youth and 
inexperience of Napoleon IV to explain why he was not prepared to rule well or responsibly.168 
Another anonymous writer agreed, noting that the prince imperial “seemed even younger than he 
was.” He maintained that Napoleon IV’s youth was problematic in light of the composition of 
the Bonapartist party. Most of the party’s key leaders and strategists, he argued – especially 
Eugène Rouher and Paul de Cassagnac – were corrupt. In fact, these leaders were responsible for 
the worst decisions and policies undertaken in Napoleon III’s regime. Because these men would 
dominate the inexperienced Napoleon IV if he took office, the writer declared that a Bonapartist 
restoration would be disastrous. He concluded by warning Legitimists and Orleanists alike to 
rally against Bonapartist political propaganda in order to prevent inevitable disaster.169 
Despite the warnings in their longer pamphlets, the monarchist response to the 
Bonapartists’ rise was relatively muted in the popular press. Although some journalists identified 
the imperialist surge as dangerous and warned their readers that a Bonapartist restoration would 
have negative consequences for France, most did not directly refute Bonapartist political or 
historical arguments.170 Republican writers, on the other hand, responded more vociferously in 
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both the press and political pamphlets to the reemergence of imperial political propaganda. Many 
republican writers, moreover, engaged with Bonapartist arguments about the recent war and its 
relationship to both the Second Empire and the new republic. They worked to popularize the 
negative view of the empire that they had put forth in the early 1870s, to defend the republic as 
the legitimate government of France, and to discredit the Bonapartist Appel au peuple campaign. 
Several pamphlets directly addressed the Bonapartist argument that the republicans were 
responsible for France’s defeat. Yves Guyot in particular condemned Bonapartist attempts to cast 
blame on the dissident republican deputies who had objected to Napoleon III’s military policy in 
the last years of his reign. Napoleon III alone could declare war and peace, Guyot argued, and he 
had placed himself at the army’s head when the war began. The military defeat was thus his 
responsibility, and Bonapartist claims to the contrary were simple obfuscation.171 Aristide 
Couteaux offered an expanded version of the same argument: by explaining the interworking of 
the Second Empire’s government, he tried to show that the republicans who had attempted to 
defy Napoleon’s military reforms had been powerless in the face of the imperial will. Their 
opposition had not amounted to any serious changes. As a result, he reasoned, the Emperor alone 
was responsible for the military decisions and preparation measures undertaken.172 
Some republican writers also responded to Bonapartist claims that the republic had 
fostered the political radicalism of the Commune. In the early 1870s, republican writers had 
denied that the republic and the Commune were linked, even suggesting that the Commune had 
more in common with the Empire than with the new regime. But in the mid-1870s, they went 
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farther by claiming that the Second Empire was the primary cause of the Commune’s eruption.173 
Louis Herbette argued that the imperial policy of suppressing political dissent while supporting 
workers’ organizations (in order to bribe the lower classes into supporting the regime) had given 
rise to politically radical groups. These groups felt no loyalty to the French nation, moreover, 
because Napoleon III had convinced them that the middle and upper classes were their enemies. 
The Emperor’s “divide and conquer” strategy thus led the poor to stage an insurrection when the 
opportunity arose. Moreover, because contemporary Bonapartists had allied with the remnants of 
the Communard leadership, a restored imperial government would combine “authoritarian” and 
“communist” principles. Herbette concluded by noting that conservatives expressed concern that 
the republicans would unleash “social peril” by upending social hierarchies and destroying the 
social fabric, but it was the Bonapartists and their communist allies who truly threatened French 
society.174 The contention that the Bonapartists harbored socialist and communist groups spread 
through a number of pamphlets.175 One anonymous commentator went so far as to accuse the 
Empire of “founding the Internationale.”176 These republicans thus tied the Empire to both the 
military defeat and the social revolution that followed in its wake. 
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Republican pamphlets and articles published in the mid-1870s did not simply refute 
Bonapartist arguments; they also reiterated earlier claims about the Empire and its connection to 
the war that republicans had put forth in 1871-1872. But they often staked out more radical 
positions in the mid-1870s. Some, for example, made increasingly inflammatory statements 
about Napoleon III’s character.177 Charles Garnier, for example, posited that Napoleon III lost 
the war because he had never truly been loyal to France. He was not really French, Garnier 
complained, but an Italian who was only interested in his own fortunes.178 Another pamphlet-
writer shaped his history of the war through a highly negative biography of Napoleon III that 
contended he was illegitimately conceived and skilled mainly in conspiracy and deception. He 
described the late emperor as a “debauched, cold, indecisive dreamer, inclined to utopias, and of 
mediocre intelligence… he had neither scruples nor remorse.”179 While republican pamphlets in 
the early 1870s had often described the emperor as “incompetent,” “selfish,” and “despotic,” 
most had not questioned his loyalties or his bloodline quite so openly. 
The charge that the Empire had “corrupted” France and thereby made the nation unable 
to resist the invading German armies also reemerged in the republican pamphlets of the mid-
1870s. Like earlier writers, some tied this corruption to Napoleon III. Édouard Talbot maintained 
that because Napoleon III was a dishonest man, he allowed debauchery and vice to spread 
throughout France, and thereby led the country towards “decadence.”180 But most alleged that 
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the corruption stemmed from the political structure of the Empire itself.181 Louis Herbette 
contended that the Empire, in order to maintain its despotic power, had tried to make the people 
forget about their lost political rights by guaranteeing them material well being. He averred that 
the Empire substituted “license for liberty; refined pleasure and luxury for moral progress; … the 
stomach for the brain” and kept the people subdued by providing them with “bread and 
circuses.” These policies thus degraded popular morality and the very fabric of French society.182 
Charles Garnier similarly argued that the Empire had promoted the “light press,” “impious 
novels,” and “shameless theater” to keep the people from discussing serious political issues. 183 
As a result of these policies, the people became politically apathetic, and turned towards 
scandalous and immoral behavior. Most republican authors therefore insisted that corruption 
went beyond Napoleon III, and implied that all imperial governments (including the one 
Napoleon IV hoped to install) would ultimately adopt similarly degrading policies.  
Like their earlier counterparts, many republican writers also took aim at the Empire’s 
military reputation. These later pamphlets, however, tried to show that its military problems 
extended beyond the Franco-Prussian War, and stemmed from the fact that the Empire was a 
dangerous, bellicose regime. H. Bellamy, for example, maintained that Napoleon III had sought 
out wars in order to mask problems at home throughout his reign. At first, he met with some 
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success, but his military incompetence meant that this strategy ultimately led to disaster.184 An 
anonymous writer similarly reminded his readers that Napoleon III had squandered French 
resources by engaging in numerous fruitless military conquests before foolishly committing to 
the fatal fight against Prussia.185 Both writers thus described the Franco-Prussian War as an 
example of Napoleon III’s bellicose and incompetent behavior rather than an isolated fluke, and 
implied that the Second Empire had been committed to endless war.186  
Some writers insisted that the Empire’s problematic relationship to war went beyond 
Napoleon III, and should be traced back to the inflated military reputation of Napoleon I.187 
Édouard Talbot, for example, acknowledged that Napoleon I led France to some inspiring 
military victories, but argued that his Empire, like Napoleon III’s, had collapsed in French 
defeat. The two rulers were thus not as different as they seemed.188 Henri Martin took this 
argument even farther in a pamphlet that showed that both Napoleon I and Napoleon III created 
ineffective imperial systems that led France into unwinnable wars and always eventually led to 
territorial losses.189 Martin then launched a personal attack on both the military policies and the 
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character of Napoleon I, maintaining that he was an unrealistic “dreamer” who had endangered 
the French people with his fantasies.190 André Lefèvre offered a more expansive critique still, 
portraying Napoleon I as little more than a bloodthirsty warrior who, because he was not French, 
looked after his own interests instead of the French nation.191 His rise to power and his rule, 
Lefèvre argued, had been a disaster for France whose consequences had continued long after his 
rule – at least partly because people had forgotten how many people he killed.192  
If Bellamy, Talbot, Martin and Lefèvre took aim at the Napoleonic myth of military 
greatness, Louis Herbette attacked Bonapartist political philosophy. He attempted to dismantle 
the Bonapartist claim that the Empire represented a “middle” way between the republic and the 
monarchy, liberty and order, and liberalism and socialism.193 The Empire’s position was not in 
the “middle,” he insisted, but made up of contradictions. The Bonapartists pretended to recognize 
Principles of religion and of the Revolution, of national sovereignty and imperial 
legitimism, of discipline and liberty, of hierarchy and equality, of social revolution 
and conservatism… and hundreds of others that take on innumerable combinations.194  
 
Because many of these principles were inherently at odds with each other, he claimed that it was 
impossible to embrace all of them at the same time. And in fact, he declared, the Empire simply 
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made use of whichever principle seemed most expedient in a particular situation. Imperialism 
was therefore not a moderate political philosophy marked by compromise but a chimeric one that 
professed to be all things to all people. He accused both the Empire and the Bonapartist party of 
trying to appeal to different people by making contradictory promises to different communities. 
The unifying principles that defined imperialism, he concluded, were “force” and “ambition.”195  
Finally, republican writers sought to discredit contemporary Bonapartist political 
practices such as Rouher’s Appel au peuple campaign. They objected to Bonapartist calls for a 
general plebiscite on the nation’s political organization, claiming that such a move would not be 
truly democratic.196 Eugène Laffineur argued that plebiscites were illegitimate because “national 
sovereignty is the expression of individual liberty… it is inalienable and imprescriptible. The 
monarchy rests on the negation of national sovereignty. The Empire… is the abdication of 
national sovereignty consecrated by a vote.”197 In other words, the republic alone was based on 
national sovereignty because it alone allowed for the freedom of the rights-bearing individual. 
All other forms of political organization were unjust, which meant there was no reason to force 
the people to choose a type of government through plebiscites.198 Jules Girard similarly noted the 
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idea of an “appel au peuple” as the Bonapartists practiced it was a contradiction in terms because 
it used universal suffrage only to ask the people to surrender their political rights.199  
There were a number of commonalities between the republican pamphlets written in the 
early and mid 1870s. Later pamphlets reiterated the early charge that the Empire was responsible 
for French defeat. Many continued to focus on the corruption of both Napoleon III and the 
Second Empire, arguing that Napoleon III was essentially a criminal, and as a result, his regime 
was illegitimate. Their persistent concern with the Empire’s popular military reputation 
demonstrates that despite all expectation, Napoleon III’s defeat at Sedan had not entirely 
dismantled the Napoleonic myth of military greatness. The fact that so many of these pamphlets 
set out to disprove this myth demonstrates that republicans and monarchists believed that the 
Bonapartists were still able to use it to attract support in the mid-1870s.  
It is nevertheless clear that republican writers in the mid-1870s were developing new 
concerns. Whereas a number of republican writers in the early 1870s linked the Empire to other 
forms of monarchy, republicans said almost nothing about monarchy later in the decade. Nor did 
they associate the Empire with any other form of government: they treated it as unique. They 
also dealt less directly with the events of the Franco-Prussian War – unless they were addressing 
Bonapartist attempts to reject responsibility for French defeat. At the same time, many went out 
of their way to tie the Second Empire and the contemporary Bonapartist party to the Commune. 
Perhaps most notably, most later republican writings focused on demonstrating that the Empire 
was a defective political system that had always led France into disaster. There were important 
differences between the writers’ accounts of the empire’s flaws, however. Some emphasized the 
failures of its leaders, while others condemned its political ideology, its relationship to war, or its 
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domestic policies. Despite these differences, these writers constructed a more unified description 
of the Empire than their predecessors in the immediate aftermath of the war. They criticized the 
political structures and ideology of empire that Napoleon III had tried to establish throughout 
much of his reign. He had portrayed the Second Empire as the “middle,” moderate way between 
republic and monarchy, maintaining that it balanced liberty with order, based its legitimacy on 
the support of the people, and ensured the development of both peace and prosperity. In the last 
years of his regime, he had also described the Empire as a military power, following in the 
footsteps of Napoleon I to create an overseas empire. The republican pamphlets turned those 
claims on their head. They contended that the empire was despotic and disorderly, bellicose and 
militarily incompetent, and never based on the will of the people. They simultaneously 
condemned the contemporary efforts of the Bonapartist party as dishonest and misleading. 
In addition to condemning the Empire, these writers developed a positive portrayal of the 
republic. They argued that the republic was actually a moderate regime that would allow all 
political groups in France political representation.200 Some republicans also appropriated the 
language of “order” and “security,” arguing that the republic could best ensure stability because 
it was based on mass political participation.201 They promised that republican institutions would 
root out imperial corruption and decadence and thereby create a new, stronger nation.202 They 
also asserted that only the republic was based on national sovereignty because it allowed for true 
universal suffrage (for men). Republicans thus used the events of the Franco-Prussian War to 
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show that the Empire’s claims about itself were fundamentally misplaced, and to demonstrate 
that it was the republic, not the empire, that embodied France’s positive qualities.  
This republican shift away from the specific events of the war and towards a broader 
condemnation of the Empire was linked to shifting political patterns in France. By 1874 it was 
clear that the monarchists no longer posed a direct political threat to the republic, and in 1875 the 
National Assembly approved a series of laws that would act as a constitution – an important step 
towards stabilizing and legitimizing the regime.203 As a result, republicans were under less 
pressure to defend their role in the war. It was now the Bonapartist resurgence that posed a direct 
threat to the republic’s newfound stability.204 Republicans thus had new reasons to argue that the 
problems with the Second Empire were not just linked to Napoleon III – who was already dead – 
but were endemic to imperialism itself. They therefore sought to show that all Emperors, 
including the would-be Napoleon IV, promoted policies that undermined French interests. 
If these shifts in representation reflect France’s changing political landscape, they also 
reveal the ways in which the conceptual categories of “empire” and “republic” progressively 
hardened against one another in the early 1870s, especially in republican thought. Although 
many Bonapartists continued to emphasize the connections between the Empire and certain 
republican ideals, republicans disavowed these connections by defining the empire and the 
republic in stark, contrasting terms. Republicans did not always agree on the content of these 
dichotomies, but the broad structural opposition became sharper as the decade progressed and as 
republicans no longer felt the need to defend the republic against monarchism. The opposition 
between Empire and republic would create conceptual complications, however, when 
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republicans – and liberals – sought to maintain Napoleon III’s overseas Mediterranean Empire 
centered in Algeria. How could a liberal republic continue to construct an empire? 
  
IV. Literature and Political Disputes 
This argument over the relationship between the empire, the war, and the republic did not 
transpire solely within the realm of newspapers and political pamphlets. It extended into 
literature and poetry as well. Literary interpretations of these events often had a less openly 
political purpose and sometimes conveyed ambiguous messages. Fiction, however, had become a 
prominent form of cultural expression in late nineteenth-century France. In an age of expanding 
literacy and relatively inexpensive print, a growing number of people could access novels, which 
they often preferred to other forms of written work.205 Popular writers could therefore engage 
larger audiences than other kinds of writers.206 Class, geography, gender, and ideology shaped 
and limited the extent of any individual author’s appeal, but the most popular nevertheless 
succeeded in producing books that reached across the country and across different readerships as 
well: their interpretations of the empire and the war therefore reverberated widely.207   
The literature about the events of 1870-71 nevertheless took a different shape from more 
explicitly political writing - in part because republicans were responsible for producing the most 
notable literary work, at least in the decade following the war. It therefore did not usually have 
the same debate-like, conversational qualities that characterized political pamphlets and 
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newspapers. While many writers wrote stories about the events of 1870-71 and the Second 
Empire, several were particularly influential – in part because they already had established 
literary careers.208 Victor Hugo (1802-1885), Émile Erckmann (1822-1885), Alexandre Chatrian 
(1826-1890), Alphonse Daudet (1840-1897), and Émile Zola (1840-1902) were among the most 
prominent of these writers. Their writing provides insight into popular republican interpretations 
of the Empire after the Franco-Prussian War and reveals the degree to which visions of the 
Second Empire spread from republican political writing into the cultural realm.  
Victor Hugo, Émile Erckmann and Alexandre Chatrian (who wrote together under the 
name Erckmann-Chatrian), Alphonse Daudet and Émile Zola entered the national conversation 
about the Empire and the Franco-Prussian War from diverse places. All were recognized writers 
who had achieved some degree of prominence before the outbreak of the war. But whereas Hugo 
and Erckmann-Chatrian were renowned novelists with established reputations, Daudet and Zola 
were part of a younger generation that had only begun to attract attention in the Parisian literary 
world during the 1860s.209 Their literary styles were also dissimilar: Hugo and to some extent 
Erckmann-Chatrian belonged to the romantic school, whereas Daudet and Zola belonged to the 
new naturalist movement.210 Romanticism usually emphasized emotive writing that conveyed 
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ideas. Naturalists, on the other hand, generally strove to represent “reality” through depictions 
based on eyewitness accounts and newspaper articles.211 The tones of the authors’ writings were 
therefore distinct, as were their approaches towards the events that they were describing. 
Even their relationships to republicanism were not identical. Victor Hugo and to some 
degree Erckmann-Chatrian belonged to the older, revolutionary republican tradition of 1848.212 
Victor Hugo in particular had established himself as the iconic symbol of republican resistance to 
Empire in the weeks immediately following Napoleon III’s coup-d’état in 1851.213 Zola, on the 
other hand, shared the positivist, scientific outlook that many Opportunist republicans of the 
early 1870s embraced – even as he took more radical social and cultural stances than most of 
republican leaders.214 Daudet’s republicanism, on the other hand, was much more conservative 
than any of the other authors’. His family was legitimist in political persuasion, and in the 1860s, 
he worked as a secretary for Morny, one of Napoleon III’s secretaries, to support his literary 
career. He was less than an entirely committed Bonapartist, however, even in the 1860s, as he 
married into a moderate republican family.215 In the wake of the defeat of the Second Empire, 
Daudet became very critical of the imperial government and began to describe himself in letters 
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to friends and family as a “republican.”216 However, his anti-Semitic and nationalist sympathies 
continued to place him firmly in the right wing of the republican party. But despite the 
differences in the writers’ political positions and literary styles, their portrayals of the Second 
Empire shared a number of similarities. They also resembled other descriptions of the Empire 
that were taking shape in more explicitly political republican writing.  
In 1872, Victor Hugo published L’Année Terrible, a collection of poems that chronicled 
the events of the Franco-Prussian War and the Commune that followed it, trying to capture the 
French experience of 1870-1871 in its totality.217 But despite the scope of its ambition, it painted 
a relatively neat vision of the relationship between empire, defeat, and republic. Hugo declared 
that Napoleon III was personally responsible for the war’s outcome and implied that it was the 
inevitable result of his immoral political tactics and unjust policies.218 He portrayed Napoleon III 
as a greedy dictator who forced his way into power and spent his entire reign grasping at 
opportunities to increase his influence and reputation.219 He held on to his position by driving the 
populace into the ground and keeping them impoverished and illiterate.220 Under his rule, the 
French people lost their sense of identity and historical purpose, which explained why they were 
unable to effectively unite against their invaders in 1870.221 Hugo did not believe, however, that 
the ultimate fault for the events of 1870-71 lay with the people who had been unfortunately 
deceived by the Emperor. In fact, he argued that Napoleon III had purposefully precipitated the 
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conflict and ensured its unfortunate outcome as a final expression of his rapacity and desire to 
prove himself the equal of his uncle.222 Lacking his uncle’s tactical skills, Napoleon III launched 
a war against a country with a better army, which led to a devastating defeat. For Hugo, then, the 
loss was due primarily Napoleon’s unreasonable ambition.223 
In the earliest poems – some of which were written during the war itself - Hugo placed 
great faith in the ability of the politically ascendant republicans to remake France and help its 
people reclaim their place as the world’s “guiding nation.”224 However, the Commune’s violence 
shook this faith, especially after calls to refrain from reprisals against the Communards went 
unheard.225 He blamed the Commune on the Empire’s legacy, contending that Napoleon III 
promoted ignorance, anger, and “darkness” among the people, which in turn led to violence and 
slaughter.226 But at the same time, he also despaired at the division between republican radicals 
and the republican state. The collection ended on an uplifting note, affirming the hope that as the 
repressive institutions give way to democratic ones, newfound liberty would unify the people and 
remind them of their shared devotion to France.227 But Hugo also recognized that the Commune 
continued to haunt the promise of the reconstituted nation.228 
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Erckmann-Chatrian’s novel L’Histoire du Plébiscite, also published in 1872, offered a 
similarly critical portrayal of Napoleon III and of his relationship to the war.229 The novelists 
portrayed the Emperor as a tyrannical, dishonest figure who cared above all for himself and his 
own prestige. They argued that his key goals consisted of enriching himself and his dynasty, 
securing his authority over the country, and extending the reach of his power.230 As a result, his 
government rested on little more than a complex system of bribes and threats.231 They declared 
that he both procured and sustained his imperial power by catering to corrupt elites and depriving 
the populace of the information and education that might have enabled them to challenge his 
authority. He was thus able to trick much of the French populace into supporting his regime, 
even as he exploited most of the nation.232 
 Like Hugo, Erckmann-Chatrian also laid the blame for French defeat primarily at 
Napoleon III’s feet.233 However, they connected Napoleon III’s personal choices to a broader 
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critique of imperial institutions in which the Emperor’s authority depended on the loyalty of 
career officers and generals. Whenever the Empire was at peace, these officers became unhappy, 
because they were unable to gain promotions or military honors. To prevent these self-interested 
officers from deserting the Empire, Erckmann-Chatrian argued, Napoleon III provoked the 
conflict with Prussia.234 The war was thus essentially a political ploy necessitated by the 
Empire’s political structure. But even as the imperial system inevitably exposed the country to 
unnecessary conflicts, Napoleon III failed to prepare for the confrontation. Despite the fact that 
he requested funds for new weapons and army maintenance, he used most of those resources to 
enrich himself.235 The army was therefore badly under-equipped. The Empire’s corrupt 
governance system also had a devastating effect on the army command because the imperial 
army based promotion on connections instead of merit.236 These problems were exacerbated by 
the incompetent Emperor’s decision to place himself at the army’s head, effectively ensuring the 
French defeat.237 In order to win the conflict, the novelists suggested, France needed an army 
based on a universal draft instead of an army built to keep the emperor in power.238 Erckmann-
Chatrian thus tied the nation’s humiliating loss both to Napoleon III’s personal choices and to the 
political and military structures that helped ensure his authority. 
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Like Hugo, Erckmann-Chatrian implied that the Empire had deleterious effects on the 
French nation. They accused the Empire of undermining popular morality and social cohesion, 
averring that the corrupt political system encouraged many to behave selfishly and to put their 
own interests before those of their country. They particularly criticized the Emperor’s reluctance 
to introduce mass education, insisting that the citizens who lacked education also lacked the 
discipline and focus necessary for serious pursuits. Erckmann and Chatrian were more optimistic 
than Hugo about the republic’s ability to solve these problems, however, in part because their 
narrative largely ignored the Commune. They claimed that a new political system that privileged 
merit over political connections could create politicians who would put France’s needs above 
their own.239 Mass education would meanwhile end the cycle of revolution and coup d’états, 
secure French patriotism, and improve the army.240 Their vision of France’s future was not 
entirely, rosy, however. They concluded by warning that a corrupt elite class attached to 
monarchy and imperialism threatened to overthrow the republic.241  
Alphonse Daudet’s collection of short stories called the Contes de lundi, which were 
written partially during the war and published in 1873, staked out a more complex position on 
the relationship between the empire, the defeat, and the new republic. If Hugo and Erckmann-
Chatrian both held Napoleon III responsible for what they saw as French decline and defeat, 
Daudet implied that the Empire’s policies and institutions were to blame. He described France 
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under the Second Empire as divided and disorderly. The empire’s autocratic political culture led 
in his view to a deadly combination of radicalization and apathy. At the same time, its attempts 
to modernize the French countryside precipitated a widespread crisis of faith, which he described 
in “Les Fées de France.” This “conte fantastique” focused on the trial of a petroleuse, who 
introduced herself as a “fairy of France” and offered this explanation for German victory: 
We have all seen our well-fed, sneering peasants open their huts for the Prussians... 
[they] no longer believe in sorcery, and also no longer believe in [their] country… 
If we had been there, none of the Germans who entered France would have 
returned alive… That is how one makes a national war, a holy war. But in a 
country that does not believe anymore… such a war is no longer possible.242  
 
“Fairies” clearly symbolized a mystical faith in country, nature, religion, and nation, which the 
petroleuse argued has disappeared. Without this mystical faith, France was unable to unite 
effectively against Germany, and wage a “national” war; indeed, some disaffected peasants even 
decided to aid the Germans. The speaker went on to attribute this lack of belief to the scientific 
textbooks, secularization, industrialization, and urbanization that had begun to infiltrate all parts 
of French life. These “modernizing” forces, she claimed, fractured traditional understandings of 
the world, and ruptured old ties, thereby rendering the French populace cynical and divided. 
According to Daudet, this crisis of faith, combined with political radicalization, made the 
populace unwilling to defend France against the Germans. While some indulged in misguided 
chauvinism, others placed politics before the nation, or abandoned patriotic feeling.243 Daudet 
indicated that the Parisian lower classes in particular harmed the war effort. Some acted as spies, 
and smuggled French strategic plans out to the besieging German army, while others undermined 
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the morale of the soldiers defending the city.244 In the countryside, peasants opened their doors to 
German soldiers. The empire’s irresponsible military leadership exacerbated these problems. 
Daudet’s stories were full of officers who flee the battlefield, abandon their troops, or surrender 
dishonorably – betraying well-intentioned ordinary soldiers.245  
Daudet was careful to indicate that the social conflicts that he identified as responsible for 
the French defeat did not reflect essential problems within the French nation. At the same time, 
his depiction of the relationship between the Second Empire, the Franco-Prussian War, and the 
Third Republic was ambivalent. This was partly because his stories implied that the Second 
Empire damaged French republicanism by disenfranchising republicans and disconnecting them 
from the nation. In “La Défense de Tarascon,” Daudet painted a satirical picture of republican 
townspeople in southern France who refused to fight to defend the Empire. Only when the 
Empire fell did they recognize the conflict as a “national war.”246 Even then, they lacked 
commitment: they joined singing societies instead of the military and marched in parades instead 
of fighting. Accustomed to political inaction, they lost their sense of patriotism and became 
unwilling to defend their country. Daudet’s stories demonstrated confidence in the French 
character; he described it as a national refinement reflected even in the French language.247 This 
character transcended France’s structural problems, Daudet implied, so the French would recover 
if they could embrace their own national essence. But his work left unresolved the question of 
the republicans’ ability to precipitate this return to the traditional nation. 
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247 Daudet, “La Dernière classe,” in Oeuvres complètes illustrées, vol. 4, 6. 
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In the 1870s, Émile Zola published no novels that explicitly engaged with the events of 
the Franco-Prussian War. But he began writing his Rougon-Macquart series as a cycle of novels 
in which he intended to chronicle the history of Second Empire France through the experiences 
of one extended family.248 Although nearly all of these novels examined aspects of the Empire’s 
institutions and politics, Son excellence Eugène Rougon (1876) was one of his most explicitly 
political efforts. It focused on the political career of Eugène Rougon, a figure loosely based on 
the Bonapartist leader Eugène Rouher who was responsible for the appel au peuple campaign.249 
Zola used Rougon to establish an image of the Second Empire that would culminate in his 1890 
novel Le débâcle, which explicitly treated the events of 1870-71. Zola’s subject matter did not 
exactly resemble that of the other writers, but his portrayal of the Empire and his interpretation 
of its effects on the French nation shared a number of commonalities with their works. 
Like Erckmann-Chatrian, Zola portrayed the Empire as a highly corrupt government that 
primarily depended on a contradictory set of personal connections and bribes.250 Several 
prominent men dominated its politics. Each of these men kept a set of followers, who worked to 
improve their leader’s political leverage, and in return received administrative posts, military 
promotions, or money.251 This system was both highly contested and deeply unstable because the 
administrators and deputies who took part in it were constantly jockeying with one another for 
favors and positions from the imperial court.252 The only people who were able to maintain 
                                               
248 Frederick Brown, Zola: A Life (1995),  
249 Many of the main characters were also based on real people. See Henri Mitterand, Zola: L’homme de Germinal, 
1871-1893 (Paris: Fayard, 2001), 235. 
250 Emile Zola, Son Excellence Eugène Rougon in Oeuvres Complètes: La République en Marche, vol.7, ed. Henri 
Mitterand (Paris: Nouvelle Monde Éditions, 2003), 54. 
251 Rougon’s group, for example, included a colonel, two deputies, and a minister. See ibid., 58. 
252 When Rougon fell from Napoleon III’s graces, his group of supporters fell with him. See ibid., 429. 
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positions of influence were those who displayed unwavering loyalty to Napoleon III and never 
questioned any of his decisions. As a result, most high-ranking officials were little more than 
incompetent yes-men who spent their days flattering the Emperor.253 In Zola’s view, the imperial 
administration was therefore staffed by poorly qualified people who were more interested in 
extending their own power or in increasing their own wealth than they were in adequately 
performing their duties.254 Nearly all of them placed their own interests before the best interests 
of France and sometimes before those of the Empire itself.255 The government thus accomplished 
little more than squandering precious resources and oppressing those who opposed it. 
Zola also implied that the Empire’s corruption spread beyond its political system into the 
culture of French ruling elites. He depicted these elites as highly dissolute, contending that they 
spent most of their time attending expensive parties, drinking too much alcohol, and sleeping 
with women to whom they were not married. They lived in a social atmosphere that thrived on 
perpetually unfolding financial and sexual scandals, which they discussed incessantly at least in 
part because they could not openly discuss real political or economic questions. Although they 
made temporary alliances with one another, they lacked any real sense of solidarity, so their 
alliances quickly broke down.256 They largely ignored the needs of ordinary French people, who 
they either pressed into submission or coopted into their wider culture of bribery and 
                                               
253 Most of these “yes-men” were only loyal in appearance; as soon as they fell from favor, they turned against the 
Empire. During Rougon’s fall from power, his followers declare themselves to be republicans, Orleanists, and 
legitimists – whichever form of government they think is most likely to help them get ahead. See ibid., 166. 
254 Zola makes it clear that all of Rougon’s followers earn honors and money because of their loyalty to him, and 
they in fact do very little in their actual positions. See ibid., 369. 
255 Even Rougon – who never directly turns against the Empire – places his own interests above those of the Empire 
when he does not report the coming assassination attempt on Napoleon III. See ibid., 358. 
256 Ibid., 130, 405, 126. 
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corruption.257 This self-centeredness and frivolity, Zola implied, blocked France from material 
progress during Napoleon III’s reign: only a handful of exceptionally dishonest people benefited 
from the apparent material prosperity.258 Zola did not directly address the Franco-Prussian War 
or the Empire’s connection to it in Eugène Rougon, but he made it clear that the Empire broke 
down the unity of the French nation by promoting a degenerate, self-centered, materialistic set of 
values that spread through wide swaths of French culture.  
Hugo’s, Erckmann-Chatrian’s, Daudet’s, and Zola’s critiques of the Second Empire’s 
politics and culture were far from identical, and yet those that focused on the events of 1870-71 
agreed that the Empire was responsible for the French defeat because it had fundamentally 
weakened the country and left it unprepared to face the Prussian armies.259 But they interpreted 
the nature of French weakness in different ways. Hugo and to some extent Erckmann-Chatrian 
laid most of the blame at the feet of Napoleon III himself, arguing that the Emperor had 
promulgated depravity and immorality, oppressed ordinary French people, and undermined the 
unity of the French nation. Erckmann-Chatrian, however, connected their criticism of Napoleon 
III to a broader condemnation of the Empire’s key political structures and institutions, which 
they condemned as incompetent and corrupt. Daudet took an even more structural approach that 
suggested that that the Second Empire’s modernizing policies, combined with its repressive 
                                               
257 One of Rougon’s followers, for example, successfully petitions to have a railroad line moved out of its normal 
course so it would come directly by his house. See ibid., 390. 
258 In the story, those who know how to work the system – like the Charbonnels, who sue to inherit their cousin’s 
fortune – succeed in becoming wealthy; those without connections inside the government suffer. See ibid., 366. 
259 Their interpretations of this loss were not identical either. Hugo emphasized Napoleon III’s incompetence, while 
both Erckmann-Chatrian and Daudet criticized the army command as frivolous and ineffective. Hugo, on the whole, 
was relatively uninterested in what caused the defeat, and merely contended that the country should have never gone 
to war in the first place. See Hugo, “Octobre,” in L’Année terrible (Paris: Michel Lévy Frères, 1872), 50; Hugo, 
“Juillet,” in L’Année terrible, 311.  
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politics, were primarily responsible for French decline. Zola, on the other hand, attacked the 
Empire’s political culture for its selfishness, frivolousness, and decadence.  
These fictional representations of the Empire’s negative effects on France inspired 
different levels of optimism about the post-war republican state and its ability to remake the 
nation. Daudet’s vision of republican France was comparatively bleak because he believed that 
the processes of “modernization” that he associated with the Empire were irreversible. If 
anything, the Third Republic embraced these modernizing processes with more enthusiasm than 
Napoleon III. Both Hugo and Erckmann-Chatrian, by contrast, expressed faith in the ability of 
republicanism to remake the nation by uniting and educating the people. They portrayed imperial 
corruption and republican virtue in diametrical opposition to one another and then maintained 
that the republic would ultimately rebuild the country. Their optimism about France’s future 
remained somewhat tempered, however, as they reflected on recent events. Hugo expressed 
reservations about the republican credentials of the new Versailles government after its treatment 
of the Communards, and Erckmann-Chatrian worried about the continuing political power of 
French elites. But unlike Daudet, their doubts focused on the ability of the new government to 
fulfill the republic’s promise rather than on the broader processes of social modernization. 
 Some of the differences between these works reflected distinct ideological strains within 
republican ideology. Daudet’s skepticism about science, modernization and even popular politics 
resembled the views of conservative “Opportunist” republicans who sought to establish a 
democratic system that protected elites from the dangers of mass politics.260 His emphasis on 
placing national unity before politics also coincided with their attempt to reconcile a divided 
                                               
260 As James Lehning has made clear, the tension between espousing democracy and fear of the crowd ran deeply 
through conservative republican thought in the wake of the Commune. See Lehning, To Be a Citizen, 14. 
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country.261 At the same time, Hugo’s and Erckmann-Chatrian’s message of national redemption 
in the wake of defeat echoed that of radical republican reformers determined to recast the French 
nation in a new mold.262 Even within republican novels and poetry, in other words, the political 
disagreements that marked other republican writings remained clear. 
In spite of their differences, the poets and novelists shared a number of perspectives. All 
four writers portrayed the Empire as a fundamentally corrupt political system that did not 
effectively protect the people. They also all believed that the Empire had deleteriously affected 
the French nation by dividing the people and creating social chaos. Both of these claims rejected 
the vision of Empire put forth by Napoleon III and reaffirmed by Bonapartists who defended the 
imperial system throughout the 1870s. The novelists also repeated arguments that appeared in the 
decade’s more explicitly political republican publications. Perhaps most importantly, these 
writers all depicted the republic as a political structure diametrically opposed to the Empire. 
Where the Empire represented despotism, the republic represented democracy; where the Empire 
embodied corruption, the republic promoted virtue. By arguing that the republic and the empire 
had nothing in common, they sought to demonstrate that the republic would solve the problems 
that the Empire created and therefore transform French weakness into new national power.  
Despite the divisions among various republican factions, a semi-coherent understanding 
of the Second Empire took shape during the 1870s in both republican political writing and 
popular literature, evolving through debates with monarchists and Bonapartists. This “republican 
vision” defined the new republic as opposite to the previous empire. This definition was of 
                                               
261 Some reviewers praised Daudet’s stories for precisely this quality, arguing that they transcended politics and thus 
would help reunite the nation. See, for example, Emmanuel des Essarts, “Les Contes du lundi,” Le Bien Public, 
April 3, 1873; Jules Lemaître, “M. Alphonse Daudet,” Revue Politique et Littéraire (March 1883).  
262 Even within the National Assembly, Hugo was on the far left. See Grévy, La république des opportunistes, 102. 
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course inaccurate—the republic borrowed political practices and economic policies from its 
predecessor. But by the end of the 1870s, the republicans had popularized this diametrical view, 
defining “empire” as a problematic system of government that contradicted France’s ideal 
political practices and values. Their success was due partly to the fact that by the end of the 
decade, they had secured the republic against monarchist and Bonapartist challenges.263 Even 
before Napoleon IV’s death in 1879, the Bonapartist threat had begun to fade. 
The republican condemnation of empire nevertheless posed problems for republicans 
who began to rethink and also defend France’s imperial relationship with its overseas colonies in 
the 1870s. Napoleon III had portrayed the Second Empire’s relationship to its overseas territories 
as a fundamental part of its imperial identity, especially in Algeria. The Emperor’s attempt to 
combine “continental” and “overseas” empire into one unified theory of “Empire” had now 
collapsed and yet the new republic still controlled overseas colonies. Further challenges would 
therefore emerge for republican politicians and writers who would have to reconcile their 
republic with an empire that was now expanding in new directions.
                                               
263 The tides swung definitively in the republicans’ favor after President Mac-Mahon’s failed coup d’état. See 
Taithe, Citizenship and Wars, 172. 
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CHAPTER 3: ALGERIA, EMPIRE, AND COLONIZATION IN THE WAKE OF 1870-71 
 
In 1877, Alphonse Daudet, the popular French author known for his short stories about 
Algeria and the Franco-Prussian War, published a novel titled Le Nabab. It chronicled the life 
and death of a fictional character named Bernard Jansoulet, who was born in poverty in southern 
France, made a fortune overseas in Tunisia, and returned to France to enter Parisian high society 
during the height of the Second Empire. The novel used its account of Jansoulet’s life to paint a 
negative vision of Second Empire politics and society, describing the imperial elite as selfish, 
superficial, effete, and overly sexualized.1 Like Zola’s Son Excellence Eugène Rougon, 
published the year before, Le Nabab indicated that the imperial government itself was largely 
responsible for France’s spreading social corruption.2 Daudet implied that the Second Empire 
used unethical political practices to organize and consolidate its power: it commanded loyalty by 
delegating authority to dishonest officials who gained their positions through some combination 
of bribery, personal connections, and rigged elections.3 The political system thus encouraged 
                                               
1 Daudet centers the book in part on the figure of an Irish doctor, Jenkins, who medicates the upper classes with 
arsenic to keep them youthful and energetic. Unfortunately, this arsenic also slowly poisons them. The book’s 
narrator, an honest and semi-impoverished banker, described this elite as “pale with glittering eyes, saturated with 
arsenic like greedy mice, but insatiable for poison and for life.” They were “depleted, exhausted people, anemics 
burnt out by an absurd life…” See Alphonse Daudet, Le Nabab: Moeurs parisiennes, 26 Ed. (Paris: C. Charpentier, 
1878), 61. 
2 Like Zola’s Son Excellence Eugène Rougon, many of the novel’s characters were thinly veiled portrayals of 
prominent government officials. One of the novel’s main characters is the Duke du Mora, based on the powerful 
Duke du Morny. Daudet described him as “the most brilliant incarnation of the Empire. What one sees from a 
distance is not a solid or insecure base… but the fine, gilded, carved spire. Mora was what was seen in France and 
throughout Europe of the Empire. If he fell, the monument would find itself bereft of its elegance…” See ibid., 353. 
3 The novel details an election in Corsica in particular, and makes it clear that the position would always go to the 
candidate who bribed the right people. See ibid., 228. 
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cronyism and scheming among French elites – values that ultimately came to infiltrate the 
French upper classes more broadly. In many ways, the novel’s portrayal of the Second Empire 
thus echoed those that appeared in other republican novels in the years following the Franco-
Prussian War. Le Nabab worked to discredit Bonapartist politics by tying the imperial 
government to a series of social problems that it in turn implied were responsible for France’s 
recent defeat. But unlike some contemporary republican writers, Daudet linked France’s 
“decadence” not only to the Second Empire’s internal politics, but also to its relationship with 
Tunisia and “the Orient.” 
Daudet’s novel implied that the Second Empire and Tunisia were connected on several 
interrelated levels. First, it indicated that many members of the imperial government were 
financially and politically dependent upon “Oriental” rulers like the bey of Tunis.4 Moreover, it 
suggested that French elites obsessively flocked towards Ottoman officials and “Orientalized” 
figures like Jansoulet. For Daudet, this obsession was a problem: because he saw North Africans 
were effete and immoral, he believed that their infiltration of Parisian society served to amplify 
its decadence and corruption.5 But perhaps most noticeably, Daudet implied that the Second 
Empire and Tunisia shared many of the same values and customs: he described Tunisia as 
“enervating” and “depraved,” but also consistently styled the Second Empire in the same terms. 
                                               
4 Many of the novel’s main characters have either made fortunes or hope to make fortunes by associating with 
important Ottoman officials; over the course of the novel, many become embroiled in a disastrous financial scheme 
surrounding a Parisian bank and the bey of Tunis. 
5 Daudet implies at multiple points throughout the novel that Europeans who spend time in North Africa or the 
Middle East end up taking on “oriental” characteristics. The most obvious example of this is Jansoulet’s wife, who 
was of French origin but grew up in Tunisia. Daudet described her quite negatively: “Enormous, bloated to such a 
degree that it was impossible to assign her an age… badly dressed in foreign clothes, laden with diamonds and 
jewels like a Hindu idol, she was an excellent specimen of those transplanted European women called Levantines. 
They are a unique race of obese creoles who are only attached to our world through speech and costume, and whom 
the East envelops with its stupefying atmosphere, with the subtle poisons of its opium-filled air in which 
everything… is enervated….” See ibid., 131. 
  182 
The novel at times explicitly conflated the Empire and North Africa with one another: at one 
point, Daudet even described an important imperial official as an “African king.”6 He thus 
painted imperial corruption in some ways as essentially African or eastern in nature.  
Conflating the Second Empire with Tunisia specifically and North Africa more broadly 
served to thoroughly discredit Bonapartist politics at a moment when Bonapartism’s appeal 
seemed to be rising once again.7 But at the same time, Daudet’s portrayal also blurred the edges 
between Napoleonic European Empire and France’s relationship with its overseas territories in 
North Africa. Although Tunisia was not a French colony in the 1860s or 1870s, Daudet’s novel 
implied that it acted as a kind of client state to the Second Empire and indicated that both were 
bound together by shared cynicism, laziness, selfishness, and corruption.8 Daudet also indicated 
that on some level, imperial France’s interest in and expansion into “the Orient” was partly 
responsible for the rot and decay that characterized imperial society. Although Daudet’s work 
did not explicitly condemn French expansion overseas, it nevertheless implied that the Second 
Empire’s interest in North Africa and its political corruption were both part of the same broader 
imperial project, and that both had had devastating consequences for the French nation.  
                                               
6 Ibid., 313. 
7 In the mid-1870s, the Bonapartists reached the height of their post-war popularity. See Price, The French Second 
Empire, 465. 
8 This conflation becomes particularly clear in the aftermath of the Corsican election. Jansoulet was competing for 
the seat with one of his rivals. Under the guidance of the Duc de Mora, who explained to him how the French 
political system worked, he spent enough money and bribed enough people, so he won the seat. Shortly after his 
election, however, the Duc de Mora – Jansoulet’s mentor and protector – died. As a result, his rivals decided to 
contest his election and claim that he won the seat illegally. One official maintained that Jansoulet’s behavior 
stemmed from the fact that he had lived “so long in the East [that] he forgot the laws, customs, and usages of his 
country. He believes in expedient justice, in beatings in the open street, he relies on the abuses of power, and worse 
still, on the veniality and baseness that crouches in all men…” The irony, of course, is that the laws, customs, and 
usages in Second Empire France are the same as those in Tunisia; in both places, political positions are bought and 
sold, and corruption only becomes a problem after someone has fallen from grace. See Daudet, Le Nabab, 433.  
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The debates that transpired over the Second Empire and its relationship to the events of 
1870-71 had a profound effect on republican – and liberal - discourse about France’s overseas 
colonies in the early years of the Third Republic. Partly because Bonapartism remained 
remarkably popular among many French voters throughout the 1870s, republican writers (as 
noted in the previous chapters) staked out and consolidated a thoroughly hostile position towards 
Empire by the middle of the decade. While differences among republicans’ ideas about the 
empire persisted, most described it as both responsible for France’s decline and at odds with the 
nation’s values and best interests. They positioned the empire in diametrical opposition to the 
new republic, which they promised would repair the damage Napoleon III had done to the 
French nation. This posturing muddled their relationship with certain aspects of the Second 
Empire’s legacy in overseas territories– and especially with the territories that Napoleon III had 
described as part of a French Mediterranean Empire in the last years of his reign. This chapter 
therefore focuses on the post-1870 republican attempts to reject the Napoleonic imperial legacy 
in Algeria. It stresses the challenges that republicans encountered as they attempted to separate 
“republican colonialism” from “Napoleonic imperialism.” 
France’s overseas territories became entangled in this conversation about the Empire’s 
failings largely because of Napoleon III’s policies towards Algeria. His insistence that the 
territory was not a “colony” but a “royaume arabe” with its own national identity had 
complicated the French discourse of empire and colonization. Early in his reign, Napoleon III 
had treated the “French nation” and the “French Empire” as equivalents: he had used the term 
“empire” to designate a specific political program in France, mobilizing it against “republic” or 
“kingdom.” But in the 1860s, he changed courses, declaring that Algeria was an Arab nation and 
that the territory was not part of France, but subject to a wider “Mediterranean Empire.” 
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Napoleon III thus redefined the French Second Empire as a multinational entity, composed of a 
set of distinct nations ruled by one central administration. Beneath this new regime, “empire” 
referred both to a form of metropolitan political organization and to a way of ordering different 
peoples beneath one governing body.9 The model thus collapsed “metropolitan” policies and 
France’s relationship to “overseas” territories together into one overarching imperial entity.  
As we have seen, Napoleon III’s attempt to recast the Second Empire as a multinational 
“Mediterranean Empire” and redefine Algeria as a “royaume arabe” met with great resistance 
from Algerian colonists. Throughout the 1860s, they vociferously objected to his insistence that 
Algeria was a royaume arabe with a cohesive sense of national identity that the French needed to 
respect. They contended instead that Algeria was foremost a French colony and argued that 
French colonists alone could ensure the territory’s economic and political success. They worked 
to undermine Napoleon III’s imperial system, criticizing both the structure of the Algerian 
administration and the military’s position within it by claiming that it “indulged” indigenous 
people and hindered the interests of French colonists.10 Instead of treating Algeria and its 
indigenous population as a distinct nation, they argued, the government should “assimilate” both 
the territory and its peoples. They insisted that the government should grant Algeria’s European 
population the same civil rights as their metropolitan counterparts and rule them through the 
same institutions. At the same time, they asserted that the government should force indigenous 
peoples to assimilate into French culture.11 Colonists thus articulated an alternative vision of 
                                               
9 “Lettre,” in La Politique Impériale, 394. This Napoleonic framework is described in detail in the first chapter of 
this dissertation. 
10 They expressed their opinions in pamphlets published in Algeria and France. For examples see Auguste-Hubert 
Warnier, L’Algérie devant l’Empereur: pour faire suite à l’Algérie devant l’opinion publique (Paris: Challamel aîné, 
1865); Jules Duval, Réflexions sur la politique de l’Empereur en Algérie (Paris: Challamel aîné, 1865). 
11 When the colonists demanded “assimilation” throughout the 1860s, they were arguing that France should force the 
indigenous population to assimilate into French culture by undermining tribal leaders, enforcing individual land 
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Algeria’s purpose and its ideal structure. Moreover, they made alliances with Napoleon III’s 
republican opponents in the metropole, who saw the conflicted situation in Algeria as an 
opportunity to further undermine the Emperor’s authority. Because of this joint opposition, 
Napoleon III never restructured Algeria or carried out most of his proposed reforms.  
In fact, even before the Empire’s collapse, Napoleon III’s royaume arabe had effectively 
dissolved. In 1869, he had organized a commission to draft a constitution for the territory, which 
overturned many of the principles he had proposed in 1863 and 1865.12 Because it primarily 
addressed the colonists rather than the Arabs, it implicitly conceded that the colonists were the 
territory’s key population. It thus treated Algeria as a French colony and not an Arab nation – a 
direct concession to colonists’ ongoing opposition.13 It also embraced an assimilationist program: 
it established Algerian assemblies, granted the territory’s inhabitants parliamentary 
representation, and greatly extended the reach of civil territory.14 But even though the colonists 
had long advocated for a constitution, they rejected these measures, claiming that they simply 
                                               
ownership, banning polygamy and sharia law, and subjecting the indigenous Algerians to the French justice system. 
But even as they proposed to subject the Algerians to French law and authority, they did not plan to grant them civil 
rights. See Meyer, Tarrade, Rey-Goldzeigueur, Thobie, Histoire de la France Coloniale, 411. 
12 The decision to issue Algeria a constitution stemmed from a complicated series of events. In response to the 1868 
famine, the government launched an inquiry into the territory’s agricultural production, which was directed by the 
Comte Le Hon. Le Hon was Bonapartist in political orientation, but when he arrived in Algeria, he was courted by 
the colonist settlers. These settlers convinced him that indigenous society was “decomposing,” and that the 
territory’s prosperity depended on the colonists. In order to secure Algeria’s future, they insisted, France needed to 
enfranchise its settlers, make it easier for them to buy indigenous property, and eliminate the military’s rule. Le Hon 
presented these findings to the Senate in April 1869, argued for the extension of civil territory, and asked for an 
Algerian constitution. As a result of these events, the Emperor decided to organize a commission, composed of three 
military and five civil servants to determine Algeria’s future. See Annie Rey-Goldzeiguer, Le Royaume Arabe: la 
politique algérienne de Napoléon III, 1861-1870 (Alger: Société Nationale d’Édition et de Diffusion, 1977), 659 
13 Michel Levallois, Ismaÿl Urbain, Royaume Arabe ou Algérie franco-musulmane: 1848-1870 (Paris: Riveneuve 
editions, 2012), 778. 
14 The members of the commission discussed the possibility of eliminating military territory altogether, but 
ultimately decided to maintain the distinction. See “Procès-verbaux de la Commission chargée d’élaborer le Projet 
de Constitution de l’Algérie,” 4-10 in Commission de la Constitution de l’Algérie, 1867-1870, F80*/2041. Fonds 
Ministériales, Archives Nationales d’Outre-Mer, Aix-en-Provence, France. 
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extended the policies of the “royaume arabe.”15 They particularly objected to the Commission’s 
decision to maintain military territory – largely because they saw the military as partisan to the 
indigenous population. They also protested against the decision to extend voting rights not just to 
French citizens, but to foreigners and indigenous people as well.16  
The colonists’ anger towards the constitutional project and their insistence that the 
imperial government’s concessions were insufficient to their purposes did not remain limited to 
the Algerian stage. One of the longstanding republican allies of the colonist coalition, Jules 
Favre, brought the matter to the Corps législatif in early 1870.17 From March 7-9, 1870, the 
Corps législatif argued about Algeria’s administration and its relationship to France before 
voting to dissolve the territory’s military organization and institute civilian rule.18 Colonists 
greeted this news with great satisfaction: L’Echo d’Oran described the Corps législatif’s decision 
as the “Waterloo of the royaume arabe.”19 But if the colonists succeeded in forcing through a 
number of theoretical concessions under Napoleon III’s rule, the government made few policy 
changes before the outbreak of the Franco-Prussian War in the summer of 1870.20 Colonists and 
                                               
15 For examples of colonist calls for a constitution, see Jules Vinet, La Crise algérienne: Quelques mots sur la 
colonisation.. (Paris: Dentu, 1863), 3; Auguste-Hubert Warnier, L'Algérie devant l'opinion publique. (Alger: Molot, 
1864), 161; Henry Didier, Le Gouvernement militaire et la colonisation en Algérie (Paris: E. Dentu, 1865). 
16 Rey-Goldzeiguer, Le Royaume Arabe, 663. 
17 Jules Favre had served as the prosecutor in the controversial Doineau trial of the 1850s, and was a vocal opponent 
of the military government and the Bureaux arabes in the metropole. See Abi-Mershed, Apostles of Modernity, 160. 
18 Guy Perville, La France en Algérie, 1830-1954 (Paris: Vendémiaire, 2012), 59. 
19 As quoted in Rey-Goldzeiguer, Le Royaume Arabe, 667. 
20 Napoleon III passed two decrees on May 31 and June 11 that endowed civil prefects with most of the 
administrative authority that had once been vested in the bureau arabes. He also passed a decree that established 
individual property in Arab territory that had been classified as “arch,” and organized elections in civil territories. 
See Levallois, Ismaÿl Urbain, 804. Colonists were, on the whole, unimpressed by these policy changes. Al. Waille 
declared, “In order to give a semblance of satisfaction to public opinion, the Emperor will soon sign two 
declarations relative to Algeria as advised by the Minister of War. These measures, like all that have been taken thus 
far in Algeria, are qualified as transitory by the minister himself… This is nothing but the pure and simple return to 
the regime of 1863, and Algeria demands something else… In effect, the new decrees maintain the disastrous 
division of territory… between the royaume arabe and the colony, between indigenous people and Europeans, that 
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republicans alike attributed this reticence to the Emperor’s ongoing commitment to his earlier 
vision of Algeria, and continued to associate the imperial government with the royaume arabe.21  
If Napoleon III’s attempt to restructure Algeria and reorder its relationship to France had 
fallen apart by 1870, his vision of a multinational Mediterranean Empire remained a subject of 
ongoing debate in the last years of his reign. Moreover, colonists’ and republicans’ very critiques 
of Napoleon III’s imperial system reinforced his attempts to collapse metropolitan and overseas 
empire together into one unified theory of “empire.” They also treated metropolitan politics and 
overseas policies as deeply intertwined, arguing that Napoleon III’s misguided approach towards 
Algeria stemmed primarily from the flaws of the Bonapartist imperial system.22 By invoking 
Napoleon III’s policies towards Algeria as a symptom of the Second Empire’s wider problems, 
they thus reinforced the idea that France’s metropolitan and overseas empires were 
interdependent. As Daudet’s Le Nabab shows, some republicans continued to associate 
Napoleon III’s Mediterranean Empire with internal imperial politics throughout the 1870s. 
The legacy of Napoleon III’s conflation of “metropolitan” and “overseas” empire created 
both strategic and conceptual problems for republicans in 1870s. After the Empire’s collapse, 
republicans had condemned metropolitan empire as a “decadent,” “militaristic,” “corrupt,” and 
“oppressive” form of political organization. But if metropolitan empire directly contradicted the 
values of the new republic, what about overseas empire? What was its relationship to Bonapartist 
practices and ideals? These questions troubled republicans who wanted to justify France’s 
                                               
has until now only served to favor the depredations of the Arabs by offering them an asylum that assures them 
impunity.” See Al. Waille, “Les Décrets algériens,” L’Écho d’Oran (11 June 1870), 1. 
21 The colonists’ ongoing opposition to Napoleon III is evident from the way that they voted in the plebiscite of 
1870. Napoleon III only failed to win the majority of the vote in the Seine, the Bouches-du-Rhône, and Algeria, 
where the opposition was most marked. See Price, The French Second Empire, 397. 
22 See, for example Jules Duval and Auguste-Herbert Warnier, Un programme de politique algérienne (Paris: 
Challamel aîné,1868); Bureaux arabes et colons (Paris: Challamel aîné, 1869) 
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imperial relationship with its colonies, especially as they looked overseas to restore French 
military prestige. They sought to untangle these two kinds of empire so that they could promote a 
new kind of republican colonial expansion untainted by Napoleon III.23 This conversation about 
empire and its significance unfolded over the course of many years and evolved in response to 
events overseas and political changes within France itself. But in the republic’s first decade, it 
centered primarily on the question of Algeria and its relationship to the French nation. 
The problems surrounding French understandings of the nature of “empire” and its 
implications for France’s overseas territories became immediately relevant after the September 4 
revolution. Algerian colonists saw the collapse of the imperial regime as an opportunity to 
overturn the vestiges of the imperial administration and restructure the territory according to 
their own wishes. And scholars have shown, the weak, unpopular, newly established republican 
government in France had a stake in meeting their demands in order to sustain their support.24 As 
a result, the government made a number of significant changes to Algeria’s administration even 
before the conclusion of the Franco-Prussian War. It invested the colonists with the same 
electoral and civil rights as their French metropolitan counterparts, marginalized the indigenous 
population, and made it easier for the colonists to claim indigenous land.25 In fact, the new 
republic’s restructuring of Algeria aligned so closely with colonists’ demands that many scholars 
                                               
23 Intellectuals and novelists like Prévost-Paradol, Fromentin, and Feydeau who had begun to popularize a 
specifically “colonialist” vision of empire in the 1860s helped make this process of disentangling possible. 
24 Annie Rey-Goldzeiguer, Guy Perville, John Ruedy, and Osama Abi-Mershed all argue that in the immediate wake 
of the Empire’s collapse, the Republican government essentially straightforwardly implemented the program that 
Algerian colonists had long advocated for. This is hardly surprising, considering that many of the same republican 
politicians had fought for the settlers’ demands in the legislature during the last years of the Second Empire. But 
during the Third Republic, they were able to implement the settlers’ demands more effectively. See Rey-
Goldzeiguer, Le Royaume Arabe, 688; Perville, La France en Algérie, 63; Ruedy, Modern Algeria, 76; Abi-
Mershed, Apostles of Modernity, 201. 
25 Meyer, Tarrade, Rey-Goldzeigueur, Thobie, Histoire de la France Coloniale, 540. 
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have argued that it was primarily settler self-interest that determined the territory’s political 
organization and structured its relationship to France in the early years of the Third Republic.26  
It is undeniable that settlers and their metropolitan allies largely drove the project of 
reorganizing Algeria in the early years of the Third Republic. But if colonists played a large role 
in determining the structure of the Algerian administration, a wider set of intellectuals and 
politicians sought to define what the form of that administration might signify for the 
relationship between Algeria and France. This process became caught up in larger conflicts 
within France itself over France’s political organization and the relative merits of “republican” 
and “imperial” forms of government. The pressures of these political currents are evident in the 
fact that throughout the 1870s, republican politicians did not use the word “empire” to describe 
any of France’s overseas territories. Instead, they made use of a series of different words – from 
“colony” to “département” – when referring to these places. This marked a profound shift from 
Second Empire usages: the imperial government often deployed the terms “empire,” “overseas 
empire,” “Mediterranean empire” and “colonial empire” to refer to overseas territories. In the 
wake of Napoleon III’s defeat, republican politicians thus struggled to articulate alternative 
theoretical models of overseas dominion that were unrelated to the discredited Napoleonic 
imperial system and that they could use republican principles to justify. This process of 
developing a new model for Algeria and its relationship to France was hardly uncontested: it was 
ongoing, fraught, and negotiated between settler populations and metropolitan authorities whose 
interests did not always line up. Ongoing political conflicts between the republicans and 
conservative groups who continued to dominate the National Assembly throughout much of the 
                                               
26 Annie Rey-Goldzeiguer, for example, argues that the settlers largely succeeded in constructing an alternative 
model of Algeria and its future in opposition to Napoleon III, and then mostly managed to push through that model 
in the wake of the Empire’s failure. See Rey-Goldzeiguer, Le Royaume Arabe, 689. 
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1870s shaped the process of redefinition. But ultimately, this conversation about Algeria and its 
connections to empire helped provoke a wider set of arguments about the purpose of France’s 
overseas territories and their connections to the French nation and its politics. 
This chapter examines the debates about Algeria and its relationship to the French nation 
in the wake of the Franco-Prussian war, and considers what they reveal about understandings of 
“empire” in early Third Republic France. It argues that these debates marked the first moment of 
an ongoing conversation within the Republic about the meaning and implications of empire that 
continued to develop through the end of the nineteenth century. Throughout this conversation, 
republicans tried to differentiate between metropolitan and overseas empire and explain why 
overseas empire did not contradict republican values even if its metropolitan counterpart was 
problematic. At the same time, they tried to show why their model of overseas “republican” 
colonization was superior to its Bonapartist predecessors. Especially at first, republicans’ ideas 
about Algeria and its relationship to empire, republic, and the French nation were conflicted. But 
as they continued to argue with Bonapartist and monarchist opponents about the territory over 
the course of the 1870s, a more coherent republican vision of empire began to emerge. 
This chapter’s analysis of these debates about French overseas empire and Algeria 
focuses on several interrelated questions. First, how did the settler population and the republican 
government seek to reorganize Algeria and redefine its relationship to France in the wake of the 
Second Empire’s collapse and a widespread indigenous revolt in 1871? Second, how did this 
conversation about Algeria intersect with wider debates between writers, intellectuals, and 
politicians of different political stripes about the meaning and implications of “empire” and its 
relationship to the French “republic” and “nation” in the 1870s? And finally, how did these 
ongoing debates about Algeria’s organization and republican France’s relationship to its overseas 
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territories connect to theoretical literature about colonization that emerged in this period? This 
chapter considers these questions by examining how this conversation about “empire” and 
Algeria played out across newspapers, political pamphlets, and academic writing published in the 
early years of the Third Republic. It begins by focusing on the debates about Algeria’s future that 
transpired in 1870-71 before expanding its analysis to consider how these debates fit into a wider 
discussion about republicanism and overseas empire during the later 1870s. 
 
II. War and Revolution: Algeria in 1870-71 
The French defeat at Sedan and the September 4 Revolution triggered a widespread 
discussion about Algeria’s administrative structure and its relationship to France. This discussion 
was, at least at first, largely driven by settlers themselves, who took to the streets in Algerian 
cities in order to signify their loyalty to the new republican government, protest against the 
remains of the Bonapartist regime, and advocate for widespread change in Algeria. Their actions 
precipitated a whirlwind of reforms, but also drew settlers into conflict with the newly 
established republican government, especially after the elections in February 1871 brought a 
conservative majority to power in the National Assembly.27 A widespread indigenous revolt in 
the spring of 1871 further complicated the situation. Taken together, these events transformed 
the discourse about Algeria and France’s relationship to its overseas territories in the early part 
of the decade. Even though different republicans and settlers often did not agree about Algeria, 
together they permanently shifted the parameters of the conversation about it. Driven by a 
complicated combination of settler self-interest, republican political opportunism, and 
                                               
27 Taithe, Citizenship and Wars, 172. 
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ideological conviction, this new understanding of Algeria would have implications for the 
French conversation about the meaning and implications of “empire” in the years to come. 
The events that led to this transformation in understandings of Algeria and its relationship 
to “empire” were convoluted. In the weeks following the collapse of Napoleon III’s government, 
the new republican government moved a number of republicans sympathetic to settlers’ demands 
– including Auguste-Hubert Warnier – into the territory’s administration.28 At the same time, 
colonists across Algeria organized themselves into “republican committees of national defense” 
– much like their urban counterparts in metropolitan France.29 But although their purported 
intention was to defend the country against Germany, they spent most of their time staging 
public protests against the Governor-General Durieu, whom they claimed was plotting a 
Bonapartist coup.30 The Republican Association of Algiers was particularly active. In a series of 
circulars published in Algerian newspapers, its members argued that the current Algerian 
military administration was incompatible with republican values and demanded immediate 
                                               
28 Warnier became the prefect of Algiers and Marcel Lucet the prefect of Constantine. See Pierre Darmon, Un siècle 
de passions algériennes: une histoire de l’Algérie coloniale (1830-1940) (Paris: Fayard, 2009), 259. 
29 The creation of these committees was controversial. While the republican government encouraged communities in 
metropolitan France to form committees on September 10th, the governor general had declared that the circular 
authorizing them was not applicable to Algeria. In response, a group of settlers in Algeria registered their discontent 
in an official complaint that they published in a number of Algerian newspapers. The complaint contended, “The 
population protests against the head of the colony’s tendency to perpetuate the imperial policy that placed Algeria 
outside of the law and in France pretended that it could defend the country through the army alone until the disaster 
of Sédan. Ready to make all of the sacrifices now imposed on Strasbourg, Toulon, and Verdun, Algeria wants to 
be… administrated by representatives from the Republic.” See “Comité Républicain de Défense,” Démocrate (12 
September 1871). After these committees were authorized in late September, the authorities appointed by the new 
republican government had trouble controlling them. The Prefect of Constantine Marcel Lucet noted, “The 
government of 4 September, acclaimed by the nation, has successively eliminated decrees of despotism… The hour 
approaches where the representatives of the people will place our laws in harmony with republican institutions… 
Already, in several places, committees have formed with the title of national defense… Algeria is effectively the 
daughter of France; she cannot rest a stranger to the nation’s great pain and patriotic resolution. As a result, she can 
be called to guard her own security to a certain measure.” He went on to warn the Committee, however, against 
“extremism” and conjoined them  to obey established authorities. See Marcel Lucet, “Circulaire de le Préfet de 
Constantine aux fonctionnaires placés sous ses ordres,” Comités politiques, F80/1681. Fonds Ministériales, ANOM.  
30 Alexandre Lambert argued that Durrieu was “turning canons against the cities” and “distributing ammunition to 
assassinate republicans.” See A. Lambert, “Aux Algériens,” Le Colon, cited in l’Indépendant de Constantine (6 
October 1870); Ruedy, Modern Algeria, 76. 
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reform.31 They succeeded in securing Durieu’s resignation by early October 1870. The 
Government of National Defense replaced the Bonapartist Durieu with General Walsin-
Esterhazy, the commander of troops in Oran, whose political allegiances were more in line with 
republican values. But the colonists saw Walsin-Esterhazy as a continuation of the military 
regime, and rioted against him. On October 28, he resigned as well. He ceded his authority to 
General Lichtlin, who went to Algiers to serve as “interim governor.” The colonists – who did 
not want even a temporary military governor - refused to allow Lichtlin to enter the city, and he 
was forced to camp outside of it before resigning in turn on November 9.32  
In the face of the settlers’ growing unrest, the Government of National Defense in Tours 
took a series of steps to placate them. Léon Gambetta, the minister of the interior, charged 
Adolphe Crémieux, the minister of justice, with Algeria’s affairs, largely because Crémieux had 
visited the territory on multiple occasions. Crémieux and the other members of the Government 
of National Defense were sympathetic to colonists’ distaste for the military regime – partly 
because they needed colonist support, and partly because they themselves saw the military as a 
conservative institution that was hostile to the republic’s future.33 Crémieux passed a series of 
decrees to reorganize Algeria and restructure its relationship to France on October 24, 1870. 
These decrees largely dismantled the military regime and took steps towards legally assimilating 
the colony into the French metropole.34 They replaced the military governor-general with a civil 
governor-general, divided Algeria into three departments that would each elect two deputies to 
                                               
31 More specifically, they argued that the Committees of National Defense would not be able to fulfill their grand 
mission as long as the “military authority” retained its position because it was incompatible with democratic forms 
of political organization. See, “République Française: Liberté – Égalité – Fraternité,” Le Tell (1 October 1870). 
32 Ruedy, Modern Algeria, 76. 
33 Meyer, Tarrade, Rey-Goldzeigueur, Thobie, Histoire de la France Coloniale, 538, 539. 
34 Ruedy, Modern Algeria, 76. 
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the National Assembly, and created elective councils to advise the governor-general. Crémieux 
selected Henri Didier, a politician and advocate for settler interests who had served as Algeria’s 
deputy during the Second Republic, to be the new civil governor-general, and promised prompt 
elections to fill the other positions.35 Although these decrees maintained the division between 
civil and military territory, they placed the officers in military territory under civil prefects.36 
Crémieux also passed a series of laws aimed at the indigenous populations, subjecting most 
indigenous Algerians to French law and granting French citizenship to Algerian Jews.37 
Though the Crémieux decrees granted the colonists many of their demands – they 
instituted a civil regime, granted settlers electoral rights, and took steps towards forcibly 
dismantling indigenous society - they did not quell the rising discontent. Many colonists felt that 
they did not go far enough. They objected to the fact that the decrees maintained military 
territories and did not abolish the bureaux arabes. If many welcomed the prospect of a civil 
governor-general, they were frustrated by the fact that the government was to remain in the 
hands of the military until Henri Didier could arrive from France – which, considering that he 
was trapped in besieged Paris, would take at least several months.38 They were also incensed by 
the government’s decision to grant citizenship to Algerian Jews, whom they saw as uncivilized.39 
                                               
35 “Nouvelles de la Province et de l’Étranger,” Le Gaulois (3 November 1870), 3. 
36 “Actes officiels,” Le Petit Journal (3 November 1870), 2. 
37 He instituted trial by jury for many indigenous crimes. But because only French citizens could serve on juries, 
indigenous peoples accused of crimes would be judged by juries composed of French settlers. Perville, La France en 
Algérie, 63. Crémieux’s decision to make indigenous people subject to French law had long been a goal of the settler 
community. Throughout the 1860s, settlers argued that the indigenous Algerians would never become “civilized” 
unless they stopped living according to religious law. This decree weakened the role of religious law. Crémieux’s 
interest in Algeria largely stemmed from his interest in Algerian Jews, whom he was committed to protecting and 
assimilating into French culture. Meyer, Tarrade, Rey-Goldzeigueur, Thobie, Histoire de la France coloniale, 541. 
38 Meyer, Tarrade, Rey-Goldzeigueur, Thobie, Histoire de la France Coloniale, 545. 
39 The decision to grant citizenship to Algerian Jews in fact proved to be among the most controversial of all these 
decrees. Shortly after it was passed, a number of settlers started a campaign to have it revoked, arguing – primarily 
in Algerian newspapers – that the Algerian Jews were distinct from their European counterparts. As early as March 
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In Algiers especially, colonists marched in the streets to protest the new measures and demand 
the resignation of all administrators associated with the military regime. Even Warnier proved 
too conciliatory for the colonists’ taste and had to resign from his post on October 29.40 
On October 30, news of General Bazaine’s surrender at Metz reached Algeria, creating a 
fervor that the local administration could not contain. Over the following days, the interim 
Governor-General sent the Government of National Defense a series of increasingly urgent 
notes, warning that there was “great agitation” and that the National Guard was “unable to 
maintain order.”41 At the same time, Romauld Vuillermoz, the more radical republican mayor of 
Algiers, sent the government a series of notes justifying the ongoing colonist protest.42 He argued 
that most of the appointed colonial administrators had been conspiring against the Republican 
government in Tours and threatening to maintain the military administration. There was no 
“disorder” in Algerian cities, he claimed, only an “unwavering commitment” to the republic and 
to a civil regime. However, he warned, if Henri Didier was detained in Paris, the republican 
                                               
1871, settlers began campaigning to have their citizenship revoked, and in August of 1871, they proposed a project 
of law that would undo the law. A number of important figures from the Algerian Jewish community appeared 
before the National Assembly to defend their newfound citizenship, and the project of law ultimately failed. A 
powerful anti-Semitic movement persisted in Algeria, however. See Juillet St-Lacer, “Les Israélites algériennes et le 
décret du 24 octobre,” La Solidarité d’Alger (11 March 1871); “Nouvelles, Le Petit Journal (22 August 1871), 2. 
40 Colonists accused Warnier of “collaborating with the military government” because he had worked with Durrieu 
and Walsin-Esterhazy. See Levallois, Ismaÿl Urbain, 816. In a letter to Jules Ferry, the mayor of Algiers claimed 
that “the political line followed by this functionary was clearly contrary to public spirit. In all circumstances, he 
leaned towards military authority.” See R. Vuillermoz, “Alger, maire, président du comité de defense, au citoyen 
minister de l’intérieur, Tours,” Annales de l’Assemblée nationale: Comte-rendu in extensor des séances, Annexes. 
Enquête sur les actes du gouvernement de la defense nationale: Rapport sur l’Algérie Vol. 26 (Paris: Imprimerie et 
Librairie du Journal-Officiel, 1875), 498. 
41 “Gouverneur par intérim à minister de la guerre,” (31 October 1871) in Actes du Gouvernement de la Défense 
Nationale: Rapport sur l’Algérie Vol. 3 (Paris: Librairie des Publications Législatives, 1876), 92. 
42 Vuillermoz was an Algerian lawyer who had been deported from France in 1851 by Napoleon III. See Claude 
Martin, La Commune d’Alger (Paris: Éditions Heraklès, 1936), 26; Perville, La France en Algérie, 62. In these 
telegrams, Vuillermoz sought to address Gambetta directly, but at least at first, Crémieux alone responded to them. 
Vuillermoz resented this fact, and on November 5, he noted, “We sent you a pressing telegram, and it was M. 
Crémieux who responded with observations in a situation that requires acts.” “Maire d’Alger au citoyen Gambetta, 
Tours,” (5 November 1870) in Actes du Gouvernement, 97. 
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government needed to send another official to take over the colony in order to make the 
necessary changes to its administration.43  He asked the government to appoint a “temporary 
extraordinary commissioner” to run Algeria’s civil and military affairs.44. The government in 
Tours did not immediately respond to the request, leading Vuillermoz to issue an ultimatum on 
November 7: the government could either send an extraordinary commissioner, or the Algiers 
Committee of National Defense would appoint Vuillermoz to the position.45 
When the government in Tours did not respond to the November 7 telegram, the 
Republican Committee of National Defense in Algiers took matters into its own hands and 
appointed Vuillermoz to the position of interim extraordinary civil commissioner.46 Vuillermoz 
made use of his new position to transform Algeria along pro-settler, republican lines. On 
November 11, Vuillermoz established a commission to organize Algeria’s settler population into 
democratic “communes” and extend the scope of colonization.47 These measures bolstered the 
                                               
43 He argued that the only events that had happened in Algiers were those meant to protect the Republic. He noted, 
“General Walsin-Esterhazy, who had a provocative attitude and used language that was openly hostile to the 
republic, was constrained to leave. A prefect who was esteemed, but who had, out of weakness, acted complacently 
towards military authority, was forced to resign. General Lichtlin, who had surrendered and whom the population 
found odious, was reduced to hand over his power….” See ibid. 
44 The municipal council of Algiers –dominated largely by members of the Algiers Republican Committee of 
National Defense – sent a letter to the National Government supporting Vuillermoz’s request and demanding that 
the government appoint Vuillermoz himself to the position of “temporary extraordinary commissioner” of Algeria. 
See “Conseil municipal à ministre de l’intérieur, Tours” (31 October 1870) in in Actes du Gouvernement , 93. These 
demands did not just come from Algiers. On November 7, Emile Thullier demanded, “It is necessary to make a 
clean slate of imperial institutions… We must organize… We must name an administrator for the department, and 
name an extraordinary commissioner for all Algeria.” See Emile Thullier, Algérie française (9 November 1870). 
45 Vuillermoz demanded, “There has been no response to our telegram. We informed you that committees of public 
health have been forming to elect an extraordinary commissioner that you will not send us. They find the nomination 
of Henri Didier, who is stuck in Paris, mystifying. If you refuse or procrastinate further, the country’s motto will be: 
Algeria tara de se. Be advised: our voices are no longer heard. Send the commissioner or confirm our authority.” 
See “Maire d’Alger à Gambetta, Tours,” (7 November 1870), in Actes du Gouvernement, 97. 
46 They asked the other Committees of Defense in Algeria to send in telegrams acknowledging and approving the 
decision. See “Arrête,” (8 November 1870) in Actes du Gouvernement, 97. Algerian newspapers quickly jumped 
into defend this decision. L’Avenir algérien maintained, “It is up to us Algerians to proclaim our superior 
administrator or extraordinary commissioner to govern Algeria, that unites and concentrates in his hands all civil and 
military power.” See “L’Algérie aux Algériens,” Avenir algérien (11 November 1870). 
47 “Arrete,” (11 November 1870) in Actes du Gouvernement, 101; Darmon, Un siècle de passions algériennes, 260. 
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authority of democratically elected city and town governments, weakened the authority of the 
central colonial administration, and undermined the position of the republican government in 
Tours vis-à-vis Algeria. Moreover, by centering Algeria’s administration in “communes” 
composed of Europeans, Vuillermoz effectively displaced the indigenous population from 
Algeria’s government and rendered them tangential to the territory’s administration. 
Vuillermoz’s appointment encouraged colonists to widen the scope of their ambitions. 
Over the next few days, a number of groups began openly expressing hostility toward the 
republican government in Tours and demanding reform. Alexandre Lambert, for example, 
insisted, “Algeria will not adopt that new error of old Crémieux. We say to the delegation of 
Tours: either Algeria will be entirely French, and ruled entirely by French law, or, if it is 
necessary that she is ruled beneath an exceptional regime, she will make her own colonial 
constitution.”48 In other words, the recently passed Crémieux decrees were illegitimate. The 
Government should not create a new constitution for Algeria; it should either assimilate the 
territory into France or allow the settlers to determine the regime under which they would live. 
On November 13, a group of republicans in Algiers went a step farther. They sent new demands 
to the metropolitan government, insisting that settlers in Algeria should have the right to name 
their own civil governor and appoint deputies to draft Algeria’s new constitution – with no 
interference from France.49 Just a few weeks before, the settlers had been advocating for a civil 
regime and a new constitution. Now they wanted the right to choose their own officials and 
select a new administrative structure for the colony as a whole.50  
                                               
48 Alexandre Lambert, Colon, cited in the Moniteur de l’Algérie (3 November 1870) 
49 “Vaux émis dans une reunion de 600 à 700 personnes à Alger,” L’Akhbar (13 November 1870). 
50 Not all of the colonists agreed with the Algiers Committee of National Defense’s actions. The prefect of 
Constantine, Marcel Lucet, publically condemned both Vuillermoz’s appointment as extraordinary commissioner 
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The government in Tours condemned the Committee of Defense’s actions and sent 
Vuillermoz a series of notes announcing that it rejected “this act of usurpation,” marking the first 
real break between metropolitan and settler republicans.51 Vuillermoz protested that he had only 
acted in order to calm the growing radicalism in Algeria and maintained that he could not resign 
without provoking a general uprising.52 But on November 17, the metropolitan government 
appointed Charles du Bouzet as the new extraordinary commissioner, and many Algerian cities 
withdrew their support for Vuillermoz.53 When Bouzet arrived in Algiers on November 20, 
Vuillermoz had to step down and the “Commune” of Algiers ended.  
Bouzet’s appointment did not end the ongoing political conflict in Algeria, however. Like 
the string of military governors that preceded him, Bouzet conflicted with Vuillermoz, who 
remained the mayor of Algiers.54 Crémieux and the National Government’s decision to modify 
                                               
and his efforts to reorganize the territory. In a series of telegrams and newspaper degrees, he encouraged the mayors 
of all the cities in Constantine to do the same. He sent them a telegram noting that Constantine’s Committee of 
National Defense “rejects with all its energy this antipatriotic movement.” See “Préfet à maires du département,” (10 
November 1870) in Actes du Gouvernement, 103. This statement was later printed in Constantine’s newspapers. 
Several towns sent telegrams to the Government of National Defense, assuring the government of their loyalty. See 
“Conseil municipal de Bône à Gouvernement, Tours,” (9 November 1870) in Actes du Gouvernement, 105. Even 
some settlers who disapproved of the Crémieux decrees condemned the Algiers government. The Indépendant of 
Constantine, which had long criticized the royaume arabe, declared, “The nomination of Vuillermoz… is a veritable 
usurpation” and “against the interests of the country.” The writer argued that the act “subordinated all authority over 
the provinces to Algiers; this creates an unfortunate precedent… [it] gives a dangerous weapon to partisans of 
centralization… The provinces that have long fought against this tendency cannot commit such a capital error.” See 
“Le conflit algérien,” L’Indépendant (15 November 1870). Le Français, on the other hand, accused Vuillermoz of 
treason and compared him to Napoleon III, claiming that his project was “to separate Algeria from France and make 
it an independent state with Vuillermoz in the role of dictator, or as they say municipal emperor.” The writer thus 
implied that Vuillermoz’s actions were not republican and threatened to return Algeria to the regime that its settlers 
had long decried. See Le Français (12 March 1871), cited Actes du Gouvernement de la Défense Nationale: Rapport 
sur l’Algérie Vol. 3 (Paris: Librairie des Publications Législatives, 1876), 94. 
51 The telegram also asked him to put up posters announcing that the Government rejected the measures undertaken 
by the municipal council and promised that they would send a civil governor within ten days. See “Gouvernement 
de Tours à maire d’Alger,” (10 November 1870) in Actes du Gouvernement, 106. 
52 “Maire d’Alger à Gouvernement, Tours,” (11 November 1870), in Actes du Gouvernement, 106. 
53 Bouzet was a republican academic who had originally been appointed the prefect of Oran after the September 4th 
revolution. See Meyer, Tarrade, Rey-Goldzeigueur, Thobie, Histoire de la France Coloniale, 546. 
54 Although it did not ask Vuillermoz to step down from his position as mayor, the government tried to weaken the 
authority of Algerian mayors by placing militia beneath the Extraordinary Commissioner. This alienated many 
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the decrees of October 24 in in late December and early January to appease the vocal settler 
population also complicated Bouzet’s position. These new decrees announced the end of “the 
regime of exception” and promised a new future for Algeria based on “le droit commune.”55 
They extended Algeria’s civil territory, effectively dismantled the bureaux arabes, and placed 
the military territories beneath the control of civilian prefects. They also legally assimilated the 
civil territory in Algeria into the French metropole.56 Despite the fact that these decrees fulfilled 
many of the settlers’ demands, the settlers saw them as insufficient, which led to further unrest.57 
On January 15, the National Government decided to intervene in the ongoing conflicts 
between Vuillermoz, the Algerian municipal council, and Bouzet by dissolving the municipal 
council of Algiers and dismissing the mayor.58 They called for new elections and granted Bouzet 
the authority to appoint a replacement for Vuillermoz.59 Instead of calming the situation, 
however, this measure led to a renewed series of protests against both Bouzet and the 
metropolitan republican government. News of Paris’ surrender to the Prussian army on January 
24 and forthcoming elections only made the situation tenser.60 Many settlers were concerned that 
the French would elect a conservative government that would be even less sympathetic to their 
                                               
settlers in Algiers and predisposed them against Bouzet. Bouzet and Vuillermoz would continue to conflict over who 
controlled the militia through January 1871. See “Decret,” (18 November 1870), in Actes du Gouvernement, 114. 
55 Crémieux, “Bordeaux, 1 janvier 1871”, F80/1862. Fonds Ministériales, ANOM. 
56 Ruedy, Modern Algeria, 76; Actes du Gouvernement, 348. 
57 Many argued that the government should eliminate the distinction between military and civil territories entirely. 
See Meyer, Tarrade, Rey-Goldzeigueur, Thobie, Histoire de la France Coloniale, 547. 
58 This decision was sparked by a conflict between Bouzet and Vuillermoz over control of the militia. Both issued a 
series of counter-decrees to the Algerian militia, which Bouzet invoked as a reason to dissolve the municipal council 
of Algiers and call for new elections. See Claude Martin, La Commune d’Alger (Paris: Éditions Herakles, 1936), 78. 
59 See “Decret” (18 January 1870), in Actes du Gouvernement, 116. 
60 On January 27, a large crowd of settlers went to the Governor’s palace to protest the municipal council’s 
dissolution. At the same time, a crowd of Algiers’ indigenous inhabitants, who saw Bouzet as an ally against settler 
rapaciousness, surrounded the palace to defend him. While the encounter did not end violently, it further heightened 
tensions between the settler population and indigenous Algerians. See L’Akhbar (27 January 1871) as quoted in 
Actes du Gouvernement, 119.  
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interests and openly expressed concern about the possibility of a Bonapartist restoration.61 The 
Independent of Constantine went so far as to declare that if Algeria were “betrayed” again by 
Bonapartists as it had been in 1851, Algerians would “prefer to give the colony to England.”62  
In light of these ongoing protests, the Government of National Defense decided that 
Bouzet was unable to enforce order in the colony. But unsettled relations between the colonists 
and the government in the metropole continued when Bouzet was replaced with yet another 
extraordinary commissioner on February 9: Alexis Lambert, the prefect of Oran.63 Lambert 
succeeded in establishing an uneasy peace in Algiers, despite the fact that the elections brought a 
wave of conservatives into the national government – much as the settlers had feared. Even the 
outbreak of the Paris Commune met with a relatively muted response because the beginnings of 
a widespread indigenous revolt increasingly overshadowed the events in the metropole.64 
The indigenous revolt began in early March in Kabylie when Muhammad al-Hajj al-
Muqrani, an important tribal leader who had long worked closely with the French government, 
called a council of war. Over the course of the next few weeks, he convinced a number of 
                                               
61 This concern with a possible Bonapartist restoration was not new; a number of colonists had advocated for the 
complete removal of all officials associated with the Bonapartist administration in order to prevent such an event. In 
December, the Colon had argued, “We must not conserve any of the employees or functionaries of the Bonapartists 
beneath the Republic, not one; all must be replaced by men whose devotion to the Republic is incontestable and 
well-justified.” See Le Colon (8 December 1871), cited in Le Moniteur de l’Algérie (9 December 1871), 2. 
62 Indépendant (9 February 1871). Because of the concern about he Algiers Committee of Defense also decide to 
send a number of observers to Versailles to represent Algeria’s interests, including Alexandre Lambert, Calvinhac 
and Lormand. See Martin, La Commune d’Alger, 89. 
63 This was in part because Bouzet was unable to maintain order. Bouzet had not even been able to enforce the 
government’s dissolution of the municipal council of Algiers. The continuing settler protests forced Bouzet to 
restore the municipal council and the mayor until their replacements could be elected. See Martin, La Commune 
d’Alger, 86; Perville, La France en Algérie, 62. 
64 Throughout the month of February, however, it is clear that at least a number of settler republican associations 
followed the movements in the Paris Commune closely, not least because Alexandre Lambert, the deputy they had 
selected to represent Algerian interests in front of the National Assembly, played an important role in the 
proceedings. Lambert published a number of articles about Algeria in the Journal officiel de la République française 
that was published by the Commune, in which he attacked the colonial administration for seeking to undermine the 
authority of the “communes” of Algeria. See Alexandre Lambert, “M. Lucet,” Journal officiel de la République 
française: Commune de Paris (3 April 1871), 136. 
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neighboring tribes to join him.65 In early April, this revolt turned into a widespread popular 
uprising when Muhammad al Haddad – an influential member of the Rahmaniyya, a Sufi 
Muslim brotherhood – publically declared his support and described the conflict as a jihad.66 By 
late April, approximately 200,000 Kabyles had joined, and it continued to spread in the 
provinces of Constantine and Alger.67 Through the spring and summer of 1871, the insurgents 
attacked settler farms, villages, and towns in an attempt to drive European settlers out of Algeria. 
It was only in late October 1871 that the French military fully suppressed the insurrection.68  
The causes behind this insurrection were both complex and diverse. Most historians 
agree, however, that the complex political and administrative changes instituted in 1870-71 made 
the indigenous Algerians fear for their future in a reorganized Algeria.69 Many tribal leaders had 
had personal relationships with Napoleon III; Muqrani in particular had visited him during the 
festivities at Compiègne in the 1860s.70 These leaders saw him and his administration – 
especially the bureaux arabes – as a bulwark against rapacious settlers who sought to steal their 
land. They feared that a civilian administration would privilege the settlers’ interests over their 
own.71 The first months of the Third Republic had only consolidated their suspicions of civilian 
                                               
65 There were earlier outbreaks in late January and early February, but it was Muhammad al-Hajj al-Muqrani who 
transformed it into a widespread insurrection. It is worth noting that Muqrani had long collaborated with the French 
administration, and specifically with the Bureaux arabes. Napoleon III had made him an officer of the Legion of 
Honor in 1862 in exchange for his services to France. See Darmon, Un siècle de passions algériennes, 268. 
66 Tahar Oussedik, Mouvement insurrectionnel de 1871 (Alger: Enag Editions, 2005), 15. 
67 The revolt involved about 800,000 people, but only about 200,000 were actively involved in military operations. 
See Lorcin, Imperial Identities, 174. 
68 The conflict that ensued over the following months led to the deaths of 2,686 Europeans and many more 
indigenous Algerians. See Ruedy, Modern Algeria, 78. 
69 See, for example Meyer, Tarrade, Rey-Goldzeigueur, Thobie, Histoire de la France Coloniale, 548; Ruedy, 
Modern Algeria, 77; Darmon, Un siècle de passions algériennes, 272; Patricia Lorcin, Imperial Identities: 
Stereotyping, prejudice, and race in colonial Algeria (New York: I. B. Tauris Publishers, 1995), 177. 
70 Darmon, Un siècle de passions algériennes, 268. 
71 Denise Bouche, Histoire de la colonisation française: flux et réflux, 1815-1963 (Paris: Fayard, 1991), 115. 
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rule – the republican journals had used the new freedom of the press to openly advocate for the 
radical cantonnement of indigenous tribes and argue that the new government should take a 
series of drastic measures to secure indigenous land. The Crémieux decrees, which undermined 
indigenous law and threatened to expand the scope of French colonization, consolidated the 
impression that the indigenous tribes were under attack.72 The fact that the settlers worked 
systematically to undermine military authority and ship the officers of the bureaux arabes 
outside of the territory – the only administrators that most members of the indigenous population 
ever interacted with – further compounded the situation. Muqrani and his followers decided to 
act before the government could consolidate a regime that seemed antithetical to their interests.73 
The revolt – combined with the outbreak of the Commune - changed the tenor of the 
debates in Algeria about the territory’s administration and its relationship to France. The newly 
elected metropolitan government decided to replace Lambert with an administrator who could 
wield greater authority over both the settler and indigenous populations.74 It eliminated the 
position of “extraordinary commissioner” and appointed Vice-Admiral Gueydon to the position 
of “Civil Governor of Algeria.”75 At first, colonists objected to this announcement – Gueydon 
was a member of the military, after all, even if he was serving as Algeria’s “civil governor.”76 He 
                                               
72 Meyer, Tarrade, Rey-Goldzeigueur, Thobie, Histoire de la France Coloniale, 548. 
73 Ruedy, Modern Algeria, 76. 
74 Gueydon also emphasized in all of his public pronouncements that he was a “civil governor.” In his initial decree, 
he claimed, “The President of the council of ministers… nominated me as the CIVIL Governor of Algeria… I 
accepted with much less hesitation because Algeria is now represented in the National Assembly, so I would not 
have to concern myself with politics. It is your representatives who are responsible for making your aspirations real 
on that account. My policies will focus on Colonization and Public Works… I will be able to devote all of my care 
to the development of a civil regime and civil institutions.” See Vice-admiral de Gueydon, “9 April 1871,” 
F80/1862. Fonds Ministériales, ANOM. 
75 Perville, La France en Algérie, 64. 
76 The prefect of Constantine noted in a letter that “the nomination of Monsieur the Admiral de Gueydon to the 
General Government of Algeria has been met with marked defiance on the part of the European population. They do 
not believe for a moment that he could actually serve as the head of a civil government and imagine that the 
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was also Legitimist in political orientation and close to Adolphe Thiers.77 The settlers argued that 
his appointment was little more than the resurrection of the old military regime and imperial 
politics. A number of municipal councils across Algeria registered complaints against the 
choice.78 But in the face of a growing indigenous insurrection and the specter of the Versailles 
government’s sharp repression of the Parisian Communards, they unhappily acknowledged his 
authority.79 By mid-1871, the settlers’ campaign to radically restructure Algeria had thus ended 
in a compromise solution that seemed to bridge, at least temporarily, military and civilian rule. 
For approximately six months following the collapse of the Second Empire, a vocal 
group of settlers organized into Committees of Defense engaged in an ongoing political battle 
with the interim republican government in Tours over Algeria’s future. They demanded political 
representation, the end of the military regime, easy access to indigenous land, and “assimilation” 
into France. The settlers’ campaign against the last vestiges of the military administration and the 
royaume arabe was, on the whole, extremely successful. Although they did not succeed in their 
attempts to draft their own constitution for the territory or appoint all of their own administrators, 
they secured French political and legal rights and effectively managed to marginalize the 
indigenous population. They owed their success in part to the fact that the interim government 
both needed the colonists’ support and was highly distracted by the events unfolding in the 
metropole. But their ability to demand reforms also stemmed from the way that they mobilized 
republican anti-imperial discourse in support of their demands. They tried to show that Algeria 
                                               
government… is planning to secretly restore the military regime by designating an admiral.” See “18 April 1871,” n. 
138. F80/1682. Fonds Ministériales, ANOM. 
77 Meyer, Tarrade, Rey-Goldzeigueur, Thobie, Histoire de la France Coloniale, 547. 
78 Even Constantine’s municipal council, which had rejected Vuillermoz’s election, formally protested the decision: 
“The municipal council of Constantine energetically protests against the appointment… that will restore the military 
regime, and it asks that this decision be immediately repealed.” See L’Indépendant (3 April 1871), 1. 
79 Meyer, Tarrade, Rey-Goldzeigueur, Thobie, Histoire de la France Coloniale, 547. 
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would only be truly “republican” when it adopted a civil administration by highlighting the 
connections between the military and the Second Empire. This strategy had its limitations, 
however, which became evident as divisions between “moderate” and “radical” republicans in 
the metropole intensified in early 1871 - especially when some of the colonists expressed 
sympathy for the Communards. The conservative metropolitan government that came to power 
in 1871 became suspicious of settlers’ calls for radical reform, and settled on a hybrid system 
that met most of their demands but kept elements of the imperial system in place.  
These debates over Algeria’s future also had an important effect on the position of the 
indigenous population in the territory on both legal and discursive levels. Although no French 
administration ever treated them equally, the new “civil” organization discriminated against them 
more openly. Under Napoleon III, neither the European colonists nor the indigenous Algerians 
were able to select their administrators. Under the new regime, however, European settlers and 
Algerian Jews would select the representatives for the entire territory, while the Muslim 
population had no representatives at all. They were thus structurally excluded from republican 
civil Algeria. This exclusion was also evident in settler demands for the territory’s organization 
and the government’s responses, most of which were formulated as though the non-European 
population did not exist.80 As Annie Rey-Goldzeiguer has pointed out, in the wake of the events 
of 1870-71, the settlers succeeded in coopting the very word “Algerian” itself, which in the 
future would be used to refer to Algeria’s European population, and not its indigenous one.81  
                                               
80 In early 1871, before the revolt erupted, Warnier wrote a pamphlet arguing for the confiscation of indigenous land 
and the removal of the army from indigenous affairs. He argued that the indigenous were not central to Algeria’s 
future and that they had accepted French rule – citing the fact that they had not yet revolted, despite France’s recent 
defeat. See A. Warnier, L’Algérie et les victims de la guerre (Alger: Imprimerie Duclaux, 1871), 11, 57. 
81 Rey-Goldzeiguer, Le Royaume Arabe, 688. 
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This marginalization of the indigenous population heightened in the wake of the 
indigenous revolt. Despite the fact that there was no overarching agreement about the causes of 
the insurrection, there was nevertheless a widespread consensus in both Algeria and France about 
what it revealed about Algeria’s indigenous population. Le Petit Journal, in a series of articles 
purportedly based on interviews that one of its journalists conducted with his “Arab friend,” 
claimed there were two factors behind the Arabs’ decision to revolt. First, the Arabs’ religion 
“commanded them to kill Christians.” The fear of French force had long kept the indigenous 
population from acting on this commandment – but when they saw Germany easily defeat 
France, they lost their fear of French military prowess. As a result of this second factor (French 
military weakness), the Arabs decided to rise up against French rule and kill as many Christians 
as they could.82 Le XIXième Siècle offered a slightly more sophisticated of the same argument. 
Though it did not claim that most Arabs spent their waking hours dreaming of killing Christians, 
it averred that marabouts had deliberately spread religious “fanaticism” throughout the 
population and then pushed them to revolt.83 This insistence on the indigenous population’s 
religious fanaticism ran through a number of newspapers and pamphlets, both reflecting and 
reinforcing an enduring suspicion of the political influence of Islam.84  
                                               
82 The journalist went on to argue that if the military had immediately responded to the revolt by violently trying to 
suppress it, the indigenous population would have quickly surrendered. But when the French administration tried to 
decide how best to respond, the Algerians read their hesitation as a confirmation of their weakness. As a result, the 
insurrection spiraled out of control. Saladin, “Lettres algériennes,” Le Petit Journal (17 April 1871), 4; Saladin, 
“Algérie: Le drame de Palestro,” Le Petit Journal (7 May 1871), 4. 
83 “Insurrection de Palestro,” XIX Siècle (3 January 1873), 3-4. 
84 Writers on opposite sides of the political spectrum embraced it as one of the key reasons behind the revolt, from 
the writer of L’Algérie devant l’Assemblée nationale, who sought to defend the military administration in Algeria, to 
Paul Fawtier, a supporter of the Commune who defended the civil regime. See L’Algérie devant l’Assemblée 
nationale: causes des insurrections algériennes (Versailles: Muzard, 1871), 6; Paul Fawtier, L’autonomie 
algérienne et la république fédérale (Constantine and Paris: Challamel, 1871), v. One author even went so far as to 
argue that France’s position in Algeria was untenable because of the religious fanaticism of its indigenous 
population. See A. Ducrot, La Vérité sur l’Algérie (Paris: E. Dentu, 1871), 14 
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This growing French consensus on the destructive tendencies of the Arabs’ religious 
beliefs also helped create an agreement in both Algeria and the metropole about how to deal with 
the defeated indigenous tribes. Though they argued about specific measures that the government 
should take, most writers concurred that the government needed to harshly punish those who had 
risen up against the French. The Journal des débats, for example, published a letter from a 
colonist from Djidjeli that sought to garner metropolitan support for a “terrible repression.” The 
journal itself noted that it published this article because it agreed with the colonist that the 
government needed to act with “a bit more vigor.”85 The same letter appeared two days later in 
Le Temps. After the letter, the Temps writer noted, “The type of government to use in the colony 
can be discussed, but there must be only one voice on the imperious necessity to cut short… 
these rebellions.”86 Le Pays argued that France would only be safe if France “made the Arabs 
feel that it was a superior force” and “inspired real terror” among them.87 Le Salut publique went 
a step farther, arguing that the revolts showed that the indigenous population would never 
assimilate into French society. It claimed, “The events that continue to unfold in Algeria have a 
considerable importance for the future of the indigenous race and for European colonization. 
Until now, many serious thinkers had believed in the progressive assimilation of Arabs and 
Kabyles… Alas! The awakening has been cruel and terrible.” The writer went on to insist that 
Algeria’s future would only be secure when Europeans had “complete possession of the soil.”88 
In the months following the indigenous revolt, a consensus thus emerged around the idea 
that the indigenous population was treacherous. Napoleon III had sought to center France’s 
                                               
85 Le Journal des Débats (2 August 1871), F80/1862. Fonds Ministériales, ANOM 
86 Le Temps (4 August 1871), F80/1862. Fonds Ministériales, ANOM. 
87 Le Pays (5 August 1871), F80/1862. Fonds Ministériales, ANOM. 
88 “Algérie,” Le Salut publique (13 May 1871), excerpt in F80/1862. Fonds Ministériales, ANOM. 
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relationship with Algeria on an imperial relationship with a coherent “Arab” nation. The 
indigenous revolt convinced many commentators on both sides of the spectrum that Algeria’s 
future could never lie in the hands of the indigenous population. Even though a few 
commentators invoked the untrustworthiness of the native Algerians as proof that Algeria could 
never be colonized, most came to support the settlers’ contention that Algeria’s future lay in a 
widespread expansion of European colonization.89 The National Assembly’s 1871 decision to 
punish the tribes by expropriating the land of those who had risen up against French rule 
reflected this new agreement.90 The “Arabophile” project to defend the economic and political 
interests of indigenous peoples – as personified by Ismaël Urbain – had been losing ground since 
the mid-1860s. The 1871 revolt consolidated the colonist position that Europeans, and not Arabs 
or even Kabyles, would be central to Algeria’s future prosperity, and that the government should 
set aside more territory to encourage increased colonization. This conviction – even more than 
the political wrangling between the settlers and the metropolitan government - finally put an end 
to Napoleon III’s long-contested vision of Algeria as a royaume arabe. With widespread 
agreement that the indigenous population would never be central to Algeria’s future, it became 
impossible to defend the idea that Algeria was an Arab nation. 
The widespread belief that Napoleon III’s imperial “politics of nationalities” was partly 
responsible for all of France’s contemporary problems further consolidated the condemnation of 
the idea of an “Arab nation.” In the wake of French defeat, both republican and monarchist 
                                               
89 Military officer A. Ducrot tried to demonstrate that no foreign government had ever subdued the indigenous 
populations of Algeria. Instead, everyone from the Romans to the Turks had struggled to maintain control of the 
territory. While he acknowledged that it might be in France’s best interest to continue to occupy Algeria, trying to 
colonize it was impossible. E. Ducros attacked this argument with yet another pamphlet. He claimed that a civil 
government would be able to win over the indigenous population and argued that the French government could 
easily keep the peace in Algeria. See A. Ducrot, La vérité sur l’Algérie (Paris: E. Dentu, 1871); Ducos, L’Algérie: 
quelques mots de réponse à la brochure ‘La vérité sur l’Algérie’ par le general Ducrot (Paris: Dunod, 1871). 
90 Perville, La France en Algérie, 70. 
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writers had claimed that Napoleon III’s attempt to divide Europe into independent nation-states 
had led to the unification of Germany and the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine.91 A number of 
commentators maintained that this policy was also responsible for provoking the indigenous 
revolt.92 E. Beauvais, for example, argued that Napoleon III’s “misapplication of the principle of 
nationality” was at the root of French problems in Europe and Algeria alike.93 Charles Strauss 
similarly asserted that the “catastrophic politics of nationality” had caused France to almost lose 
Algeria, just as it had lost Alsace-Lorraine.94 By directly linking the Algerian revolt to France’s 
loss in the Franco-Prussian War, these writers insisted that creating policy based on the idea of 
an Arab nation would only continue to lead France towards disaster. 
The indigenous revolt put an end to the open political wrangling over Algeria’s 
organization, reflected a new political consensus about the importance of colonization, and 
marked an end to the royaume arabe, but it also provoked a more theoretical conversation about 
Algeria’s future, its relationship to France, and its implications for the new republic. Although 
settlers and metropolitan politicians, journalists, and intellectuals all concurred that Napoleon 
III’s vision for Algeria’s purpose and relationship to France was flawed, they disagreed about 
what should replace his kind of imperial system. What would a new “republican” Algeria look 
                                               
91 See, for example, C. Cambier, République, empire ou royauté (Paris: Victor Palmé, 1871), 19, 20; Louis Herbette, 
Bonapartisme et bonapartistes (Paris: André Sagnier, 1875), 54; Le Parti Bonapartiste et ses hommes par un 
conservateur (Paris: Librairie André Sagnier, 1875), 17; Les doctrines et les faits de l’Empire proposes à la 
mediation des catholiques bonapartistes (Agen: Imprimerie Demeaux, 1876), 11; Le dernier Empire (Paris: E. 
Dentu, 1875), 32; Napoléon III et la politique contemporaine (Paris: P. Jammet, 1872), 149;  
92 Even in the mid-1870s, commentators continued to draw this connection. In an article on the Algerian justice 
system, Charles Roussel argued, “The Empire inaugurated a policy of utopias and contradictions in Algeria, for 
which the Napoleonic ideology was primarily responsible. The principle of nationalities rose up in the imagination 
of the head of state, and the royaume arabe became the formula for Algeria.” See Charles Roussel, “La Justice en 
Algérie: Les tribunaux indigènes,” La Révue des deux mondes (1 August 1876), 689. 
93 E. Beauvais, En colonne dans la Grande Kabylie: Souvenirs de l’insurrection de 1871 (Paris: Challamel, 1872), 
323. 
94 Charles Strauss was a French lawyer and administrator who spent much of his career in Algeria. See Charles 
Strauss, L’Assimilation et la reconstitution du Ministère de l’Algérie (Paris: Chez tous les librairies, 1874), 6. 
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like? The process of determining the new model was contentious, and informed by debates over 
the relative benefits of a civil or military administration. These specific debates about 
administrative policies were couched in broader, powerful discourses about the memory of the 
Second Empire, the Paris Commune, Algerian radical republicanism, and the indigenous revolt. 
Although the conversation began in Algeria, by late 1871 it extended into the metropole as well. 
Moreover, it would also grow to include not only republicans but also the diverse conservative 
factions who dominated French politics in the elections of 1871. Indeed, it was only through 
dialogue and conflict with other political groups that a more coherent vision of French Algeria 
and its relationship to the new republic would emerge. This vision would ultimately play an 
important role in shaping French understandings not only of Algeria, but also of empire, 
republicanism, and nation in the early years of the Third Republic. 
 
III. Theorizing Algeria’s Relationship to the Republic 
In the wake of the tumultuous events of 1870-71, a more widespread discussion about 
Algeria and its future began to unfold. To some degree, this discussion echoed the debates that 
had transpired in Algeria immediately after the collapse of the Second Empire. But even as 
commentators continued to argue about the relative merits of different forms of administration, 
the role of the army, and the usefulness of military territory, they also engaged in a more abstract 
conversation about Algeria’s future and its relationship to France. This conversation was 
informed by debates within France about the country’s political organization, which, as we have 
seen, focused on the relative merits of republicanism and Bonapartist imperialism. After all, 
although the moderate republican Government of National Defense had presided over Algeria’s 
reorganization in 1870, conservative politicians – many of whom actively opposed the republic - 
dominated the elected government that came to power in 1871. These conservative politicians 
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did not always agree with the Government of National Defense’s policies towards Algeria and at 
times sought to redefine the territory on their own terms.95 The ongoing arguments between 
different political actors transformed the popular and political discourse around the territory, 
giving rise to a republican vision of Algeria that largely eschewed the notion of “empire.” 
This conversation began in 1871 as a debate about the merits of Algeria’s new 
administration, the nature of its new status, and the structure of its relationship to France. This 
debate was informed by the memory of the recent political conflicts in Algeria and the 
widespread indigenous revolt. If most commentators agreed that the revolt demonstrated that the 
indigenous population was untrustworthy, they disagreed about which French policies had 
instigated its outbreak. Some maintained that the Empire and Algeria’s military administration 
were primarily responsible, whereas others claimed that it was the new republic and its civil 
administration that had created the instability that made insurrection possible. These contrasting 
positions emerged at least in part from conflicting beliefs about the legacy of the Second Empire 
and the political conflicts that had transpired in Algeria following its collapse, and they served as 
a referendum on both the Empire’s and Republic’s respective relationships with Algeria. They 
also presented an opportunity for republicans to differentiate the new regime in Algeria from its 
previous administration, demonstrate that the continued republican presence there represented a 
new era, and lay out a vision for a new “republican” Algeria. 
The conversation in Algeria itself about the territory’s problems did not focus directly on 
the relative merits of the Empire or Republic. Instead, most commentators argued that the 
                                               
95 This conservative National Assembly criticized many of the policies undertaken by the Government of National 
Defense in Algeria. In 1873-1874, they launched an inquiry of the republican government’s policies in Algeria, 
focusing on the “communard” activity in Algeria’s cities and the military’s handling of the insurrection. See Annales 
de l’Assemblée nationale: Comte-rendu in extensor des séances, Annexes. Enquête sur les actes du gouvernement de 
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military administration was responsible for the recent conflict in the territory and blamed 
military officers for the recent revolt’s outbreak and spread. L’Akhbar, for example, claimed that 
because military operated as a corrupt system, it had had a “damaging” effect on both the 
indigenous and colonist population. By first mismanaging native Algerians and then limiting 
European colonization, it implied, the military regime had set the stage for a revolt and then 
weakened the state’s ability to suppress it.96 Other authors went a step farther, and implied that 
the military had deliberately provoked the conflict. As L’Alger française argued, if the military 
had acted immediately, the insurrection would have been “easy to put down the revolts with a 
single blow” but “the military authority neglected to put its foot down on the first sparks, and 
now everything is on fire.”97 The author went on to imply that this negligence was deliberate 
because the military was trying to use the revolt in order to prove that it was critical to France’s 
authority in the territory.98 Settlers in Algeria thus sought to use the conflicts in Algeria to show 
that the bureaux arabes and military governance were corrupt, self-serving, and ineffective 
institutions that would be detrimental to Algeria’s future, even if the government in France was 
becoming “republican.” At the same time, they promised that a civilian government that 
promoted colonization would bring stability to the territory under a new republic.  
These arguments about the military’s role in recent Algerian conflicts extended into the 
metropolitan press, and especially to republican newspapers – at least in part because Algerian 
colonists wrote in to them to express their opinions about the unfolding events. Charles Jourdan, 
                                               
96 “Alger,” L’Akhbar (30 September 1871), excerpt in F80/1862. Fonds Ministériales, ANOM. 
97 L’Alger française (11 May 1871), excerpt in F80/1862. Fonds Ministériales, ANOM. 
98 He argued, “Now, certainly, something other than militias are necessary for protecting colonized territory, but 
they would have sufficed before Mokrani, the intimate friend of General Augerau… raised the standard of revolt. At 
the beginning of the uprising, it would not have been impossible to stop it short with the forces that remained in 
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immediately against the roots of the agitation…” See ibid. 
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an influential settler journalist, wrote a series of letters to Le Siècle attacking the military and its 
attempt to handle the revolts.99 In these letters, he suggested – even more openly than the Alger 
française had - that the military had purposely “allowed the insurrection to grow” in order to 
prove that its officers were still necessary to protect French rule in Algeria. By highlighting 
Muqrani’s longstanding ties to several of the bureau’s important officers, moreover, he even 
implied that the bureaux arabes might have started the revolt in the first place. He went so far as 
to demand an official inquiry into the military’s behavior during the revolt, and warned that the 
government would prosecute any officers who had committed “crimes” against the state.100 He 
concluded his condemnation of the military’s ineffectiveness by expressing the hope that the 
metropolitan government would limit the military’s influence in the territory.101 This claim that 
officers of the bureaux arabes had at least sanctioned and even possibly sparked the revolts 
occurred in a number of metropolitan publications produced by settlers.102 
If the metropolitan press’ coverage of the insurrection at times reflected the reporting in 
Algeria, it was often much more politicized: metropolitan writers went out of their way to tie the 
recent conflicts to the metropolitan government. Many republican writers linked the revolts 
directly to Napoleon III’s policies in Algeria and specifically to his attempt to reorganize the 
territory into a royaume arabe. La Gazette de France thus maintained that the revolt was the 
result of the “faults of the Empire” and the “arabophile” policies that Napoleon III had 
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supported.103 Auguste Pomel insisted that Napoleon III’s desire to create a royaume arabe led 
him and his officers to “reinforce the feudal organization of the tribe,” which degraded the 
Arabs’ character and pushed them to revolt.104 A. Lenthéric, on the other hand, tied the problems 
in Algeria to other disasters that he laid at the feet of the Empire: namely, the Franco-Prussian 
War and the Commune. He opined, “It is clear today that the politics followed by the Empire 
will spare us no failures. In Algeria the royaume arabe, Napoleon III’s foolish utopia, has 
brought its fruits: the insurrection of all the tribes in the province of Alger and Constantine.”105 
Both writers, in other words, sought to show that the revolts in Algeria were part of a broader 
pattern of the Second Empire’s failings: its policies had led both to French defeat in Europe and 
indigenous revolt in North Africa. In order to redeem itself – in metropole and overseas territory 
alike – the French would need to adapt a radically new political system.  
Even explanations of the revolt that adopted a more moderate tone often had a political 
agenda. Félix Robiou de la Trehonnais, an agronomist who had spent several years in Algeria, 
maintained that many colonist attacks on the bureaux arabes, the military administration, and 
Napoleon III were “calumnies.”106 At the same time, however, he argued that both Napoleon III 
and his military officers had been “seduced” by the “undeniable courage of the Arabs… their 
savage bohemian customs… and all the poetry in their patriarchal and free life.”107 He even 
claimed that Napoleon III and his military officials shared many commonalities with the Arabs 
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since both belonged to a political system based on the principles of “absolute sovereignty.” As a 
result of the Empire’s desire to preserve this “splendid mirage of the desert,” he insisted, the 
Emperor and his officers had treated the Arabs too leniently, and had wrongly opposed the 
expansion of European settlements.108 These two policies led to an uncontrollable indigenous 
population that revolted when its Bonapartist-protected privileges were challenged.109 
Trehonnais thus argued against the often-repeated contention that Napoleon III and the bureaux 
arabes had been conspiring against Algeria to serve their own interests, but his characterization 
of the Napoleonic bureaus’ motivations was, if anything, just as damning. After all, he implied 
that the French imperial government and Arab tribes in the Algerian desert lived by the same 
patriarchal codes and had much in common. In the context of a well-developed colonial 
discourse that often invoked those desert tribes as the epitome of barbarian practices and feudal 
values, such a comparison was highly unflattering to the Second Empire and its administration. 
Moreover, like other authors, Trehonnais concluded by noting that the problems with the Second 
Empire’s administration demonstrated that Algeria’s future lay in a republican civilian 
administration and expanded colonization.110 
 
Republican Visions of Algeria: Assimilation 
If republicans tended to paint the Second Empire as responsible for Algeria’s problems 
while implying that the new republic would restore the territory, they did not necessarily agree 
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on how the republic would solve these problems or on the relationship it would have with 
Algeria. Many concurred that the republic would redeem the faults of the past by granting the 
colonists the “political liberty” that was intrinsic to republican government.111 But they had sharp 
disagreements about what this “political liberty” would look like and the specific relationship 
with France it would entail. Although many republicans argued that Algeria should be entirely 
assimilated into the French nation, others proposed that France should restructure its relationship 
with Algeria and its other overseas territories on the principle of political autonomy.  
The argument that Algeria should assimilate into the French nation had a long history, 
dating back at least to the Second Republic.112 During the last years of the Second Empire, 
settlers had used the idea to criticize the military administration and demand that the state grant 
Algeria’s European population the same civil rights and governmental institutions as those 
guaranteed to French citizens within France itself. The settlers were usually less clear about the 
position that the indigenous population would occupy in this new “assimilated” state, especially 
in 1870-71, when they mostly formulated their demands as though native Algerians did not exist. 
The conversation about “assimilation” expanded in the early 1870s as both metropolitan and 
colonist writers disagreed about what such a program would mean for Algeria and France.  
Some of these disagreements centered on the timeline for Algeria’s integration. René de 
Semallé, for example, contended that Algeria should immediately merge with France. He argued 
that there should “no longer be a country officially called Algeria, only overseas departments, 
                                               
111 Lenthéric, “La Guerre en Algérie,” Gazette de France (1 August 1871). 
112 The French theory of “assimilation” itself had an even longer history, dating back at least to the French 
revolution. Scholars have shown that the theory of “assimilation” emerged out of the universalist ideals of French 
revolutionary republicanism, which held that “human nature… was a universal impervious to cultural and historical 
difference,” and as a result, all men should have a set of equally universal rights. See Osama Abi-Mershed, Apostles 
of Modernity: Saint-Simonians and the Civilizing Mission in Algeria (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2010), 9. 
  216 
each independent of the others… Algeria should only be a topographical name…”113 He insisted 
that the European settlers should become French citizens with full voting rights and that 
metropolitan ministries and laws should govern them.114 As a result, he claimed that Algeria’s 
administrative and legal system needed to be transformed to match the metropole’s.115 Louis 
Rinn, on the other hand, asserted that immediate “pure and simple assimilation” would not be 
possible in Algeria.116 He argued that the republican government should instead slowly work to 
“suppress the laws of exceptions… and, insofar as it is possible, the positions that do not exist in 
the metropole… and arrive at rules marked by unity, simplicity, and fixity.”117 He nevertheless 
believed that eventually, Algeria would integrate into the metropole and warned that it “must not 
be isolated and separated from France by governmental institutions… that continue to make 
Algeria a colony… because she has the right to be considered an integral part of French 
territory.”118 He promised that by suppressing the distinction between civil and military territory 
and applying French law whenever possible, Algeria would slowly become “overseas France.”119 
Although these writers concurred that Algeria was not a colony and should instead become “part 
of France,” their interpretations of the time that incorporation would require diverged.  
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Advocates of assimilation also disagreed about its implications for the indigenous 
population. They had very different ideas about the degree to which Algeria’s indigenous 
population would “assimilate” and about the form that their assimilation would take. Some 
authors indicated that some indigenous populations would continue to exist in a separate sphere. 
René de Semallé, for example, proposed that a “Commission of Arab and Kabyle Affairs” – 
which could function similarly to the US Commission of Indian Affairs - should oversee the 
indigenous population in the south.120 He insisted that in the rest of Algeria, however, the French 
government should force assimilation by dividing tribal property between individuals and 
banning polygamy. At the same time, however, he implied that these peoples’ “assimilation” 
would be partial because they would have none of the rights of French citizens.121 Auguste 
Pomel, on the other hand, divided the indigenous population by ethnic group instead of by 
location. He argued that the Arabs could not assimilate into French society and that the 
government should therefore relocate them to the Sahara.122 The Kabyles, on the other hand, 
shared French political values, so it would be easy to incorporate them.123 Although Pomel did 
not claim that the Kabyles would become French citizens, he argued that the government would 
eventually be able to “reconcile” their laws and customs with those of France.124 
Pomel and Semallé both argued that some indigenous groups would integrate into French 
society more rapidly than others, but other authors insisted on a more radical assimilation that 
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would incorporate everyone. Henri de Senhaux, for example, agreed with Semallé’s contention 
that the government should force assimilation by eliminating tribal property, but he contended 
that the policy should apply to all of Algeria.125 He also argued that the state should eliminate all 
indigenous officials and rule the indigenous population directly through European justices of 
peace. These justices would enforce French law in all parts of Algeria.126 The indigenous 
population would thus legally assimilate into the state – although, like Sémallé, Senhaux insisted 
that they would not have the rights of French citizens. An “officer of the militia” proposed a 
more systematic plan. Like the other writers, he insisted that assimilation would have to begin 
with the institution of individual property.127 But he also argued that the state should transform 
Arab tribes into cantons and communes and use European administrators to oversee them. These 
communes would have the same type of administration and justice system as their European 
counterparts.128 The Arabs would be able to continue to practice most of their customs, although 
the officer insisted, that the state should force them to give up polygamy.129 All of these authors 
thus proposed measures that would force indigenous peoples to adopt French legal, economic, 
and cultural norms – even as they denied them political rights. 
Some authors were more concerned about the legal rights of the newly assimilated Arab 
population. Louis Rinn, for example, agreed that the indigenous population needed to adopt 
French customs. However, he claimed that the best way to convince them to do this was to 
                                               
125 It is also worth noting that he also thought that the government should take away much of this property and give 
it to settlers. See Henri de Senhaux, La France et l’Algérie (Paris: Challamel Ainé, 1871), 53. 
126 He indicated that they would make some exceptions for Muslim beliefs. See ibid., 88. 
127 Like Senhaux, he also thought that most tribal land should be given away to European settlers. See À Monsieur le 
Vice-Amiral de Gueydon: La pacification de l’Algérie (Constantine: Louis Marle, 1871), 15. 
128 À Monsieur le Vice-Amiral de Gueydon: La pacification de l’Algérie (Constantine: Louis Marle, 1871), 10.  
129 Ibid., 12. 
  219 
“multiply the means of contact between colonists and natives” by granting land to colonists in 
indigenous territory. He argued that these colonists would slowly influence the surrounding 
tribes and bring them closer to French traditions.130 At the same time, however, he asserted that 
true assimilation would require that the indigenous population participate in Algeria’s politics 
and administration. Like other authors, he did not believe that they should gain French 
citizenship or electoral rights equivalent to those of Europeans; he contended that it would be 
“impossible” for the indigenous population to be represented at the National Assembly.131 
Instead, he argued, the population should be “consulted” on matters that concerned them directly. 
He claimed, “if we really want to penetrate Algeria with our democratic institutions, we must… 
call on the natives to give us their views, in all that concerns purely Algerian questions….”132 He 
suggested that some Arabs should be admitted to Algeria’s consultative council and encouraged 
to participate in some basic decision-making processes, though they would still lack the right to 
vote in French elections or participate in other political institutions. 
It is clear that advocates of assimilation had very conflicting ideas about the degree to 
which the indigenous population would be included in the process. Louis Rinn was unusual in 
advocating for an “assimilation” that would include indigenous peoples and that would, in 
limited ways, accommodate their voices. Most agreed that assimilation should not entail 
citizenship or any political rights for native Algerians. Because indigenous groups made up the 
bulk of Algeria’s population, this political exclusion represented a tension in the thought of pro-
assimilation advocates who sought to make Algeria into an “extension” of the French nation. 
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Despite these tensions, treating Algeria as an extension of France had a number of 
ideological benefits: most notably, it served as a way to distinguish between the republic’s 
relationship with its overseas territories and the empire’s. If in the immediate aftermath of the 
war, republicans of all stripes had effectively discredited the term “empire,” describing Algeria 
as a part of France became a way to avoid the implications of maintaining an overseas empire 
while repudiating metropolitan empire at home. If Algeria was a part of republican France and 
not a component of a multinational Mediterranean Empire, republicans could more effectively 
distance themselves from both Napoleon III’s metropolitan and overseas empires without having 
to explain the apparent contradiction of a republic that was also still an empire. 
 
Republican Visions of Algeria: Autonomy 
In contrast to the many writers who argued that the new Third Republic should assimilate 
Algeria into the French nation, some authors insisted that France should reconstitute Algeria as a 
semi-autonomous French colony. Those who made the case for Algeria’s autonomy did so for 
different reasons. One group claimed that Algeria could never assimilate into France because its 
indigenous population would only slowly – if ever - adapt to French rule. Roubiou de la 
Trehonnais, for example, insisted that the native Algerians were too uncivilized and unruly to be 
controlled by French law.133 Giving the indigenous peoples the liberal institutions and immunity 
against arbitrary power that came with civil institutions would only encourage them to revolt.134 
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The army, stripped of its political authority, would have to continue to govern them, until the 
French broke down their customs – especially their joint property ownership and family 
structure.135 As a result, he concluded that Algeria’s administration needed to be independent 
from France’s so that it could govern its settlers as French citizens while subjecting the 
indigenous population to a different regime. A. Villacrose similarly condemned recent attempts 
to subject the Arabs to French law. He warned the government that many of the measures it had 
taken to assimilate Algeria were premature and would lead only to instability.136 Even the first 
steps towards Algeria’s assimilation would be many years away - after the native Algerians died 
or left  the territory.137 Even though most pro-assimilation authors also indicated that the 
indigenous population would not fully assimilate, they did not argue that this population would 
prevent the territory’s assimilation in the same way that Trehonnais and Villacrose did. 
Other writers defended the idea of an autonomous Algeria in abstract political terms. J. 
G. Bézy, a former military officer who had long opposed Napoleon III’s policies in Algeria, 
argued, much like Trehonnais and Villacrose, that the indigenous population posed an obstacle to 
Algeria’s assimilation. He noted that the republican principles of liberty and universal suffrage 
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that worked well in France did not function in Algeria because the indigenous population was in 
“great majority.” If France granted the native Algerians voting rights, France would be “drowned 
in a fanatical and oblivious mass of voters who are hostile to our progress and even our presence 
in Algeria.”138 Excluding them, on the other hand, would create a country “of 30 thousand voters 
in a state of three million inhabitants.”139 Algeria thus required a hybrid administrative system in 
order to account for the needs of both its indigenous and European inhabitants. Unlike 
Trehonnais and Villacrose, Bézy did not treat Algerian assimilation as even an attractive if 
impossible goal. Instead, he maintained, France should transform Algeria into a semi-
autonomous state that had the liberty to determine its own affairs while maintaining a “national 
link” to the French Republic. Notably, Bézy did not advocate for this semi-autonomous status to 
be applied to Algeria alone. In fact, he argued, France itself should become a “federated 
republic” made up of decentralized states loosely linked to one another, thus suggesting a 
political model that few French republicans in France or abroad would ever accept.140 
Paul Fawtier, a republican who expressed sympathy for the Parisian Communards, 
similarly claimed that Algeria should not assimilate into France because such a move would lead 
to “excessive centralization, the instrument of all despotisms.”141 He noted that the settlers had 
called for assimilation under the Empire in order to stave off the “monstrous idea of the Royaume 
arabe” but claimed that the idea was now “inapplicable” to Algeria because its population was 
too different from that of France. He did not believe that this intractable difference resulted from 
the indigenous population (as Trehonnais, Villacrose, or Bézy had argued); on the contrary, he 
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maintained that “the only assimilation that is possible is that of  [turning] the indigenous race 
into the conquering one.”142 Instead, the issue stemmed from the fact that Algeria’s settler 
population consisted of immigrants from all over Europe. These immigrants could not become 
French: instead, they needed to come together to create a distinctive Algerian nation.143 This 
nation would relate to France through a federal system: it would send representatives to Paris and 
contribute to France’s government and defense. At the same time, however, it would have its 
own colonial parliament and constitution that the settlers alone would determine instead of the 
metropolitan government. Like Bézy, Fawtier’s embrace of a federal system extended beyond 
Algeria itself: he argued that France should also be divided into semi-autonomous provinces and 
communes that would make many decisions independently from the federal government.144  
Other publications echoed Fawtier’s insistence that Algeria could not assimilate because 
the needs of its settlers differed from those of metropolitan French citizens. 145 T. E. A. Juillet 
Saint-Lager, for example, insisted that granting settlers the right to elect representatives to the 
French National Assembly would not solve Algeria’s problems, because the territory’s 
representatives would only constitute a small minority of the Assembly’s deputies. French 
politicians who knew nothing about the territory would therefore have the greatest influence over 
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Algeria’s administration and future.146 Instead of subjecting the territory to the whims of 
metropolitan politicians, he argued, Algeria should relate to France as a semi-autonomous state 
in a wider federal system. Its European settlers should follow the same civil laws and exercise 
the same civil rights as their metropolitan counterparts.147 But the settlers should also have the 
right to appoint representatives who would write Algeria’s constitution and determine its future. 
By granting the territory its own “colonial assembly,” Juillet Saint-Lager maintained, France 
would ensure that Algeria’s government would be able to create policies and laws designed 
specifically to solve local problems. Like the other federalists, however, Saint-Lager did not 
envision a semi-autonomous system in which the indigenous people would have equal rights.148 
Bézy, Fawtier, and Juillet Saint-Lager did not only proffer suggestions for remodeling 
Algeria’s administration. They also suggested theoretical frameworks for understanding the 
nature of Algeria, its relationship to France, and the French nation itself. For Bézy, this 
framework shared some commonalities with the assimilationists’. Like the assimilationists, Bézy 
treated Algeria as part of France, but he proposed a vision of a decentralized French nation made 
up of territories that were only loosely bound together. Algeria could thus become part of the 
French nation without “integrating” into it. Although Fawtier and Juillet Saint-Lager shared 
Bézy’s view of a decentralized French nation, they went beyond Bezy by arguing that Algeria 
should remain outside of France. Fawtier insisted that Algeria would become its own nation, 
bound to France through a set of republican political allegiances. Juillet Saint-Lager, on the other 
hand, maintained that Algeria should be understood above all as a French “colony” comparable 
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to the British colony of Canada.149 In fact, he specifically advocated for the French government 
to adopt the British model of semi-autonomous settler rule and apply it in Algeria.150 He thus 
invoked a wider international history of colonialism and used it to defend a very particular vision 
of Algeria. This vision had sweeping theoretical implications for Algeria’s future and for its 
relationship to the French nation. By narrating a multinational history of Europe’s overseas 
colonies and inscribing Algeria within it, Saint-Lager detached Algeria from European 
metropolitan empires like Napoleon III’s and implied that the practice of modern colonization 
was distinct from traditional European imperialism. Such arguments were not entirely new.151 
Juillet Saint-Lager had also compared Algeria to British colonies in a number of other pamphlets 
– even ones that did not necessarily advocate for Algerian autonomy.152 None of these calls for 
Algerian autonomy gained much traction in the immediate aftermath of 1870-1871 – perhaps in 
part because many of the advocates for autonomy suscribed to a theory of federalization that 
                                               
149 Napoleon III’s insistence that Algeria was not a colony was based on the belief (drawn from Ismaël Urbain) that 
the term “colony” did not just signify a state’s overseas territory; it referred to a territory that a state intended to 
populate with its own citizens. Because Napoleon III thought that indigenous peoples would remain the primary 
population of Algeria, he thought calling it a “colony” would be misleading. See Levallois, Ismaÿl Urbain, 322. 
150 This model of colonization, he argued, was superior to the French model, which was based on Roman methods of 
military occupation and forced exploitation. He noted that the decision to exile 1848ers to Algeria was similar to the 
Romans’ use of slave labor to build their colonies. This model was inefficient, because it meant that Algeria’s 
colonists did not want to be there. Moreover, the presence of political radicals made Algeria unattractive to other 
prospective colonists. Semi-autonomous settler rule would enable Algeria’s inhabitants to create useful laws that 
would promote enterprise and attract a large European population. See Juillet Saint-Lager, France et Algérie, 4, 12. 
151 In 1866, Jules Duval differentiated between European metropolitan empire and overseas colonial empire. Duval 
had maintained that all absolutist governments – whether monarchies or empires – were unable to understand or 
operate colonies. To thrive, he argued, colonists needed “complete liberty” – a guarantee that absolutist governments 
were unable to provide. Duval thus blamed “colonial Caesarism” for the failures of Napoleon III’s Algerian policies. 
For Algeria to succeed as a colony, Duval argued, France needed a different kind of government altogether – not a 
Bonapartist empire, but a republican regime that would allow for greater freedom of initiative. His critique thus 
sought to pull apart Napoleon III’s association of “metropolitan empire” with “colonial empire,” implying that they 
were opposed enterprises that required distinct sets of political institutions. See Jules Duval, Reflexions sur la 
Politique de l'Empereur en Algerie (Paris: Challamel Ainé, Commissionnaire pour l'Algérie et l'Étranger, 1866). 
152 Henri de Senhaux, for example, did not argue that Algeria should be structured as a semi-autonomous colony. 
But even as he argued that Algeria should be assimilated into France, he compared France’s colonization efforts in 
Algeria unfavorably to England’s efforts in North America and Australia. See Henri de Senhaux, La France et 
l’Algérie (Paris: Challamel Ainé, 1871), 64. See also A. Aubanel and J. Maistre, Notes sur l’Algérie, 2nd ed. (Nimes: 
Imprimerie Clavel-Ballivet, 1878), 9. 
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became discredited after the Paris Commune.153 But they represented an early effort to define 
and legitimize France’s relationship to overseas territory by invoking a language that did not 
depend on older French or European imperial formations.  
 
Conservative and Bonapartist Critiques 
Not all writers held the military, the bureaux arabes, or Napoleon III responsible for 
Algeria’s problems and the recent widespread revolt. Nor did they all agree on the ability of the 
republican state to remake Algeria and secure its future. Some instead argued that Algeria’s 
current problems resulted from the failings of the new republican administration that had come to 
power in the wake of September 4. These writers were usually more sympathetic to the military 
regime, and interested in defending aspects of Napoleon III’s policies towards Algeria. They 
sought to show that it was the republicans, rather than the military or the Bonapartists, who were 
responsible for Algeria’s problems – an argument that had much in common with the Bonapartist 
argument against the Republic within metropolitan France.154 A number of these writers pointed 
specifically to the administration’s decision to pass the Crémieux decree that granted Algerian 
Jews French citizenship.155 Louis Serre, for example, argued, “without the naturalization of the 
Jews… the revolt would have never happened.”156 He noted that the Arabs “hated” the Jews 
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154 Some Bonapartists in France invoked Napoleon III’s actions in Algeria and his treatment of the indigenous 
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155 François Leblanc de Prébois, for example, insisted that Arab anger over Jewish naturalization had pushed them to 
revolt against an administration they saw as unjust. He thus used the Crémieux decree as evidence that it was the 
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Leblanc de Prébois, Serre was a former military officer. See Louis Serre, Arabes martyrs. Étude sur l’insurrection 
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because they were “soft, cowardly, and effeminate” and as a result, they were “humiliated” when 
the Jews were elevated to a position above them.157 Serre concluded by arguing that the decree 
had been a disastrous mistake on the part of the Algerian administration, and cast doubt on the 
ability of the republican administration’s ability to draft responsible legislation for Algeria.158  
Some authors implied that the revolt stemmed from issues that went beyond a single 
republican decree to include a broader set of problems that characterized the new republican 
regime. Many pointed to the republic’s decision to establish a civil administration. Le Temps, for 
example, contended that the insurrection was “uniquely the result of discontent and irritation 
caused by the introduction of the civil regime.”159 François Leblanc de Prébois agreed, but took 
the argument a step farther: he maintained that the civil regime caused the insurrection and was 
also responsible for its size and duration. The civilian government’s inability to control native 
Algerians, he asserted, proved that it was “weak” and “inane.”160 He argued that the prospect of 
eliminating the military administration in a territory almost entirely composed of indigenous 
peoples was “an illusion;” instead of eliminating the bureaux arabes, the French should expand 
their authority over “civil” and “military” territories alike because the military was the only force 
in the territory that could ensure security.161 He thus turned the settlers’ attempts to blame the 
military for the revolt on their head, claiming that the revolt stemmed not from the legacy of the 
military regime but from the colonists’ and republic’s desire to eliminate it.162 
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Several other authors echoed Prébois’ claim that the revolts proved that a “civil 
government” would never be able to rule Algeria, but they offered different reasons for its 
failures. In Le Gaulois, C. de Salvière argued that the civil government’s real weakness reflected 
the fact that it was beholden to the settlers’ interests. As a result, it was unable to mediate 
between the colonists and native Algerians: it would simply subsume the needs of the indigenous 
people to those of the colonists. He claimed that the settlers were well aware of the radical 
imbalance of power that a civil government would bring, and maintained that it was, in fact, the 
reason that they pursued civil government so avidly. He noted that the colonists “had all the 
impatience of a new people” and wanted to secure their fortunes. They hated the military regime 
because it “interrupted their taste for domination” and saw the civil regime as “more apt… to 
enrich them.” Salvière thus implied that the colonist population’s attempt to defend the civil 
regime by invoking republican ideals stemmed primarily from a desire to secure their own 
interests.163 They had succeeded in duping their metropolitan republican allies, he argued, but the 
indigenous Algerian population was aware of their motives. The Kabyles thus rose up against the 
civil government because they saw that it would strip them of all of their privileges.164 He 
concluded by warning that the indigenous population would continue to revolt against a civil 
government that so radically opposed their interests. An anonymous former Algerian officer 
offered a similar argument. He maintained that the indigenous population had revolted against 
the civil regime because it “signified the enslavement of the indigenous population by the 
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republicans’ decision to grant citizenship to Algerian Jews, whom he described as “rodents.” See Ernest Feydeau, 
Souna: Moeurs Arabes (Paris: Ancien Maison Michel Lévy Frères, 1876), 19, 182. 
163 He even implied that the republicanism of this population was basically a sham, noting that their taste for 
republicanism stemmed from day that the imperial government “declared indigenous property incommunicable.” 
See C. de Salvière, “L’Insurrection de l’Algérie,” Le Gaulois (22 August 1871), 2. 
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Europeans.”165 Like Salvière, he thus insisted that a civil government could never rule Algeria 
because it would lead to endless indigenous insurrections. But he also maintained that such an 
administration would have negative consequences for France, both because its oppressive nature 
would violate the country’s Christian morality and because it would prevent Algeria from 
becoming stable and prosperous.166 Both Salvière and the anonymous military officer thus 
sought to counter settler arguments that the civil administration was both inherently more “just” 
than its military counterpart and would necessarily lead to greater prosperity and stability in 
Algeria. Instead, they maintained, the civil regime was an illegitimate form of administration that 
would make it impossible for France to effectively hold onto the territory. 
Many of the authors who condemned the Third Republic’s policy decisions in Algeria 
also implied that republicanism itself was responsible for the territory’s current problems. Some 
went so far as to insist that the settlers’ radical republicanism had played a key role in sparking 
the insurrection. Louis Serre argued that the Algerian “radical press” and “Communard 
movements” frightened and alarmed the indigenous population, and pushed them to revolt 
against French rule.167 Prébois similarly maintained that the radical settlers’ printed attacks 
against the Second Empire and their protests against the military administration alienated the 
Arabs in particular, who saw Napoleon III and the military as their protectors.168 C. de Salvière, 
on the other hand, argued that it was above all the colonists’ behavior that alienated the 
indigenous population. He noted that after the September 4th Revolution, the colonists – 
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“excited” by “passions” - organized into committees of defense “under the pretext of the war 
with Prussia” and pestered the government to remove all of the soldiers from Algeria and replace 
them with citizen militias. As a result, most of the officers who had experience working with the 
indigenous tribes disappeared. The civilian prefects sent in to replace them failed to treat the 
tribes with respect. These insults, combined with the bad news from the war with Germany and 
“seditious” articles printed in the colonist press, drove the indigenous tribes to revolt. Serre, 
Prébois, and Salvière thus all directly linked the settler population’s radical republican activism 
to the indigenous population’s discontent, and implied that it was radical republicanism, rather 
than imperialism, that was the cause of the problems in Algeria. 
Despite the fact that these critics of the new republican government and the civil regime 
were more sympathetic towards the indigenous population in Algeria, most of them nevertheless 
agreed that colonization – under military supervision – would be a key component of ensuring 
Algeria’s future security. Jules Quinemant, a retired military officer and Algerian settler, claimed 
that the Arabs “could not be assimilated,” but that the military could “move them closer to us.”169 
Moreover, he insisted, the Arabs would never be able to make Algeria prosperous, because they 
were incapable of improving or farming their land. In order to ensure Algeria’s future wealth and 
stability, Quinemant argued, the government needed to inspire a large wave of European 
colonization so that the French population would “counterbalance… that of the indigenous.”170 
However, he insisted, the government should not count on immigration to populate Algeria, but 
should instead settle former soldiers in military agricultural colonies. These colonists, he averred, 
would be better able to defend themselves against the predations of the Arabs. At the same time, 
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they would also slowly gain the respect of their indigenous neighbors who only respected 
military force. This vision of colonization thus positioned the spread of the settler population as 
equivalent to the spread of the military’s influence in Algeria. Instead of replacing the military 
government with a civil government in order to placate the colonists, he proposed to displace the 
civil colonist population with a military one.171 Quinemant’s proposal was unique. But a number 
of other critics of the civil regime agreed that while the French state needed to support 
colonization, the nature of the colonist population needed to change. Prébois and Salvière both 
argued that the government should recruit colonists from the rural areas of France who would be 
free from the demagogy of their urban counterparts – and who would also make better 
farmers.172 Like Quinemant, they thus sought to change the nature of the colonist population in 
order to resolve its ongoing conflicts with the military administration. 
These diverse accounts of Algeria’s problems and its potential reflected the political 
concerns of the people who formulated them. Many settlers had an interest in linking the recent 
insurrection to military incompetence because they were still seeking to eliminate the last 
vestiges of the military administration, and they feared that the outbreak of the revolts would 
convince metropolitan administrators to restore the military government.173 At the same time, in 
light of the republicans’ shifting electoral fortunes in 1871, some colonists started to separate 
their own desires to reorganize the colony from the conflicts of metropolitan politics. They began 
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to claim that their demands did not emerge from a particular political ideology, but instead 
stemmed from a desire to transform Algeria into a functioning territory. Some employed the new 
consensus that settler colonization would serve as the basis for Algeria’s future as an argument to 
bolster their contention that the territory’s administration was an apolitical question. As one 
settler journalist contended in the fall of 1871, “Reconstituting the administration of Algeria on 
new bases is not politics, but colonization.”174 This argument linked colonization and civil 
administration in order to convince readers that people of all parties and political convictions 
should support the administrative reorganization of Algeria. Especially in light of the strong links 
between many Algerian colonists and metropolitan radical republicans during the winter of 
1870-71, this type of positioning represented a discursive shift and a new political strategy. 
In metropolitan France, on the other hand, descriptions of the revolt and its implications 
for Algeria remained deeply tied to political debates. Indeed, the historic close ties between the 
settlers and the republicans to some degree ensured that Algeria and its future became entangled 
in wider political arguments about the viability of republicanism, monarchism, and Bonapartism 
in the early years of the Third Republic – even at a moment when some settlers tried to 
depoliticize the question of Algeria’s future. Those who entered into the debate about the relative 
value of the civil and military administration thus usually couched their arguments in a wider set 
of claims about France’s political organization. Republican commentators highlighted the 
connections between the military regime and the Second Empire, arguing that both were 
primarily responsible for contemporary Algeria’s problems. They sought to demonstrate that the 
revolt was the result of the Second Empire’s negative legacy and not connected to the new 
republic. At the same time, they promised that the new republican regime would be able to bring 
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a long-awaited peace and prosperity to the territory – even if they did not agree about what a 
“republican Algeria” would look like. Conservative commentators, on the other hand, insisted 
that the republicans’ changes to Algeria’s administration were responsible for the insurrection. 
By arguing that the radical press played a key role in pushing the indigenous population to 
revolt, moreover, they invoked the situation in Algeria as an evidence of the fact that the damage 
caused by radical republicans in 1871 extended beyond Paris. They thus rejected the idea that a 
civilian regime could rule Algeria more effectively than a military one and also cast aspersions 
on republicanism itself by linking it to the radicalism of the Commune.  
These diverse commentators also expressed fundamentally different views about the 
connections between Algeria’s administrative structure and France’s political organization. 
Republicans in particular tended to paint the collapse of the Second Empire as a break in 
Algeria’s history, implying that it had ushered in a new era in the territory’s relationship with 
France. They described the new civil administration as the natural outgrowth of republicanism, 
and indicated that by changing the administration of the territory, they had transformed Algeria’s 
relationship to France from an “imperial” one to a “republican” one. The new Algeria was not a 
separate, subjected territory – let alone a separate nation. Instead, it would either merge with the 
French nation, or exist next to it, as a semi-autonomous republican state. As a result, these 
commentators implied, the new Algeria would be in line with democratic, republican values that 
would redeem Algeria from the mistakes of the past.175  
Many of their conservative opponents, on the other hand, used a somewhat different 
approach. Although most conservatives bound the civil administration to the new republican 
                                               
175  This line of argumentation echoed other republican political commentators’ promise that republicanism in 
France would redeem the country from the faults of the Second Empire. 
  234 
administration and implied that both were responsible for the indigenous revolt and Algeria’s 
current problems, they did not usually try to defend the Second Empire or Napoleon III’s vision 
of France’s relationship to Algeria. Even as they relied on some of the key principles that had 
underwritten his policies towards Algeria – namely, that France’s best interests lay in defending 
the indigenous population against the predations of the settler population – they never referred to 
Napoleon III by name, let alone mentioned the royaume arabe. In other words, even as they tied 
the failures of the civil regime to republican politics, they sought to distance the military regime 
from any particular kind of political organization in France. This rhetorical strategy was 
doubtless due, at least in part, to the degree to which Bonapartism in general and Napoleon III in 
particular had become discredited in the wake of French defeat. But it also meant that they 
struggled to present a coherent vision of Algeria’s future. They argued for the continued 
presence of the military regime, but did not connect the military’s presence in Algeria to any 
particular (or Bonapartist) understanding of Algeria’s relationship to France. 
Conservative critics’ inability to articulate a clear model for a new Algeria - combined 
with the fact that its association with radical Communard thought had discredited the republican 
campaign for Algerian autonomy - meant that in the wake of 1870-71, politicians of all parties 
increasingly began to use “assimilation” to describe Algeria and its relationship to France. This 
move towards “assimilation” was also driven by a discourse that described Algeria as central to 
France’s future in the wake of the Franco-Prussian War. The idea that Algeria was critical to 
France was not new: Prévost-Paradol had posited it in 1868 when he contended that 
strengthening the French presence in Algeria would enable the country to counter Prussia’s 
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growing power while staving off national decline.176 In light of France’s defeat, Prévost-
Paradol’s warnings began to seem prescient, and his claim that France needed to increase its 
borders and population in order to avoid becoming a second-rate power took on a new 
urgency.177 Many authors began to invoke his vision of a France Africaine when articulating 
their ideas about Algeria.178 In 1877, J. J. Clamageran published an account of his recent travels 
to Algeria inspired, he claimed, by Prévost-Paradol.179 He noted that he initially read the author’s 
conclusions about the territory with some reserve, but that his trip across the countryside had 
convinced him of Prévost-Paradol’s conclusion that Algeria, with the right administration, would 
help save the French nation and allow it to contend with its European competitors.180 
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Even writers who did not engage with Prévost-Paradol often described Algeria as central 
to France’s continental security. In 1874, Charles Strauss composed a series of pamphlets 
arguing that Algeria was valuable to France not only because it offered the opportunity to expand 
France’s boundaries and population in the face of other growing European powers, but also 
because controlling Algeria would enable France to dominate the Mediterranean.181 He argued 
that the republic should “enclose the two shores of the Mediterranean between two Frances, 
make Algeria an inhabited France, and we will not have to wait to recoup the fruits of this 
generous and civilizing creation.”182 Controlling the Mediterranean, he implied, would both 
improve France’s military position and offer new opportunities for commerce and trade even as 
it “doubled” the size of its territories.183 Strauss even intimated that the opportunity Algeria 
represented was so valuable that Germany would try to take it if not prevented.184  
In some ways, Strauss’ desire to see France dominate the Mediterranean was similar to 
Napoleon III’s: both saw expansion into North Africa as an important way of securing prestige 
and security. Both also insisted that Algeria should not be understood as a “colony.”185 However, 
Strauss’s understanding of the French overseas project was distinct from Napoleon III’s. 
Napoleon III had argued for the creation of a multinational Mediterranean empire in which the 
imperial government would exercise control over a set of distinct nations: he had asserted that 
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Algeria was not a colony because he did not believe that its primary population would be made 
up of colonists. In Strauss’ vision, on the other hand, French domination of North Africa would 
be based on the extension of the French people over new territories. The existing populations in 
North Africa would have to either assimilate or leave: they certainly would not be able to form 
their own nation. Settlement – not political control – was at the center of Strauss’ vision for 
Algeria’s future. He maintained that Algeria was not a colony because it was not fundamentally 
separate from France: instead, it represented the prolongation of France overseas.186 Strauss thus 
described Algeria as deeply connected to the French nation and he assumed that French settlers 
would displace the indigenous population.187 
 
Emigration from Alsace and Lorraine 
The idea that Algeria and France were bound together was enforced by attempts to link 
the territory to the lost provinces of Alsace and Lorraine that Germany had recently annexed.188 
Even in 1871, some writers began to argue that France should use Algeria to “create a second 
France… to compensate for our diminished presence on the Rhine.”189 By transforming Algeria 
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into three départements, a writer for Le Temps hoped, France would be able to regain what it lost 
in status, population, and territory when Germany defeated it.190 The author of the popular 
children’s book Le Tour de la France par deux enfants wrote a novel devoted to the subject in 
1887, Les enfants de Marcel, which described Algeria as the “new Alsace.”191 In this vision, 
merging Algeria into the French nation would not only benefit Algerian settlers, who would gain 
the rights, privileges, and institutions that they had been denied: it would also benefit France 
itself by healing the dismembered national body and conjoining it with new overseas territory.192  
The tendency to link Algeria and Alsace-Lorraine both drove and was driven by a visible 
if unsuccessful campaign to encourage displaced Alsatians and Lorrainers to move to Algeria. As 
early as December 1870 – long before Germany annexed the two regions - Auguste Warnier 
began to argue that the government should encourage French citizens living beneath German 
occupation to immigrate to Algeria.193 He insisted that in order to avoid becoming a second-rate 
nation and to gather its strength against a newly unified Germany, France needed to greatly 
expand its colonizing efforts.194 He claimed that many peasant families in these occupied 
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territories did not have the resources to rebuild their destroyed homes. If they remained in 
France, they would only impoverish the French nation, leading to ever-greater French weakness. 
But if France raised a relatively small tax, the government could move all of these newly 
impoverished peasants to Algeria. There, they would ultimately help invigorate both the colony 
and the metropole by generating economic capital and increasing France’s population.195 
The idea that Alsatians and Lorrainers should move to Algeria became even more 
popular after Germany annexed the territories and gave its inhabitants the choice between 
leaving and surrendering their French citizenship.196 A movement developed to encourage the 
refugees to immigrate to Algeria, where they would be able to “remain French.”197 This idea that 
Algeria would represent a site wherein displaced French citizens could move in order to retain 
their national status became extremely popular.198 This plan eventually gained government 
support. In June 1871, the National Assembly voted to set aside 100,000 acres of the “best land” 
for emigrants from Alsace-Lorraine and promised to pay to transport them to the colony and set 
up “population centers” for them that would include a school, roads, water, and other basic 
services.199 The Algerian administration also raised money to help with the project.200 
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A number of groups emerged from across the ideological spectrum to facilitate 
emigration from Alsace-Lorraine and to provide resources for recent emigrants. The Society for 
the Protection of Alsatians and Lorrainers raised money and advocated on the behalf of 
emigrants to Algeria to increase their land allotments.201 In 1873, they even sent one of their 
members to Algeria in order to inspect the situation of the recent emigrés and arrange assistance 
for them if necessary.202 In 1874, the Comte d’Haussonville, an Orleanist with familial ties to the 
duc de Broglie, organized an art exhibition at the Palais de la Présidence du Corps Législatif to 
fund Alsatians and Lorrainers “who wanted to remain French” as they emigrated to Algeria.203  
Despite the efforts of the government and these advocacy groups, very few peasants from 
Alsace and Lorraine moved to Algeria, and many of those who did eventually moved back to 
France.204 These efforts nevertheless produced an enduring mythical connection between the two 
territories: the idea that Algeria would help make up for France’s loss proved very influential.205 
As a result, the campaign helped secure popular conceptions of Algeria as an “extension” of 
metropolitan France. European settlers in Algeria had long campaigned for the territory’s 
assimilation into France. This assimilation was never cemented as fully as many of them might 
have hoped, but on a more abstract level, the idea that Algeria was an integral component of the 
French nation gained increasing traction in the wake of French defeat.  
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For republicans in particular, the idea that Algeria would ultimately become a component 
of the French nation served a variety of purposes. On the most basic level, it placated many of 
their republican settler allies in Algeria, providing them with much-needed support in the 
National Assembly. 206 But on a more abstract level, it also enabled republicans to differentiate 
between a republican Algeria and an imperial Algeria – which was in line with their attempts to 
distinguish between republican and Second Empire France. It gave them a new vocabulary to 
describe France’s republican relationship with Algeria that avoided the discredited idea of 
empire itself. The model nevertheless carried a number of contradictions and tensions. It 
remained unclear exactly how and to what degree Algeria would be able to “assimilate” into 
France. The position of the indigenous population in this newly assimilated Algeria also 
remained unclear.207 And perhaps even more problematically, at least on an ideological level, the 
language of “assimilation” did not give republicans a language to describe France’s relationship 
to other overseas territories. In the years to come, as republicans looked to expand French 
influence in other parts of the world, they would search for more comprehensive models that did 
not rest on the concept of assimilation. 
 
IV. New Models of Colonization 
This new model for French expansion would ultimately emerge in part from a new 
literature on “colonization” that began to appear in the early 1870s.208 This literature attempted 
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to provide a new working definition of “colonization” and explain the purpose, problems, and 
potential benefits of “colonizing” for European countries. Like Juillet Saint-Lager, many of these 
writers explicitly drew on British theoreticians and modeled their ideas after British colonial 
policy. They invoked Britain partly because they saw it as successful but also because it enabled 
them to distinguish between colonial expansion and the discredited Napoleonic Empire, distance 
their ideas from Napoleon III’s, and show that colonization was not necessarily in contradiction 
with republican values.  
Scholars have long debated whether these scholarly attempts to define and justify 
colonization were influential, the nature of the role they played in French colonial expansion, and 
the scope of their popular influence. In 1972, Raoul Girardet contended that the theorists writing 
in the 1870s were largely responsible for formulating what he called the l’idée coloniale that 
would ultimately lead to the French colonial conquests of the 1880s and 1890s.209 More recently, 
other scholars have argued that most of these theorists in the 1870s were not necessarily calling 
for widespread colonial expansion at all, but instead were attempting to change France’s 
relationship with it existing overseas territories.210 Still others have insisted that France’s 
colonial ideology and especially its colonial policies were shaped by colonial administrators and 
settlers – and not by armchair theorists back in France.211 It seems clear that much of this 
literature was not very influential when it was first published: it lacked a popular audience, and 
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only a narrow range of specialists read it. 212 But it nevertheless provided an ideological 
foundation that would help ground justifications for French republican expansion in later years. 
This was partly because the theorists who wrote about colonization also worked to define the 
relationship between “empire” and “colonies” that had become so complicated in French 
political discourse in the wake of Napoleon III.  
One of the earliest of these theorists was Jules Duval, a French liberal who originally 
published his Les Colonies et la politique coloniale de la France in 1864 during the Second 
Empire. This book, which reemerged in the 1870s along with L’Algérie et les colonies 
françaises, attempted to explain the meaning and purpose of colonization. Duval argued that it 
was an “ancient” practice that consisted of “the foundation of new societies; it is an art because 
of the practical methods it employs, a science because of the laws it uses.”213 Although material 
interests might impel a society to embark on a project of colonization, colonies also involved 
“moral, religious and political interests… it initiates savages and barbarians to the arts and the 
faith of civilization; it is the moral education of young societies.”214 He claimed that the French 
practice of colonization began with the ancient Gauls, re-emerged during the Crusades, and 
reached its first apogee in the early modern era. He devoted much of his attention to explaining 
how these different colonies emerged, how they functioned, and why many of them ultimately 
fell apart. He then turned to the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, noting that during that 
period, France’s colonizing efforts had largely derailed – with the exception of the 1830 
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conquest of Algeria and the Second Empire’s occupation of New Caledonia and Cochinchine.215 
As a result, Duval argued, contemporary France ranked only fourth among the colonizing 
peoples: its colonies were less numerous than England’s, the Netherlands’, and Spain’s. He 
argued that France needed to adjust this imbalance in order to command international respect 
because “all colonies… are a source of honor for the metropole.” They lent the colonizing nation 
prestige, moral authority, and global influence.216  
Even in 1864, Duval had thus described colonization as a unique kind of enterprise that 
was separate from metropolitan political questions and from European contiguous empires. 
Colonization, he argued, was the practice of founding new societies – and it thus had little to do 
with politics or European conflicts at all. He did imply that in order for colonies to succeed, 
governments needed to regulate them with policies that encouraged political, economic, and 
religious liberty.217 By demonstrating that the French had founded colonies under a wide variety 
of circumstances and systems of political organization, he distinguished between the practice of 
overseas settlement and European imperial formations, and indicated that Bonapartism and the 
Napoleonic Empires were unrelated to French overseas political conquests.218 
Nearly a decade later in 1874, Paul Leroy-Beaulieu published the first edition of De la 
colonisation chez les peuples modernes – a work that tried to describe the colonizing efforts of 
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all modern nations.219 Like Duval – whose work he drew on in a number of ways – Leroy-
Beaulieu sought to define the meaning of colonization and explain its history. The scope of his 
work, however, was wider because he compared France’s colonizing efforts to those of other 
European powers. At the same time, he also worked more systematically than Duval to create an 
ideal model for colonization and to develop a robust theoretical justification for the practice. 
Much of Leroy-Beaulieu’s first edition was devoted to an account of the history of 
European colonization.220  His narrative began in early modern Europe and examined the French, 
English, Spanish, and Dutch colonial projects during that era.221 By comparing the methods of 
colonization they used, he claimed that he could elicit a general theory of colonization and a 
model for future French colonial policy.222 He devoted the second half of the work to explaining 
this theory and recommending policies that he believed metropolitan governments should adopt 
vis-à-vis their colonies. Above all, he argued, colonies required both economic and political 
“independence.”223 From an economic standpoint, he contended that colony and metropole alike 
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would prosper most if colonies could trade on the free market.224 On the political front, he 
claimed that colonies needed to have the authority to act on internal matters independently of the 
central government. He insisted that settlers should elect local administrators and politicians 
democratically. Only once the settlers had the ability to trade and govern themselves as they saw 
fit, he argued, would the colonies prosper. He lamented that the French government had failed to 
follow these basic guidelines throughout the eighteenth and into the nineteenth century. If France 
hoped to keep its remaining colonies, he warned, the new republican government would have to 
increase these territories’ economic and political freedoms.225 
Leroy-Beaulieu sought to define the meaning and significance of “colony” much more 
systematically than his predecessor. Duval had simply equated “colony” with “settlement.” 
Leroy-Beaulieu, on the other hand, insisted that not all colonies were the same, and that they 
could take several different forms. He maintained that there were three main types of colonies: 
commercial colonies, agricultural colonies, and plantation colonies.226 Each of these colonial 
forms had different purposes. Commercial colonies consisted of trading outposts designed to 
bring goods and wealth into the metropole. These colonies, however, neither “augmented the 
power nor extended the race of the metropole.”227 Plantation colonies, by contrast, cultivated 
particular consumer goods like sugar and tobacco to serve the specific market for such 
commodities. Agricultural colonies, on the other hand, were founded by large settler populations 
and contributed most directly to the country’s influence and power, but they rarely did much to 
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enrich the metropole’s economy. Of the three types, however, he maintained that agricultural 
colonies were both the most complex and the most rewarding.228 
Leroy-Beaulieu’s preference - at least in the early 1870s - for settler or agricultural 
colonies was reflected in his justification for colonial expansion.229 He contended, “Colonization 
is the expansive force of a people: it is its power of reproduction… it is the submission of the 
universe or of a large part to its language, ideas, and laws.”230 In other words, colonization – and 
especially the establishment of agricultural colonies – was beneficial primarily because it would 
secure the future of the French language and culture by spreading it globally. Despite the fact 
that he was an economist, Leroy-Beaulieu thus saw the benefits of colonization as political, 
cultural, and national in nature. Like Duval, he believed that colonizing would help bolster 
France’s prestige around the globe. But he was even more concerned about the ways in which 
colonization would bolster the nation’s ability to compete demographically, linguistically, and 
culturally with other European powers.231  
Although Leroy-Beaulieu explained the purpose of colonial expansion differently from 
Duval, they both employed similar strategies to distinguish between the practice of overseas 
colonization and the Napoleonic European Empire. Leroy-Beaulieu’s approach was more 
explicit, however, at least in part because of its comparative methodology. Whereas Duval had 
argued that many different governments throughout French history had founded colonies, Leroy-
Beaulieu insisted that all “civilized” peoples practiced colonization. His narration of the history 
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of colonization implied that colonial expansion had little to do with domestic political 
organization at all, though he did insist that governments needed to adopt specific liberal policies 
if they wanted to keep their colonies. And whereas Duval’s work implied that military expansion 
within Europe was a different enterprise than colonial expansion overseas, Leroy-Beaulieu 
opposed them to one another. By definition, he maintained, overseas colonization denoted the 
spread of one particular nation across the globe in the form of small “new” societies that would 
come to dominate the surrounding territory.232 Colonial empires were thus distinct from all older 
European empires because European empires ruled over a diverse set of pre-existing societies 
while colonial empires founded new ones. Tellingly, his history of colonization made no mention 
of French metropolitan empires like the one constructed by Napoleon I.233  
In 1874, Leroy-Beaulieu saw Algeria as the obvious site to begin to rebuild France’s 
colonial holdings.234 He argued that by adopting the right kinds of policies towards the territory, 
France could make it prosperous once more.235 But from there, he hoped, France would be able 
to expand its influence from Algeria towards Senegal, which would enable it “to dominate and 
civilize the entire northwest of Africa… We could have there beneath our influence a territory 
almost as large as Europe.”236 He also encouraged the government to invest in the French 
territory of Cochinchine in order to increase its influence there.237 Even in 1874, Leroy-Beaulieu 
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thus looked beyond Algeria, placing the North African territory in the context of a wider set of 
French overseas colonies instead of describing it as part of France. He also expressed the hope 
that France would expand its overseas holdings overseas and extend its colonizing efforts into 
new territories – albeit in limited ways.238 He concluded by encouraging France to improve its 
policies towards its existing colonies, and informing his readers that “the people who colonize 
the most are the first people; if they are not today, they will be tomorrow.”239 
Napoleon III had sought to secure the prestige of the Second Empire in the early 1860s 
by promoting a vision of empire that combined a particular political program with overseas 
imperial expansion. His vision of a multinational Mediterranean Empire dominated by France 
drew heavily on his uncle’s attempt to establish a modern version of the Roman Empire across 
Europe. Both Duval and Leroy-Beaulieu, on the other hand, differentiated between metropolitan 
and colonial expansion in no uncertain terms. The political organization of France, they implied, 
did not determine its relationship to the territory it conquered. These writers rebuffed Napoleon 
III’s specific political goals and policies and rejected his broader vision of a multinational 
empire, which they saw as at odds with the colonial holdings they hoped to establish. French 
expansion would not bring new nations into a wider French Empire, they argued: instead, it 
would allow the French culture, language, and “race” to spread across a wider geographical 
expanse. They thus provided a foundation for justifying republican colonial expansion with a 
model that was more flexible than “national assimilation” but remained distinct from Bonapartist 
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imperialism. At the same time, however, these descriptions of “colonization” offered no clear 
way to explain the relationship between the established “colony” and European “metropole.” 
Although Duval and Leroy-Beaulieu prescribed a number of policies that the metropolitan 
government should use to regulate its colonies, they did not explain the specific mechanisms that 
bound the two together. By avoiding the term “empire,” they were left without a vocabulary to 
describe the overarching political structure that connected France to its overseas territories. 
If the liberal and republican thinkers who formulated theories of colonization in the 
1860s and 1870s usually avoided using the term “empire” to describe the kinds of global 
formations they hoped to build, some more conservative theorists did use it. In 1877, L’abbé 
Pierre Raboisson, a conservative Catholic theorist, published one of the most influential of these 
texts under the title Étude sur les colonies et la colonisation au regard de la France.240 In this 
work, instead of attempting to separate “empire” and “colony” like Duval and Leroy-Beaulieu, 
he explicitly linked the two concepts together. He argued, “The grandeur and prosperity of 
colonies makes the grandeur and prosperity of empires. As a result, it is of paramount 
importance that France possesses great and prosperous colonies.”241 Raboisson went on to 
indicate that all empires did not necessarily possess colonies. But he insisted that all of the 
strongest and most successful empires in history had extensive colonial holdings. Moreover, he 
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claimed, when these empires lost their colonies, their influence and power quickly collapsed.242 
This formulation had two consequences. First, it indicated that colonies and empires existed in an 
interdependent relationship and defined colonies above all as a necessary attribute of imperial 
formations. Second, it implicitly described France as an “empire.” 
Raboisson also defined the term “colony” differently from Duval and Leroy-Beaulieu. He 
argued that colonization was “the effective action of a state on a territory (possessed through 
treaties or conquests) to appropriate its productions and assimilate its inhabitants.”243 By 
assimilating inhabitants, he claimed, an empire “extended its homeland, multiplied its citizens” 
as long as it “communicated to its colonies’ inhabitants its spirit, its heart and its faith.”244 Like 
Duval and Leroy-Beaulieu, Raboisson thus portrayed colonization as the extension of France 
across the globe. But whereas both Duval and Leroy-Beaulieu had argued that colonization 
above all signified the “settlement” of one group of people in new territory, Raboisson implied 
that it primarily consisted of bringing new groups of people beneath one overarching state and 
assimilating them into French culture.245  
Perhaps most notably, Raboisson’s account of colonization and colonial practices did not 
distinguish between European conquests or imperial formations and their overseas counterparts. 
In fact, it confounded the two. Throughout the text, Raboisson used the term “colony” to 
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describe any territory conquered or occupied by an “empire.”246 He explicitly described Alsace, 
Scotland, and Ireland as “colonies” of France and Britain because they were conquered territories 
inhabited by different peoples whom the state had assimilated, at least to some degree. He in fact 
invoked the Alsatians’ continued devotion to France under German rule to demonstrate how 
effective French colonizing efforts could be.247 From this perspective, France’s relationship with 
Alsace or Austria-Hungary’s relationship with the Czechs was not inherently distinct from 
France’s relationship with Algeria.248 Both represented conquered territories that a central state 
sought to administer and incorporate. Both Duval and Leroy-Beaulieu had narrated the history of 
colonial expansion as an enterprise entirely distinct from European imperial expansion. 
Raboisson took the opposite approach: he described colonial expansion as one aspect of a 
broader set of imperial politics. 
In some ways, Raboisson’s vision of the relationship between empire and colony had 
more in common with Napoleon III’s 1860s model than with the model embraced by his 
contemporary republican theorists. Napoleon III had also collapsed “metropolitan” and 
“overseas” empire together: he had sought to restructure France’s relationship with Algeria and 
extend the country’s influence overseas in order to invoke the memory of Napoleon I’s extensive 
European conquests.249 But Raboisson’s vision also remained distinct from Napoleon III’s. On 
                                               
246 He described nearly all of ancient Rome’s conquered territories as “colonies,” for example. See ibid., 6. 
247 He argued that the Alsatian’s devotion to France showed that France was a more effective colonizing power than 
Britain, since the Irish and the Scottish hated the British. He also described the Austrian Empire as an (ineffective) 
colonizing power within Britain. See ibid., 67. 
248 Raboisson defended this claim in part by arguing against the idea that race “explains everything about the history 
of peoples.” He insisted instead that the history of a people was primarily determined instead by their “morality,” 
noting that the Romans had spread their culture and values to people of many different races. While the process of 
assimilating indigenous Algerians into France might take longer than assimilating Alsatians because the indigenous 
Algerians had such different morals and customs, the two processes were essentially identical. See ibid., 105-106. 
249 He also tried to link these overseas relationships to the structure of the imperial government, implying that the 
Bonapartist state sat above both France and its dependent nations. 
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the most basic level, Napoleon III had tied the structure of France’s government to its 
relationship with its overseas territories, while Raboisson did not discuss France’s political 
organization at all. Perhaps even more importantly, however, Napoleon III defined the French 
Empire as a multinational entity: he promised that it would respect the distinct customs, beliefs, 
and practices of its different inhabitants. For Raboisson, on the other hand, the very purpose of 
empire was to eliminate differences between peoples, and encourage conquered peoples to adopt 
the customs, beliefs, and practices of the conquering state. Notably, he argued that in order to 
improve its relationship with its colonies, France should encourage the use of evangelical 
Catholicism to encourage conquered peoples to convert. Once the indigenous inhabitants of 
Algeria and Indochina adopted France’s religion, he implied, they would be well on the way to 
becoming productive French citizens.250 
Raboisson’s vision of the relationship between empire and colony had a number of 
features that would have made it controversial in France during the 1870s. He described Alsace 
as a “French colony” at a moment when most politicians were describing it as an integral part of 
the French nation. He also insisted that the French should use Catholicism to spread their 
influence throughout the globe – a claim that would not have attracted the support of either 
republicans or liberals.251 But Raboisson was not an outlier in the conversation about 
colonization in post-Napoleonic France: he was an active member of the newly formed Société 
des études coloniales et maritimes, one of the few organizations in the 1870s devoted to studying 
                                               
250 He argued that France should export its “Christian ideas and values,” and implied that the only way that Algeria 
in particular would become peaceful was after the Kabyles and Arabs converted. This was at odds with Napoleon 
III’s attempt to preserve the culture, beliefs, and practices of Algeria’s indigenous population. See ibid., 49, 113. 
251 Raboisson in fact directly posited his understanding of colonialism in opposition to the “liberal” model of 
colonization championed by Leroy-Beaulieu. See ibid., 104. 
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and popularizing the French colonies.252 His account of French colonization thus demonstrates 
that in the 1870s, some thinkers continued to associate European empire with colonial expansion, 
and perceived them as politically intertwined.  
Raboisson’s explanation of the relationship between colony and empire was marked by 
some contradictions and gaps - in part because he explained what he meant by “colonization” 
much more clearly than what he meant by “empire.” He did not seem to attach any political 
structures or institutions to the term. At times, he used “empire” interchangeably with “nation”; 
at other moments, he used this broad term to refer to any state that had ever conquered any kind 
of territory. He certainly did not treat “empire” as synonymous with “Napoleonic Empire,” nor 
did he imply that an empire necessarily had to have an emperor. His vision of French empire was 
deeply informed by conservative values, but it nevertheless remained politically ambiguous. This 
text’s political acceptance of Bonapartist ideas about empire, however, reveals that the 
republicans’ attempts to discredit empire as a form of political organization and to separate it 
from colonial expansion continued to face new challenges in the 1870s.  
During the 1870s, there was no major campaign to expand France’s overseas territories or 
embark on a major project of colonization. Even Duval, Leroy-Beaulieu, and Raboisson were 
primarily concerned about increasing awareness and appreciation of the colonies that France 
already had: they did not advocate for a major project of overseas conquest. But these texts’ 
basic contention – that colonization would be beneficial for the French nation – became 
increasingly influential over the course of the 1880s. Even in 1871, the politician Ernest Renan 
took up the point, arguing in his La réforme intellectuelle et morale that colonization was a 
                                               
252 Bulletin de la société des études coloniales et maritimes 2:1 (January 1878), 31. 
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“political necessity of the first order.”253 To some extent, the force that drove this argument and 
the idea that Algeria should become part of the French nation was the same: the sense that in the 
wake of the Franco-Prussian War, France was in danger of becoming a second-rate power, so it 
needed a mechanism to increase its prestige and make up for its loss. Expanding its influence 
outside Europe, colonial advocates implied, would protect France against Germany and enable it 
to compete with Britain. Even in the 1880s, this message would be controversial – partly because 
colonial conquest was difficult to justify in republican terms.254 But these authors helped form a 
conflicted republican defense of colonization that colonialism’s advocates would draw upon to 
defend their ideas as the Third Republic became more established.255 
As more republicans came to agree that overseas expansion was necessary to secure 
French prestige and influence, however, the legacy of the Napoleonic Empire and Napoleon III’s 
conflation of “overseas” and “European” empire remained troubling – especially since some 
colonial theorists like Raboisson continued to associate the two political formations. Republicans 
in the second half of the 1870s devoted much attention to attacking empire and placing it in 
opposition to the new republic. As a result, they wanted to avoid describing French overseas 
territories as “an empire” and to develop robust theories that could explain why maintaining or 
even expanding these territories was in line with republican values. But colonial theorists like 
                                               
253 He argued that colonization would protect nations against socialism, or conflict between rich and poor. This 
vision of the benefits of colonization was distinctly at odds with Leroy-Beaulieu’s, who argued that colonization 
would not really change the economic organization of the country. See Ernest Renan, La réforme intellectuelle et 
morale de la France (Paris: Michel Lévy Frères, 1872), 92. 
254 See Schivelbusch, The Culture of Defeat, 162.  
255 Some scholars have argued that French defeat and the forced annexation of Alsace-Lorraine also complicated the 
French relationship to “conquest” immediately following the war. Renan’s relationship to this is particularly 
interesting; he condemned the German annexation as illegitimate, arguing that the only type of conquest that was 
legitimate was colonial conquest, or the “conquest of an inferior race’s country by a superior race, who establishes 
itself there in order to govern.” This kind of conquest, he insisted, was morally acceptable because it would lead to 
the “regeneration of inferior races by superior races” and was “in the providential order of humanity.” But it 
remained unclear how to differentiate “superior” from “inferior” races. See Renan, La réforme intellectuelle, 93. 
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Duval, Leroy-Beaulieu, and even Renan who avoided the term “empire” struggled to find a 
theoretical vocabulary to describe the form of political organization that would structure France’s 
relationship with its overseas territories. As a result, the relationship between “empire” and 
“colonies” remained conflicted and ambiguous within republican discourse itself, and in the 
republican debates with anti-republican theorists. 
 
V. Conclusion: Empire, Republic, Colony, and Nation 
In the aftermath of the Franco-Prussian War, French republicans defended the new 
republic against their political opponents by arguing that the Second Empire was responsible for 
all of France’s political misfortunes and promising that the republic alone could redeem the 
country. They contended that empire was an illegitimate form of political organization and 
promised that any return towards imperialism would ruin France’s future. Such arguments threw 
the nature of France’s relationship with its colonies into question because some writers and 
intellectuals continued to associate “colonies” with “empire.” The relationship between these two 
ideas was particularly conflicted in Algeria because Napoleon III had used the territory to 
promote the idea of a French Mediterranean Empire that would rest on Bonapartist political 
principles and bind multiple nations together beneath one overarching political structure. At least 
on a discursive level, he thus transformed Algeria into a centerpiece example of Bonapartist 
imperial strategy, but republicans now wanted to connect Algeria to their new republican state. 
After the Second Empire’s collapse, republicans therefore worked to transform 
understandings of France’s relationship with its overseas territories. They tried to distinguish 
between France’s colonial holdings and European Napoleonic Empire by describing those 
holdings in republican terms. In the 1870s, much of this conversation referred to Algeria and 
became a complex set of conflicts and negotiations between settlers, the French government, and 
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intellectuals of different political stripes. The evolving debate about Algeria was informed by the 
Second Empire’s legacy and also by the memory of French defeat in the Franco-Prussian War, 
the new settler political radicalism, the widespread indigenous revolt, and the loss of Alsace-
Lorraine. Over the course of the 1870s, two key strategies emerged in republican writing to 
distinguish France’s colonial holdings from the European Napoleonic Empire. In Algeria itself, 
French republicans and some settlers mostly tried to avoid the problem of explaining the 
relationship between “colony” and “empire” by (1) denying that Algeria was a “colony” and by 
(2) arguing that Algeria was only an “extension” of the French nation overseas.256  
The government’s decision to describe Algeria as an extension of France had practical 
implications for the rights, duties, and positions of the different populations that inhabited the 
territory. It also provided immediate benefits for the settler population and republican politicians 
alike. Because the new conception of Algeria granted political and civil rights to settlers, but not 
to the indigenous population, it secured the settlers’ hegemonic position within the territory. 
Supporting settlers’ demands also gave the embattled republicans the much-needed support of 
Algerian settlers in the National Assembly.257 But the redefinition of Algeria carried ideological 
benefits as well. Treating Algeria as an extension of France served as a way to separate the 
republic’s relationship with its overseas territories from the policies of the Second Empire. In the 
immediate aftermath of the war, republicans had effectively discredited the term “empire,” so 
describing Algeria as a part of France became a way to avoid the problematic implications of 
maintaining an overseas empire while repudiating the metropolitan empire at home. If Algeria 
was a part of France rather than a component of a multinational Mediterranean Empire, 
                                               
256 This line of argumentation was somewhat ironic, especially considering that throughout the 1860s, settlers in 
particular had insisted that the government should treat Algeria as a colony instead of as a “royaume arabe.” 
257 Taithe, Citizenship and Wars, 172. 
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republicans could distance themselves and the new republican state from Napoleon III’s 
metropolitan and overseas empires without having to explain the apparent continuities in their 
own colonialism. At the same time, however, this model had a number of practical weaknesses, 
which centered especially on the place of Algeria’s indigenous population in this new system. 
Over time, most republicans and many conservative politicians came to agree that 
Algeria was not part of a wider French empire but instead a territory that would slowly assimilate 
into the French nation. But some Algerian settlers and colonial theorists sought to articulate a 
broader and more ambitious model for colonial expansion that nevertheless divorced the concept 
of overseas colonialism from imperialist practices in Europe. These efforts had somewhat mixed 
results – in part because especially in the early years, they reached somewhat limited audiences. 
Moreover, it is also clear that despite republicans’ efforts, some conservative pro-colonists like 
Raboisson continued to associate European empire with overseas colonial expansion. The 
conflicted nature of the republicans’ relationship to empire and colonization would drive political 
conflicts in the 1880s when the Republic embarked on a major campaign of political expansion. 
The complex connections between Bonapartist imperialism and republican colonialism had not 
simply disappeared through the publication of new books that tried to deny the overlapping 
aspects of both systems.
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CHAPTER 4: DEVELOPING A COLONIAL VOCABULARY: ARGUING OVER 
INDOCHINA, 1880-1890 
 
 On January 24, 1886, Émile Lonchampt, a reserve army officer and a member of the 
Société d’Émulation de Cambrai, organized a conference in Paris devoted to examining what he 
described as the politique coloniale of Louis XV. The conference focused specifically on the 
efforts of Joseph-François Dupleix to establish an expansive French colony in India. In 
Lonchampt’s speech, which he later published, he highlighted Dupleix’s achievements in India - 
even going so far as to claim that Britain was later able to assert its authority over the territory 
only because its administrators copied Dupleix’s innovative governing strategies.1 Lonchampt 
acknowledged that France ultimately lost most of its outposts in India. But he insisted that 
Dupleix’s history showed that - contrary to popular belief - eighteenth-century France was just as 
effective at colonizing as Britain. France’s failures in its colonies did not stem from a lack of 
aptitude amongst its people, but instead from the central government’s poor management and the 
French people’s inability to appreciate “valiant explorers” like Dupleix who “worked for the 
glory of their country” and embodied “male courage.”2 
 In his introduction, Lonchampt made it clear that he believed Dupleix’s role in India was 
not just an object for historical debate. In fact, he argued, Dupleix’s attempt to expand French 
control in the Indies was immediately relevant to the problems facing the contemporary French 
                                               
1 Émile Lonchampt, Duplex et la politique coloniale sous Louis XV: Conférence fait à Paris, le 24 janvier 1886 
(Reims: Matot-Braine, 1886), 28. 
2 Ibid., 29. 
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nation.3 Even now, he insisted, many “intrepid explorers” were extending French influence into 
new territories. Much like Dupleix, he feared, these figures had inadequate support from 
France’s government and most of its population. This lack of support imperiled both the 
explorers’ safety and the success of their missions. It was also dangerous to France’s future. 
Only by fully embracing politique coloniale, Lonchampt warned, would France be able to 
maintain its position in Europe: unless it pursued a ruthless path of overseas expansion, it would 
fall behind its neighbors. He acknowledged that some republicans might object to the prospect of 
violently conquering other peoples and subjecting them to French rule on ideological grounds, 
but he insisted with a kind of Darwinian logic,  
…It is a universal law that all people – great and small – are subject to the general 
law of terrestrial life that dictates that the great inevitably devour the small… One 
can dream of an ideal world where justice presides over the destiny of nations and 
of an ethereal vision which sees people as brothers, united in eternal concord… I 
do not believe in such a brilliant mirage.4 
 
France’s commitment to its ideals, Lonchampt thus implied, had only succeeded in placing its 
colonies in English hands. It was also responsible for Alsace and Lorraine’s loss to the Germans. 
Instead of dreaming of universal fraternity, France needed to focus on the universal laws of 
“terrestrial” life by building up its armies and securing itself against its European enemies.5 
 Lonchampt’s interest in France’s former colonies and his tendency to connect them to 
contemporary French problems was echoed throughout the 1880s, particularly in scholarly 
circles, but also in political debates, newspaper articles, journals, and school textbooks.6 Over the 
                                               
3 Ibid., 1. 
4 Ibid., 31. 
5 Ibid., 32. Lonchampt also published a longer book in 1888 examining how the old regime lost control over North 
America. See Émile Lonchampt, Pourquoi l’Amérique du Nord n’est pas française? (Paris: Challamel Ainé, 1888). 
6 Kate Marsh and Nicola Frith, ed., France’s Lost Empires: Fragmentation, Nostalgia, and La Fracture Coloniale, 
(Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2011), 5. 
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course of the decade, a wealth of literature emerged devoted to the study of France’s past and 
present colonies and to what commentators increasingly described as politique coloniale. Much 
like the colonial theorists of the 1870s, writers usually defined politique coloniale as a practice 
with a long history that many European states employed in overseas territories. They also 
indicated that despite its name, politique coloniale was essentially an apolitical activity practiced 
by a variety of governments and peoples. This definition enabled these writers to avoid having to 
explain the relationship between the practices of colonialism and earlier European empires – 
particularly the connections to the discredited idea of Napoleonic “empire.” But if these writers’ 
understandings of colonialism had much in common with their 1870s counterparts', there were 
also several important differences that characterized this new interest in politique coloniale. On 
the most basic level, there were far more writers interested in the topic in the 1880s. These 
writers, moreover, also often sought to define colonialism and explain its significance more 
systematically than their earlier counterparts. And perhaps most importantly, most of these later 
writers were not simply calling for reforms in France’s existing colonies – the focus of the works 
in the 1870s. Instead, they were demanding widespread colonial expansion.  
International events and trends partly drove both this new interest in colonialism and the 
belief that colonial expansion was an apolitical enterprise critical to France’s future. During the 
early 1880s, an increasing number of European states began to expand their reach overseas. This 
movement led to a growing sense of competition between European powers, especially in Africa, 
which led in turn to the 1884 Congress of Berlin.7 Although the Congress focused primarily on 
                                               
7 A series of complicated events led to the 1884 Congress. During the late 1870s and early 1880s, France, Belgium, 
and Britain supported exploratory expeditions along the Congo and Niger rivers. Competition over trading rights in 
those territories thus increased. In 1882, tensions between Britain and France arose over Egypt. After a series of 
conflicts with the Egyptian army, Britain decided to invade the country. The British initially invited France to 
participate in its military exercises against Egypt, but the French government had refused to vote for the credits that 
would have made it possible. As a result, the British went in alone and assumed control over the territory. The 
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establishing the claims of different European powers to various parts of Africa and determining 
the means by which European states could lay claim to territory on the continent, it also played 
an important role in defining and legitimizing overseas conquest. By laying out a specific set of 
rules for “colonial conquest,” the Congress helped solidify the growing consensus that war, 
conquest, and domination outside of Europe were both morally justified and fundamentally 
different from wars and conquest within Europe itself.8 At the same time, it also convinced many 
politicians and intellectuals across Europe that colonization was a necessary undertaking for any 
state that hoped to maintain its international influence. In the years following the Congress, the 
speed of European conquests dramatically increased.9  
In light of this growing international interest in colonial expansion, French intellectuals’ 
and politicians’ insistence on the importance of politique coloniale and their failure to explain its 
relationship with metropolitan political parties or ideological principles is perhaps unsurprising.10 
But it is worth noting that these French writers were not simply reacting to a changing European 
intellectual framework – they were also contributing to it. The French government played a role 
in provoking the events that led to the 1884 Congress of Berlin and also participated in the 
                                               
French government – which had longstanding ties to Egypt and an active interest in the Suez Canal – was angered 
when the British did not leave the territory. As a result, it ratified a series of treaties that Savorgnan de Brazza, the 
French explorer, had concluded with tribal leaders along the Ogoué River, laying claim to new territory in Africa. 
The British in turn tried to purchase some of Portugal’s rights to the Congo. Bismarck saw the growing tensions 
between France and Britain as an opportunity to stage a rapprochement with France. He convinced Jules Ferry, the 
prime minister, to agree to jointly put pressure on Britain to agree to an international conference that would establish 
a unified African policy. See William Roger Louis, Ends of British Imperialism: The Scramble for Empire, Suez, 
and Decolonization (New York: I. B. Tauris, 2006), 77; Meyer, Tarrade, Rey-Goldzeigueur, Thobie, Histoire de la 
France coloniale, 621; M. E. Chamberlain, The Scramble for Africa (New York: Routledge, 2014), 48-53. 
8 It is worth noting that the outcome of this conference was quite controversial in France – at least in part because 
the French representatives openly made alliances with the German representatives against Britain, leading some 
commentators in France to fear that France’s focus on overseas expansion was leading it to forget its lost provinces. 
See Jean Martin, L’Empire triomphante, 1871-1936 (Paris: Denoël, 1990), 27. 
9 Chamberlain, The Scramble for Africa, 3. 
10 Gilles Manceron, ed., 1885: le tournant colonial de la République (Paris: La Découverte, 2007), 9. 
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accelerated pace of colonial conquests that occurred in its aftermath.11 If an international shift in 
the discourse of colonialism was partly responsible for this new interest in politique coloniale, 
political and ideological transformations within France itself also played a role in its emergence. 
For most of the 1870s, France’s basic political configuration had remained a subject of 
ongoing contestation. Republican deputies had declared France a republic in the wake of the 
September 4 revolution, but for the first half of the decade, Legitimists and Orleanists dominated 
the government. Especially at first, both groups devoted their energy towards finding a way to 
overturn the republic.12 As a result, they only took steps towards determining the regime’s shape 
in 1875, when they approved a series of laws that would function as a constitution.13 In 1876, 
Opportunist republicans won the majority of seats in the Chamber of Deputies, marking the first 
time since the republic’s establishment that its supporters dominated one of the legislative 
bodies. But it was not until 1877, when Legitimist President Mac-Mahon failed to stage a coup 
d’état, that public opinion definitively swung in the republic’s favor.14 In the 1879 elections, 
republicans gained the majority of seats in the Senate and the republican candidate Jules Grévy 
                                               
11 France’s decision to conquer Tunisia in 1881 helped provoke the scramble for Africa and its explorers contributed 
to the competition between European powers in the Congo. See Chamberlain, The Scramble for Africa, 35. 
12 As discussed in chapter 2, the Legitimists and Orleanists tried to make common cause. The Orleanists had agreed 
to support the Comte de Chambord – the Legitimist candidate – in part because he was elderly and childless, and 
they expected the Orleanist candidate to succeed him after his death. But the Orleanists also wanted the Comte de 
Chambord to make constitutional promises. In 1873, it became clear that he was not prepared to make these 
promises, and the conservative alliance fell apart. See Alan Grubb, The Politics of Pessimism: Albert de Broglie and 
Conservative Politics in the Early Third Republic (Newark: University of Delaware Press, 1996), 165. 
13 The monarchist-dominated government largely decided to take these measures because of the growing popularity 
of Bonapartism in France. Orleanists and Legitimists feared the restoration of the empire more than a conservative 
republic. The conservatives agreed to use the word “republic” to refer to the French state in exchange for the 
establishment of a Senate in addition to the Chamber of Deputies. See Grévy, La république des opportunistes, 27. 
14 He decided to dissolve the National Assembly after the 1876 elections resulted in a republican majority. See 
Bertrand Taithe, Citizenship and Wars: France in Turmoil, 1870-1871 (New York: Psychology Press, 2001), 172. 
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assumed the presidency.15 By the end of the 1870s, the republicans had thus established control 
over all of the branches of the French government. Their political ascendancy was not without 
complications – the party’s political success sharpened its internal divisions, which became 
increasingly visible over the course of the 1880s. But at the same time, the declining popularity 
of the Orleanist and Legitimist parties made a monarchist restoration increasingly unlikely, just 
as Napoleon IV’s death that year rendered the possibility of a Bonapartist restoration remote.16 
As a result, 1879 marked the moment when France’s future as a republic began to seem assured. 
Even as the republic stabilized, however, the newly elected Opportunists remained 
concerned about how best to ensure the republic’s popularity and its future. As Philip Nord has 
shown, these politicians wanted to secure the primacy of republican ideology in French culture 
and therefore passed a series of measures intended to promote republican values.17 They declared 
the republican Marseillaise the French national anthem, made Bastille Day a public holiday, and 
decreed that the motto Liberté, Égalité, Fraternité would appear on all public buildings.18 At the 
same time, they campaigned to expand and reform public education – partly because many were 
convinced that the clergy’s influence in elementary education was responsible for the peasantry’s 
                                               
15 It is worth noting that the growing power of the republican party did not directly lead to the displacement of older 
elites. These elites were unable to overthrow the government, but they continued to have an important degree of 
influence over the republic’s administration. See Philip Nord, The Republican Moment: Struggles for Democracy in 
Nineteenth-Century France (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995), 3. 
16 Napoleon IV’s death left Napoleon III’s cousin, Jerome Bonaparte, at the head of the party. But the party disliked 
him, partly because during his tenure as Corsica’s deputy to the National Assembly, he sided with the moderate 
republicans against the Bonapartists. See Price, The French Second Empire, 465. 
17 Nord, The Republican Moment, 191. 
18 It also passed a number of reforms to make the republic fall more closely in line with republican values. In 1881, 
the government liberalized the laws around the freedom of the press. In 1883, it took steps to remove conservative 
functionaries who opposed the republic from their positions of power. And in 1884, they passed a series of laws that 
outlawed the practice of nominating senators to their positions “for life” and made princes ineligible to become 
president of the Republic. These measures also had the advantage of further securing the republic against its 
monarchist and Bonapartist detractors. The law forbidding princes from becoming the president of the republic was 
specifically intended to prevent another Napoleon III from seizing power. See Alice Conklin, Sarah Fishman, and 
Robert Zaretsky, France and its Empire since 1870 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 62. 
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conservatism.19 In addition to these “pedagogical” campaigns, many republican politicians also 
sought to secure their party’s popularity by assuring the public that the republic could best 
defend France against its European enemies.20 They justified many of their reforms by arguing 
that they were part of a broader campaign to strengthen France and ensure that it never suffered 
another defeat at the hands of its competitors. Republican ministers thus sometimes defended the 
republic’s changes to France’s educational system by contending that these changes were 
necessary to “prevent a second Sedan,” implying that the Second Empire’s decision to leave 
primary education in the hands of the clergy had contributed to its loss in 1870-71.21 
France’s relationship to Germany continued to complicate the republicans’ attempt to 
paint themselves as the defenders of the French nation, however. In the early 1880s, the idea of 
revanche against Germany remained relatively popular. Although only a minority consistently 
called for war, many continued to demand that France prioritize reclaiming the lost provinces of 
Alsace and Lorraine.22 During the 1870s, a number of republicans – following Gambetta - had 
                                               
19 Many republicans were convinced that all of France’s earlier republics had failed because most of the population 
was too poorly educated to understand the benefits of republicanism. Most peasants, they believed, were 
brainwashed by the Church or uneducated. See Gilbert G. Chaitin, The Enemy Within: Culture Wars and Political 
Identity in the Novels of the Third Republic (Columbus: The Ohio State University, 2009), 41. 
20 As chapter 2 shows, Republicans had also made use of this line of argumentation in the 1870s. They blamed the 
empire and the monarchy for France’s recent defeats and claimed that the republic alone could redeem the nation. 
21 J. Moody, French Education Since Napoleon (New York: Syracuse University Press, 1978), 87; Jean-François 
Chanet, “‘Schools are Society’s Salvation’: The State and Mass Education in France, 1870-1930” in Mass Education 
and the Limits of State Building, 1870-1930, ed. Laurence Brockliss and Nicola Sheldon (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2012), 119. 
22 Revanche’s popularity in the 1870s and 1880s has been an object of debate. For a long time, historians argued that 
it deeply influenced French politics throughout the Third Republic. Claude Digeon, for example, claimed that the 
loss of Alsace-Lorraine “transformed the French soul” by reshaping it around the idea of “revanche.” In more recent 
years, some historians have argued that the importance of the lost provinces fluctuated over the course of the Third 
Republic in response to events within both France and Germany. They have also questioned the degree to which 
republicans who spoke often of revanche in the early years – like Léon Gambetta – actually saw it as a feasible 
enterprise. See Claude Digeon, La crise allemande de la pensée française, 1870-1914 (Paris: Presses universitaires 
de la France, 1959), 3; Karine Varley, Under the Shadow of Defeat (Basingstroke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 191. 
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successfully garnered popular support by promising to restore these provinces.23 But once the 
Opportunists gained control over the government, it became clear that a war against Germany 
would be too expensive and was likely to end once again in defeat.24  
In light of these complications, some politicians began to argue that while France could 
not immediately pursue revenge against Germany, it could nevertheless increase its strength by 
pursuing other conquests overseas. Such conquests would, they contended, train the French 
army, increase France’s wealth and its trading opportunities, and enhance its international 
prestige.25 Over time, these thinkers argued, these conquests would make it possible for France 
to regain its lost provinces from Germany. They would also enable France to keep British 
ascendancy in check. This argument – that colonial expansion would strengthen France and 
perhaps even enable it to regain some of its lost territories in Europe – contributed to the growing 
interest in politique colonial within France and the republican party.26  
The contention that colonial conquests would increase France’s continental prestige and 
allow it to win back its lost provinces was controversial, however. Many nationalists condemned 
the idea out of hand.27 And even if many French republicans argued that politique coloniale was 
essential both to France’s international power and the stability of the party’s position in France, 
                                               
23 Wolfgang Schivelbusch, The Culture of Defeat: On National Trauma, Mourning, and Recovery (New York: 
Picador, 2001), 150. 
24 The inability of the republicans to deliver on their calls for revenge when they came into power was partly 
responsible for the frustrations that ultimately coalesced in the Boulanger Affair. See James Lehning, To Be a 
Citizen: The Political Culture of the Early French Third Republic (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001), 155. 
25 Scholars have long argued about the role of economic interests in France’s drive towards overseas expansion. This 
is at least partly because it is unclear that colonies ever brought economic benefits to France. However, it seems 
clear that a variety of industrial and commercial groups were convinced that colonial expansion would lead to 
economic growth. See Pierre Brocheux and Daniel Hémery, Indochina: An Ambiguous Colonization, 1858-1954 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2009), 31. 
26 Schivelbusch, The Culture of Defeat, 181. 
27 Lehning, To Be a Citizen, 136. 
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the practice of colonial conquest rested uneasily with some republican political principles - 
especially with the republic’s theoretical commitment to supporting liberty among peoples and 
fraternity between nations. Even Lonchampt’s call for action made some of these tensions 
apparent. He tried to dismiss these apparent contradictions by describing the republican 
principles in question as idealistic, impractical, and dangerous in the face of France’s European 
competitors. But the fact that he felt the need to mention them at all makes it clear that the 
longstanding association in republican thought between conquest, subordination, and the Old 
Regime and imperial governments continued to complicate the prospect of colonial expansion. In 
other words, even as supporters of colonial expansion like Lonchampt argued that metropolitan 
politics had no bearing on colonial expansion - which they described as primarily a matter of 
national prestige and security - other republican intellectuals and politicians continued to see 
overseas expansion and metropolitan politics as intertwined. In fact, many continued to associate 
colonial expansion with authoritarian forms of political organization and even drew direct 
connections between the new “colonial empire” that France was trying to build and the older 
“Bonapartist empire” that had led France to defeat. These disagreements led to a series of 
contestations over the purpose, history, and morality of politique coloniale between different 
intellectuals, politicians, and writers. In a variety of mediums - including political debates, 
pamphlets, scholarship, textbooks, and novels – these different commentators sought to explain 
politique colonial’s relationship to France’s politics, describe its ramifications for the French 
nation, and articulate its relationship to the history of “empire.”  
These debates about colonial conquest were not only theoretical: they emerged 
specifically in response to the Opportunist republicans’ decision to embark on a series of colonial 
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conquests – the first since France’s defeat in the Franco-Prussian War.28 Jules Ferry, who served 
as prime minister from 1880-1881 and 1883-1885, played an important role in orchestrating 
these conquests.29 In 1880, he encouraged the Third Republic to annex Tahiti and several 
neighboring islands.30 In 1881, he fabricated a crisis with the bey of Tunisia to justify sending 
French troops across the border, ostensibly to secure Algeria’s future, and used the opportunity 
to declare Tunisia a French protectorate.31 At the same time, he encouraged a series of operations 
in Sudan, Congo, and Madagascar to spread French influence in those areas with an eye towards 
expanding France’s holdings throughout Africa.32 And finally, he spearheaded the conquest of 
Annam and Tonkin between 1883 and 1885. Although almost all of these conquests and 
annexations incited some opposition, the conflicts in Indochina in particular proved extremely 
controversial.33 It was around Indochina that the debates over the value, purpose, political 
implications, and national consequences of politique coloniale would coalesce. 
The controversy over France’s policies in Indochina played out in numerous spheres and 
on a variety of levels. Most immediately, the complications that attended the conquest of 
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30 Conklin, Fishman, Zaretsky, France and its Empire since 1870, 65. 
31 The motivations for taking over Tunisia were economic: French companies were concerned about the Italian 
influence in the territory. Ferry used the incursion of Tunisian tribes into Algeria to justify a military invasion that 
he had already decided on. See Meyer, Tarrade, Rey-Goldzeiguer, and Thobie, Histoire de la France coloniale, 585. 
32 The French began expanding into Sudan from Senegal in the late 1870s under the guidance of Faidherbe. At the 
end of 1879, the National Assembly voted to grant credits to build a railroad across the Sahara desert. They also sent 
troops to secure the area for the railroad. At the same time, Pierre Savorgnan de Brazza conducted a series of 
expeditions into the Congo. In the early 1880s, France also launched a naval expedition to Madagascar to secure 
French influence in the territory against the growing presence of Protestant missionaries from Britain. See Denise 
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northern Vietnam sparked a series of debates in the Chamber of Deputies about its costs, 
methods, and implications. Many Opportunist Republicans defended Ferry’s actions in the 
territory, while some vocal leftist radicals and conservatives questioned both their means and 
purpose.34 Between 1883 and 1885, these debates became heated. Ultimately, discontent with 
France’s military actions in Indochina spread across the Chamber of Deputies, enabling the 
opposition to bring down Ferry’s government over the issue in March 1885.35  
The debate in the Chamber of Deputies did not remain confined to the official political 
realm: it also reverberated into the public sphere, taking shape in newspapers, journals, 
pamphlets, and scholarly treatises. To some extent, writers and intellectuals’ arguments about 
Indochina reflected those that also echoed in the Chamber of Deputies. However, many writers 
also often connected their arguments about Indochina to wider questions about the nature, 
purpose, and political implications of politique coloniale. The debates about Indochina – and the 
wider discussion about politique coloniale that it provoked – thus marked the moment when 
“colonialism” became an object of widespread public discussion. 
The parliamentary debates in 1885 over France’s conquest of Indochina have received 
much scholarly attention – partly because they are accepted as a “turning point” in France’s 
colonial history.36 The arguments about Indochina marked both the first and last moment of 
                                               
34 Meyer, Tarrade, Rey-Goldzeiguer, and Thobie, Histoire de la France coloniale, 617. 
35 Brocheux and Hémery, Indochina, 46. 
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major opposition to the Third Republic’s decision to embrace colonial expansion.37 Even though 
opponents to Ferry’s politique coloniale succeeded in bringing down his ministry, they did not 
stem the growing support for colonial expansion that was emerging across France. Historians 
have therefore sought to explain the reasons behind the opposition’s ultimate failure. Some have 
pointed to the political divisions in the groups that opposed colonial expansion.38 Others have 
argued that many who opposed colonial expansion did so primarily on practical, rather than 
ideological grounds. They contend that most politicians only saw Ferry’s policies in Indochina as 
problematic when they became expensive – both in terms of French lives and French money.39 
But if scholars have sought to explain why the opposition was ultimately unsuccessful, they have 
devoted less attention to examining why the proponents of colonial empire took this apparently 
weak and divided opposition so seriously. Long after it became clear that the political opposition 
would not surrender the colonial conquest of Indochina, proponents of French colonial expansion 
continued to attack the critics of France’s politique colonial. 
This chapter examines the debates that emerged during and after France’s conquest of 
Indochina over the republic’s new expansionary politics. It looks at the ideological concerns that 
underpinned the arguments justifying or condemning the conquest and considers how this 
conversation about politique coloniale intersected with broader contemporary political debates - 
especially with disputes over the meaning, value, and history of “empire” and its relationship to 
the contemporary French republic. More specifically, this chapter shows how the memory of 
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Napoleon III and France’s defeat during the Franco-Prussian War continued to play an important 
role in shaping the republican conversation about colonial expansion into the 1880s. For much of 
this period, critics of politique coloniale were able to mobilize the memory of Napoleon III to 
criticize their opponents’ ideas – partly because he was largely responsible for investing France 
in Indochina in the first place during the 1860s. In response to these critics, those who defended 
politique coloniale sought to develop a new vocabulary to describe it and a new historical 
lineage to legitimize it in the eyes of the French public. By examining the connections between 
these disputes over Indochina and ongoing arguments about the political organization of the 
French state, the chapter highlights the ways in which the memory of the Second Empire helped 
give shape to a specifically republican discourse about colonial expansion. 
The chapter thus begins by examining the parliamentary debates over Indochina and the 
responses that those debates provoked in newspapers, journals, and political pamphlets, 
emphasizing the role played by political ideology and memory in this conversation. It then turns 
to the theoretical literature that these debates provoked and analyzes how different authors 
sought to define politique coloniale and provide it with a new theoretical basis and history. 
Through this analysis, the chapter demonstrates that the historical relationship between “empire” 
and “republic” remained a problem for republicans as they sought to justify new overseas 
conquests in the 1880’s. At the same time, it shows how republicans were increasingly able to 
elide those connections by formulating the idea of a “republican colonial empire.” 
 
II. The Conflict over Indochina, 1883-1885 
 The republican government’s decision to launch a large invasion of northern Vietnam 
between 1883 and 1885 marked both a shift in France’s expansionary policy and a high degree of 
investment in Southeast Asia. But France’s involvement in Indochina itself was not new: it dated 
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at least from the Second Empire.40 In 1857, Napoleon III sent troops into Cochinchina as an 
addendum to the larger intervention in China during the Second Opium War. The rationale for 
this military action was ostensibly to protect French Catholic missionaries and the local Christian 
population from persecution at the hands of the Vietnamese Emperor Tu Duc.41 In 1858, the 
Vice Admiral Rigault de Genouilly landed in Tourane with about 2000 soldiers. However, he 
attracted very little support from the indigenous Christians he was sent there to protect - the first 
in a series of setbacks. Instead of a quick, decisive victory, the French engaged in a protracted 
conflict with Tu Duc between 1858 and 1862.42 Over time, they gained ground, and in 1863, they 
forced Tu Duc to sign a treaty that ceded three of his provinces to France, granted freedom of 
navigation to all French ships, opened up major cities to French trade, and declared religious 
freedom throughout his empire.43 As the concessions make clear, the Second Empire’s interest in 
the territory had a religious component, but it centered on securing French commerce in 
Southeast Asia while increasing the government’s prestige domestically and internationally.44  
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If the 1863 treaty met most of the Second Empire’s goals, it did not end the conflict. The 
government continued to antagonize the Vietnamese by supporting measures to extend France’s 
influence in the area and establish trade with China. In 1864, the French signed a treaty 
establishing a protectorate over Cambodia.45 And in 1867, the Governor General Admiral de La 
Grandière annexed the western provinces of Vietnam.46 Throughout the late 1860s and into the 
early 1870s, moreover, military officers Ernest Doudart de Lagrée and Francis Garnier 
spearheaded several expeditions up the Mekong, Red, and Yangtze Rivers in order to increase 
France’s economic influence in northern Vietnam. Although these expeditions were only 
moderately successful, they increased French interest in trading with the Chinese province of 
Yunnan, even as they increased tensions with both the Chinese and Vietnamese governments.47 
Ultimately, these tensions came to a head in 1872-3 during the first crisis over Tonkin. 
In 1872, the French trader Jean Dupuis had led an expedition up the Red River in order to 
sell arms to the Chinese.48 On his return, Vietnamese mandarins in Hanoi detained him – an act 
that gave him an excuse to occupy part of the city before asking the French government for 
military assistance. The governor of Cochinchina, Admiral Marie-Jules Dupré, saw Dupuis’ 
actions as an opportunity to extend French influence in the area. He sent Francis Garnier to 
                                               
promising that the French would retain control over key port cities. Napoleon III found this proposition agreeable, 
and in fact sent a naval officer to sign the treaty with the Vietnamese in 1864. However, the republican opposition – 
led by Adolphe Thiers and Victor Duruy – refused to ratify it. See Brocheux and Hémery, Indochina, 21, 23, 26. 
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Hanoi ostensibly to negotiate with the mandarins.49 Instead, Garnier joined forces with Dupuis. 
Together, they seized Hanoi’s citadel and issued a proclamation declaring that the Red River was 
open to international trade. In the ensuing conflict, Garnier was killed. The government in Paris – 
still recovering from the events of 1870-71 – refused to occupy Tonkin, and ordered French 
troops to withdraw. They nevertheless succeeded in using the incident to negotiate a new treaty 
with the Vietnamese that consolidated France’s hold over Cochinchina and increased its trading 
privileges in Tonkin. But the incident was a setback for the advocates of expansion in Indochina 
– especially since France found the new treaty difficult to enforce.50 
At the beginning of the 1880s, tensions in Indochina rose once again. This was partly due 
to political developments in Southeast Asia. During this period, the Vietnamese Emperor Tu Duc 
distanced himself from France and cultivated closer ties with China.51 At the same time, the 
British began to advance towards Yunnan from Burma.52 These trends led some administrators 
and government officials to fear that France’s influence in Indochina was waning. The growing 
conviction that France’s ability to control territory overseas would determine its future influence 
and prosperity convinced many Opportunist Republicans that securing France’s position in 
Indochina against British and Chinese competition was critical.53 The Opportunists in Paris did 
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not – at least at first – seek out a military confrontation. But when local officials instigated a 
conflict, the republican government responded very differently from the way it had in 1873. 
In 1882, the Governor-General sent naval officer Henri Rivière to Hanoi to investigate 
the Vietnamese court’s complaints about the behavior of certain French merchants. Instead, 
much like Dupuis and Garnier in 1873, he used the troops accompanying him to capture the 
city’s citadel against the orders of the French government.54 Rivière only held the citadel for a 
few days before the metropolitan government ordered him to surrender it. The incident was thus 
resolved quickly, but it sparked a series of debates in France. Some republican politicians – 
including the Prime Minister Charles Duclerc – began to advocate for a military intervention in 
Indochina. For the most part, they framed this military intervention as defensive and insisted that 
its main objectives would center on protecting French commerce and enforcing the terms of the 
1874 treaty. However, they also made it clear that France would only be able to accomplish these 
objectives if it occupied the country militarily.55  
The conquest of Hanoi also affected the Vietnamese government. It convinced Tu Duc 
that the only way to stave off French conquest was to resist new incursions with military force. 56 
He thus sought out aid from the Black Flags, a semi-independent army commanded by Liu Yong 
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Fu and composed largely of soldiers-of fortune from Guangxi, China.57 At the same time, Tu 
Duc also appealed to the Chinese government for military assistance in the event of a conflict.58 
In response, the Chinese government agreed to send arms to support the Black Flags against the 
French and to move a Chinese army into the northern provinces of Tonkin.59 
Despite the growing enthusiasm for a military confrontation, French advocates for such 
action were initially unsuccessful in raising money and men to send into Tonkin – at least in part 
because many politicians remained unenthusiastic about the prospect of an open conflict with 
China. Because the Chinese Emperor had traditionally exercised rights of sovereignty over 
Vietnam, the threat of a conflict was very real.60 French politicians also were somewhat wary of 
funding an overseas war so soon after France’s expensive conquest of Tunisia. As a result, there 
were eight months of uneasy peace.61 When Jules Ferry assumed the position of Prime Minister 
in 1883, however, the group advocating for a military intervention gained new influence in the 
Chamber of Deputies.62 This shift in the metropolitan political climate had immediate 
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repercussions in Indochina. Almost immediately, Rivière – with renewed hope for metropolitan 
support - decided to launch an attack on the Vietnamese coalfield at Hon Gay and the city of 
Nam Dinh.63 After a short, bloody conflict, he occupied both territories.64  
News of Rivière’s most recent conquests was received with relatively positive attention 
in France. Many major French newspapers covered the story. In the Journal des débats, Charles 
Gauthier described Rivière as a brave man who was “defending our flag and our interests in the 
Far East. Commander Rivière has, thanks to his energy and industriousness… maintained our 
position in Hanoi and Haiphong…”65 He described Rivière’s most recent conquests as a matter 
of “military necessity,” insisting that without them, Rivière would not have been able to maintain 
any position in the territory at all. Le Figaro similarly implied that Rivière’s conquests were 
defensive in nature – even as it commended the speed and dexterity of his military maneuvers.66 
An author writing for Le Temps went a step farther: he contended that Rivière’s easy military 
successes demonstrated that France should not hesitate to intervene in Indochina. The 
Vietnamese government’s hold on its territories and the loyalty of its citizens, the writer asserted, 
was extremely weak. The author went on to claim that the French government should 
immediately send reinforcements to enable Rivière to maintain control over these new territories 
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and enforce the 1874 treaty.67 While many newspapers thus supported Rivière and even insisted 
that the government should send more troops and materials to Indochina, they continued to 
describe France’s purpose in the territory in relatively conservative terms. They argued that 
France needed to defend its position in Tonkin and protect its trading rights, but they also went 
out of their way to point out that France had no interest in conquering the territory. 
Rivière’s actions also incited a new debate in the French Chamber about how and to what 
extent France should support Rivière’s attempts to extend French control over a larger part of 
Vietnam.68 Many representatives remained concerned that this heightened conflict with the 
Vietnamese Emperor would provoke a larger and more expensive clash with China – especially 
since the Chinese government had warned against larger French engagement in the territory.69 
Advocates of intervention sought to address these concerns by promising that any military 
intervention would remain limited and avoid involving China. The proposed bill drafted by the 
Minister of the Navy and Foreign affairs to divert funds and troops to Indochina promised that 
France was not even “undertaking a military expedition” because, he claimed, “our troops will 
only act against pirates.”70 In other words, a French military operation in Tonkin would not seek 
conflict with the territory’s inhabitants or its government, let alone with China. Instead, it would 
simply consist of policing outlaws – like the Black Flags - who flouted both French and 
Vietnamese laws and thereby threatened France’s commerce and authority in the territory. At the 
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70 The bill even went so far as to contend that the Vietnamese government’s failure to enforce the terms of the treaty 
of 1874 was not deliberate. Instead, it stemmed from the fact that the government was too weak to control these 
“pirates” who disrupted French commerce and threatened French nationals. The French troops would therefore not 
fight against the Vietnamese government – in fact, they would fight for it by enforcing laws that the government 
could not itself enforce. See “Projet de Loi sur Tonkin,” Le Temps (28 April 1883), 1.  
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same time, the bill went on to imply, the military action would ensure that the Vietnamese 
government held to its previous promises to the French state.71 The ministry, like the press, thus 
sought to minimize the potential scope of the conflict and reassure the French deputies that the 
conflict would remain limited in size and scope. Even before this proposed bill came to a vote, 
however, events on the ground in Tonkin changed the nature of the conversation. 
 
Rivière’s Death and its Effects 
In May 1883, Rivière attempted to extend his reach north of Hanoi and died in battle with 
Vietnamese and Chinese Black Flag troops.72 News of his death reached France at the end of the 
month. It created widespread anger and led to calls for revenge across a variety of publications.73 
F. Joussenet, writing for the Journal des débats, described Rivière’s death as “heroic” and 
insisted that it imposed “new duties” on the French government. He noted that “a virile nation’s 
most noble means of avenging its loss is to continue the work to which they were sacrificed.”74 
Le Temps also argued that it was “necessary to avenge the death and maintain the honor of our 
pavilion.”75 The contention that military conflict was unavoidable because France’s honor was 
now at stake appeared in a number of publications across the political spectrum.76 
Several publications took their interpretation of this event a step further and used it to 
criticize the government’s recent strategies in Indochina. The conservative republican newspaper 
                                               
71 Ibid. 
72 Rivière had headed north of Hanoi with 450 troops to attack the Black Flag troops in the Vietnamese countryside. 
But the Black Flag troops caught them at the Paper Bridge. A number of French soldiers died and the rest were 
forced to retreat. See Chapius, The Last Emperors of Vietnam, 65. 
73 This was in sharp contrast to the public reaction to the news of Garnier’s death in 1873. In 1873, Garnier’s death 
was mostly ignored. See Taylor, A History of the Vietnamese, 470. 
74 F. Joussenet, Journal des débats politiques (27 May 1883), 1. 
75 “Bulletin du Jour,” Le Temps (28 May 1883), 1. 
76 See, for example, “L’Affaire du Tonkin: Mort du commandant Rivière,” Le Petit Journal (28 May 1883), 1; “La 
mort du commandant Rivière,” Le Rappel (28 May 1883), 1. 
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Le Siècle described the death as a “warning” and insisted that it was partly the government’s 
fault. If the Republic had enforced the terms of the 1874 treaty all along, the author averred, 
Rivière’s military intervention would never have been necessary. The French government’s 
failures in Indochina, the author went on to contend, were not isolated mistakes. Instead, they 
were a symptom of the republican government’s “flightiness” – a trait that was endangering 
France’s establishments around the world. He explained that in the years immediately following 
the Franco-Prussian War, the French government had neglected its overseas colonies – even in 
the face of extensive Italian and English overseas expansion. It was only in the wake of the 
British conquest of Egypt that any republican politicians had become interested in colonial 
questions at all. But even as these politicians became convinced that overseas expansion was 
central to France’s future, they remained concerned that the French public would not support it. 
As a result, they employed “half-measures” and obscured their goals to avoid public dissent. 
Rivière’s death was the result of a government that “wants and does not want, dares and does not 
dare” because its inconsistencies placed brave men into dangerous situations without enough 
support. The writer concluded by insisting that in the future, France needed to fully commit itself 
and its resources to defending and extending these overseas territories – regardless of public 
opinion - in order to protect France’s “external prestige, moral force, and commercial markets.”77   
Like the journalist in Le Siècle, writers from the republican XIXe Siècle and Gil Blas, 
along with the conservative Le Gaulois also argued that the government was responsible for 
Rivière’s death because it had failed to commit enough resources to its overseas projects.78 H. de 
                                               
77 The author specifically pointed to Napoleon III’s misadventures in Mexico as one of the key historical memories 
driving this distrust. See “Un Leçon sévère,” Le Siècle (28 May 1883), 1. 
78 In Le XIXe Siècle, Henry Fouquier argued, “The responsibility for his death and that of his poor soldiers must 
weigh on the consciences of the eternal partisans of half-measures.” See Henry Fouquier, “Chronique,” Le XIXe 
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Pène contended that “the real murderers of Rivière and his companions” were not in Indochina, 
but in the French Chamber of Deputies. He invoked Rivière’s death as a sign of France’s decline 
into decadence and warned that without major political and social changes – which he saw as 
unlikely - this degeneration would become worse.79 The republican writers were not as 
pessimistic about France’s future – but like the journalist writing for Le Siècle, they used the 
incident to call for greater commitment to France’s colonial enterprises.80  
Left-leaning journalists, on the other hand, also used the incident to criticize the 
government’s strategies in Indochina. La Justice contended that the incident revealed the 
“thoughtlessness” with which the government undertook overseas military expeditions.81 Henri 
Rochefort, on the other hand, compared the government’s strategies in Indochina unfavorably to 
what he saw as Pierre Savorgnan de Brazza’s “peaceful” conquest of the Congo and questioned 
the purpose of avenging Rivière’s death.82 But only Le Petit Parisien used the incident to 
question the basic purpose of France’s presence in Indochina. An anonymous journalist 
described France’s activity in the country as a dangerous “adventure” – the same term that the 
republican opposition had long used to describe Napoleon III’s overseas expeditions. This 
adventure, he warned, would lead to a “considerable war six thousand leagues from France” and 
                                               
Siècle (28 May 1883), 1-2. See also Albert Delangle, “Henri Rivière,” Gil Blas (28 May 1883), 2; “L’Affaire du 
Tonkin: Mort du commandant Rivière,” Le Petit Journal (28 May 1883), 1. 
79 He described Rivière’s death as a French defeat and insisted that it was a sign that France had failed to recover 
from its losses after 1870-71. See “H. de Pène, “Le Drapeau en Péril,” Le Gaulois (27 May 1883), 1. 
80 Henry Fouquier expressed the hope that Rivière’s death would be seen as “a sadness, an example, and a lesson,” 
that would move France to embrace more “intelligent and resolute” political choices. See Fouquier, “Chronique,” 2; 
Jules Richard, “Le Corps Expéditionnaire du Tonkin,” Le Figaro (30 May 1883), 2.  
81 La Justice (29 May 1883), 1. 
82 He noted with admiration that indigenous chiefs willingly ceded “magnificent territory” to him. See Henri de 
Rochefort, “Vengeance!” L’Instransigeant (29 May 1883), 1. 
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was likely to become the republic’s “Mexico.”83 Although the journalist did not openly advocate 
against the government’s quest to avenge Rivière, he thus implied that France’s very presence in 
Indochina was problematic and directly compared the country’s strategies there to Napoleon III’s 
overseas policies. This perspective, however, was not very widespread or popular. 
If a few left-leaning journalists thus protested against the military strategies in Indochina 
and even called on the government to rethink its ambitions in the territory, most newspapers used 
the incident to call for still-greater investment in the territory. Although many of these 
newspapers had supported an expansion of France’s control over Indochina, their calls for action 
in Indochina after Rivière’s death took on a new tone. For the most part, those advocating for an 
extension of France’s presence in Indochina had long implied that this presence was necessary 
simply to “restore” the terms of the 1874 treaty.84 These new calls for expansion, on the other 
hand, did not even mention the 1874 treaty and increasingly argued explicitly for colonial 
expansion as a desirable goal. In fact, many compared France’s actions in Indochina to those it 
had taken in Tunisia – a military conflict that ended in French control of the territory.85 Others 
compared France’s relationship to Indochina to Britain’s colonial conquests around the globe.86 
                                               
83 See “La Guerre au Tonkin: Mort du Commandant Rivière,” Le Petit Parisien (28 May 1883), 1. Journalists 
writing for Le Petit Parisien had been very critical of the Opportunist government’s policies overseas for some time 
– both in Tunisia and in Tonkin. They were particularly critical of Jules Ferry and his policies. For examples of 
articles, see “Le Tonkin,” Le Petit Parisien (7 April 1883), 2; “Le Tonkin,” Le Petit Parisien (13 April 1883), 3. 
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the future of France’s relationship to Vietnam. In Le Journal des débats, Charles Gauthier had indicated that 
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See, for example, Pène, “Le Drapeau en Péril,” 1; “Un leçon sévère,” 1; Jules Richard, “Le Corps Expéditionnaire 
du Tonkin,” Le Figaro (30 May 1883), 2. 
86 “Bulletin du Jour,” Le Temps (28 May 1883), 1; “Un leçon sévère,” 1. 
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In other words, while initially French newspapers had at least nominally called for a limited 
military effort that would promote French commerce in East Asia, they now began to argue that 
France needed to conquer all of Vietnam.  
This growing interest in Tonkin was also reflected in a growing number of political 
pamphlets, which sought to convince their readers that a French conquest of Tonkin would bring 
essential political, economic, and cultural benefits to the Tonkinese and the French nation alike. 
Several writers went out of their way to assure their readers that France’s conquest of Tonkin 
was not unjust, both because France had fundamental rights to the territory and because it alone 
could ensure the happiness of the territory’s inhabitants.87 Charles Lemire, for example, insisted 
that France’s control over Indochina would be “salutary” for the peoples who lived there because 
it would bring order to a territory overrun by pirates and outlaws.88 Henry Thureau promised that 
French rule would above all “deliver” the “unhappy country oppressed by odious tyrants.”89 By 
contending that a French conquest of Tonkin would be both legal and morally just, these authors 
thus sought to convince their readers that colonial conquest fell squarely within republican 
political principles. Colonialism, in short, was becoming a popular nationalist theme across most 
of the factions in Third Republic French political culture. 
                                               
87 This question of rights was important partly because China also claimed sovereignty over Tonkin. Several writers 
went out of their way to dispute this sovereignty. Edmond Plauchut, for example, insisted that China had 
surrendered its rights to the territory with the treaty of 1874. Henri Cordier, on the other hand, insisted that while 
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See Daughton, An Empire Divided, 76. 
89 Henry Thureau, Notre colonie, le Tong-Kin: Explorations et conquêtes, apercus géographiques, les produits 
naturels, les ressources commerciales (Paris: Dreyfous, 1883), 2. Not all authors argued that the Republic’s role in 
Tonkin would be to “liberate” its inhabitants. De Thiersant in fact contended that France would be able to rule in the 
territory because of the fact that its inhabitants embraced authoritarian and patriarchical political and social 
structures. See Philibert Dabry de Thiersant, Nos intérets dans l’Indo-Chine (Paris: Ernest Leroux, 1884), 30. 
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A number of authors also argued that conquering Tonkin would bring immense 
commercial benefits to France. Some contended that Tonkin would serve as an important market 
for French exports that were struggling to find buyers elsewhere.90 Thureau, for example, 
insisted that French commerce was suffering across the globe because its markets had 
diminished in the face of British competition. In order to protect its trade, France needed to 
create its own markets – and Tonkin, because of its geographic position and the size of its 
population, promised to be a fruitful one.91 Others pointed to the richness of the territory’s 
natural resources. Philibert Dabry de Thiersant, for example, argued that Tonkin was a fertile 
country that could produce rice, cotton, tea, sugar, coffee, tobacco, opium, and spices for 
export.92 Still others claimed that Tonkin was valuable primarily because it would provide 
France with an opening to trade with China. A. S. de Doncourt, for example, argued that Tonkin 
itself could become an important center to conduct commercial trade with Yunnan and other 
wealthy Chinese provinces.93 These benefits, the writers implied, would eventually offset any 
expenses France might incur while conquering the territory in the first place. 
If many writers highlighted the economic benefits that Tonkin’s conquest would bring to 
France, others cast the conflict in more urgent cultural terms. Doncourt, for example, contended 
that France’s presence in Tonkin was a “national” undertaking with implications for the future of 
                                               
90 Armand Rivière, La guerre avec la Chine: la politique coloniale et la question du Tonkin (Paris: Auguste Giro, 
1883), 6. 
91 Thureau, Notre colonie, le Tong-Kin, 6. 
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“civilization” itself.94 Paul Deschanel similarly claimed that France needed to conquer Tonkin 
and establish a secure foothold in East Asia in order to compete against other European nations. 
He reminded his readers of Prévost-Paradol’s France nouvelle, which had warned of France’s 
future eclipse in the face of Anglo-Saxon and German expansion. This future, he suggested, was 
becoming reality. In order to secure France’s future cultural influence in Europe and across the 
globe, France needed to embark on an expansive project of colonization – beginning in Tonkin.95 
These different writers did not all share the same vision for France’s future in Indochina: 
they described its potential values in distinct if overlapping terms. But together, they sought to 
secure the importance of Tonkin in the popular imagination in the wake of Rivière’s death, 
insisting that the benefits that the territory would bring to France would far outweigh the costs 
involved in conquering it. These visions of Tonkin’s promise worked together with the memory 
of Rivière’s death to build support for a continued French intervention in the territory. 
Rivière’s death did not only echo across French newspapers and journals. It also created 
immediate political effects – at least partly because Rivière’s conquests had pushed him into 
national prominence. In fact, shortly before the government received the news that he had died, 
they had named him superior commander of the naval forces in Tonkin.96 When the Minister of 
the Navy announced that Rivière was dead, the Chamber of Deputies voted unanimously to 
approve war credits.97 Jules Ferry promised that with new troops, funds, and supplies, the army 
                                               
94 Doncourt, Les français dans l’Extrême-Orient, v. 
95 Paul Deschanel, La Question du Tonkin (Paris: Berger-Levrault, 1883), 2. Deschanel was a lawyer who would be 
elected deputy for Eure-et-Loire in October 1885 and join the Progressist Republicans. See Kevin Passmore, The 
Right in France from the Third Republic to Vichy (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 76. 
96 Mermeaux, “Le commandant Rivière,” Le Gaulois (27 May 1883), 1. 
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would quickly consolidate its hold over Tonkin.98 Like their journalistic counterparts, most 
deputies had come, by the end of May, to agree that a wider war of conquest in Indochina was 
necessary. But they continued to disagree about the ultimate aims of such a war beyond revenge. 
These divergences in opinion would become apparent as the conflict dragged on. 
Despite Ferry’s promise for a quick French victory, the quest to avenge Rivière marked 
the beginning of a conflict between the French army, Vietnamese mandarins, Black Flags, and 
regular Chinese troops that ultimately lasted two years. France’s position in this conflict was 
complicated: the Opportunists who formed the majority of the government wanted to extend 
France’s control over Tonkin but at the same time still remained wary about open war with 
China.99 These conditions hampered the measures the army could take, especially since Chinese 
soldiers were actively engaged in the conflict. But despite the army’s inability to operate openly 
against China, French troops met mostly with success in 1883 and 1884.100 This success was due 
in part to the succession crisis that followed the death of the Vietnamese Emperor Tu Duc in July 
1883, which made it more difficult for the Vietnamese government to oppose French advances in 
an organized manner. The dynastic struggle also weakened the loyalty of some Vietnamese 
mandarins to the Hue court and led them to support the French instead.101  
By June 1884, the French government was able to force the weakened Vietnamese court 
to sign the “Pâtenotre treaty,” which established a French protectorate over Tonkin and 
                                               
98 Cooper, France in Indochina, 16. 
99 Ferry’s knew that the Assembly would not support a war with China. Over the next year, during his speeches to 
the Chamber of Deputies asking for more money and more men, he repeatedly assured the representatives that China 
would not intervene – despite the fact that there were at least 30,000 Chinese soldiers in northern Vietnam. See 
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Annam.102  At the same time, the French signed a convention with the Chinese, in which China 
agreed to recognize the new French protectorates.103 However, the French government also sent 
China an ultimatum demanding that the government withdraw its troops from Tonkin and pay a 
large indemnity to the French government for participating in the conflict. The Chinese 
government had been willing to recognize French control over Vietnam, but it refused the terms 
of the ultimatum and did not withdraw its troops from northern Vietnam. As a result, France’s 
conflict with China moved into a higher key.104  
In response to China’s refusal to retreat, Ferry decided to organize an invasion of Taiwan. 
He sent the French navy to bombard the harbor and institute a blockade. This strategy was 
unpopular in the Chamber of Deputies, however, both because it was expensive and because the 
British opposed it.105 At the same time, the Chinese forces launched a counteroffensive in Tonkin 
itself, forcing the French government to expend considerable resources in order to counter the 
advancing Chinese front.106 Over the second half of 1884, Jules Ferry had to appeal to the 
Chamber several times for more money and men. While the deputies continued to approve these 
bills, discontent over the growing expenses resulting from France’s investment in Indochina 
                                               
102 More specifically, it placed the provinces in Tonkin under direct control of French residents, and installed a 
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began to rise on both the right and the left.107 This discontent would ultimately crystalize in 
response to the “crisis” of Lang Son in March 1885.  
 
Responding to the Crisis of Lang-Son 
The French had captured the city of Lang Son in Tonkin in February 1885 with a large 
army commanded by General François de Négrier after several months of fighting with Chinese 
and Black Flag troops in the surrounding countryside.108 In March, however, the Chinese 
counterattacked. During the fighting, General de Négrier was wounded, so he decided to put 
Lieutenant-Colonel Paul Herbinger in command of the troops. Herbinger panicked in the face of 
the advancing Chinese army and ordered a retreat from the city.109 The French troops abandoned 
most of their supplies and many of their cannons as they fled, leaving both in the hands of their 
opponents.110 Overall, it was a relatively inconsequential defeat – not least because it occurred 
after Jules Ferry had already secretly entered into peace negotiations with Chinese authorities.111 
But because no one knew about the extent of the loss or about the peace negotiations, France’s 
defeat at Lang Son created a political crisis in France that played out both in the Chamber of 
Deputies and in the popular press. It also led to a wide debate about the meaning, purpose, and 
value of “empire” that would ultimately help shape French justifications for colonial expansion. 
                                               
107 Ferry asked for war credits in October 1883, December 1883, June 1884, and December 1885. Each time, more 
deputies voted against them. See Meyer, Tarrade, Rey-Goldzeigueur, Thobie, Histoire de la France coloniale, 610. 
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News of France’s defeat at Lang-Son reached France almost immediately. Even more 
than Rivière’s death, it sparked a firestorm of controversy around France’s strategies in Tonkin 
and the politique coloniale that drove them. Jules Ferry announced the news on March 30 and 
used the occasion to ask for a credit of 200 million francs to “avenge [France’s] loss” and to 
“safeguard [its] honor.”112 Republican radicals Georges Clemenceau and Alexandre Ribot 
insisted that the Parliament could not discuss the question of credits until it held an inquiry that 
determined who was responsible for the recent events.113 Clemenceau even went so far as to 
contend that France’s defeat at Lang-Son proved that the Ferry ministry was untrustworthy, 
which meant, “the Chamber no longer has ministers before it, but defendants… accused of high 
treason.”114 The conservatives, led by Bonapartist Jules Delafosse, agreed. When Jules Ferry 
asked to prioritize the vote for credits over the inquiry, Parliament overturned the proposition, 
306 votes to 149. Even a number of Opportunist republicans who had long supported Ferry’s 
actions in Indochina voted against him.115 In response, Ferry’s cabinet immediately resigned.116 
Lang-Son also provoked a series of newspaper debates in the press that took on a 
different tone from the 1883 Indochina debates. Two years earlier, most publications had 
invoked Rivière’s death as a call to action – even if they had also used this event to criticize 
government policies. The French army’s retreat from Lang-Son, on the other hand, led many 
authors in major leftist and conservative publications to go beyond a critique of the French 
government’s strategies in Vietnam and attack the wider premises of France’s presence in the 
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  290 
territory. This line of argumentation was not entirely new – journalists in Le Petit Parisien had 
been questioning French involvement in Indochina since 1882 – but it now appeared in a much 
wider range of publications. At the same time, however, other journals continued to defend the 
Ferry ministry’s policies in Indochina and to call for an expansion of France’s military efforts in 
the territory. To some extent, these debates fell along ideological lines – but they also crossed 
over and complicated political perspectives. Ultimately, these arguments over Lang-Son 
expanded from specific questions about France’s future in East Asia to much wider debates 
about the purpose of politique colonial and the nature of colonialism’s relationship to French 
republicanism and imperialism.  
Although many Opportunist Republicans abandoned the Ferry ministry in the wake of 
Lang-Son, a number of republican newspapers continued to defend the government’s actions 
abroad. They employed several different strategies to convince their readers that the Ferry 
ministry’s policies in Indochina had not irrevocably failed. Many contended that the deputies 
were overreacting to the events at hand. Le Siècle conceded, for example, the events in Lang-Son 
were “serious,” but they were not, as some deputies had implied, “irreparable.” It thus called on 
both its readers and the government to avoid rash actions in a “moment of exaggerated 
emotion.”117 Le Temps similarly claimed, two days after the ministry’s collapse, that the situation 
was “not as black” as it first seemed: it argued that the defeat would not affect France’s future in 
the territory, noting that it had not even resulted in the death or injury of many French soldiers.118 
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It accused the Chamber of acting hysterically by treating the minor defeat at Lang-Son as a “new 
Sedan” that would “merit a second September 4th.”119 Le Temps thus sought to assure its readers 
that France’s defeat at Lang-Son was a minor setback that could not be compared to major 
French losses under the Second Empire during the Franco-Prussian War.  
Even as these defenders of Ferry’s policies in Indochina sought to reassure their readers 
about the security of France’s position in Tonkin, they also used the incident at Lang-Son to call 
for more troops and funds – much like their predecessors in 1883. Le Temps argued that the only 
way for France to regain the lost territory from the Chinese was to send in 50,000 soldiers.120 Le 
Petit Journal similarly proposed that France needed to send reinforcements and resources 
immediately to avenge itself against China.121 Both newspapers thus implied that France should 
not respond to its defeat at Lang-Son by withdrawing from Tonkin; the French should instead 
invest more resources in order to secure a more favorable future outcome. Le Siècle even went so 
far as to contend that the incident indicated that France needed to expand, not contract, its 
military efforts in East Asia. In order to secure France’s in Indochina, one anonymous journalist 
argued, France needed to send a large army immediately into China itself. Only by invading 
Beijing itself, he declared, would France conclude the conflict successfully.122  
In fact, many defenders of France’s expansionary policies in Indochina insisted that the 
weakness in the government’s strategies stemmed not from the Ferry ministry’s poor decisions 
but from both the radicals and conservatives who had blocked their efforts in the territory at 
                                               
the French conquest of the territory back a single month – it certainly had not endangered France’s place in the 
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119 “Événements de Tonkin,” Le Temps (1 April 1885), 1. 
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121 “Une Journée perdue,” Le Petit Journal (1 April 1885), 1. 
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every turn. They claimed that the defeat at Lang-Son would have never happened if these groups 
had not made it so difficult to send soldiers and money to the territory. Le Temps argued that the 
Ferry ministry had been forced to wage an “inexpensive” war, which had in fact proven very 
costly.123 Emmanuel Arène similarly contended that the government was simply unable to “strike 
with decisive blows” and could not even dare to “pronounce the name of war” without being 
harassed by an opposition that was prepared to profit from its “smallest hesitations and faults.”124 
These journalists thus implied that blame for France’s defeat at Lang-Son should fall mainly on 
the members of the opposition that had hypocritically brought down Ferry’s government. 
If some journalists deflected culpability for Lang-Son away from the Ferry ministry, 
others sought to turn attention away from questions about responsibility altogether. They insisted 
that instead of identifying who was to blame, all political parties needed to work together in 
order to overcome the military setback. The republican writers at La République français, for 
example, declared, “There is no room for recrimination. There also is not any room to worry 
about the past: only to look towards the future. The rallying cry must be: union and action.”125 
The conservative republican Le Siècle similarly argued that everyone’s “first thoughts must be 
for our brave soldiers… it is the hour where all divisions must be forgotten… where the honor of 
the flag imposes silence on all party considerations.”126 These journalists thus implied that 
internal political debates were subsidiary to this larger “national” problem. A second journalist 
writing for Le Siècle took this argument a step farther: he used the juxtaposition between divisive 
party politics and national unity to criticize the behavior of conservatives and leftists in 
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Parliament. He claimed that by overturning the Ferry ministry, the Chamber of Deputies had 
chosen a petty “ministerial question” over a critical “national question” and thus complicated 
France’s task in Indochina.127 He thus implied that the ministry’s critics were shortsighted and 
insufficiently patriotic; they had sought to improve their party’s political position instead of 
working in the nation’s best interests. 
These defenders of Ferry’s policies in Indochina therefore minimized the consequences 
of Lang-Son in the popular imagination, while simultaneously invoking the event as a reason for 
all political parties to rally around the French flag and invest more resources in securing Tonkin. 
Although they did not devote much space to defending Jules Ferry, they called on the newly 
appointed ministry to continue his efforts in East Asia under the banner of national honor and 
revenge. At the same time, they tried to depoliticize these debates over France’s expansionary 
policies in Indochina by describing them as “national” concerns for the whole Republic. 
Even as some republican newspapers thus defended Ferry’s policies in Indochina, others 
took up the arguments of various deputies to criticize the French government’s strategies and 
goals for Lang-Son. These journals did not necessarily sympathize with the political opposition’s 
perspective on France’s position in Indochina. Like their counterparts at Le Temps and Le Siècle, 
republican journalists at Le Journal des débats and Le Petit journal argued that the Parliament 
had overreacted to the defeat at Lang-Son. Le Journal des débats, for example, insisted that 
France’s situation in Lang-Son was “grave” but not “disastrous.”128 Auguste Vacquerie similarly 
described the defeat as serious, but argued that it was important not to act as an alarmist.129 
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Notably, these writers also argued that the government should respond to the crisis by sending in 
reinforcements – not by pulling out of the territory.130 
If these republican critics of the Ferry ministry, much like his supporters, minimized 
France’s defeat at Lang-Son and proposed a military solution for solving it, their assessments of 
the situation differed in other ways. They were more likely to contend that the Ferry ministry 
was uniquely responsible for the defeat. Le Journal des débats, for example, insisted that the 
Ferry ministry had allowed “events to drive [its] policies” instead of creating policies that would 
direct the course of the war. Although both the Ferry ministry and its Opportunist supporters had 
proven adept at producing “patriotic harangues,” Le Journal des débats noted, they had waged a 
passive and ineffective offensive in Tonkin.131 Thomas Grimm similarly described the ministry’s 
actions in Indochina as “equivocal” and called on the new government to act decisively in order 
to avoid new disasters.132 Jules Simon contended that the ministry had not methodically pursued 
its goals: instead, it had embraced a policy marked by “hesitations and half-measures.”133 These 
republican critics thus agreed with Ferry’s supporters that indecisiveness had led to France’s 
most recent defeat. But Ferry’s supporters attributed these hesitations to the parliamentary 
opposition, whereas his critics proclaimed that they stemmed from the ministry itself.  
In addition to attacking the means by which the Ferry ministry had carried out the 
invasion of Indochina, some of these republican critics also condemned the decision to conquer 
Tonkin in the first place. An anonymous journalist writing for Le Journal de débats, for example, 
insisted that Ferry’s decision to attack China in particular had been a mistake. This war was far 
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riskier for France than it was for China, he asserted, and it was now becoming difficult to see 
how France would be able to exit smoothly from the conflict.134 Other journalists went so far as 
to imply that the conflict was effectively pointless. Jules Simon declared that Tonkin offered no 
strategic or economic benefits for France and that as a result, Ferry’s decision to extend France’s 
holdings beyond Cochinchina – a colony that was useful - was “not in the interest” of the 
nation.135 Thomas Grimm took this argument a step further still by arguing that no part of 
Indochina would ever be useful to France. Instead of attempting to spread its influence so far 
afield, he maintained, France should concentrate on spreading its influence in North Africa. 
Territories in North Africa were more economically productive and better positioned 
strategically than the lands in Southeast Asia. Moreover, France would be able to defend its 
holdings there – unlike in Indochina, which was too far away. Although Grimm did not argue 
that France should withdraw from Indochina, he insisted that after resolving favorable peace 
treaties with China, it should pull most of its resources out of the territory.136  
A number of major republican publications thus used France’s defeat at Lang-Son to 
criticize the Ferry ministry’s attempt to conquer Tonkin on multiple levels. Many contended that 
the ministry had failed to organize the invasion effectively; some even implied that the decision 
to invade had been a mistake in the first place. But at the same time, their vision of France’s 
colonial future in Indochina was not markedly different from that of republicans who continued 
to support the Ferry ministry. Most argued that France needed to respond to the defeat by 
sending in reinforcements to protect its soldiers and its reputation. And perhaps even more 
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importantly, even as many insisted that the invasion of Tonkin had been a mistake, they did not 
disavow colonial conquest itself. Instead, they differentiated between more and less useful 
colonies and contended that Tonkin fell into the latter camp. 
Much like in 1883, the most vehement criticism of the Ferry ministry’s policies appeared 
in left-leaning journals. Many of these journals invoked the events of Lang-Son to condemn 
France’s conquest of Indochina in no uncertain terms. Le Petit Parisien in particular described 
France’s activities in Indochina as “the most lamentable of adventures” which had 
“compromised France’s national interest.”137 The contention that France’s activities in Indochina 
amounted to little more than an irresponsible “adventure” that would never bring security, 
material wealth, or national prestige echoed across a number of leftist publications.138 
Many of these journalists argued that France’s decision to conquer Tonkin had been a 
mistake, which the government made even worse because it had been deliberately negligent and 
indeed duplicitous in promoting the conquest. They referred to Jules Ferry’s recent assurances 
about the security of France’s troops in Indochina as evidence that he had purposefully misled 
both the French Parliament and the nation about the nature of the conflict in the territory.139 
Henry Maret even implied that the Ferry ministry had used “false dispatches” from Indochina in 
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order to convince the public that the conquest was going well.140 S. Pichon similarly contended 
that Ferry had presented the public with “illusions” and “falsities” by describing the conflict as a 
“military promenade” and painting China as a “negligible quantity.” Pichon was quick to point 
out, however, that the responsibility for Lang-Son did not fall on Ferry alone: he maintained that 
the majority of the Chamber had followed along with his plans and served as his 
“accomplices.”141 Other writers implied that the government’s obfuscations were not only 
dishonest but also criminal.142 L’Intransigeant – much like Clemenceau himself - went so far as 
to insist that the ministry’s actions amounted to “treason” and compared Jules Ferry to a 
murderer who needed to be tried.143 
Even more notably, many left-leaning journals drew comparisons between the Ferry 
ministry and the Second Empire. Some simply implied that both regimes were equally marked 
by folly and blind optimism. An anonymous journalist writing for Le Petit Parisien, for example, 
claimed that the Opportunist republicans cried, “To Peking!” with as much enthusiasm and as 
little preparation as the Bonapartists before them had shouted “To Berlin!” at the outset of the 
Franco-Prussian War.144 He went on to indicate that both enterprises would meet with the same 
fate. Other writers, drew direct parallels between the two regimes’ moral flaws. In La Justice, S. 
Pichon argued that the government’s conquest of Indochina had been undertaken with even more 
“cynicism and bad faith than the Empire itself would have permitted.”145 He thus implied that the 
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problems that many Republicans had attributed to the imperial government also affected the 
republican regime. Henri Rochefort proclaimed in an even more inflammatory tone, “I do not 
wish to do Napoleon III the dishonor of comparing him to Jules Ferry. If the former committed 
the odious folly of declaring war on Germany, at least he went in person to Sedan… Ferry did 
not even risk his insect shell for an instant during this expedition.”146 He went on to indicate that 
on some level, Ferry and all of the ministers who supported him were even more corrupt than 
their imperial counterparts because they sent others to die overseas without risking themselves. 
The contradictions of “republican imperialism” were thus apparent to some Republican critics. 
All of these comparisons were to some extent hyperbolic; they compared the Ferry 
ministry to the Second Empire primarily to demonstrate that the ministry was problematic and 
corrupt. Other journalists made more direct connections between the two regime’s strategies and 
respective relationship to overseas territory by complaining that both devoted too many resources 
to expensive, never-ending overseas expeditions. In La Justice, Léon Millot argued that the 
Second Empire and the Third Republic undertook constant “warlike expeditions that will haunt 
us forever.” He noted with some despair, “after the experience of Crimea, China, Mexico, and 
Germany, we have thrown ourselves at Tunisia, Madagascar, and Tonkin.”147 He thus implied 
that the Second Empire and the Third Republic shared essential and equally destructive core 
programs. He concluded by insisting that France would only find true stability and prosperity by 
giving up the project of overseas conquest altogether.  
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Camille Pelletan, writing in the leftist La Justice, took the comparison between the Third 
Republic and the Second Empire a step farther by warning that the Third Republic’s policies 
were in danger of leading France towards yet another conflict with Germany. He cautioned that 
the government’s habit of sending its army off on “adventures” around the world would only 
serve to “leave Europe at the mercy of Germany” much like in 1870. He reminded his readers, 
“The future of France is not in China” and implored the government to act accordingly.148 
Pelletan’s conviction that France’s colonial investment overseas would lead to a second Sedan 
appeared in multiple publications. In Le Radical, for example, Henry Maret compared the 
Republic’s actions in Indochina to the Second Empire’s disastrous invasion of Mexico. He 
warned, “Mexico led us to Sedan, beware of where Tonkin will lead us.”149 Le Petit Parisien 
even implied that the Third Republic’s policy of pursuing overseas conquest was not only similar 
to imperial policies in the years leading up to 1871, but the direct result of German interference. 
The author claimed that Bismarck himself was responsible for pushing Jules Ferry first towards 
Tunisia and later towards Tonkin in an effort to distract France from its continental interests.150 
Jules Ferry, much like Napoleon III before him, was thus allowing Bismarck to manipulate him.  
Leftists’ critiques of the Ferry ministry’s policies were thus more radical than their 
republican counterparts’ were. They began from the premise that France’s presence in Indochina 
was mistaken and averred that the Ferry ministry’s strategies in the territory were incompetent 
and criminal. Moreover, many argued that the Ferry ministry’s mistaken decision to conquer 
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Tonkin was not unique; they insisted that all of Ferry’s colonial conquests – including Tunisia 
and Madagascar – were equally problematic. These writers also sought to discredit overseas 
conquest and politique coloniale in general by associating the policy directly with the Second 
Empire and Napoleon III. They warned that the Ferry ministry’s politique coloniale would again 
make it impossible for France to defend itself in the event of a European conflict.  
Despite these criticisms of the Ferry ministry’s conquest of Tonkin and its embrace of 
politique coloniale, however, most leftists did not call for the new government to retreat from 
Tonkin. Although a few, like Henri de Rochefort, contended that France should focus less on 
“attacking the door to China” than France’s “door to the east,” most leftist journalists, like their 
moderate counterparts, asserted that France should respond to the defeat at Lang-Son by sending 
in reinforcements to defend its soldiers and avenge its honor.151 In other words, even as they 
argued that Ferry’s investment in overseas territories and his promotion of politique coloniale 
was leading France towards disaster, they did not for the most part claim that France should 
adopt new strategies in Tonkin. Some implied that eventually, France should consider 
withdrawing from the territory – but even those writers did not propose a clear exit strategy.152 
These writers thus joined the attack on Ferry’s ministry but did little to overturn his policies. 
Conservative newspapers and journalists also used the French defeat at Lang-Son to 
criticize the Ferry ministry’s strategies and goals in Tonkin. To some extent, their condemnations 
of Ferry’s policies echoed those of the left. Many even used the same terminology to describe 
France’s activities in Tonkin – they labeled it as a “disastrous adventure” that would never 
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benefit the nation.153 Some also similarly went beyond criticizing Ferry’s specific strategies in 
Tonkin and implied that his entire foreign policy was misguided. Like leftist journalists, they 
sought to cast aspersions on the politique coloniale that he had embraced. Conquering far-flung 
overseas territories, these conservatives implied, was a careless and expensive activity that would 
only endanger France’s position on the continent. Some writers even went so far as to imply that 
politique coloniale itself was little more than a “policy of adventures” that was much more likely 
to harm France than it was to benefit its economy, prestige, or military.154  
Conservative writers also drew parallels between the Ferry ministry and the Second 
Empire. A number compared the expedition to Napoleon III’s invasion of Mexico – much like 
the republican critics at La Justice and L’Intransigeant – but most of the comparisons were less 
specific.155  An anonymous journalist writing for La Presse described the Ferry ministry as “a 
poor imitation of the Empire” that had collapsed the same way as its predecessor had in 1870, 
and went on to imply that Ferry was even more blameworthy than his imperial predecessors.156 
This contention – that the Ferry ministry was not only comparable to but worse than the Second 
Empire – appeared in a number of conservative publications. Several writers implied specifically 
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that the Republic’s defeat at Lang-Son was even worse than the Empire’s defeat in the Franco-
Prussian War because it was more embarrassing to lose to the Chinese than to the Germans.157  
Conservative journalists’ descriptions of France’s future in Indochina, however, deviated 
more widely from their leftist counterparts’ visions. Although some leftist journalists had argued 
that France should withdraw from Indochina – at least as soon as the defeat at Lang-Son was 
avenged – most conservative journals insisted that France was now, for better or for worse, 
committed to the territory. Le Figaro, for example, acknowledged that France would be better 
served by pulling out its troops and its money instead of investing more in a fruitless endeavor. 
At the same time, however, the newspaper went on to contend that it was impossible for nations 
to back away from important commitments and keep their honor – even if they realized that they 
had made a mistake.158 In Le Gaulois, H. de Pène similarly stated that France could not 
“honorably” withdraw from Indochina: he declared that the only road to peace in the territory 
was “through victory.” Moreover, he argued, even after this victory, France could not “abdicate” 
its responsibilities in East Asia. After all, France was a “Catholic nation” and could not abandon 
the Christians in Indochina to persecution at the hands of their own government.159 Even more 
than their leftist counterparts, most conservative journalists thus proposed a future plan for 
Tonkin that did not deviate that markedly from the one proposed by Ferry himself. 
Perhaps the most significant difference between left-leaning and conservative journalists’ 
assessments of the situation in Indochina lay in their understandings of the event’s consequences 
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for France’s political future. Like their leftist counterparts, conservatives often believed that the 
government’s conduct in Indochina had been duplicitous and criminally negligent – at least in 
part because the dangers of the Tonkin campaign were so clear and its potential benefits so 
remote.160 H. de Pène described Jules Ferry as an “assassin” who was responsible for both Lang-
Son and the death of Rivière.161 La Presse described the Ferry ministry as “odious” and 
“dishonorable” and maintained that it pursued “idiotic” policies.162 But conservative journalists 
particularly emphasized that the Ferry ministry alone was not responsible for France’s recent 
poor decisions: in fact, they insisted, the entire Opportunist Republican majority was complicit. 
Le Gaulois described the majority as “Ferry’s accomplices” who had “revolted too late” against 
him. Its writers claimed that this majority was the “real culprit” and expressed concern that it 
would escape its responsibilities.163 Writing in Le Figaro, Perry implied that turning over the 
Ferry ministry was futile because the Chamber majority that remained in power was only “under 
the illusion” that it had been oppressed: in fact, it was just as responsible for Lang-Son as Ferry 
himself.164 Le Soleil similarly contended that although Ferry had deliberately lied to the nation, 
the Opportunist majority “was only tricked because it wanted to be.”165 La Presse even implied 
that Grévy, the president of the Republic, was implicated in the disaster.166 These charges thus 
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implied that changing the Ferry ministry alone would not solve France’s problems because the 
entire government needed to be overturned to prevent a future Lang-Son from occurring. 
More notably still, conservatives’ critiques of the government’s policies in Indochina 
invoked the events in Lang-Son to criticize the nature of the Republic itself. Le Gaulois claimed 
that the defeat put “the entire governmental system into play.”167 Élémir Bourges, on the other 
hand, implied that the events proved that France’s decision to “abandon itself to the spirit of 
rebellion of democracy” had undermined its ability to wage war.168 De Grandieu similarly 
contended that the Republic had weakened the army and that the Republic’s only legacy would 
be the Paris Commune and military defeat at the hands of the Chinese.169 Étienne Vacherot went 
so far as to proclaim that the events proved that France required a prince to guide it wisely.170  
The conservative perspectives thus diverged most notably from the republican views in 
their discussions of the overall significance of Lang-Son. Conservatives charged that the Ferry 
ministry was corrupt – a claim that also appeared in leftist publications – to attack the structure 
of the Republic. Increasingly displaced by the Opportunist Republicans, these conservatives saw 
France’s failure in Tonkin as an opportunity to unseat the republicans’ newfound dominance. 
They hopefully compared the Ferry ministry’s collapse to the Empire’s collapse on September 4 
and envisioned a new, conservative government taking its place. 
France’s defeat in Lang-Son provoked strong, divided reactions from the French press as 
different political groups used the event to either defend their political position or attack their 
opponents. These groups were not otherwise united in either their political opinions or their 
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rhetorical approaches, and their perspectives on the significance of Lang-Son often crossed 
political lines. Each group nevertheless staked out positions on Lang-Son and its significance, 
relationship to politique coloniale, and implications for the French Republic. French republicans 
who defended Ferry for the most part argued that France’s control over Indochina was a matter 
of national urgency and should transcend petty political debate. They thus sought to depoliticize 
both Tonkin and politique coloniale more generally by implying that both required national 
consensus. There were other republicans, however, who criticized the government’s strategies in 
Tonkin. Some even implied that the decision to invest French troops in the territory was 
unsound. But they did not generally criticize colonial expansion itself: they simply implied that 
Tonkin was a poor colonial target. Leftist writers were much more likely to condemn both the 
Ferry ministry’s policies in Tonkin and all colonial expansions by tying such interventions to the 
Second Empire. Conservative journalists offered a similar argument: they implied that politique 
coloniale was an irresponsible strategy that had led to the disaster in 1870 and was certain to do 
so a second time. At the same time, they sought to show that the Republic’s embrace of this 
flawed policy revealed the weakness of a corrupt regime that was on the brink of collapse. 
Despite these many critiques of Ferry’s policies in Tonkin and politique coloniale more 
generally, it is striking that most commentators from all sides of the political spectrum promoted 
almost exactly the same strategy in response to France’s recent defeat at Lang-Son. Nearly all of 
the critics argued that France needed to immediately send in troops, supplies, and money in order 
to recoup the recent losses, even though there were some differences in how the different camps 
proposed to follow up on this new aid. Republicans who supported Ferry were more likely to call 
for a radical expansion of France’s efforts in the territory and to contend that France would only 
be able to resolve the conflict by invading Beijing. Some leftists, on the other hand, argued that 
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France should consider leaving Tonkin after it avenged itself against the Chinese and secured the 
position of its soldiers. Conservatives wanted a completely new government to manage future 
campaigns. But for the most part, writers in all political factions declared that France needed to 
protect its national honor. Protection of this honor did not necessarily mean that France should 
try to conquer China, but it did seem to require a continuing French presence in the territories 
that France had recently brought under its control. Although these writers thus objected to 
Ferry’s strategies and even his guiding philosophy, they did not for the most part reject the 
Republic’s new politique colonial. 
 
After-Effects of Lang-Son 
This equivocal reaction to Lang-Son in the press and public debates was echoed in the 
French government itself. A new ministry headed by Henri Brisson, a deputy from the left, took 
power in April 1885. When the new minister of foreign affairs, Charles de Freycinet, proposed to 
send 200 million francs and 8,000 soldiers into Tonkin, the majority of the Chamber – including 
46 of the 147 radical republicans - voted for the measure, demonstrating that they were willing to 
support intervention in Indochina as long as the Ferry ministry was not behind it.171 Perhaps even 
more importantly, the Ferry ministry’s collapse did not interrupt the secret peace negotiations 
with China, which concluded provisionally with a ceasefire on 4 April 1885.172 China and France 
signed the Tsien-Tsien treaty two months later on 11 June 1885, ending the conflict between the 
two countries. By signing this treaty, China formally withdrew both its soldiers and its claims to 
sovereignty from Vietnam – thereby leaving space for France to consolidate its control over 
                                               
171 This measure was almost identical to Ferry’s. See Brocheux and Hémery, Indochina, 47. 
172 Grevy and Ferry had appointed Albert Billot, the director of political affairs at the Quai d’Orsay, to negotiate 
peace with China, so Ferry was not critical to the ongoing proceedings. See McAleavy, Black Flags in Vietnam, 276. 
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Tonkin and Annam.173 In other words, even though the opposition brought down Ferry’s 
government over its policies in Tonkin, most of its members ultimately voted for measures that 
had emerged directly from his policies. Moreover, at no point in the days leading up to the peace 
treaty did any deputies in the Chamber propose France’s withdrawal from the territory.174 
If the debates around Tonkin in March 1885 thus ended in a tacit victory for Ferry’s 
supporters, neither the internal conflicts nor the problems in Indochina itself disappeared. This 
was at least partly because the Tsien-Tsien treaty that ended France’s conflict with China did not 
bring peace to Vietnam. After the Chinese troops withdrew, the Vietnamese Emperor, 
mandarins, and larger population all rose up against French rule in Tonkin. As a result, the 
Brisson government was unable to recall French troops from the territory.175 The ongoing 
conflict’s unpopularity became apparent in the election results in October 1885, when both 
leftists and conservatives gained ground against the Opportunist republicans who had supported 
French expansion in Asia.176  
Ongoing tensions over Tonkin reached another political crisis in December 1885, when 
the Brisson ministry asked the Chamber of Deputies to approve more credits to support the 
army’s efforts to put down the ongoing revolt in the territory. This request led to extended 
                                               
173 The Tsien-Tsien treaty essentially upheld the provisions of the 1884 Li-Fournier agreement, which was never 
enforced. However, it did not include the indemnity that had provoked the second round of conflicts in the first 
place. France also agreed to retreat from Taiwan. As a result, it effectively returned France’s position in Tonkin to 
where it had been in 1884 before the second wave of conflicts. See Chapius, The Last Emperors of Vietnam, 71. 
174 There was fear that the Opposition would not vote this way – many of the journalists who had supported Ferry’s 
activities in Tonkin in fact devoted a fair amount of space to denouncing a possible French withdrawal from the 
territory that no one in the Chamber had even proposed. See Brocheux and Hémery, Indochina, 47 
175 In July 1885, after France signed the peace treaty with China, the Hue court under the new Emperor Ham-Nghi 
launched the first of many revolts against French rule. The French put it down and exiled Ham-Nghi to Algeria, 
replacing him a puppet ruler. France then divided Vietnam into three territories to make it easier to rule: Tongking, 
Annam, and Cochinchina. But the revolts continued until 1892. See Charles Meyer, Les Français en Indochine 
(Paris: Hachette, 1985), 170; McAleavy, Black Flags in Vietnam, 278; Bodin, Les Français au Tonkin, 268. 
176 The right elected 220 deputies (in comparison to 90 in 1881), while the republicans elected 382 (instead of 457), 
168 of which were radicals. See Meyer, Tarrade, Rey-Goldzeigueur, Thobie, Histoire de la France coloniale, 624. 
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debates over France’s position in northern Vietnam that continued through four parliamentary 
sessions. The new debates in many ways echoed both the form and themes of previous political 
disputes because conservatives and left-leaning deputies again came together to challenge the 
funding of government policies in Vietnam, while Opportunist republicans in the center were 
more likely to defend the government’s project.177 Some deputies, especially on the left, even 
proposed for the first time that France should consider withdrawing from a territory that was so 
costly to maintain.178 Ultimately, however, the Chamber approved the ministry’s proposition to 
increase credits for the territory by a majority of four votes. Although the opposition succeeded 
in limiting France’s military and monetary investment in Tonkin and Annam – and in making 
new colonial expeditions impossible for the rest of the decade - it did not succeed in blocking the 
Opportunist republicans’ plans to establish colonial control over northern Vietnam.179  
At least in part because of the opposition’s limited effects on France’s policies in Tonkin, 
some scholars have contended that most critics of the conquest of Indochina did not oppose 
colonial expansion per se. They have pointed out that Ferry’s actions in Indochina only became 
problematic when they became extremely expensive – both in terms of French lives and French 
money. French historians Brocheaux and Hémery in particular have argued that the debates 
                                               
177 Brocheux and Hémery have noted that the goals of most members of the opposition during this debate were also 
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deputies. See Meyer, Tarrade, Rey-Goldzeigueur, Thobie, Histoire de la France coloniale, 624. 
179 The vote was close enough that it led the Brisson ministry to resign almost immediately afterwards. Charles de 
Freycinet, who replaced Brisson, was careful to respect the most pressing concerns of the opposition by limiting 
France’s military investment in Tonkin and Annam. See Brocheux and Hémery, Indochina, 47 
  309 
about Indochina were not even about colonization at all, but instead about the wisdom of war 
with China, the amount of money and resources France could afford to devote to colonial 
expeditions, and the relationship between the Prime Minister and Chamber of Deputies. Ferry 
had advocated a policy of “strong government,” which alienated everyone besides the 
Opportunists. The opposition’s decision to bring down his government – and its protests against 
Brissot’s ministry - was thus as much a response to the way that both governments sought to 
control parliamentary assemblies as it was a response to their strategies in Indochina.180 
Even if much of the opposition was motivated by concerns over money and manpower 
rather than political principles, however, the critics succeeded in sparking a public debate over 
the practice of colonial conquest that spread outside the formal political realm into both 
intellectual and popular spheres. These debates took on new shapes both in the Chamber and in 
theoretical literature during the late 1880s. As republican politicians and writers developed new 
arguments to defend colonial expansion, they also reacted specifically to their critics’ attempts to 
link France’s overseas empire to its discredited Bonapartist continental empires by drawing 
comparisons with the expansionary efforts of other European nations. Over time, these debates 
transformed the republican conversation about empire itself. 
 
III. The Development of New Colonial Theory 
During the mid-1880s, a more theoretical debate surrounding politique coloniale and its 
connections to republicanism and imperialism thus emerged alongside the disputes about 
France’s policies in Tonkin. To some extent, the wider debate echoed elements of specific 
arguments about Tonkin: leftists and conservatives in particular came together to argue that 
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politique coloniale was endangering and impoverishing France in relation to its European 
competitors. They also sought to discredit politique coloniale by tying it directly to the failed 
politics of the Second Empire. This linkage to the former Empire forced defenders of politique 
coloniale to articulate ever-more-complex theoretical structures to explain the practice of 
republican colonialism, justify it politically, and define it as essential to France’s future. 
Defenders of colonial expansion drew on older colonial theories advocated by thinkers like Paul 
Leroy-Beaulieu, but their definitions of politique coloniale also reflected new concerns and 
shifted over time in response to their opponents’ critiques.  
Jules Ferry made one of the first attempts to explain politique coloniale and justify its 
practice in July 1885, several months after his ministry collapsed.181 In a speech to the Chamber, 
he defined politique coloniale as a system that rested on a combination of “economic principles 
and interests… humanitarian beliefs of the highest order, and political considerations.” He 
argued that nations could build two fundamentally different types of colonies. The first type of 
colony was a settler colony, which required European settlers to emigrate to territories where 
they could create new societies. The second type of colony was a commercial or economic 
colony, which established overseas markets for national products. The first type of colonialism 
was best suited to European countries that had excess population, while the second was best for 
modern societies that created too many goods. France, Ferry acknowledged, did not have excess 
population, and so the French did not need to establish settler colonies. However, he insisted, 
France was in an excellent position to create commercial colonies – which he found to be more 
                                               
181 He was defending the practice of colonial expansion in the context of a debate about Madagascar. France had 
committed troops to the territory and the Parliament was arguing about whether the project was worth more money. 
See Jeanneney, ed., La Politique coloniale, 9. 
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rewarding than their settler counterparts.182 His ministry had conquered Tunisia and Tonkin and 
invaded Madagascar, he explained, in order to create these commercial establishments. 
Ferry went on to contend that establishing commercial colonies was critical to France’s 
future because it was one of the best ways to ensure the nation’s economic prosperity. He 
declared that France’s agriculture and industry had been suffering since 1860 since both lacked 
international markets. This problem would only get worse, he argued, as other nations conquered 
their own colonies and established protective tariffs that would make it effectively impossible for 
France to expand its trade either within Europe or overseas. In order to prevent an economic 
crisis, he maintained, France thus needed to create its own markets around the world.183  
Ferry also defended politique coloniale on political and national grounds. He claimed that 
all countries in Europe – no matter their political organization or sympathies – were pushing to 
expand their reach in Asia and Africa.184 If France did not join in colonial expansion, he insisted, 
it would become unable to compete overseas or within Europe. The lack of overseas colonies 
would weaken the French navy because French ships needed outposts where they could refuel 
and build bases from which to defend French commercial interests. Even more importantly, he 
contended, abstaining from colonial conquest would also weaken the country’s moral fiber. 
Staying on the continent and avoiding conflict would only lead to a “decadence” that would 
cause the nation to fall “from the first rank of nations to the third or fourth.”185 Ferry thus 
affirmed that politique coloniale was a national political, economic, military, and moral mission 
that transcended all party affiliations and conflicts. 
                                               
182 Manceron, ed., 1885, 55, 56. 
183 He argued that Germany and the United States would soon create tariffs to protect their industries. See Ibid., 57. 
184 He claimed that Germany would start conquering colonies to create markets for its industry. See ibid., 57. 
185 Ibid., 66, 68. 
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Even as Ferry placed politique coloniale above French political divisions, he also sought 
to show that it converged with republican politics and moral principles. He contended that 
France’s decision to dominate others was justifiable because it would contribute to the 
republican mission of spreading liberty and justice across the world. He drew upon the language 
of racial hierarchy to differentiate between conquest within Europe – which he implied was 
suspect – and conquest overseas: 
It must be stated that superior races have a right over inferior races… they also 
have… the duty to civilize inferior races… [which] was often misunderstood in 
earlier centuries… But in our days… European nations have been fulfilling… this 
duty… Could anyone deny that there is more justice, more material and moral 
order, and more social virtue in North Africa before France conquered it?186 
 
Ferry thus argued that European nations could conquer peoples in Africa or Asia because 
Europeans were racially superior to Asians and Africans. This right to conquest, he was quick to 
explain, did not mean that Europeans could treat these “inferior races” however they pleased; he 
condemned the way that the Spanish in particular had treated the indigenous population in the 
Americas.187 Europeans’ “rights” over inferior non-Europeans therefore came with a moral duty: 
they were required to “civilize” the people they conquered. In the past, Ferry conceded, 
European nations had not always fulfilled this duty. But contemporary England and France now 
understood this duty. As a result, they were neither oppressing the peoples they conquered nor 
depriving them of their political freedom: they were liberating them.188 
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contended that in Tunisia and Tonkin, “We have acted according to necessity and right: we have been directed by 
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Ferry’s defense of politique coloniale drew heavily on earlier thinkers. His insistence that 
politique coloniale was an apolitical endeavor critical to the future of the French nation echoed 
Prévost-Paradol’s and Leroy-Beaulieu’s claims about the benefits of colonization. Even Ferry’s 
division of colonies into different “types” was a more simplistic version of Leroy-Beaulieu’s 
classification of different types of colonial enterprises.189 Yet Ferry’s definition of politique 
coloniale also added new elements. His appraisal of the value of settler and commercial colonies, 
for example, was quite different from Leroy-Beaulieu’s preference for “settler” colonies over 
commercial colonies.190 This difference was partly a simple reflection of the fact that Ferry was 
using the theory of politique coloniale to defend conquests in Tonkin and Tunisia, where large 
European populations would never want to emigrate. But Ferry’s themes also reflected a 
different understanding of the kinds of benefits that colonization could bring to the nation. 
Leroy-Beaulieu had contended that colonization did not create wealth, whereas Ferry invoked 
France’s colonies as critical to the country’s commercial interests.191  
Perhaps even more importantly, Ferry also articulated a more elaborate defense of 
colonial conquest than most of his earlier counterparts had developed. Many of these earlier 
thinkers – like Jules Duval and Paul Leroy-Beaulieu – were not interested in promoting new 
colonial conquests: instead, they had sought to encourage the French government to reform its 
relationship with its already existing colonies. In the process of defending new colonial 
conquests, however, Ferry also simultaneously proffered new descriptions of racial hierarchy and 
                                               
189 He had argued that there were three types of colonies: commercial, agricultural, and plantation colonies. See Paul 
Leroy-Beaulieu, De la colonization chez les peuples modernes (Paris: Guillamin, 1874), 537. 
190 Ibid., 535, 536. 
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its relationship to “civilization” and “civilizing processes.” The idea that France had an 
obligation to “civilize” the people it conquered was not new – many of the Saint-Simonians 
discussed in the first chapter had in fact articulated the same notion for Algeria in the 1850s and 
1860s.192 But Ferry’s contention that this obligation to “civilize” gave European powers rights 
over other peoples assumed an even more unequal relationship between Europe and other parts 
of the world. Ferry’s juxtaposition of “superior” and “inferior” races also drew sharper racial 
lines than many of his republican predecessors, who tended to describe races as more or less 
“advanced” – a term that at least implied that progress was theoretically possible for all peoples. 
Ferry’s defense of politique coloniale sent reverberations through the Chamber, which 
soon played out in two debates in 1885 – the first in July and the second in December. During 
these debates, deputies on both the right and the left set forth strong objections to Ferry’s 
politique coloniale. They did not all use the same reasoning to attack his ideas, however. Some 
objected to his economic justification for politique coloniale, while others criticized his attempt 
to connect politique coloniale to France’s future or to align it with republican political principles. 
A number of speakers specifically rejected Ferry’s contention that politique coloniale 
would bring economic benefits to France. Edgar Raoul-Duval, a liberal monarchist, for example, 
insisted that while colonial conquest might make certain merchants wealthier, it would never 
enrich the nation itself.193 Leftist Camille Pelletan, on the other hand, maintained that “cannons 
                                               
192 The Saint-Simonians had insisted that all races, cultures, and societies could reach the same advanced level of 
civilization, but at any point, some would be ahead of others. Thus, the Saint-Simonians did contend that Europeans 
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193 He implied that some merchants – especially those selling opium – had interests in the colonies. See Manceron, 
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do not create commerce” and that “far-flung conquests do not open markets but close them.” 
France’s conquests, he went on to declare, would never pay for themselves; in fact, they would 
continue to require an indefinite supply of money and military personnel to prevent the 
indigenous population from revolting.194 Frédéric Passy, a liberal economist, similarly argued 
that “merchandise does not follow the cannon” and implied that colonial conquests endangered 
both international trade and the French merchants who tried to pursue it.” Émile Vernhes, a 
radical deputy, noted that even Algeria had done very little to enrich France over the years.195 
Several deputies also objected to Ferry’s claim that overseas conquest would be critical to 
France’s ability to compete with its neighbors. Paul de Cassaganc, the Bonapartist deputy, 
described Ferry’s solution to European competition as little more than “an apology for war.”196 
He implied that France could find better ways of securing itself against its European rivals than 
committing to an endless series of overseas conquests. Georges Clemenceau similarly averred 
that Ferry’s insistence that France had a “national interest” in conquering territory all over the 
world was misleading; he claimed that such expeditions would only weaken France because of 
their financial and human costs.197 
Most critics, however, went beyond the practical problems and objected to Ferry’s 
attempts to align overseas conquest with republican principles. They took issue with his claim 
that politique coloniale was morally and politically justifiable because it enabled “superior” races 
to civilize their “inferior” counterparts. Georges Périn, a radical deputy from Haute-Vienne, 
noted that it was a nice abstraction to think that superior nations would have a “civilizing 
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influence” in conquered territories. However, he insisted, conquering nations were more 
concerned with material gain than moral progress. He held up France’s promotion of opium trade 
in Indochina as evidence of the nation’s lack of interest in the wellbeing of conquered peoples. 
Ferry’s claims that France would “civilize” inferior peoples was thus obfuscation; in fact, 
politique coloniale asserted the right of superior races to take the property of inferior races.198 
Far from aligning with republican principles of liberty and justice, politique coloniale was 
greedy, ruthless theft. Périn thus argued that the idea of a “civilizing mission” was disingenuous 
because advocates of politique coloniale had no intention of carrying it out. His fellow deputy, 
Camille Pelletan, claimed that the idea that violent conquest could lead to civilization was 
inherently contradictory. He contended that it was absurd to think “we have a pressing duty, as 
men of a superior race, to go civilize all of the barbarians in the world with cannon fire! If we 
consulted these barbarians, I suspect they would allow us to leave!”199 For Pelletan, the problem 
was not that governments who promised “civilization” failed to deliver on their promises, but 
that violence and civilization were inevitably at odds.  
Georges Clemenceau also objected to Ferry’s claim that France had both a right over and 
a civilizing duty towards the “inferior peoples” that it conquered. But he took the argument a 
step farther by objecting to the underlying logic that drove both claims. He contended,  
Superior races! Inferior races! …For my part, I have recoiled [from this idea] ever since I 
saw German intellectuals scientifically demonstrating that France had to be defeated in 
the Franco-Prussian War because the French are a race inferior to the Germans. Since 
that time… I have looked twice before turning away from a man or a civilization and 
pronouncing: inferior man or civilization!”200 
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By linking Ferry’s description of racial inequality to German intellectuals, Clemenceau implied 
that it was both prejudiced and unscientific.201 Moreover, Clemenceau maintained, using an 
intellectual system that classified peoples as “inferior” and “superior” to justify conquest violated 
republican principles. He argued that France’s history since the Revolution was a protest “against 
this unjust pretention” and asserted that Ferry was effectively “clothing violence in the 
hypocritical name of civilization.” Colonial conquest, Clemenceau asserted, had nothing to do 
with “civilizing duty”: it was the “pure and simple abuse of the power of scientific civilizations 
over rudimentary civilizations to appropriate and torture men …for the profit of the pretended 
civilizer.” Ferry’s justification for politique coloniale simply obfuscated a political program that 
privileged “might over right.”202 
Some authors took the argument that politique coloniale was at odds with republican 
values a step farther by linking the policy to other forms of political organization – especially the 
discredited Second Empire. Republican deputy Émile Vernhes, for example, insisted that 
colonial conquest was “not an act of republican politics.” On the contrary, it represented the 
continuation of imperial strategies and values into the politics of the Third Republic. “Since 
1870,” he complained, “the majority of ministers… have acted like Napoleon III, who, fearing 
above all the demands for domestic political liberty, threw himself… into Mexico and other 
expeditions. This sovereign thus sought to use war to create a diversion… you practice the same 
                                               
diplomatic annals of certain peoples, you could see documents that would prove that the yellow race… is not at all 
inferior to those that hasten to proclaim their supremacy.” See Ibid., 78. 
201 Jules Miagne and Joseph Fabre, republicans, and Joseph Guilloutet, a Bonapartist, also objected to Ferry’s racial 
hierarchy. Miagne and Fabre implied that it contradicted the values of “a country where the rights of man had been 
proclaimed,” and Guilloutet argued that it relied on the same theory that had justified slavery. See ibid., 61. 
202 Clemenceau insisted that most colonial conquests had not led to the development of morality or social virtue. 
Instead, they were marked by “atrocious and terrible crimes committed in the name of justice and civilization.” The 
Europeans also brought their “vices” to the peoples they conquered by bringing opium and alcohol. See Ibid., 79, 80. 
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system.”203 Vernhes thus argued that the Third Republic was using colonial conquest for the 
same purpose as Napoleon III. In both cases, these conquests abroad served as a distraction from 
more important political matters at home and became key components in political systems that 
sought to deny sufficient rights to French citizens. 
Vernhes’ effort to tie the Republic’s politique coloniale to Napoleon III and the Second 
Empire was also echoed by other deputies. Monarchist deputy Armand de Baudry d’Asson, for 
example, remarked that the republic’s commitment to politique coloniale showed that “the 
Republic means war.”204 He thus deployed the old republican critique of the Empire – “the 
empire means war” – against Jules Ferry. Georges Périn similarly insisted that the Republic 
seemed to share the Empire’s taste for “far-flung adventures.”205 Edgar Raoul Duval, a liberal 
monarchist, connected the Republic’s colonial expeditions more specifically to the Second 
Empire’s adventures in Mexico, reiterating a theme that many of his counterparts had introduced 
in earlier debates over Indochina. He warned that these expeditions were likely to end in a 
repetition of the disasters in 1870-1871 if the government did not check them.206 Georges 
Clemenceau, on the other hand, claimed that a Republic that embraced politique coloniale would 
be even worse than the Second Empire. The Second Empire at the very least, he contended, had 
promised to pursue peace – even if it had not actually acted on that promise. Politique coloniale, 
on the other hand, was little more than a promise for unending conflict.207  
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Frédéric Passy, a liberal economist, proposed a different negative comparison by drawing 
explicit parallels between the Republic’s politique coloniale and Germany’s policies in Alsace-
Lorraine. He noted that while republicans condemned “the crimes committed in European 
conquest,” they pretended that they 
…not only had the right but the duty to dominate, enslave, and exploit other peoples 
who… have their own personality and nationality… and are not less attached to their 
independence… These territories are the life, the body, and the blood of these poor 
people, they are their Alsace and their Lorraine.”208  
 
By annexing territories around the world and subjecting their inhabitants to French rule, Passy 
averred, France was not acting like the Second Empire but like the German Empire itself. If the 
Opportunist Republicans wanted to insist that Germany had committed a crime by annexing 
Alsace and Lorraine, they could not then commit the same crime as they stole territory from 
other peoples. He noted that although advocates of politique coloniale asserted that France 
needed to expand in order to remain a great power, truly “great peoples” protected the 
independence of others. The French, in short, should not behave like the Germans. 
Clearly, these deputies wanted to refute Ferry’s contention that politique coloniale would 
enrich France and strengthen it against its European competitors while enabling it to spread 
republican principles throughout the world. Notably, the majority of deputies from across the 
political spectrum who criticized politique coloniale also focused above all on its relationship 
with republican politics and values. They insisted that politique coloniale was not republican and 
declared that it reestablished the policies of the discredited Second Empire. Colonial conquest 
could not spread liberty, they argued, because it was an imperial enterprise predicated on armies 
and might. Such imperial enterprises, moreover, had endangered France before and would do so 
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again. Although this argument ultimately failed to convince the majority of the French Chamber 
to vote against French investment in Madagascar and Tonkin, it did push the advocates of 
politique coloniale to alter their arguments for colonial expansion.  
 
Wider Debates over Politique Coloniale 
These debates over politique coloniale spread far beyond the Chamber of Deputies. 
Although the parliamentary debates were influential – they were reprinted in a number of 
pamphlets and newspapers – they entered a wider conversation about the meaning and purpose 
of politique coloniale that played out in the scholarly and popular press. Both advocates and 
opponents of politique coloniale joined this broader conversation to explain their ideas about 
politique coloniale and the nature of its relationship to republicanism and Bonapartism. 
Public critics of politique coloniale echoed many of the arguments that had been set forth 
by their counterparts in the Chamber. Several prominent economists thus echoed the liberal 
Deputy Frédéric Passy and criticized politique coloniale on economic grounds. They maintained 
that despite promises made by supporters of politique coloniale in the Chamber of Deputies, 
colonization would never increase trade enough to make conquered territories profitable. R. 
Lavollé in particular declared in an economic journal that it was extremely expensive both to 
conquer colonial territory and to preserve French control over it. Even in Algeria, he averred, 
France had almost always lost money.209 The economist Yves Guyot took the argument a step 
farther in a pamphlet that insisted the colonies were so expensive that they made it difficult for 
France to develop the metropolitan infrastructure it needed to stay competitive within Europe. He 
argued that the Opportunist republicans foolishly worried about “civilizing the Cochinchinese” 
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when they lacked the money to adequately pay for instructors who would educate their own 
citizens. Instead of fretting about “policing” the Tonkinese and building infrastructure in distant 
colonies, he maintained, France should focus on building its own infrastructure.210 
Other writers – on both the right and the left – argued that politique coloniale was 
undermining France’s national security. Albert de Broglie, in a speech to the Senate that was 
later printed and distributed in pamphlet form, conceded that colonial conquest was not always 
problematic. If a country was strong at home and within Europe, he implied, it could afford to 
expend strength and money exerting its influence overseas.211 But the attempt to conquer 
colonies overseas when France was already weakened was nonsensical. Colonies, he insisted, 
were a “luxury” that would only further compromise France’s position on the continent, and a 
weakened France would have to use more of its limited resources to assert its authority 
overseas.212 France would find it difficult to control the people it had conquered, he warned, but 
it would also struggle to hold its conquests against its European rivals. It was not an accident, he 
argued, that Germany was encouraging France’s embrace of politique coloniale. The German 
government was in fact pleased to see that France’s overseas struggles diminished its military 
power and alienated its English ally.213 When the Germans felt that their strength was secure and 
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France was diplomatically isolated, Germany could declare war on France, secure a second, easy 
victory, and take all of France’s newly conquered colonies for itself.214 The Republican 
government might dream of creating a “colonial empire,” but such an empire was destined to end 
in disaster.215 This sense that politique coloniale would necessarily compromise France’s 
position within Europe – and the belief that Bismarck was encouraging the policy with precisely 
that result in mind - reappeared in a numerous pamphlets across the political spectrum.216 
Leftist republicans, on the other hand, were more likely to criticize politique coloniale by 
insisting that it violated republican principles and moral values – much like their allies in the 
Chamber. Louis Guétant, the vice president of the Lyonnaise section of the Ligue des Droits de 
L’Homme, argued that politique coloniale was little more than the “official organization of 
international brigandage”; it involved above all the “exploitation of the weak” and the 
destruction of “the independence of young peoples who are forming their nationalities,” so that 
France could steal their riches.217 Claiming that France’s intervention in these territories would 
benefit or “civilize” the indigenous population was an absurd “pretext” that allowed France to 
“steal [these peoples’] liberty and their country.”218 The only examples of “civilization” that 
France had shown thus far in its conquered territories consisted of “massacring prisoners” and 
“destroying private property.” France’s behavior in Tonkin and Madagascar – and even in 
Algeria itself - proved that the French Republic’s ostensible support for “liberty and 
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independence” was little more than a lie.219 This behavior was particularly embarrassing, he 
argued, because France had protested so loudly against Germany’s behavior in Alsace-Lorraine. 
Like some leftist republicans in the French Chamber of Deputies, Guétant drew parallels 
between the Opportunist Republicans’ politique coloniale and the Second Empire. He noted that 
ironically many of the same deputies who supported France’s overseas colonial expeditions had 
opposed Napoleon III’s expedition to Mexico in the name of the Mexican people. But after they 
rose to power, they had engaged in the same unsavory behavior that they previously condemned. 
Their newfound politics were not only embarrassing for advocates of republicanism; they were 
dangerous for the country, as the results of Napoleon III’s disastrous attempts to extend France’s 
influence overseas had shown. Guétant noted that in the wake of the Franco-Prussian War, many 
politicians had come to see Algeria as “compensation” for France’s loss. However, he asserted, 
Algeria itself had actually “played a role” in the defeat. If Napoleon III had not invested so many 
resources in controlling the territory, France “would not have needed to be compensated” in the 
first place.220 All societies that built empires eventually succumbed to “decadence,” so France 
should focus on strengthening itself at home instead of trying to conquer distant colonies.221  
A. Laison similarly insisted that the politicians who embraced colonialism were 
“republicans in name” but “reactionaries in fact.” He invoked the Opportunists’ activities in 
Tunisia, Tonkin, and Madagascar as evidence that their politics contradicted “democratic 
principles.” These expeditions, he claimed, were “ruinous” for the public because they sacrificed 
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“honor, French blood, the financial equilibrium, [and] national defense” to the needs of “high 
finance.” They thus might reward particular scheming members of the haute bourgeoisie but 
would never enrich the nation itself.222 Where Guétant had argued that France’s policies overseas 
were hypocritical and problematic, Laison took the political-economic argument a step farther by 
implying that politique coloniale undermined the practice of democracy in France itself as it 
sacrificed the needs of the people to the selfish demands of one class. 
Like their counterparts in the Chamber, the nongovernmental critics of French politique 
coloniale did not attack all colonial expansion on the same grounds or for the same reasons. 
Some indicated that it was economically unsound, while others worried that it would affect 
France’s ability to keep up with the nation’s European competitors. Still others felt that the 
seizure of new colonies violated France’s republican principles or even undermined those 
republican principles within the metropole itself. To some extent, these concerns overlapped, but 
they also functioned as independent critiques among different commentators who did not 
necessarily agree on other issues. Perhaps even more importantly, these different commentators 
were also divided on the question of whether colonial expansion was always problematic or 
whether it was merely unwise given France’s current circumstances. In other words, while some 
thinkers opposed politique coloniale as such, others objected on pragmatic grounds to the ways 
that the government was trying to build a colonial system. These disagreements made it difficult 
for the critics to develop a coherent platform. Despite their different purposes and ideological 
orientations, however, many employed the same strategy to criticize politique coloniale: they 
linked it with the Second Empire either by charging that both were characterized by a regrettable 
taste for “adventure” or by indicating that both shared despotic political orientations. The 
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frequent appearance of this criticism across the political spectrum demonstrates the degree to 
which French intellectuals and journalists continued to see colonial expansion or colonial empire 
as closely intertwined with the Napoleonic Empire well into the 1880s. 
In the face of these critiques, supporters of politique coloniale tried to explain and defend 
the term, which they claimed was often used but seldom understood.223 Their explanations of the 
idea, however, did not always align with Jules Ferry’s – at least in part because they were not all 
equally committed to defending his specific colonial conquests. Gabriel Charmes, a popular 
journalist, was among the most influential of these pro-colonial writers. He described politique 
coloniale as a movement “so natural, so legitimate, so useful and so necessary that it has slowly 
won over all of Europe and that no one can resist it today.”224 He acknowledged that politique 
coloniale had recently fallen into disfavor in France, but claimed that the public’s distaste for it 
stemmed primarily from the disorganized and disastrous way that the government had pursued 
colonial expansion.225 He therefore sought to change the views of those who saw politique 
coloniale as a “hoax” and to help critics recognize its value. Meanwhile, he also wanted to “turn 
the Republic away from the errors that have compromised it and threaten to ruin France.”226 
Only once the country gained a clear understanding of the aims and purpose of politique 
coloniale, he argued, would the policy be able to serve the ambitions of the country. 
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Charmes began by delineating the different opponents to politique coloniale. First, he 
noted, there were radicals who “rejected as a crime all idea of conquest… Their system is 
founded on a series of negations and one single affirmation: the pretended solidarity of peoples 
opposed to a league of oppressors.”227 He also maintained, however, that a second camp of 
opponents was more respected and influential than the radicals. This group, influenced by the 
memory of the Franco-Prussian War, argued that France should abstain from all overseas 
conquest in order to focus on defending itself against Germany. Both of these perspectives, 
Charmes averred, were misguided. On the one hand, he claimed that if France and England 
worked together to exert their influence over the “Orient,” they would contribute to “liberty” and 
“civilization” overseas and help secure peace in Europe.228 On the other hand, he argued that it 
was foolish to assume that the failures of the Second Empire’s foreign policy meant that overseas 
conquest itself was dangerous. Charmes insisted that the Bonapartist “Empire was lost because it 
never knew how to maintain a wise and stable foreign policy; it oscillated between alliances; it 
threw itself into all adventures; and it finished with the most terrible of all, in which it 
perished.”229 He argued that the Second Empire attempted to make conquests overseas without a 
centralized and coherent plan. The Republic’s overseas conquests, he acknowledged, had also at 
times suffered from this problem, but if the republican government could pursue a more 
systematic policy, its colonial conquests would strengthen the country instead of weakening it. 230 
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Charmes contended that politique coloniale was above all an apolitical set of policies and 
strategies that would work together to strengthen the French nation at home and abroad. Charmes 
rejected the idea that foreign policy was dependent upon a single kind of internal political 
organization. He noted that republics and monarchies across Europe had embraced similar 
foreign policies.231 An older argument – which he traced back to the French Revolution – 
wrongly assumed that monarchies only enacted foreign policies based on “personal interests” 
while republics concerned themselves with “the emancipation of the people” and the “expansion 
of liberal ideas.”232 Even the first Republic, he argued, had embarked on ambitious conquests 
across Europe. The history of Europe itself showed that, contrary to many radicals’ ahistorical 
theories, different peoples were not “brothers,” but in fact often had “opposing interests.” As a 
result, popular governments were usually just as prone to war as their absolutist or monarchist 
counterparts. France thus needed to act accordingly to its needs rather than in accordance with an 
abstract ideological principle.233 For Charmes, then, politique coloniale above all involved 
enriching and empowering the country while enabling it to act in its own self-interest. 
Like Jules Ferry, Gabriel Charmes sought to justify France’s conquest of overseas 
territory by appealing to its “civilizing” potential, but he described this process of “civilization” 
in distinct terms. Charmes accepted the claim that some races were “inferior” to others, yet he 
also insisted that even “inferior” races were “susceptible to education; the day will come 
where… they no longer need masters and tutors. But we are far from that day. Until then, it is 
necessary to dominate them, not to oppress them… but to elevate them and to keep them from 
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abusing their material strength against us.”234 Although Charmes thus emphasized that “inferior 
races” could be educated and perhaps one day could live independently, he also asserted that 
these peoples could not educate themselves without French interference. Civilization, he argued, 
could only come from Europe and imperial domination alone could “spread generous ideas, 
disseminate germs of progress.”235 Charmes’ account of France’s “civilizing mission,” like 
Ferry’s, was thus predicated on racial hierarchies. His vision, however, remained more open 
because it implied that in some distant day, this racial hierarchy might disappear. It was also 
markedly less idealistic: France might help other peoples to progress, but it would meanwhile be 
acting in its own interest by preventing colonized peoples from opposing its demands. 
Charmes’ vision of how France should go about pursuing politique coloniale also 
differed from Ferry’s. Ferry had proposed that politique coloniale was above all a secular 
enterprise that was dependent upon the French state. Charmes, on the other hand, insisted that 
Catholicism would be critical to France’s ability to exert its influence overseas. He argued that 
republican France’s decision to suppress the influence of Catholicism was a mistake, because 
Catholic missions could play a critical role in spreading French values. He thus wanted France to 
establish a “Catholic protectorate,” particularly over North Africa, where Catholic missions 
would work to “civilize” the Muslim population. He did not indicate that he hoped these 
populations would themselves become Catholic; in fact, he implied, by “civilizing” these 
barbarous peoples, the missions would ultimately have the effect of turning these conquered 
populations in North Africa away from religion altogether and towards French secular values.236 
He nevertheless argued that France should follow the English model of colonization and “make 
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use of religious missions instead of fighting them.”237 Charmes’ advocacy for religious missions 
was thus based on a utilitarian perspective similar to the one that drove his understanding of 
politique coloniale in the first place. 
Ferry’s politique coloniale had been marked by tensions that emerged when he 
simultaneously described politique coloniale as a republican enterprise and an apolitical, national 
agenda. Charmes did not struggle with the same contradiction. Although he argued that failing to 
systematically embrace politique coloniale might lead to the republic’s collapse, he in no way 
suggested that politique coloniale was dependent on a particular political system or agenda. 
Instead, it was above all a matter of national strategy. At the same time, Charmes also sought to 
dispel radicals’ claims that politique coloniale was unsound because it was linked to the Second 
Empire. He insisted that the Second Empire was one example in a long list of French 
governments that had sought to pursue politique coloniale with more or less success, and he 
claimed that the Second Empire’s ultimate failure stemmed from the disorganized ways in which 
it had pursued its goals – not from the goals themselves. 
A number of other authors echoed Gabriel Charmes’ attempt to portray colonization as an 
apolitical enterprise. Some, like J. L. de Lanessan, the future governor of Indochina, insisted that 
colonization was a “universal movement” that was “pushing all the nations of Europe towards 
territory that civilization has not yet conquered.”238 This movement, he argued, was not created 
by politicians; instead, it was a “natural” outgrowth of the history of humanity itself. It resulted 
from the fact that Europe had entered a new “scientific” stage of civilization that was defined by 
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growing markets and industrialization. As a result, it was not subject to political or moral debates 
but evolved as a simple reflection of human historical forces.239 The influential economist 
Charles Gide claimed that all the major European powers embraced politique coloniale, so 
France was the only country in which some citizens remained unconvinced. Like Lanessan, he 
averred that politique coloniale was a “force of nature” that transcended political questions.240 
Barbié de Bocage, on the other hand, warned his readers that the embrace of politique coloniale 
across Europe would leave France politically and economically behind if it did not join in.241 All 
three writers thus contended that politique coloniale had nothing to do with French political 
debates: instead, it was a global broad phenomenon that was transforming much of Europe.242 
Other authors sought to render politique coloniale apolitical by grounding it in narratives 
about French history. Louis Pauliat, for example, insisted that the republic’s embrace of politique 
coloniale had a long tradition that dated back even before the ancien régime and was already an 
integral part of France’s history in “ancient times.”243 Like Charmes, he argued that some 
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colonizing policies were more effective than others, but he claimed that the French people should 
not oppose this ancient tradition simply because a number of recent French politicians had 
enacted a few ineffective colonizing policies.244 Alfred Rambaud, a professor of history with 
close ties to Jules Ferry, contended in his lengthy collaborative historical account of French 
colonization that France was in fact one of the oldest colonizing countries. He averred that 
explorations and encounters with other peoples had always been a key element of French 
national identity.245 Aristide Couteaux, writing under the pen name Jacquillou, similarly insisted 
in a pamphlet intended for a more popular audience that colonial expansion was “independent of 
any form of government.” It represented a “politics of the nation” that was “traditional” to all 
governments that have “cared about the prosperity, the grandeur, and the glory of the country.” 
The Republic had thus simply embraced expansion policies that France’s most effective leaders 
had always promoted.246 
Many defenders of politique coloniale also sought to render it apolitical by defining it as 
a set of policies that would benefit the French nation. They often articulated their understandings 
of these benefits in diametrical opposition to their critics’ attempts to demonstrate the ways in 
which politique coloniale would harm France. A number of authors – much like Jules Ferry – 
thus insisted that colonial expansion would improve France’s economy. Lanessan, for example, 
argued that colonial expansion alone would enable France to secure resources and new markets 
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that would eventually improve its material wealth. He noted that critics of politique coloniale 
rightly stressed that conquering colonies could be expensive, but he argued that these critics also 
underestimated the economic benefits that these colonies would bring. Over time, Lanessan 
asserted, these territories would more than make up for the costs of their conquest.247 Jules 
Bossière and Alfred Rambaud, on the other hand, were more cautious. Bossière acknowledged 
that poorly run colonies could cost the metropole money. He contended, however, that well-run 
colonies would eventually bear the costs of their own administration while providing France with 
critical natural resources.248 Alfred Rambaud similarly conceded that modern colonies might 
never produce as much wealth as their 18th century predecessors, but they would increase French 
trade in important new markets.249 Neither of these authors saw colonies as a likely source of 
income but they assumed that colonized territories would indirectly help industry and trade. 
Other writers insisted that pursuing politique coloniale would strengthen the French 
nation militarily. Louis Vignon explained, for example, that France’s colonies had always 
supported the nation in times of conflict and war, so there were historical reasons to believe these 
recent conquests would help secure France’s continental security – not weaken it, as some 
opponents of politique coloniale had claimed.250 An anonymous pamphleteer, who identified 
himself simply as “a sailor,” took this argument further by repeating Ferry’s claim that France 
needed more colonies so that its navy could operate. Conquering Tunisia, Tonkin, and ultimately 
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Madagascar would create a network of ports for the French navy to refuel in a global conflict 
against its two rivals, Germany and England.251 Some authors also insisted that new colonial 
conquests would enable France to fight ground wars more effectively. Alfred Rambaud – 
objecting to critics’ contentions that France’s engagements overseas would limit the number of 
troops it could draw on during a European conflict – argued that France’s colonies would 
actually extend the “theater of war” and force France’s opponents to send their troops around the 
world. Moreover, the colonies would add soldiers to France’s armies as “citizens of color” came 
to form a “colonial army” that could fight in “intertropical wars.”252  
A number of writers also repeated the argument that politique coloniale would help 
secure France’s cultural and intellectual influence on a global scale. Louis Vignon argued that 
colonization would “bring its name, its language, [and] its ideas to distant places,” which would 
ultimately secure France’s “moral and intellectual grandeur.”253 Charles Gide made a more 
dramatic version of a similar argument by contending that France was losing its position as one 
of the “greatest” nations in the world because of its declining population. In fact, it was in danger 
of becoming a “small nation” at a moment when the fate of such nations was especially 
precarious. In the past, a small but civilized people such as the Greeks could conquer large 
empires, but in a world where all peoples were becoming “equal,” the economic prosperity, 
military power, and intellectual influence of each nation would be “mathematically proportional 
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to the number of its population.”254 In order to secure the nation’s future influence, Gide argued, 
France needed to expand in Asia and especially in Africa. In the face of its demographic crisis, 
France was left with no other choice than to “adopt and assimilate people from foreign races” in 
order to increase the size of its population. These people might be of different races and 
separated by an ocean, but one day, he promised, they would come to “speak our language, read 
our books and our journals, nourish themselves on our ideas, [and] associate themselves with our 
history and our political destiny.”255 With such a large adopted population, he implied, France 
would be able to remain among the ranks of the greatest nations. 
Although many of these writers thus argued that colonization was above all an apolitical 
enterprise ultimately intended to benefit the French nation, a number of defenders of colonization 
also sought to show that politique coloniale did not violate republican principles. On the most 
basic level, they declared that France’s activities in these countries were contributing to the 
larger republican project of spreading liberty and promoting progress. By conquering “savages” 
or “half-barbarian peoples,” France was spreading civilization to all corners of the world. 
Colonial wars thus ultimately benefitted both conquered peoples and humanity in general.256 
Other authors tried to reconcile conquest even more directly with republican beliefs. Charles 
Gide, for example, noted that although a number of “humanitarians” insisted that colonization 
amounted to very little more than “oppression” and “robbery,” their arguments suffered from a 
fundamental misunderstanding. Although it was true that “men of all races… must be considered 
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equal in rights,” some “political organisms” were still “inferior” and “defective.” The “rights of 
individual barbarians” could not be violated, but the “rights of barbarian states… were not 
sacred.” By differentiating between the rights of individuals and the rights of states, Gide was 
able to argue that invading “barbarian states” and establishing governments subservient to France 
could be reconciled with republican principles. Overthrowing such states would not only benefit 
France, it would also enable the indigenous inhabitants to “pass from barbarism into 
civilization.” As a result, these conquests contributed to the “general good of humanity,” and 
colonization, he insisted, was one of the “duties that rests on great nations.”257 Conquest and 
domination could thus coexist with a national commitment to individual liberty and equality. 
Other defenders of colonization justified its status in republican thought by distinguishing 
sharply between republican colonial expansion and its antecedents. They acknowledged that 
earlier European efforts at colonization had been problematic but maintained that contemporary 
colonizers employed new methods and pursued different goals. A. Bordier, for example, noted, 
“colonization in the past had mostly been a work of destruction.”258 However, he claimed, the 
new colonization “would not destroy but revitalize races… substitute the spirit of conquest with 
peaceful association.”259 Republican colonial conquest was thus an enterprise entirely distinct 
from monarchical or imperial colonial conquest: it did not rely on exploitation but instead 
promoted peace and prosperity. Aristide Couteaux expanded this argument by claiming that the 
Republic’s politique coloniale did not involve war at all. Instead of attacking peaceful societies – 
like the European colonial powers of the 17th and 18th centuries – the Republic was simply 
“repressing the brigandage committed by hordes of savages on the frontiers of our overseas 
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possessions.” The Republic was thus behaving like a police force rather than as an invading army 
in the territories it occupied. Its incursions and conquests were intended above all to impose 
order and peace, which would benefit both France and the indigenous population.260 
For the most part, the scholarly and journalistic defense of colonization echoed many of 
the same themes that appeared in Ferry’s speech. This is perhaps not surprising because these 
writers both influenced and were influenced by Ferry’s activities and speeches for much of the 
1880s. They defended politique coloniale by describing it as a “national politics” that would 
improve France’s global mercantile, military, political, and cultural position. But at the same 
time, they defined politique coloniale’s relationship with metropolitan political questions in 
distinct and sometimes contradictory ways that went beyond Ferry’s views. Some figures – like 
Gabriel Charmes – divorced politique coloniale from republican political values, which he 
implied were either misguided or irrelevant. Notably, Charmes insisted that France should make 
use of the Church in order to spread its influence in its overseas territories at a moment when the 
republicans under Jules Ferry were developing strong anticlerical policies in France.261 He also 
described the republicans’ theoretical commitment to promoting liberty and fraternity as foolish 
in a world where political dominance ultimately lay in the hands of the strongest. Charmes thus 
implied that the republicans’ values and theoretical commitments – while perhaps adequate for 
shaping France’s domestic policy – had little place in the Darwinian struggle for colonial 
conquest. Politique coloniale, he averred, required strategic planning instead of moral principles. 
Most republicans, however, still drew strong lines between republican colonial conquests 
and imperial or monarchist colonial conquests – even if they simultaneously contended that 
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politique coloniale was apolitical. Unlike its monarchist and imperial predecessors, they argued, 
republican France was not conquering overseas territories to amass power or riches. Instead, it 
was spreading French culture and values to “uncivilized” peoples. As a result, these conquests 
were not despotic; in fact, they would organize uncivilized societies, improve their material well- 
being, and introduce them to the principles of liberty, equality, and fraternity. The republic’s 
politique coloniale would thus ultimately promote human progress by exposing societies around 
the world to republican ideals.  
These thinkers’ ability to differentiate between republican conquest and monarchical or 
imperial conquest was, like Ferry’s, predicated on a belief in racial or – increasingly often – 
“cultural” hierarchy. In his speech to the French Parliament, Ferry had insisted that “superior 
races” like France had rights over “inferior races” like the Vietnamese. After the opposition 
condemned this language as violating the principles of The Rights of Man, a number of 
commentators began to substitute the words “culture” or “civilization” for the word “race.”262 To 
some extent, the change in vocabulary implied that the differences between France and the 
places that it conquered were more mutable. But the hierarchy that all of these terms invoked 
performed essentially played essentially the same role. In all cases, commentators argued that 
colonial conquest was just if the conquering civilization was “superior” to the conquered and 
planned to “improve” the peoples now under its control. Because most of these thinkers 
classified all peoples who were not of European descent as “inferior,” they were thus able to 
justify any French conquest in Asia or Africa.  
These attempts to distinguish republican colonization from its monarchical or imperial 
predecessors emerged in part out of a desire to reject critics’ attempts to discredit politique 
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coloniale by associating it with Napoleon III’s expansionary politics during the Second Empire. 
Much like earlier colonial theorists, these defenders of politique coloniale sought to demonstrate 
that colonial conquest was a fundamentally different enterprise from Napoleonic imperialism. 
But even as these thinkers insisted that politique coloniale had nothing to do with imperial 
politics, many began to use the term empire coloniale or empire d’outre-mer to describe the 
territory that France was conquering.263 Throughout the 1870s and even into the early 1880s, 
most colonial theorists has avoided using “empire” to refer to any of France’s overseas territories 
or conquests – at least in part because the term had been so discredited by Napoleon III. Even in 
the mid and late 1880s, none of the advocates of politique coloniale used “empire” without 
attaching some kind of descriptor to it or explicitly explained the term’s meaning and 
significance. However, an increasing number of writers attached empire coloniale to politique 
coloniale by implicitly describing the former as the ultimate goal of the latter. 
 The new use of the term empire coloniale to describe France’s conquered territories in 
the mid-1880s resulted from a number of contributing factors. On the most basic level, it partly 
stemmed from the growing strength of the international discourse on colonialism. British 
colonial theorists had for some time regularly used “colonial empire” to refer to Britain’s 
overseas conquests. During the 1880s, French advocates of politique coloniale saw Britain as 
both a competitor and a model. Many of them explicitly drew on British colonial models in their 
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work to create their visions of France’s colonial future.264 As a result, it is perhaps unsurprising 
to see translated British terminology appearing in their work. Given the complex history of 
“empire” in France, however, it remains noteworthy that these French advocates for colonial 
expansion felt comfortable borrowing the term. The empire colonial nevertheless operated as an 
extension of the distinction that these thinkers were already drawing between republican colonial 
conquest and imperial or monarchical colonial conquest. If republican colonization could be 
understood as a distinct enterprise, then republican colonial empire could also function entirely 
differently from continental or Napoleonic Empire.  
 
IV. Conclusion: Popular Colonization 
 The Third Republic’s decision to invade, conquer, and occupy Tonkin and Annam 
unleashed a debate that played out both in Parliament and in the press over politique coloniale, 
its relationship to republican politics, and its implications for the French nation. Both right-wing 
and left-wing critics of France’s policies overseas sought to discredit politique coloniale by 
associating it with Napoleon III and the Second Empire. Their critiques gained enough support to 
overturn Ferry’s government and push a number of Opportunist Republicans out of the French 
parliament in the elections of 1885 – even if they ultimately proved both unwilling and unable to 
end Ferry’s policies. In response to these challenges, supporters of politique coloniale defended 
and explained their ideas in numerous publications that simultaneously defined the policy as 
apolitical and in line with republican principles. For the most part, they sharply separated 
republican colonial conquest from despotic imperial or monarchical conquest. This delineation in 
turn enabled them to articulate a new idea of republican colonial empire, which they implied had 
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as little to do with the Second Empire as republican colonial conquest had to do with French 
colonies under the ancien régime. 
Despite the political setbacks that advocates of politique coloniale encountered in 1885, 
they were quite successful at promoting their understanding of the policy, its relationship to 
French politics, and its implications for the French nation in various mediums – including, 
increasingly, in popular publications. During the 1880s, a number of writers published books 
aimed at general audiences that sought to describe France’s colonial holdings and convince 
readers of their importance. These publications also promulgated some of the new republican 
defenses for politique coloniale. Alexis-Marie Gochet, a member of the society of geography in 
Paris, for example, published several editions of an illustrated atlas that described the history, 
resources, and inhabitants of France’s conquests. These texts all argued that republican France 
was spreading its values into these territories and improving the lives of their inhabitants, while 
stressing the importance of these territories to the future of the French nation.265 A popular 
history of France’s relationship with its colonies for young readers by E. Guillon similarly 
stressed the republic’s unique mission in its overseas territories.266 Such publications would 
become even more numerous in the 1890s as advocates of politique coloniale sought to secure 
the ascendancy of their ideas and promote the unique virtues of republican colonial expansion. 
As popular approval for colonial expansion grew during the 1890s, the memory of the 
Second Empire, Mexico, and France’s defeat in the Franco-Prussian War would begin to fade 
from the public conversation about France’s politique coloniale and empire coloniale. 
Increasingly, French politicians, journalists, and intellectuals would come to see continental 
                                               
265 Alexis-Marie Gochet, La France coloniale (Tours: Mame et Fils, 1886, 1887, 1888). 
266 E. Guillon, Les colonies françaises (Paris: Librairie Centrale des publications populaires, 1881) 
  341 
empire and colonial empire as distinct enterprises. This dichotomy did not emerge organically, 
however, and it was not without its contradictions. In fact, it was partly because of the way 
critics mobilized the memory of the Second Empire during the 1880s that republican 
commentators formulated their defenses of politique coloniale in the way that they did. The 
republican defense of colonial expansion thus in many ways evolved out of the shadows of 
France’s problematic relationship to Napoleon III and the Napoleonic empire that he had failed 
to construct. During the 1890s, advocates for colonial expansion would continue to develop a 
more robust justification for the colonial empire that they were trying to build by recasting its 
relationship to republican politics in more positive terms. 
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CHAPTER 5: THE DEFENSE OF A “COLONIAL EMPIRE” IN REPUBLICAN 
FRANCE AFTER 1890 
 
 In 1889, the French Republic held a large Universal Exposition in Paris. This Exposition 
– remembered primarily for the construction of the Eiffel Tower – put France’s scientific 
advancements and engineering capabilities on display for an international audience.1 At the same 
time, however, the organizers of the Exposition also devoted space to celebrating France’s 
expanding colonial territories. As many scholars have noted, organizers envisioned this space as 
part of a broader attempt to “popularize” these newly conquered overseas territories.2 Although 
later Expositions would overshadow it, at the time, 1889 marked the most ambitious attempt yet 
to recreate colonial spaces and display colonized people for a metropolitan audience.3  
 The exhibit was structured around a central palace, painted with “bright colors according 
to colonial tastes” and decorated with sculpted panels portraying colonial fruits and flowers. 
Indigenous troops flanked the building.4 The organizers also constructed a number of pavilions 
dedicated to representing France’s different colonial possessions – theoretically modeled after 
                                               
1 Alice Conklin, Sarah Fishman, Robert Zaretsky, France and its Empire since 1870 (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2010), 81. 
2 Sandrine Lemaire and Pascal Blanchard, “Exhibitions, Expositions, Media Coverage, and the Colonies,” Colonial 
Culture in France since the Revolution (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2014), 91. 
3 These organizers included Eugène Étienne, the Colonial Under Secretary of State, Victor Schoelcher, Senator and 
former abolitionist, and Félix Faure. See Jean Meyer, Jean Tarrade, Annie Rey-Goldzeiguer, Jacques Thobie, 
Histoire de la France coloniale des origines à 1914 (Paris: Armand Colin, 1991), 637. 
4 Exposition universel de 1889: Colonies françaises et pays de protectorat (Paris: J. Bell, 1889), 13. 
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the territory’s traditional architecture.5 These pavilions included a range of native flora and 
fauna, artwork, cultural productions, religious objects, and photographs of “diverse types of 
indigenous peoples.” Sometimes, indigenous people themselves were on display, especially in 
the exhibits devoted to Indochina, Senegal, and the Congo, where they engaged in “habitual” 
activities.6 These pavilions thus, according to the organizers, served as “monuments to the 
civilizations that they represent,” while demonstrating France’s territorial expansiveness, its 
commitment to the principles of assimilation, and the spread of its culture across the globe.7 
 The exhibition was accompanied by an extensive illustrated guide, published by order of 
the colonial ministry under the direction of Louis Henrique. Divided into five lengthy volumes, it 
aimed to “make our overseas possessions known to the public in the most realistic, most lively, 
and most attractive way possible.”8 The work was intended to provide an “experience” of the 
colonies – much like the exhibition itself. The volumes relied on maps along with botanical, 
ethnographic, and architectural sketches to enable their readers to envision the territories and 
peoples who lived under France’s control. At the same time, they provided extensive 
descriptions of the different colonies’ climates, economies, and histories – combined with even 
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lengthier explanations of France’s administration of the territories and the “civilizing” efforts 
that administration had undertaken. The works thus served a dual and at times contradictory 
purpose. On the one hand, they sought to provide a picturesque and exoticized vision of France’s 
overseas territories that justified French dominion by demonstrating that colonized peoples were 
racially and culturally inferior. At the same time, they also emphasized the success of the 
colonizing project by highlighting the ways in which the French administration had succeeded in 
making these territories more like France itself.9 
 The colonial ministry was not the only organization to publish a guide to the colonies 
represented at the French exhibition. The Société des études coloniales et maritimes also 
published one, which similarly sought to popularize France’s overseas territories by presenting 
them in a heavily illustrated, descriptive format. The introduction - written by Paul Leroy-
Beaulieu himself – noted that colonization had long been “the object of much misunderstanding 
and contempt” in France.10 This was in part, he acknowledged, because the French government 
had not always pursued colonial policy in a logical fashion. However, he insisted, no rational 
person could witness the colonizing efforts of the English, the Dutch, and the Russians - “the 
most practical and efficient nations in the world” – and conclude that colonizing was “useless” or 
“dangerous.” As the ever-improving fortunes of France’s own colonial holdings showed, 
colonization was “good in itself”: it was a “civilizing work that would profit both the colonizing 
and the colonized.”11 The positive value of colonization, he noted, had in fact become even more 
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marked in recent years, as European powers gave up colonizing by force and increasingly used 
peaceful means to assert their authority over new territories. He concluded by expressing hope 
that the popularity of the colonial exhibits at the Exposition reflected a newfound enthusiasm in 
France for the colonizing project.12 
 If this exhibition and the publications that surrounded it thus focused on promoting and 
popularizing France’s colonies, it also served as an opportunity for specialists – primarily from 
France, but also from other countries - to meet and discuss colonization, its aims, and its future. 
From July 30 to August 3, an international colonial congress organized by Victor Schoelcher and 
General Louis Faidherbe met in the central colonial palace. In the inaugural session, Édouard 
Barbey, a senator and the former French minister of the navy and the colonies, welcomed the 
delegates to the conference. In his speech, he noted that colonization had now become a matter 
of concern for all European countries. While in the past, he acknowledged, European powers had 
pursued colonial conquest out of a desire to enrich the metropole, modern colonization sought 
above all to contribute to the “grandeur of colonizing nations” and to the “prosperity of the 
colonies.” European nations thus no longer “exploited” the places that they conquered; instead, 
they tried to spread both their civilization and their population to new territories overseas.13 This 
vision of a “modern,” humanitarian colonization, which had also appeared in Paul Leroy-
Beaulieu’s introduction to the colonial exhibit, would structure most of the congress. 
Over the next few days, the delegates met to discuss a variety of topics, including 
whether and how a colonizing power should seek to civilize the indigenous population, how to 
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increase the profitability of colonized territories, and what kind of political regime colonies 
should be placed under.14 The topics themselves were hardly new; indeed, many appeared in 
Paul Leroy-Beaulieu’s work from the late 1860s. If anything, they demonstrate that many French 
colonial theorists continued to publically espouse a vision of colonial expansion that had its roots 
in the early Third Republic. Notably, most French speakers expressed a theoretical commitment 
to the principle of assimilation and continued to promote colonial expansion primarily as a way 
of contributing to national influence and prestige.15 At the same time, however, many speakers 
also drew on the theoretical apparatus that republican politicians and intellectuals had developed 
earlier in the decade in order to defend politique coloniale and colonial expansion. They implied 
that the French republic’s relationship to its overseas territories was entirely distinct from 
France’s relationship with its earlier imperial holdings by describing colonialism as a modern 
enterprise that had been undertaken by all of Europe. Moreover, they differentiated between 
European wars and colonial conquest by drawing on Social Darwinism and racist logic.16  
For the most part, neither the colonial exhibit nor the congress that accompanied it 
produced a new way of understanding colonization and its relationship to French politics.17 But 
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both the Exposition and the Congress nevertheless marked a shift in colonial discourses. Both 
represented a new effort by the republican government and other colonial advocates to 
popularize the French colonies in France and to locate France in the center of the broader 
conversation about colonization that was occurring across Europe. The 1890s would be marked 
by a growing campaign to promote the colonies to an ever-widening group of French people 
while simultaneously securing France’s international reputation as a colonial power.  
This widening popular – and political – interest in colonial empire in 1889 and especially 
in the 1890s is particularly notable in light of the debates and controversy that had surrounded 
politique coloniale in 1885, when the Chamber of Deputies had brought down Jules Ferry’s 
government over France’s policies in Tonkin.18 Especially after radicals and conservatives 
unseated the Opportunist republicans who had followed Ferry in the elections of October 1885, a 
popular rejection of colonial expansion seemed to have solidified.19 As Chapter 4 demonstrates, 
however, the crisis over Tonkin primarily served to illuminate the ideological tensions in the 
Opportunists’ embrace of politique coloniale and revealed that many French people continued to 
have reservations about the wisdom of extensive overseas expansion. It is less clear that the 
political turmoil represented a widespread rejection of colonialism itself. And in the years that 
followed – as the 1889 International Exposition and Colonial Congress both demonstrate - 
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political advocacy for colonial expansion would ultimately spread across most French political 
parties and a number of cultural platforms.  
This new popular and political interest in colonialism was the result of a combination of 
factors, including ongoing changes to France’s internal political configuration, growing 
international competition, and increased advocacy on the part of groups and individuals with 
financial or personal interests in France’s overseas territories.20 Partly because of these changes, 
colonialism became much less politically controversial during the 1890s than it had been during 
the 1870s and the 1880s. Even colonial conquest itself faded as an object of debate. Politicians, 
journalists, and theorists continued to argue about its means, but far fewer contended that the 
prospect of conquest was itself problematic.21 
The 1890s were also marked by a new effort by a variety of politicians, intellectuals, and 
writers to define France’s colonial possessions and explain their relationship to republican values 
and the French nation. These efforts were themselves not new. Much like the speakers at the 
Congress in 1889, many republican intellectuals, politicians, and authors drew on theoretical 
work about colonization drafted decades before. However, these new publications on the 
colonies were much more prolific than their earlier counterparts had been; they were also aimed 
at a wider audience. At the same time, they also increasingly drew on a new term – empire 
colonial – in order to describe these colonial possessions. 
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As Chapter 4 makes clear, a number of writers began using the term “colonial empire” in 
the mid-1880s to describe France’s colonies.22 This marked a shift from the first years of the 
Third Republic, when republicans avoided using the term “empire” to describe France’s 
relationship to its overseas territories because of the term’s negative connotations.23 However, 
most writers in the 1880s only invoked the term tentatively; they neither used it consistently nor 
tried to define it. The debates over Indochina in the 1880s showed, moreover, that many on both 
the left and the right continued to associate colonial conquest with the Bonapartist legacy and 
continued to connect the two in order to discredit colonial expansion. The word “empire” – even 
when attached to the word “colonial” - thus remained fraught. But in the 1890s, Bonapartism and 
the Second Empire increasingly faded from political discourse and popular consciousness.24 As a 
result, the negative connotations towards “empire” faded away, and the term “colonial empire” 
took on a place of increasing importance in popular discourse. 
This chapter examines the emergence of “colonial empire” as the key linguistic and 
conceptual category for understanding France’s overseas territories in the wake of the Boulanger 
Affair and the conquest of Madagascar. It looks at the different ways in which politicians, 
journalists, and writers used and defined the term over the course of the 1890s. Its analysis 
                                               
22 As the chapter explained, these thinkers were partly borrowing the term from the British. British colonial theorists 
had used “colonial empire” to refer to Britain’s overseas conquests for some time. During the 1880s, French 
advocates of politique coloniale saw Britain as both a competitor and a model; many of them explicitly drew on 
British colonial models in their work to create their visions of France’s colonial future. See Wolfgang Schivelbusch, 
The Culture of Defeat: On National Trauma, Mourning, and Recovery (New York: Picador, 2001), 213. 
23 As Chapter 3 emphasizes, the term did not entirely disappear from political discourses, but it was usually only 
used by monarchists and Bonapartists – not by republicans. See, for example, Pierre Raboisson, Étude sur les 
colonies et la colonisation au regard de la France (Paris: Challamel Ainé, 1877). 
24 The death of Napoleon IV in 1879 had already weakened Bonapartism as a political movement. His uncle and heir 
had alienated most of the party by associating himself with the republicans. The rise – and fall – of Boulanger would 
consolidate the growing sense that the Bonapartists were irrelevant. In the wake of his fall, many of them would join 
together with the new conservative opposition movement that accepted the republic. See James Lehning, To Be a 
Citizen: The Political Culture of the Early French Third Republic (New York: Cornell University Press, 2001), 180. 
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focuses on several interrelated questions. First, which factors led republican thinkers to embrace 
“colonial empire” as a conceptual category during this period? Second, how did different figures 
explain and defend the term? And finally, how did they explain its relationship to the Third 
Republic and the French nation? The chapter considers these questions by considering how this 
conversation about “colonial empire” played out across political pamphlets, academic writing, 
and popular publications over the course of the decade. It begins by examining some of the key 
political crises of the 1890s and considering how they affected the conversation about 
colonization and its benefits. It also looks at the growing prominence of racialized and racist 
discourses in this conversation. From there, it turns to reflect on the emergence of a wider 
discussion about empire coloniale and its significance during this period.  
This chapter argues that empire could only re-emerge as an organizing concept in 
republican colonial thought when the possibility of a Napoleonic imperial restoration faded. 
However, it also demonstrates that the new political climate was not alone responsible for 
making  “empire” a safe conceptual category for republicans to embrace. Colonial and 
continental empire were also understood as separate during this period as a result of the growing 
body of racialized and racist thought, which drew sharp lines between Europe and the colonies. 
As a result, concerns about “empire” as a form of political organization became irrelevant to the 
conversation about overseas territories. In fact, the colonial empire became increasingly integral 
to the way that republican thinkers defined both the Third Republic and the nation-state itself. 
 
II. A New Colonial Synthesis? Political Crisis and Imperial Conquest  
During the late 1880s and 1890s, France was beset by a number of political crises, 
including the Boulanger Affair, the Panama Scandal, and the Dreyfus Affair. Taken together, 
these crises and the political transformations that accompanied them had important effects on 
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France’s colonial discourse and its colonial policies. They simultaneously altered the Third 
Republic’s political configuration and moved colonial expansion away from the center of 
political debate. As a result of these changes, for most of the decade, France was ruled by a 
governing coalition that saw colonial expansion as a political tool that could unite a divided 
nation and increase France’s international prestige. This vision of the colonies’ political 
advantages was hardly new – in fact, Napoleon III had envisioned colonial expansion in much 
the same terms. But the 1890s marked the first time that this vision of the colonies’ promise did 
not encounter any effective opposition. 
The growing enthusiasm in France during the early 1890s for France’s existing colonies 
and the prospect of further colonial expansion was due in part to the rise and fall of Georges 
Boulanger. Although the Boulanger Affair did not directly involve France’s colonies or the 
question of colonial empire, it posed a challenge to the republican political order that ultimately 
helped bolster the popularity of colonial expansion as a national strategy in the years that 
followed. In the wake of Boulanger’s fall, a coalition of moderate republicans and conservatives 
would increasingly turn to the colonies as a means of strengthening their political legitimacy. 
 Georges Boulanger, an army general with an unremarkable military career, rose to 
prominence in 1886 when Georges Clemenceau put him forward as minister of war. Clemenceau 
nominated Boulanger because of his anticlerical and progressive reputation.25 During his tenure 
as minister of war, Boulanger enacted a number of military reforms, including the removal of 
military officers associated with the Orleanist and Bonapartist houses. At the same time, he 
courted widespread popularity by advocating for revanche against Germany. The moderate 
                                               
25 Boulanger began his career by serving in Austro-Sardinia and Cochinchina under the Second Empire. He also 
fought during the Franco-Prussian War and was wounded while suppressing the Paris Commune. See Irvine, The 
Boulanger Affair Reconsidered, 34. 
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republicans – who had initially supported Boulanger’s appointment – objected to these measures 
and allied with conservatives to block his return to government after the ministry fell in May 
1887. The new administration, concerned about Boulanger’s growing popularity, sent him to 
command the XIII Army Corps at Clermont-Ferrand.26 In the months that followed, however, 
radical republicans and conservatives rallied against the new administration. The radicals in 
particular saw Boulanger, who was eager to return to politics, as a potential avenue for political 
reform. They supported his candidacy in a series of by-elections, where he won the support of 
radical and Bonapartist working-class voters on a platform calling for constitutional revision.27 
Even as the left organized around Boulanger politically, however, conservatives began to 
underwrite the costs of his campaigns. As scholars have shown, conservative support emerged 
from the ground up: conservative leaders came to support him when they saw their followers 
rallying around his revanchist message and opposition to the Third Republic’s institutions.28 At 
the same time, however, these leaders hoped that he would dismantle the Third Republic and 
perhaps even restore the monarchy. Bonapartists and Orleanists came together to advocate for a 
return to the imperial plebiscite, which they hoped would secure Boulanger’s power.29 This 
                                               
26 The moderate republicans also objected to a number of other measures that the radical republicans – theoretically 
their legislative allies – had pushed through. See Robert Gildea, Children of the Revolution: The French, 1799-1914 
(New York: Penguin, 2008), 258. 
27 They were in part reacting against or making use of a scandal around President Grévy’s son-in-law, who had been 
selling honors. The radicals were using Boulanger in an attempt to establish a presidency elected by direct universal 
suffrage.  See Lehning, To Be a Citizen, 156. 
28 Over the years, a number of historians have debated about whether Boulangisme was a political phenomenon 
belonging to the left or the right. It is certainly true that many republican radicals and socialists supported 
Boulanger, especially at first, and that many of his reforms as war minister seemed in line with a radical republican 
platform. But at the same time, much of his growing influence came from his ability to win provincial elections in 
conservative districts. The Royalist press was also largely responsible for supporting him. Boulanger also drew 
heavily on Bonapartist appeal. See Kevin Passmore, The Right in France from the Third Republic to Vichy (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 46; Irvine, The Boulanger Affair Reconsidered, 13. 
29 The Bonapartist and Royalist leaders both asked for and received permission from their respective pretenders to 
financially support this campaign. Boulanger, in return, sent emissaries promising that he would advocate for a 
return to the monarchy if he received their support. See Gildea, Children of the Revolution, 268. 
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alliance between left and right was not without its tensions. Eventually, many of the radicals and 
socialists who had initially supported Boulanger withdrew their support as the movement moved 
farther to the right. But enough support remained on both sides of the political spectrum to 
enable Boulanger to run in and win an increasing number of elections in 1888, although he was 
unable to serve because he remained an active military officer.30  
Boulanger’s increasing popularity threatened the Third Republic’s conservative 
republican and parliamentarian order, which had sought to restrict direct democracy and limit 
political debate. Boulanger, by contrast, promoted populist political engagement across all 
registers in French society. He used elections as an opportunity to mobilize voters and encourage 
them to participate directly in the political process. This populism, which drew on radical 
republican and Bonapartist traditions, challenged the elitist, moderate republic.31 Tellingly, when 
he was elected deputy of Paris in January 1889, the moderate republican leadership and 
mainstream republican press expected a coup d’état.32 Instead, he hesitated, which gave the 
government the opportunity to prosecute both Boulanger and the Ligue des patriotes that 
supported him. In response, Boulanger fled the country, and Boulangisme died out over the 
course of the next two years – well before Boulanger committed suicide in 1891.33 
The Boulanger Affair was short-lived, but it affected both French politics and popular 
debates over colonialism and colonial empire. On the most basic level, Boulangisme’s collapse 
strengthened the centrist republicans who had supported colonial expansion throughout the 
1880s while weakening their radical, Bonapartist, and monarchist counterparts who had 
                                               
30 Irvine, The Boulanger Affair Reconsidered, 9. 
31 Passmore, The Right in France, 48. 
32 Lehning, To Be a Citizen, 160. 
33 This was partly because there was a concerted effort in the press to attack the movement and reveal its indiscrete 
alliances with members of different political parties. See Irvine, The Boulanger Affair Reconsidered, 4, 159. 
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criticized it. Even the Panama Scandal, which discredited some of the coalition’s members, did 
not shake its hold on power.34 Moreover, some monarchists and the majority of Catholics  – 
reacting both against the demagogic character of Boulangisme and in accordance with an order 
from the Vatican - rallied to the Republic and to the Republic’s colonial policies.35  As a result, 
the Third Republic emerged with a strong political center committed to defending its political 
order and to extending its reach overseas.  
Boulangisme also affected moderates’ attitudes about the security of the republic. On the 
one hand, the Boulanger Affair strengthened many moderates’ concerns about the likelihood of 
popular violence and political revolution. This ongoing concern in fact helped drive the alliance 
between conservatives and moderates for much of the 1890s, especially in light of the growing 
strength of the socialist party.36 At the same time, however, the Third Republic’s ability to 
contain the Boulangiste threat also helped create a new optimism about its future. In the years 
following Boulanger’s death, it became increasingly clear that both monarchist and Bonapartist 
threats to the Republic’s political order had faded. The Legitimist, Orleanist, and Bonapartist 
parties fractured and realigned, and their successors were largely willing to work within the 
republic’s legal and political framework.37  
                                               
34 Meyer, Tarrade, Rey-Goldzeiguer, Thobie, Histoire de la France coloniale des origines à 1914, 639. 
35 In the 1890s, the Church instructed its followers to accept the Republic in order to defend social order. Catholics 
came together with former Orleanists to form the droite républicaine. For most of the 1890s, Opportunists (now 
usually known as “Progressists”) allied more frequently with the right than with the radicals. At the same time, the 
diminishing health of the Count of Paris and the scandalous behavior of his presumptive heir created further 
fractures among Royalists. See Passmore, The Right in France, 74.  
36 The socialist and anti-Semitic movements further consolidated these connections. See Lehning, To Be a Citizen, 
180; Robert Lynn Fuller, The Origins of the French Nationalist Movement (Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 2012), 47. 
37 New threats to the republic’s political order had emerged, of course, including the nationalist and socialist 
movements. But while these opposition movements sometimes continued to argue for reformation or revolution, 
they did not propose to restore the monarchs of earlier centuries. By 1892, some of the key members of the 
monarchist leadership – including figures like De Mun, Breteuil, and Mackau – were declaring that the monarchist 
cause had become hopeless. Some monarchists continued to dream of carrying out a coup d’état, but they lost hope 
for electoral victory. See Irvine, The Boulanger Affair Reconsidered, 162-166. 
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These dual legacies of Boulangisme affected the discourse surrounding overseas 
expansion. First, the fear of rebellion led moderate leaders on both the right and the left to view 
colonial expansion as a way to unite a French populace prone to political division and disorder. 
Much like Napoleon III in the 1860s, they saw colonial expansion as an attractive strategy to 
direct popular bellicose sentiment and strengthen France’s military reputation while avoiding the 
dangerous European war that revanchisme threatened. And at the same time, the problematic 
specter of Napoleonic Empire, which opponents of colonial expansion had invoked to criticize 
the Republic’s activities overseas for much of the 1870s and 1880s, faded along with 
Bonapartism itself. Republicans’ increasing concerns about mass politics and the growing 
weakness of their former political opponents thus worked together to strengthen the appeal of 
colonial expansion and unsettle the ability of its opponents to criticize it. 
The turn towards colonial expansion among moderate and conservative politicians and 
intellectuals in the wake of Boulangisme was not only driven by a reaction against the 
movement’s tactics and values, however. In fact, during the 1890s, advocates of colonial 
expansion often drew upon some of the same discourses that Boulangisme had made use of and 
further popularized, including discourses of racial science and nationalism.38 These discourses 
would help underwrite the new, more comprehensive visions of colonial empire articulated by 
French writers, intellectuals, and theorists during the 1890s. They would distinguish France’s 
new colonial empire from other imperial configurations while creating a vision of empire that 
could fall in line with French republican principles. 
                                               
38 Boulanger drew on these discourses in order to raise popular resentment against foreigners and immigrants and to 
increase support for the prospect of a war of revenge against Germany. Boulangists used Social Darwinism in order 
to emphasize the competition that divided interest groups. Immigrants, some Boulangists implied, were dangerous to 
France’s national character because they were racially degenerate. The Boulangiste movement also drew on anti-
Semitic discourses that would re-emerge during the Dreyfus Affair. See Passmore, The Right in France, 50. 
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Racial science was far from new in 1890s France; in fact, it had long played an important 
and contradictory role in French colonial policy.39 Napoleon III himself had drawn on a Saint-
Simonian vision of racial progress in order to justify his plan to restructure France’s relationship 
to Algeria, while colonists had used an alternative system of racial classification to mobilize 
against that plan.40 But over the course of the 1880s and 1890s, biological explanations for racial 
difference played an increasingly prominent role in French culture and political discourse. These 
biological explanations were not necessarily Darwinian – indeed, even French scientists had 
somewhat ambivalent attitudes towards Darwinism until the end of the nineteenth century.41 But 
even if Republican thinkers were as likely to draw on Lamarck as on Darwin, they nevertheless 
applied principles borrowed from evolutionary biology to explain society and politics. During 
the 1890s, Republican thinkers were especially likely to apply these principles to explain the 
relationships between different nations or peoples.42  
                                               
39 Modern racial theory arguably had its roots in Enlightenment thought, but it was only systematized in the late 
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries as scientific thinkers sought to classify and rank human races. During the 
early nineteenth century, European scientists and philosophers had divided over the question over whether human 
races were defined by monogenism or polygenism. Advocates of monogenism held that all humans had descended 
from a common source, while advocates of polygenism contended that humans had descended from different 
sources. See Nancy Stepan, Picturing Tropical Nature (London: Reaktion Books, 2001), 85. 
40 Prosper Enfantin, Colonisation d’Algérie (Paris: P. Bertrand, 1843), 499; Patricia Lorcin, Imperial Identities: 
Stereotyping, Prejudice, and Race in Colonial Algeria (New York: IB Tauris & Co., 1995). 
41 Darwin’s work was not ignored in France. While The Origin of Species was ignored in French journals, and was 
only translated into France in 1862, The Descent of Man, published in English in 1871, was translated in 1872. In 
the 1850s, evolution or transformisme was relatively unpopular in France – in part because of the lasting influence 
of Georges Cuvier, a paleontologist opposed to the philosophy. Darwin’s growing importance in England did have 
an impact on the fortunes of evolutionary biology in France; during the 1870s and 1880s, an increasing number of 
scientists, intellectuals, and politicians adopted the theory. Many of them, however, did not adopt Darwin’s vision of 
evolution, but Lamarck’s – in part because Darwinism was seen as an import. Slowly, over the 1890s, the Darwinian 
model won out. See Robert E. Stebbins, “France,” in The Comparative Reception of Darwinism, ed. by Thomas F. 
Glick (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988), 117, 120, 125, 155, 162; Rae Beth Gordon, Dances with 
Darwin, 1875-1910: Vernacular Modernity in France (Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing, 2009), 60-65. 
42 Darwinism tended to emphasize competition between species while Lamarckism tended to focus on inherited and 
environmental changes. As Linda Clark shows, French politicians who sought to apply these biological explanations 
to social life often drew on some combination of them. See Linda Clark, Social Darwinism in France (University, 
AL: The University of Alabama Press, 1984), 178; Alice Conklin, In the Museum of Man: Race, Anthropology, and 
Empire in France, 1850-1950 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2013), 23. 
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The growing popularity of racialized thinking was reflected in the rising fortunes of 
Arthur Gobineau’s Essai sur l’inégalité des races humaines, which had originally been published 
in the 1850s (when it had been almost entirely ignored). In this text, Gobineau sought to describe 
“the fall of civilizations” – a phenomenon that could only be explained, he insisted, by 
examining race. He contended that all major civilizations had been established by the white race 
– especially Aryans – and that the same civilizations began to fall when the white race began to 
mix with other peoples. 43 Over time, he warned, the white race would disappear, especially in 
France – a trend that would ultimately lead to universal decay and barbarism.44 This vision of 
racial decay was not formed by evolutionary biology, whose advocates contended that the forces 
of evolution led to human progress.45 But the growing popular interest in race led to new 
printings and a growing reception during the 1880s and 1890s – despite the fact that Gobineau’s 
political opinions were far from republican.46 If Gobineau’s vision of racial inequality remained 
more controversial than its evolutionary counterparts, it demonstrates both the new influence of 
racist thinking and the contradictions that could characterize these kinds of explanations. 
The growth of racist and biological thinking thus affected French discourses about 
colonial expansion in two ways. On the one hand, a number of Republican thinkers drew on the 
                                               
43 He identified ten different key civilizations, which included India, Egypt, Assyria, Greece, China, Rome, 
Germany, Alleghenia, Mexico, and Peru. See Joseph Arthur Gobineau, Essai sur l’inégalité des races humaines 
(Paris: Librairie de Firmin Didot Frères, 1953), 1: 1, 359; Michael Biddiss, Father of Racist Ideology: The Social 
and Political Thought of Count Gobineau (London: Widenfeld and Nicholson, 1970), 122. 
44 In fact, he insisted that the French Revolution revealed above all the extent of France’s racial decadence. See 
Gobineau, Essai sur l’inégalité des races humaines, 169. 
45 It contradicted Darwinist principles. Gobineau insisted that there were three races whose characteristics did not 
change over time. While he did not embrace polygenism, he argued that “black” and “yellow” races were separate 
from “white.” See Biddiss, Father of Racist Ideology, 248. 
46 As Stephen Kale has shown, Gobineau was a “heretical legitimist” who originally wrote the Essai to criticize the 
French aristocracy and modern French society. Kale argues that Gobineau’s racial theories were intended above all 
to explain “the irredeemable degeneracy of the French nobility” and “account for France’s uniquely tragic historical 
development.” See Stephen Kale, “Gobineau, Racism, and Legitimism: A Royalist Heretic in Nineteenth-Century 
France,” Modern Intellectual History 7.1 (April 2010), 35, 36. 
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language of Darwinian competition to justify France’s overseas colonial expansion. They 
insisted that all nations were competing with one another for influence and indeed survival, and 
that ultimately, the largest and most powerful of these nations would come out on top.47 Unless 
France extended its borders and expanded its population, it would find itself unable to keep up 
with its British and German rivals. In its substance, this kind of argument was not new – Prévost-
Paradol had articulated a version of it in the late 1860s. But it became both more widespread and 
more biologized in the 1880s and 1890s.48  
On the other hand, a growing number of thinkers also relied on this more robust vision of 
racial inequality to differentiate more thoroughly between conquest within Europe and overseas 
colonial conquest. By arguing that the peoples living in Africa were biologically inferior to 
Europeans, French republicans were able to simultaneously argue in favor of democratic political 
practices in Europe and non-democratic domination of non-Europeans overseas. Of course, not 
all Republican thinkers adopted this biological vision of racial inequality. In some ways, after all, 
it posed a racial problem to the republican justification for colonial expansion. Republicans 
claimed that they had a moral right to colonize overseas places because they would bring 
“civilization” to the peoples who lived there. But if the peoples who lived there were biologically 
inferior, how could a new “civilization” or “culture” improve their status?  
The tension between this vision of biological inferiority and the promise of republican 
civilization had been present even in the 1889 Universal Exposition, and it would continue to 
                                               
47 Clark, Social Darwinism in France, 161. 
48 Gordon, Dances with Darwin, 1875-1910, 81; Meyer, Tarrade, Rey-Goldzeiguer, Thobie, Histoire de la France 
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mark much republican thought about colonial expansion.49 For example, in his 1897 Principes de 
la colonisation, Jean Marie Antoine de Lanessan, the republican former governor-general of 
Indochina, insisted that racial inequality was the driving factor for much of human history; it 
explained which peoples had expanded over new territory and which had contracted or 
disappeared.50 He claimed that conflicts between peoples over territory were inevitable and 
implied that modern colonization was the extension of this underlying natural law. As a result, he 
acknowledged, colonization was undeniably “savage”; moreover, “the degeneration or the 
destruction of one of the races in contact” inevitably followed.51 This destruction was not 
necessarily violent – it might take the form of “miscegenation” or displacement instead of 
slaughter – but it was the inevitable consequence of contact. Colonization thus did not 
necessarily improve colonized peoples, but simply reflected the permanent and necessary 
conflict over resources and land that drove all of human history.52 At the same time, however, 
this destruction was not purposeless. While it might negatively affect colonized peoples, the 
spread of civilization across the world contributed to the progress of humanity.53 
 In this vision of colonial expansion, Lanessan drew on the Darwinist notion of “survival 
of the fittest” in order to argue that racial conflict was a central part of human history. 
                                               
49 Alice Conklin, A Mission to Civilize: The Republican Idea of Empire in France and West Africa, 1895-1930 (Palo 
Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 1997), 9, 256. 
50 Like Leroy-Beaulieu, Lanessan argued that the earliest “colonization” was difficult to disentangle from human 
migration. However, he argued, the most “inferior” peoples – like the Hottentots in South Africa – had never 
migrated at all. See Jean Marie Antoine de Lanessan, Principes de la colonisation (Paris: Félix Alcan, 1897), 6. 
51 He insisted that histories of colonization “never lack motives for explaining the acts of barbarity committed by 
Europeans. It is always the indigenous peoples who are always wrong; they steal from Europeans, they destroy their 
plantations… and thus attract just reprisals… The most superficial examination of the conduct of the [colonizers] is 
sufficient to establish that the indigenous people are only avenging their injuries.” See ibid., 24. 
52 This brutal vision of human nature and human conflict was typical of many thinkers who borrowed the Darwinian 
notion of “survival of the fittest” and applied it to human society. See Ibid., 25. 
53 Ibid., 22. 
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Colonization thus did not require moral or political justification; it simply reflected human 
nature. At the same time, however, he also used a positivist notion of “progress” that implied that 
colonization would ultimately contribute to a broader project of civilization.54 In other words, 
Lanessan did not abandon the idea of the “civilizing mission,” but instead reoriented it. Instead 
of spreading civilization to different peoples around the world, he implied, colonization spread 
civilization to different territories. Moreover, instead of benefiting the specific groups of people 
that fell beneath French control, it benefited humanity as a whole. This reorientation effectively 
effaced the peoples who lived in the territories the French conquered and the violence of the 
French occupation. 
Other republican thinkers did not necessarily share Lanessan’s attempt to reconcile 
evolutionary biology and the “civilizing mission.” A number insisted that France’s civilization 
would be able to improve or alter the biological inferiority of the people that it conquered. Others 
avoided the language of evolutionary biology entirely. In fact, this disagreement about whether 
people identified as racially inferior could over time become equal would continue to create 
tensions in republican colonial thought into the twentieth century.55 But even if applying the 
language of evolutionary biology to republican colonial conquest created contradictions, it 
helped justify a vision of racial hierarchy that secured the popularity of politique coloniale and 
supported new attempts to outline a comprehensive vision of a republican colonial empire. 
This new agreement between right and center on the potential political and cultural 
benefits of colonial expansion was particularly notable in the popular and political response to 
the disastrous invasion of Madagascar in 1894-1895. France had long claimed some rights over 
                                               
54 Samia El Mechat, “Sur les Principes de colonisation d’Arthur Girault (1895),” Revue historique 657 (January 
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55 Wilder, The French Imperial Nation-State, 5. 
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Madagascar, and in the mid-1880s, Jules Ferry had worked to further consolidate French control 
over the territory. In 1890, France even succeeded in establishing European acceptance of its 
rights to the island. However, the French administration was able to exercise little effective 
authority over the island’s interior. In 1894, in the face of rising conflicts with the Malagasy 
population, the republican government sought to impose a protectorate on Queen Ranavalona 
III’s government. When she refused, the Chamber of Deputies voted to fund an expedition led by 
General Jacques Duchesne that would impose the protectorate by force.56  
From the beginning, Duchesne’s expeditionary force ran into a number of setbacks. 
When French troops actually encountered the Malagasy army, they met with little serious 
resistance. But if almost no French troops died in combat, nearly 6,000 of the 15,000 troops sent 
to the territory died of disease.57 Moreover, almost as soon as France succeeded in forcing the 
Malagasy government to agree to the sought-after protectorate, a popular uprising spread across 
the territory. The movement, often referred to as the menalamba or “red shawl” uprising, took 
the form of a guerrilla war. Its adherents singled out foreign missionaries and indigenous 
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Christians for attack.58 In 1896, chaos spread across the island as the republican government tried 
and failed to exert order.59 In the face of this upheaval, the republican government replaced the 
territory’s administration and sent in Colonel Joseph Gallieni to serve as Governor-General; he 
eventually succeeded in suppressing the revolt.60  
France’s invasion of Madagascar thus ended with French control over the territory, but it 
consumed more resources and lives than initially predicted. The French government found itself 
investing both money and men in an increasingly expensive and unpopular expedition. Although 
the French army did not encounter any serious military resistance, a high number of French 
soldiers died during the conquest – largely because of poor government planning. The Ministry 
of War had failed to supply the invading troops with enough porters to carry supplies or 
sufficient medicine to treat those who had fallen ill.61 To make matters worse, ongoing conflicts 
between the Ministry of War and the Ministry of the Colonies further complicated the treatment 
of sick soldiers. In order to avoid having to collaborate with colonial officials, army officers 
decided to ship sick soldiers back to France instead of bringing them to nearby Reunion. Many 
of them died on the journey because of the heat and unsanitary conditions.62  
                                               
58 The uprising did not seriously threaten French rule, but it did upset European residents, especially since the rebels 
went out of their way to target missionaries. See Daughton, An Empire Divided, 175. 
59 Louis Brunet, L’oeuvre de la France à Madagascar (Paris: Challamel, 1903), 119. 
60 Finch, A Progressive Occupation, 173. 
61 Brunet, L’oeuvre de la France à Madagascar, 133-135. 
62 The Minister of the Colonies and the Minister of the Army articulated different versions of this conflict. The 
Minister of the Army claimed that the Minister of the Colonies had insisted that Reunion could only house 300 sick 
soldiers at a time. Moreover, he had decided that the ministry of war would need to pay 9 francs per day for each 
sick soldier housed there. As a result of these difficulties, the Minister of War claimed, the army had no choice but 
to ship the ill back to France. The Minister of the Colonies reported, on the other hand, that he had often offered the 
army assistance of all kinds throughout the expedition, but that all help had been entirely refused. He insisted that 
the Ministry of the Colonies had offered to house as many sick soldiers as necessary in Reunion, and claimed that 
the only reason that the Ministry of War could not afford to pay 9 francs per day was because they had misallocated 
the resources necessary for the expedition. See “Revue des Journaux,” Le Figaro (19 September 1895), 3; Henry 
Laupauze, “Le général de Montauban et l’expédition de Madagascar en 1861,” Le Gaulois (20 September 1895), 1; 
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The problems that accompanied the invasion of Madagascar received considerable 
attention in the French press. To some extent, this coverage echoed the debates over Indochina 
that occurred a decade previously. Journalists from the left, right, and popular press came 
together to attack the government’s policies and practices. The right-leaning Revue 
hebdomadaire, for example, described the invasion of Madagascar as “poorly prepared, 
organized, and conducted” and accused both the Minister of War and the Minister of the 
Colonies of incompetence.63 The popular Monde illustré similarly wondered how the 
government “could have thrown itself into this deadly campaign with so little thought or 
foresight.”64 The left-leaning Rappel complained that the expedition had been organized in a way 
that “delivered our troops to all of the forces of destruction posed by a murderous climate” 
instead of putting them in a position to adequately fight the Hova.65 These journals thus implied 
that the French government – and especially the Ministry of War – had acted incompetently and 
foolishly endangered the lives of French soldiers. 
A number of journalists even went so far as to contend that these mistakes were 
consequential enough to warrant immediate consequences. The popular Petit Parisien 
condemned the expedition’s “incapable organizers” and averred that they had committed an 
“unpardonable crime” that “mocked” the French nation.66 A journalist writing for the 
                                               
“Conflit ministerial,” 1; “Madagascar,” Le Journal des débats (26 September 1895), 1; Meyer, Tarrade, Rey-
Goldzeiguer, Thobie, Histoire de la France coloniale des origines à 1914, 669. 
63 “Bulletin Politique,” La Revue hebdomadaire (September 1895), 636. Maurice Talmeyer, writing for the same 
publication, implied that the government’s incompetence was directly responsible for killing soldiers. See Maurice 
Talmeyer, “Causerie,” La Revue hebdomadaire (September 1895), 631. 
64 “À Madagascar,” Le Monde illustré (28 September 1895), 195. 
65 Pelletan went on to imply that the ministry of war’s incompetence was in fact endangering the entire army, and 
warned that their abuses had put the “military spirit” itself under attack. See Camille Pelletan, “Pour l’armée,” Le 
Rappel (22 September 1895), 1. 
66 “L’expédition de Madagascar,” Le Petit parisien (23 September 1895), 1. 
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conservative Gaulois argued that the deputies needed to determine who was responsible for “the 
thoughtless waste of French resource and the sacrifice of so many of its children.”67 The leftist 
Justice agreed that Parliament should launch an inquiry into the expedition.68 The insistence that 
the administration’s behavior was not simply foolish but criminal had also characterized the 
criticism of the Tonkin expedition in 1885 – although in 1895, most journalists did not suggest 
that the officials responsible were guilty of treason.69 
The Ministry of War’s decision to repatriate French troops through the Suez Canal in the 
middle of the summer was the object of particular criticism from all sides.70 In the Senate itself, 
Arthur Ranc, the head of the Gauche démocratique, wanted to question the Minister of War over 
the incident; journalists on both the right and the left supported these efforts. The centrist Temps, 
conservative Figaro, and left-leaning Justice all in fact used the decision on the transport of ill 
soldiers to accuse the Minister of War of corruption and heartlessness. They implied that the 
Minister of War had decided to send French troops home on ships – even though he knew that it 
would likely kill them – because he was hoping that if they died in France after their return 
instead of in Reunion, they would not be counted as casualties of war. The Ministry had thus 
sacrificed the lives of French soldiers, these journalists contended, in a misguided attempt to 
seem less incompetent.71 Other writers claimed that different, but equally questionable 
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69 See, for example, Camille Pelletan, “Responsabilités,” La Justice (4 April 1885), 1; “Les événements,” Le Petit 
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motivations had determined the ministry’s decisions. Camille Pelletan, for example, argued that 
the Ministry of War refused to send soldiers to Reunion because it did not want to share the 
riches of Madagascar with the Colonial Ministry.72 Even if journalists did not necessarily agree 
on the motivations behind these repatriations, many thus suggested that the Ministry of War had 
sacrificed the lives of ordinary French soldiers for its own purposes. 
The press coverage of the invasion of Madagascar was far from uniformly critical, 
however. In fact, a number of popular journals defended the Ministry of War and the government 
more generally against these charges. Many of the journalists writing for the Journal des débats 
and Liberté in particular – conservative republican newspapers – sought to demonstrate both that 
the expedition’s problems were minor and that the government was not responsible for them.73 
One article, for example, argued that the intensity of the criticism over Madagascar did not stem 
from the events that had transpired, but instead was the result of socialist meddling. These 
socialists, the author implied, were not interested in the welfare of French soldiers; instead, they 
were attempting to use Madagascar to divide republicans and discredit the government.74 Gaston 
Calmette, writing for Le Figaro, similarly claimed that the discontent was due above all to 
English propaganda.75 These journalists were not uncritical of the government or the ministry’s 
efforts, but they believed that the incident did not merit as much attention as it was receiving.76 
                                               
72 Pelletan was a journalist and a politician who was also a member of the Bloc des gauches. He implied that the 
Minister of War was afraid of involving the Ministry of the Colonies in the conquest of Madagascar in any way. See 
Camille Pelletan, L’Éclair (25 September 1895), as quoted in Brunet, L’oeuvre de la France à Madagascar, 137. 
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74 “Bulletin: Discours présidentiel,” Le Journal des débats (20 September 1895), 1. 
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Although the invasion of Madagascar thus succeeded in provoking a debate in the French 
press, this debate took on a shape very different from the debates over Indochina in the 1880s. 
During the earlier debates, a wide coalition of journalists and politicians on both the left and the 
right had invoked Indochina as evidence of the flaws intrinsic to both politique coloniale and 
colonial expansion. They associated both strategies with the Second Empire and Napoleon III 
and in fact implied that Napoleon III’s embrace of colonial expansion was responsible for 
leading France to defeat at Sedan in 1870. Together, these criticisms forced the proponents of 
colonial expansion to articulate more elaborate theoretical defenses for their expeditions. 
In 1895, on the other hand, the debate was both less intense and less elaborate. Over the 
course of August and September, many journalists and some politicians condemned the Ministry 
of War’s tactics and strategies. Some even linked the Third Republic’s army to the Second 
Empire’s by implying that the events in Madagascar demonstrated that the French military was 
no more competent in 1895 than it had been in 1870.77 Others held up the conflict between the 
Ministry of the Colonies and the Ministry of War as evidence of broader political problems in the 
Third Republic.78 Still others – especially on the right – insisted that the incident reflected badly 
above all on the Chamber of Deputies.79 However, most journalists did not question the outcome 
or the value of the Madagascar conquest in the same way as their earlier counterparts had 
questioned the expansion in Indochina. A few journalists on the left continued to contend that 
politique coloniale was incompatible with republican principles by associating it with 
                                               
77 François Coppée, the nationalist poet, argued that the mistakes in Madagascar showed that “in the past twenty-five 
years, we have not become wiser… Beneath the Empire that you saw fall and beneath the Republic acclaimed by the 
naïve and the ridiculous… you can see the same faults, the same lack of foresight… the same frivolousness in the 
heart of politicians when it comes to spending the blood and the gold of France.” See François Coppée, “Vingt-cinq 
ans après,” Le Journal (26 September 1895), 1. 
78 See, for example, “Politique et grandes manoeuvres,” La Lanterne (21 September 1895), 1. 
79 See, for example, Vicomte de Montfort, “Madagascar: la véritable responsabilité,” Le Figaro (2 October 1895), 1. 
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Bonapartist and German imperialism.80 But for the most part, even the most ardent critics 
avoided entering into a discussion about the benefits and drawbacks of colonial expansion – even 
if they questioned the government’s strategies for carrying it out.81 
In this context, Georges Clemenceau’s reaction to the events of Madagascar is revealing. 
In 1885, Clemenceau helped shape the radical left’s opposition to the Tonkin expedition by 
articulating an expansive critique of politique coloniale, which he insisted violated republican 
principles.82 In 1895, he remained critical of the Madagascar expedition but argued against it in 
different terms. In an open letter to Arthur Ranc published in La Justice, he expressed support for 
the decision to question the Minister of War on his policies.83 He condemned the Ministry of 
War’s “criminal destruction of lives” and claimed that the French people had the right to know 
“what inept ideas or negligence… led to the decimation… of our unhappy soldiers.” Clemenceau 
went on to argue, moreover, that an inquiry would be insufficient; if the Chambers held one 
minister responsible for the invasion of Madagascar, it would not resolve the problem. Instead, 
the Republic needed political change in order to prevent incidents like this from recurring.84  
                                               
80 Edouard Durranc, for example, insisted that the Republic had betrayed its principles by conquering overseas 
territory. He complained that the Republican politicians who had embraced colonial expansion had fallen to the 
“temptations of Berlin.” Bismarck sought to divert French attention from Alsace-Lorraine by directing it overseas; 
by embarking on overseas conquest, France was thus doing his bidding. This act, he warned, would have terrible 
consequences. First, it had distracted the French from their true concern: regaining Alsace-Lorraine. Worse, it had 
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overseas conquest and connected both with despotic, imperial forms of government – had been prominent in 1885, 
but was less common in 1895. See Édouard Durranc, “La vie de Patachon,” La Lanterne (23 September 1895), 1. 
81 Many critics of the government’s policies claimed that it should create a colonial army. See Charles Chincholle, 
“Retour de Madagascar,” Le Figaro (23 September 1895), 1; “Le Prix du succès,” Le Petit Parisien (27 September 
1895), 1; Victomte de Montfort, “Madagascar: la véritable responsabilité,” Le Figaro (2 October 1895), 1.  
82 He had associated it both with the German Empire and the Second Empire. See Manceron, 1885, 78. 
83 At the time, he was not in office; he temporarily lost much of his political popularity in the wake of the Panama 
Scandal. See Fuller, The Origins of the French Nationalist Movement, 53. 
84 Georges Clemenceau, “À un interpellateur,” La Justice (24 September 1895), 1. 
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Much like in 1885, Clemenceau thus invoked the problems with Madagascar as part of a 
broader problem with republican politics. He argued that the Republic itself was corrupted and 
even contended that it was barely an improvement over the discredited Second Empire.85 But he 
did not imply that the problems that beset Madagascar were evidence of broader problems with 
colonial expansion itself. He questioned the Ministry’s methods and implied that they revealed 
the flaws of the Republic’s political construction – but he did not say that the government should 
have avoided invading Madagascar. Instead of calling for the Republic to refrain from colonial 
expansion, he insisted that the Republic needed broad-sweeping internal reforms.86 This 
perspective was echoed by a number of critical journalists on the left. They suggested that the 
conflict had revealed deep problems in the Ministry of War, the army, and perhaps even in the 
Republic, but they did not use the incident to criticize politique coloniale or colonial expansion. 
Notably, while a number of journalists criticized the behavior of the government and the 
Ministry of War, they remained convinced of the inevitability and benefits of French victory. 
Even as Le Gaulois called for a sweeping investigation, it reassured its readers that it was only a 
matter of time before the French asserted military control over the island.87 Once word reached 
France of General Duchesne’s success at Tananarive, moreover, Le Gaulois insisted that the 
French should thank “our brave soldiers, their eminent commanders, and their general” for 
bringing the expedition to a successful close. The author went on to conclude that the expedition 
– despite its problems - had brought honor both to the army and to France itself.88 Although the 
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86 Ibid. 
87 “Responsabilités,” Le Gaulois (22 September 1895), 1. The leftist La Lanterne also reported on the army’s 
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leftist La Lanterne continued to condemn the Ministry of War even after French victory was 
assured, it too praised General Duchesne and his army for its successes.89 Journalists thus 
distinguished between the French government and the army and celebrated the conquest of 
Madagascar even if they criticized the way that the conquest had been conducted.90 
The conflicts over Madagascar reveal that many commentators from across the political 
spectrum remained suspicious of the Third Republic and of the republican coalition that 
governed it. Many were quick to portray the government as corrupt, incompetent, and inefficient. 
More generally, they argued that the government – either in the form of the Ministry of War or 
the Chamber of Deputies - was too engaged in petty intra-parliamentary struggles to wage war 
effectively. But at the same time, these conflicts also show how competing views of colonial 
conquest and colonial expansion had faded from the center of the debate. While some journalists 
continued to object to the practice and associate it with Bonapartist imperialism and Napoleon 
III, the majority seems to have accepted that the French conquest of Madagascar was 
inevitable.91 They simply used the government’s botched efforts as an opportunity to criticize the 
political coalition that had emerged in the wake of the Boulanger Affair. 
This confluence of moderate republicans and conservatives that marked much of the 
1890s was threatened in the second half of the decade by the Dreyfus Affair, which created a 
                                               
89 La Lanterne did conclude by insisting that France needed to learn a lesson from the problems that beset the 
conquest of Madagascar. Maujan in fact insisted that although Duchesne’s ability to bring the campaign to a 
successful close was remarkable, it was overshadowed by the government’s corruption and incompetence. He noted, 
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new rift in the French political order and redrew the lines between left and right.92 For several 
years, anti-Dreyfusard nationalists used the Affair in order to inflame popular sentiment against 
the Third Republic and its institutions. For most of 1898, Dreyfus’ defenders found themselves 
on the defensive; some of them in fact lost their seats to rising Nationalist and anti-Semitic 
groups in the Chamber of Deputies.93 Conservative republicans or Progressistes split on the 
issue, and a number joined the nationalists and the remaining monarchists in opposition to the 
Republic.94 At the same time, however, the anti-Dreyfusards struggled to unite into a coherent 
political bloc.95 Moreover, as they increasingly turned to violence and rioting, and ultimately 
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leftists took up his cause. Republicans allied with some socialists against nationalists, monarchists, and Catholics, 
and regionalists in order to secure a parliamentary majority and what they saw as the right-wing threat to the 
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Moreover, as Christopher Forth has argued, both sides became increasingly invested in some of the same values. See 
Christopher Forth, The Dreyfus Affair and the Crisis of French Manhood (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 2004), 237; Frederick Brown, For the Soul of France: Culture Wars in the Age of Dreyfus (New York: Alfred 
Knopf, 2010), 2; Passmore, The Right in France, 102; Gildea, Children of the Revolution, 273-275. 
93 For years, the anti-Dreyfusards “strengthened and unified the forces hostile to the Third Republic: Boulangists, 
Bonapartists, royalists, anti-Semites, and many Catholics.” These groups did not all try to overthrow the republic, 
but many hoped to make it authoritarian. See Fuller, The Origins of the French Nationalist Movement, 82. 
94 David Drake, French Intellectuals and Politics from the Dreyfus Affair to the Occupation (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2005),34. 
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While both agreed that Dreyfus was guilty, they did not agree on anti-Semitism. Déroulède refused to adopt openly 
anti-Semitic language in the nationalist meetings. Moreover, Dérouldède continued to believe in an authoritarian 
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threatened revolution – especially after the Fashoda crisis increased their anger against the 
French government - they pushed their opponents to make common cause against them.96 
Socialists, radicals, and leftist Republicans thus united to form the government of Republican 
defense under Pierre Waldeck-Rousseau.97 In the wake of the affair, this new Bloc des gauches 
consolidated its political control over the Chamber of Deputies, while the conservatives and 
nationalists found themselves politically marginalized.98 The Dreyfus Affair thus reordered the 
political alliances that had characterized the early 1890s and while raising moderates’ fears about 
the threat posed by the right to the republic’s stability.99 
The Dreyfus Affair also had important effects on France’s political and intellectual 
culture. As scholars have shown, anti-Dreyfusards embraced a pro-Catholic, anti-rational, anti-
scientific, and anti-Semitic perspective that rejected republican universalism. But at the same 
time, many also used made use of Darwinist thought and positivist principles in order to 
articulate an organicist vision of the French nation that stressed racial identities and the people’s 
links to the land. They argued that the Third Republic’s centralizing policies and its tolerance 
                                               
republic, while some anti-Semite leaders like Jules Gérin were tied to the royalists. Eventually, Déroulède was 
joined by a group of intellectuals and politicians who united in the Ligue de la Patrie Française, led by critic Jules 
Lemaître and poet François Coppée. It attracted members of the respectable middle class. See Martin P. Johnson, 
The Dreyfus Affair: Honour and Politics in the Belle Époque (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1999), 115. 
96 The Fashoda crisis occurred when British and French troops conflicted over the Upper Nile River. The French 
government ultimately backed down, which convinced many nationalists that it did not truly have France’s best 
interests at heart. See Fuller, The Origins of the French Nationalist Movement, 108. 
97 Conklin, Fishman, Zaretsky, France and its Empire since 1870, 112. 
98 Some of the key leaders, including Paul Déroulède and Jules Guérin, were arrested and convicted. See Drake, 
French Intellectuals and Politics, 36. 
99 It also led to the creation of new political parties; the Parti républicain radical et radical-socialiste was founded in 
1901, and the Dreyfusard Progressists formed the Alliance républicaine démocratique. In 1902, the Socialists also 
consolidated into parties, just as monarchists on the right formed Action libérale and anti-Dreyfusard Progressists 
formed the Fédération républicaine. Passmore, The Right in France, 127. 
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towards foreigners and Jews was anti-populist and endangering the nation’s future.100 Although 
the anti-Dreyfusard position became marginalized by the end of the 1890s, the movement had 
succeeded in bringing public attention to these racialized discourses. Notably, during this period, 
scientists, intellectuals, and politicians from across the political spectrum increasingly drew upon 
both scientific racism and Social Darwinism to describe the French nation and its position in 
Europe.101 The Boulanger Affair had already popularized these discourses to some extent, but the 
Dreyfus Affair helped consolidate their influence in French public life. 
The Dreyfus Affair had something of a paradoxical effect in France’s colonies. On the 
most basic level, the Affair – much like the other scandals of the 1890s – directed political 
attention away from France’s policies in its overseas territories and its colonial expansion.102 For 
the most part, France’s colonies remained outside of the center of political debate and public 
controversy.103 France’s colonial empire did not disappear from public consciousness, however. 
Indeed, during the late 1890s and early 1900s, new cultural productions emerged that helped 
further popularize these overseas colonial territories. But politique coloniale and colonial 
expansion no longer served as one of the key conceptual categories through which politicians 
from both sides of the spectrum articulated their conflicting visions of the future of the French 
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nation and republic. Even the post-Dreyfus transfer of political power to the new Bloc des 
gauches did not affect the government’s attitude towards its colonies.104 
If the Dreyfus Affair did not directly affect French colonial politics, it did make the army 
and its position in French society into an object of public scrutiny and debate.105 Because the 
army was partly responsible for both conquering and overseeing at least some of France’s 
overseas territories, arguments over the army and its relationship to the republic also to some 
extent involved colonial rule. During the late 1890s, Dreyfusards accused the army of corruption, 
incompetence, and anti-republican tendencies, while anti-Dreyfusards conflated the army with 
France’s national identity and insisted that the Dreyfusards were undermining both.106 At the 
same time, however, as Christopher Forth has shown, both sides became increasingly invested in 
a vision of French masculinity predicated on soldierly values and military might.107 In the years 
following the Affair, the Dreyfusard government would devote some attention towards reforming 
the army, but it never distanced itself as much from military officials as the anti-Dreyfusards had 
implied it would.108 The Affair thus only gave minimal support to those who continued to 
advocate against the preponderant role played by the military in France’s overseas territories. Its 
effects on the uneasy alliance between Catholics and the Republic that had characterized much of 
the 1890s were more profound. Notably, it broke the alliance between French republican colonial 
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administrators and French missionaries in a number of France’s overseas territories.109 Although 
the Dreyfus Affair thus sparked a number of disagreements about the administration of France’s 
overseas territories, it did not threaten the Republic’s commitment to expanding its colonial 
influence and securing its hold over the territories it had already conquered. 
The political crises that marked the late 1880s and the 1890s thus helped contribute, in 
different ways, to the emergence of a more prominent interest in colonial empire and colonial 
expansion among a wider section of French society. Both the rise of racist discourses and the 
Dreyfus Affair also offered new rationales for constructing that empire. This interest was 
consolidated by perceived competition in overseas territories on the part of other European 
powers – especially England – and by the emergence of new groups and societies committed to 
promoting France’s colonies. The “colonial lobby” – as this loose alliance of groups came to be 
known – was far from unified. Its members lacked a clear ideology and a united set of goals. But 
they formed a group of politicians, businessmen, writers, and intellectuals who came together in 
order to popularize France’s colonies and secure their importance.110 
The role of the “colonial lobby” in France’s overseas empire has been a subject of debate 
in post-colonial scholarship. Some scholars have insisted that the colonial lobby was largely 
responsible for imposing France’s empire on an uninterested French population.111 Others have 
claimed this argument overstates the colonial lobby’s role in promoting support for French 
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colonization, especially in the late nineteenth century. They have argued that enthusiasm for 
French colonialism spread beyond a narrow spectrum of interested parties, thereby contesting the 
argument that colonialism was imposed from the top down.112 Still others have noted that 
referring to the different groups who supported colonization as one “lobby” can obscure the 
divisions between their visions of France’s colonial project.113  
Lobbying groups and pro-colonial individuals certainly played an important role in many 
of France’s colonial conquests during the 1880s and 1890s.114 Many of these individuals and 
groups also devoted money and attention to increasing awareness of and enthusiasm for France’s 
overseas territories at the end of the nineteenth century. While they sometimes worked at cross-
purposes with one another, the different advocates for colonial expansion nevertheless 
contributed to the growing popularity of the notion of “colonial empire” in the 1890s – even if 
they did not necessarily agree on exactly what a “colonial empire” was or how it related to the 
French nation and the republic.115 These groups did not “impose” colonialism on an unwilling 
French population, but they began a conversation about France’s overseas territories and their 
connection to the French republic that would continue across a wider span of media and a larger 
public during the twentieth century. 
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III: The Emergence and Development of “Colonial Empire” 
 In 1912, Georges Saint-Paul, a doctor who had spent his career serving the French army 
in Algeria and Tunisia, wrote a series of articles later collected into a book called Vers empire.116 
In these articles, he insisted that the Republic needed to adopt a politique impérialiste and 
embrace “empire.”117 He assured his readers that he was not engaging in “politics” or trying to 
restore “the Bonapartist system.” Empire, he argued, was not associated with Bonapartism, but 
was instead a “grouping of nations with the same intellectual center, united by the common 
desire to help… the development and the prosperity of the whole.” Empire should thus be 
understood as a “republic of peoples” or “republic of republics.” The purpose of politique 
impérialiste was to “assure the homogeneity” of French territory and create “solidarity” between 
the metropole and colonial empire.118 In Saint-Paul’s model, politique impérialiste was thus a 
republican enterprise. Notably, he insisted that the way to bind the metropole and the colonies 
together was to spread democratic practices and principles in France’s conquered territories.119 
Such a policy, he claimed, would enable France to harness the force of its empire more 
effectively, as each colony would “freely” contribute its energies toward French goals.120 
 In these articles, Saint-Paul actively worked to reclaim the terms “empire” and 
“imperialism” from Bonapartist politics. He likely did so primarily for rhetorical purposes – he 
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did not spend any significant time explaining why his proposals had nothing to do with 
Bonapartism. But he consistently made the distinction between colonial empire and Bonapartism 
when he introduced the term “empire” or “imperialism.”121 Making this distinction enabled him 
to co-opt the term imperialism and use it to promote what he saw as a republican cause. Of 
course, Saint-Paul’s vision of empire in fact shared certain commonalities with the one promoted 
by Napoleon III in the 1860s. His contention that empire should be understood above all as a 
“grouping of nations” echoed Napoleon III’s earlier vision of a multinational Mediterranean 
empire. There were also important differences between these two models, however. Saint-Paul’s 
vision of empire was predicated on the slow extension of democratic principles and practices 
across France’s territories, whereas Napoleon III had centered his empire on a popular but 
authoritarian political structure.122 Nevertheless, Saint-Paul’s model for French empire was not 
as different from its Bonapartist counterpart as he claimed. 
During the 1890s and early twentieth century, most writers did not distinguish between 
“Bonapartist” empire and “colonial” empire in the way that Georges Saint-Paul did in 1912. But 
over the course of the decade, an increasing number of writers, intellectuals, and politicians 
began to use the term empire colonial to refer to France’s overseas territories.123 This term had 
already begun to emerge in the 1880s in the debates over French policies in Indochina. But in the 
1890s and 1900s, advocates of colonialism increasingly embraced it and even sought to define it 
– albeit usually in indirect ways. These figures did not use the term identically; instead, each 
used it to articulate a particular vision of France’s colonies and their future. These visions often 
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varied along political, religious, and personal lines. But taken together, these new publications 
worked together to create a more comprehensive discourse about France’s colonies and their 
relationship to the republic and the nation. 
Arthur Girault, a moderate republican and professor of law, became one of the most 
influential voices in this discussion about colonization, empire, republicanism, and nation. In 
1895, he published Les principes de la colonisation et de législation coloniale, which came to 
operate as the theoretical foundation for French colonial legislation and administration. The book 
- published in five subsequent editions over the course of the next fifty years – sought to define 
and defend colonization and colonial empire on legal grounds.124 The book’s introduction 
described colonization, laid out a system for classifying colonies, and endorsed the value of 
colonialism in ideological, economic, and political terms. At the same time, it also proposed a 
foundation for colonial legislation. This colonial legislation, Girault explained, would structure 
France’s colonial empire by binding colonies to the nation in a manner that was consistent with 
republican political principles.125 In order to articulate this vision, Girault drew on a complex 
mixture of social Darwinist thought, a familial vision of society, and republican ideals.126  
Girault’s introduction began by defining the practice of colonization. Like many other 
colonial theorists, he contended that colonization was an act only undertaken by “civilized” 
peoples who moved to a territory “occupied by a savage… or half-savage population.” However, 
he argued, it was not enough for these civilized peoples to move there; they also needed to build 
new infrastructure, improve the territory they settled in, and civilize the indigenous peoples they 
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encountered. He insisted, “it is this civilizing action, this double culture of the land and its 
inhabitants that constitutes… the work of colonization.”127 Colonization thus did not necessarily 
have to involve a large settler population; instead, it referred to the spread of civilization to lands 
that had previously remained barbarous or savage. All of the different types of colonies he 
identified – which included commercial colonies, colonies of exploitation, plantation colonies, 
settler colonies, military colonies, and penal colonies – fell into this model.128 He assumed that 
any kind of colony carried civilizing consequences. 
Girault deployed several different reasons to justify colonial expansion. First, he argued 
that “superior men” had a “natural right” to procure as many goods and as much space for 
themselves as they could.129 Like Lanessan, he acknowledged that this expansion often had a 
devastating effect on indigenous peoples – at least at first. But he insisted that subsequent 
generations usually benefitted directly from European rule.130 Moreover, he contended, 
colonization would also directly benefit France by preventing internal conflicts, improving the 
moral character of the country’s citizens, and increasing its global influence. It would thus allow 
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France to compete effectively against its European rivals.131 Finally, he argued, the act of 
colonization was a service to humanity at large: it spread commerce and industrialization across 
the world while preventing war between different European powers. It thus contributed directly 
to “human progress.”132 Girault therefore partly drew on the language of survival of the fittest in 
order to provide a “scientific” defense of colonization; he argued that France had a right to the 
territory of weaker peoples and implied that France itself would be weakened if it did not 
exercise that right. At the same time, he also made use of the language of the civilizing mission 
in order to describe colonization as a moral project in line with republican principles. These two 
lines of reasoning were not necessarily consistent with one another, but they worked together to 
detach colonization from any associations it might have with political tyranny or Bonapartist 
imperialism by rendering the practice first “scientific” or apolitical and secondarily republican. 
Girault’s discussion of colonial legislation further bolstered this vision of a specifically 
republican colonization and a republican colonial empire. He contended that countries could 
invoke three colonial principles or models in order to structure the legal relationship between 
colony and metropole. These principles would not necessarily translate directly into legislation, 
and they would not be applied the same way in each colony.133 Instead, each would provide an 
ideological framework that would accommodate individual differences.  
Girault argued that the first of these principles – subjugation – had been popular in the 
17th and 18th centuries. This model understood colonies as a means to enrich the metropole; 
European nations exploited the territories that they conquered in order to recuperate the greatest 
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amount of wealth possible.134 During the Revolution, however, many people had come to see this 
model as tyrannical and unfair. Revolutionaries had insisted that all races were equal, and that 
“birth into a civilized race” did not confer superiority or legal rights over those born into less 
civilized ones.135 Revolutionaries’ condemnation of the exploitative practices that characterized 
“subjection,” he implied, spread across Europe. As a result, almost no contemporary European 
countries used subjugation to justify or structure the relationship between metropole and colony. 
The second principle, according to Girault, was “autonomy.” Unlike “subjugation,” 
which he implied was morally and politically dubious, Girault described autonomy as a “virile” 
and “hardy” colonial model. Colonizing nations who embraced the principle of autonomy, he 
argued, intended to enable colonies to become independent. The government would “guide the 
first steps” of the new colony but then would progressively “abandon” their affairs to them. 
Ultimately, the diplomatic tie would “rupture” and the colony would become a new state. This 
model was “not entirely foreign” to France, Girault acknowledged, but it found its full fruition in 
England.136 Girault expressed a certain amount of admiration for England’s embrace of 
autonomy, although he did use the negative language of “abandonment” to describe it. Moreover, 
he noted, such a policy could not be effectively instituted in France. 
Instead, Girault insisted, France should embrace the third and final principle of 
“assimilation” and use it to structure its colonial empire. This principle – which he argued 
belonged especially to the “Latin races” – sought to slowly transform France’s colonial 
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possessions through economic development and “civilizing” processes so that they could 
ultimately become an extension of the French nation overseas. “Assimilation,” Girault warned 
his readers, did not necessarily mean that all parts of the French empire would be treated 
identically. Nor did it indicate that France’s colonies would be immediately assimilated into the 
nation-state. In fact, it did not enable the colonies’ inhabitants to exercise any political rights. 
Instead, “assimilation” represented a goal that could only be achieved over time.137 Notably, in 
subsequent editions, he described colonial assimilation as increasingly further in the future.138 
As Samia El Mechat points out, Girault’s presentation of his principles of colonization 
created a vision of French colonial empire that fell in line with republican politics and values. By 
arguing both that the Old Regime had used the principle of “subjugation” to structure its 
relationship with its colonies and that revolutionary thinkers had objected to this model, Girault 
avoided engaging with the idea that colonization itself could contradict republican political 
principles. The problem was not with conquest or overseas expansion but instead with the 
principle of “subjugation” – a principle that the Third Republic had replaced with the much fairer 
“assimilation.”139 Indeed, Girault situated “assimilation” as central to republican politics; he 
argued that its influence in French colonial politics had always been tied to “the triumph of 
republican ideas.” Over the course of the nineteenth century, the French government had 
embraced “assimilation” when the republicans were in power – only to abandon the principle 
once they fell out of power.140 A colonial empire that used assimilation to structure its 
relationship with its colonies would thus by definition operate according to republican principles. 
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How would this republican colonial empire operate? Girault addressed this question by 
invoking a familial metaphor in order to describe the empire and its evolving relationship to the 
French nation. Throughout his introduction, he compared France’s colonies to children who 
required parental guidance due to their uncivilized state. At first, they would not be able to 
exercise political or civil rights because they could not yet exercise them responsibly.141 As 
France provided them with guidance and resources, they would slowly become more self-
sufficient and civilized. As a result, they would be ruled less strictly and allowed more 
freedoms.142 Once they neared adulthood – a moment that would occur once “Europeans are 
numerous enough or the indigenous peoples are sufficiently civilized” – France would grant 
them a growing number of rights and responsibilities. Finally, once the colonies became fully 
adult, they would be invested with complete political rights. Notably, however, these rights did 
not include political independence – instead, the colonies would merge into the French nation-
state and become overseas provinces.143 Their inhabitants would become full French citizens, 
invested with the same rights enjoyed by their metropolitan counterparts. In this vision, France’s 
colonial empire was thus a family in which children would become equal partners upon 
assuming adulthood. Once this happened, the “empire” itself would disappear, only to be a 
replaced by an expansive French nation-state that would spread across the globe. 
Girault thus used a familial model for colonial empire that enabled him to articulate a 
commitment to the principle for assimilation while denying colonized people political rights and 
representation – at least for the immediate future. This vision of empire was “republican,” he 
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implied, because it promised to eventually incorporate colonized peoples into the French nation. 
They would only live beneath French control until they reached “maturity” and could join the 
ranks of their civilized brethren. France’s empire was thus republican primarily because it was 
ultimately destined to disappear; its authoritarian structures were temporary measures intended 
above all to enable colonies to eventually enjoy political rights and freedoms. In the meantime, 
imperial practices might contradict republican values – but as long as they ultimately led to 
assimilation, they were the legitimate expression of the French republican state. 
 Girault’s attempt to reclaim the term empire and align it with republican political 
principles by promising its future disappearance was not shared by all contemporary political 
theorists. Others envisioned empire as a more permanent part of the French state; still others did 
not necessarily seek to align it with republican political principles at all. In 1901, Paul Leroy-
Beaulieu published a new edition of De la colonisation chez les peuples modernes that 
envisioned a French colonial empire in both more permanent and less republican terms. This text 
built on older editions of Leroy-Beaulieu’s extensive account of the history of Europe’s colonies 
by doubling the text devoted to describing French, British, German, Belgian, and Russian 
colonization and extending the theoretical part of the work.144 At the same time, it also deployed 
the term “empire” in order to explain these countries’ respective relationships to their overseas 
territories. The term had not been absent from Leroy-Beaulieu’s 1874 edition, but in 1901, it 
played an increasingly central role as a conceptual category. 
In the new preface, Leroy-Beaulieu began by describing France’s newly conquered 
overseas territories in congratulatory terms. He noted that the French colonial movement had 
expanded substantially over the past decade, and that popular enthusiasm for the colonies had 
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grown alongside it.145 The colonies, he implied, had prevented France from falling into 
decadence. He argued, “At the moment when public opinion seemed resigned to the situation in 
metropolitan France created by the sad events of 1870-1871, we had before us… immense 
spaces… the embryo of a colonial empire.”146 This “colonial empire,” he thus suggested, had 
compensated for the territory that the country had lost during the Franco-Prussian War. At the 
same time, it also provided France with a new project that would ensure its future. Without such 
an empire, France would be “sequestered” in a small part of the world; its economic and moral 
influence would become increasingly limited.147 According to this logic, France’s empire served 
as an auxiliary to the nation: it was critical to both national recovery and survival.148 
 Leroy-Beaulieu did not define “colonial empire” in his work. And in many ways, his 
vision of the relationship between France and its colonies echoed his earlier arguments.149 There 
were important distinctions, however. In 1874, Leroy-Beaulieu had emphasized the importance 
of “settlement colonies,” which he insisted would spread France’s influence across “unpopulated 
territories” around the world. But in 1902, Leroy-Beaulieu placed more stress on “commercial” 
colonies and “colonies of exploitation.”150 To some extent, the shift reflected the changes in 
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France’s colonial holdings over the course of the previous three decades. Most of the new 
territories that France had conquered did not attract French settlers.151 But this difference also 
had ideological consequences. In 1874, Leroy-Beaulieu had claimed that colonies were destined 
to become independent from France; they were temporary additions to the nation-state that 
would develop into allied countries over time. France would not colonize to create a permanent 
political union but to spread influence throughout the world.152 In 1902, on the other hand, he 
argued that many of France’s new “commercial” colonies would never gain independence. 
Without settler populations, he argued, advanced civilization was unlikely to remain in these 
places once Europeans left. European supervision alone could keep the indigenous peoples from 
lapsing back into barbarism. As a result, these territories would remain dependent on the French 
nation-state. In order to rule them effectively, France would have to develop a political and 
administrative infrastructure that would connect them to the nation in a beneficial way.153  
If Leroy-Beaulieu did not define “colonial empire,” his 1902 edition articulated a new 
model for French colonial holdings that envisioned them as a permanent and institutionalized 
part of France. He used the term “empire” to capture that permanence and institutionalization. 
This model hinged on a modified understanding of the “civilizing mission” that had long driven 
much of France’s colonial policy.154 Like Jules Ferry and Arthur Girault, Leroy-Beaulieu insisted 
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that civilized peoples had a “right” to rule over peoples whose civilizations were either 
stagnating or barbaric and to spread their ideas and their culture across such territories.155 But 
while Ferry and Girault had argued that the civilizing presence of France would improve the 
peoples that they conquered, Leroy-Beaulieu promoted a vision of unchanging human inequality 
that could only be remedied by permanent political and cultural domination. Leroy-Beaulieu thus 
drew on biological and racial thinking in order to envision a political system that would enable 
France to exert political and institutional control over distant places and peoples without ever 
integrating them into the French nation or enabling them to develop into independent nations. 
Instead, they would remain under “tutelage” as territories loosely connected to France. 
Leroy-Beaulieu’s vision of French empire had much in common with Arthur Girault’s. 
This commonality is perhaps unsurprising – not least because Girault had drawn on older 
editions of Leroy-Beaulieu’s work when drafting his book. Notably, both drew on the language 
of racial inequality and social Darwinism in order to create a vision of empire that was detached 
from metropolitan political questions. They positioned colonial conquest as part of an 
evolutionary competition to determine which species would be able to survive. Political and 
moral principles had little relevance in such a vision of human society. But while Girault 
combined this evolutionary thinking with republican ideas by articulating a commitment to the 
principle of assimilation, Leroy-Beaulieu left empire and colonization detached from political 
                                               
republican values because they improved the lives and societies of conquered peoples. At the same time, many 
advocates of the “civilizing mission” also drew on the growing body of racial and racist thought to insist that more 
civilized peoples had “rights” to the territory of the less civilized. See Dino Costantini, Mission civilisatrice:  Le rôle 
de l'histoire coloniale dans la construction de l'identité politique française (Paris:  La Découverte, 2008). 
155 He noted, “it is neither natural or just that civilized westerners remain indefinitely and suffocate in enclosed 
spaces… as they accumulate accomplishments in sciences, arts, and civilization… and they leave the rest of the 
world to small groups of ignorant, weak men… or to decrepit populations without energy.” See Leroy-Beaulieu, La 
colonisation chez les peuples modernes, 5th ed., 2: 707. 
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questions. Unlike Girault’s, his vision of a French empire was a permanent one – at least partly 
because he envisioned human racial inequality in much more unchanging terms.  
Girault and Leroy-Beaulieu thus articulated overlapping but distinct visions for France’s 
empire, its future, and its relationship to the French nation. However, both of them developed 
these visions indirectly: they did not actively define empire and its significance. Joseph Chailley-
Bert, the secretary of the Union coloniale and the editor of its newspaper, sought to define the 
term more directly. In 1901, he published an article that distinguished between empire colonial, 
politique coloniale and mise en valeur. Many people, he warned, failed to differentiate between 
these different terms, which had unfortunate consequences for France’s inability to compete 
overseas.156 Politique coloniale, he contended, described the conquest and pacification of 
colonies, while mise en valeur denoted the slow process of development that would enable the 
colonies to become profitable. He used empire colonial, on the other hand, to refer 
geographically to France’s overseas holdings instead of to imply a set of politics or policies.157  
If Chailley-Bert thus used “empire” as a geographic term, he also employed it to 
articulate a particular vision of France’s overseas territories and their relationship to the French 
nation. In fact, he deployed the term in part to avoid using the word “colonies,” which he felt 
was widely misused. Unlike Girault and Leroy-Beaulieu, who used “colony” to refer to all of 
France’s overseas territories, Chailley-Bert argued that the term should only refer to territories 
dominated by French settlers. Almost none of France’s new conquests fit this description 
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“Joseph Chailley-Bert and the Importance of the Union Coloniale Française,” The Historical Journal 17:1 (1974), 
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because indigenous peoples made up the majority of their respective populations. Indochina, 
Madagascar, and even Algeria were thus not colonies but French possessions. Referring to them 
erroneously as “colonies” had unfortunate consequences, because it led the French public and 
politicians to treat these territories identically to settler colonies like Reunion and the Antilles.158 
Instead of grouping France’s overseas territories together as colonies, he thus united them under 
the term “empire,” which he saw as less bound up in problematic practices.159  
 One of the main problems with treating French possessions as colonies, Chailley-Bert 
insisted, was that it led colonial administrators to ignore the indigenous populations of each 
colony. He contended that French policy needed to “recognize the differences in race, genius, 
aspirations, and needs between indigenous inhabitants and their European masters” and provide 
each group with a distinct set of institutions.160 The Third Republic had not recognized this need; 
its colonial policies continued to follow those developed under the Old Regime and during the 
Revolution, which had been aimed first at settlers and later at freed slaves. These policies had 
sought to integrate these inhabitants into the French metropole. In territories occupied by French 
settlers and Africans without any culture of their own, he argued, these methods were relatively 
effective. Territories like Algeria and Indochina, however, were inhabited by “whites” and 
“yellows” who were “too intelligent and anchored in their civilizations” in order to be integrated 
into France.161 For the most part, he argued, colonial administrators had either treated this 
                                               
158 Joseph Chailley-Bert, Dix années de politique coloniale (Paris: Libraire Armand Colin, 1902), 3. 
159 In both this article and the book that expanded on its ideas, Chailley-Bert argued against what he saw as the 
French tendency to treat its overseas territories identically. He insisted that there could be no one politique coloniale 
or mise en valeur because each territory had distinct needs. He thus contended that France’s colonies could not have 
a uniform administration and legislation. He criticized the government for sending functionaries around the empire 
without allowing them to obtain local expertise. See Chailley-Bert, “Un tournant de la politique coloniale,” 417. 
160 Chailley-Bert, Dix années de politique coloniale, 45. 
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problem with “indifference” or foolishly attempted to assimilate populations that could not be 
assimilated. Only under the Second Empire had the government sought to deal with it directly by 
establishing Bureaux arabes that provided indigenous peoples with their own administration. 
Chailley-Bert noted that there were problems with the Bureaux arabes but suggested that the 
republican government should follow this model in order to create a true “indigenous policy.”162 
 Chailley-Bert’s critique of “assimilationist” policy was not unique; in many ways, 
Girault’s commitment to the idea was more unusual in an era where most colonial thinkers and 
policy makers were turning away from “assimilation” and back towards “association.”163 His 
nostalgia for certain institutions from the Second Empire – like the Bureaux arabes – is less than 
surprising in this light. Notably, though, Chailley-Bert’s vision of a French empire based on 
“association” and his belief that indigenous peoples, rather than French colonial settlers, would 
be critical to France’s overseas territories had much in common with Napoleon III.164 Chailley-
Bert did not envision France’s empire as multinational, but he described it as a differentiated 
space that would enable conquered peoples to live according to their respective “civilizations” 
while remaining subjugated in a field of French power. In other words, even as he implied that 
the term “empire” was politically neutral and not associated with particular practices, his vision 
of empire expressed certain Bonapartist qualities. 
 Girault, Leroy-Beaulieu, and Chailley-Bert all played important roles in French colonial 
politics during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. During this period, all began to 
use the term “empire” to describe France’s relationship with its overseas territories. At the same 
                                               
162 He insisted that these institutions should be enshrined in constitutions for each territory. See Ibid., 54, 158. 
163 Robert Aldrich, Greater France (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996), 110. 
164 Notably, La Quinzaine Coloniale, Chailley-Bert’s journal, published a defense of Napoleon III’s royaume arabe 
in 1902 and claimed that the decision to reject that model and replace it with assimilation had been deeply mistaken. 
See “La réparation d’une erreur coloniale,” La Quinzaine Coloniale (25 July 1902), 417. 
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time, their respective understandings of this empire remained distinct. This was in part because 
their respective visions of colonization and the “civilizing mission” diverged. All agreed that the 
practice of colonization would spread civilization to uncivilized places. Arthur Girault’s belief in 
the power of colonization and civilizing practices was perhaps strongest: he insisted that France 
would be able to institute reforms that would improve uncivilized races and integrate them into 
France itself. Leroy-Beaulieu, on the other hand, implied that colonization might be able to 
permanently spread civilization to some uncivilized peoples. But others – especially in Africa – 
were too racially inferior to maintain their hold on civilization without French oversight. The 
purpose of colonization was thus not to civilize inferior peoples permanently but instead to 
spread civilization to new parts of the globe. Chailley-Bert agreed that it was difficult to spread 
civilization to conquered peoples – especially to those peoples who already had some form of 
“civilization” of their own. But he nevertheless indicated that over time, conquered peoples were 
likely to slowly adopt the civilization of their conquerors if they were not forced into it.  
 These different visions of colonization and the civilizing mission were grounded in 
distinct understandings of race. Girault, for example, argued that non-Europeans were both 
uncivilized and racially inferior. The most inferior, he implied, would likely disappear. But 
others, like European children, would learn to adapt European cultural practices and integrate 
into the French nation-state. Leroy-Beaulieu, on the other hand, implied that “civilization” could 
not address racial inequality so easily; some peoples were too biologically inferior to internalize 
its practices.165 For Chailley-Bert, the problem was not some peoples were too inferior to adopt 
“civilization” – in fact, quite the reverse. He argued that the most uncivilized people the French 
                                               
165 It is worth noting that Leroy-Beaulieu also thought that the climate might play a role here; he implied that 
civilization might not be able to survive unaided in tropical climates. See Leroy-Beaulieu, La colonisation chez les 
peuples modernes, 5th ed., 2: iv.  
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had conquered – which he identified as slaves from Africa – had successfully integrated into 
French society. The problem arose when France sought to deal instead with more sophisticated 
societies that already had more advanced cultures, because they were more likely to resist French 
ideas and practices. In his work, Chailley-Bert did not ignore the subject of race – in fact, he 
usually mapped “race” and “civilization” directly on top of one another. But he did not make use 
of social Darwinist or evolutionary theories in the way that Girault and Leroy-Beaulieu did. As a 
result, he was more skeptical than both Girault and Leroy-Beaulieu that France’s conquered 
populations would recede before or merge into France’s superior culture. In some ways, he thus 
had even less faith in colonization’s ability to spread French civilization than Leroy-Beaulieu. 
 These different understandings of colonization, the civilizing mission, and race led each 
of these thinkers to articulate distinct visions for colonial empire, how it should operate, and how 
it should relate to the French nation. Girault defined colonial empire as an explicitly republican 
set of legal measures and institutions that bound colonies to the metropole and would 
increasingly fold that empire into the French nation. Leroy-Beaulieu, on the other hand, defined 
colonial empire as an apolitical and permanent institutional and administrative structure that 
would enable France to ensure the continual presence of civilization in the territories that it had 
conquered. Chailley-Bert also defined colonial empire as apolitical; for him, the term referred 
generally to all of France’s overseas possessions without implying that they could all be treated 
as settler colonies. At the same time, however, Chailley-Bert also used the term to articulate a 
vision of an open political structure that would effectively incorporate many peoples and places 
into it. If Chailley-Bert thus sought to distance “empire,” from metropolitan politics, he 
nevertheless used the term in ways that were reminiscent of Napoleon III. This echo does not 
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represent a return to Bonapartist politics, however; if anything, it demonstrates the degree to 
which Bonapartism and the memory of the Second Empire had faded by the twentieth century. 
 
III. Narrating the History of “Empire” in France 
 If some key colonial theorists sought to define the term “colonial empire” with particular 
references to political theory and republicanism, others delineated the term by narrating its 
history. This mobilization of historical narratives to describe and justify colonization was not 
new – indeed, some of the earliest histories of France’s colonies dated back to the 1860s. But in 
the 1890s, these histories became more numerous; they also narrated the history of France’s 
colonial empire instead of its colonizing efforts.166 Together, they worked to detach the idea of 
colonial empire from continental empire by describing its history as unique. But even though 
members of similar republican colonial advocacy groups produced these histories, their accounts 
often framed the history of colonial empire in distinct ways. While some authors positioned 
“colonial empire” as an enterprise with prehistoric roots, others focused on the phenomenon of 
“modern” colonization, which they implied was distinct from its earlier counterparts. Some tried 
to demonstrate that colonial empire was in line with republican ideals, while others insisted that 
it transcended metropolitan political questions. Writers also disagreed about the permanence of 
the empire and the ultimate fate of the colonies within it. The shape of the resulting historical 
narratives and visions of colonial empire reflected these divergences in perspective.  
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 Léon Deschamps, a historian who wrote his dissertation on the French Revolution’s 
colonial policy, was one of the most prolific contributors to this attempt to chart colonial 
empire’s history.167 Over the course of the 1890s, he published multiple books on the history of 
France’s colonies, which were aimed at both specialized and popular audiences. In 1894, he 
published one of his most successful, Histoire sommaire de la colonisation française, which he 
hoped might be used in commercial schools to spread knowledge of France’s colonial empire to 
a public that he feared remained largely uninterested.168 In this text, Deschamps provided an 
overview of France’s colonizing efforts that described French conquests, highlighted shifts in 
administrative policy, and emphasized the national, commercial, military, financial, and political 
benefits of colonial expansion.169 Over the course of his narrative, he sought simultaneously to 
promote a vision of a specifically republican colonial empire and to convince his readers that 
such a colonial empire was central to France’s future prosperity and security. 
Deschamps’ account began with early accounts of French exploration in the sixteenth 
century and continued into the 1890s. He argued that throughout this period, France’s colonial 
empire had centered on two alternative models, which were respectively associated with the Old 
Regime and the Revolution. The Old Regime’s model – which had also been embraced by both 
Napoleonic Empires and the Restoration government – had treated the colonial empire as a way 
to “enrich the metropole.”170 This model relied on a combination of privileged colonial 
companies, direct and centralized administration, and the pacte coloniale in order to extract 
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wealth from conquered territories.171 The revolutionary or republican model, on the other hand, 
replaced the Old Regime’s “brutal” exploitation of its colonial empire with a commitment to 
assimilate the colonies politically and economically while providing them with “administrative 
autonomy.” It promoted liberty in its colonies and granted citizenship rights to their 
inhabitants.172 However, this newfound liberty was short-lived; as soon as Bonaparte declared 
himself emperor, he reinstated “slavery, the pacte coloniale, administrative tyranny, and an 
arbitrary legal system.” This return to the Old Regime model remained intact until 1870.173  
According to this narrative of France’s colonial history, the colonial empire had served as 
a battleground between authoritarian governments that refused to let go of the Old Regime’s 
despotic practices and republican governments that promoted liberty, political assimilation, and 
administrative autonomy in the same territories. Much like Girault – who had drawn on 
Deschamps’ work – Deschamps thus presented a vision of France’s colonial history that 
positioned colonial expansion as an apolitical endeavor embraced by a variety of regimes. At the 
same time, he claimed a republican heritage for France’s current colonial empire by tying the 
principles that governed it directly to the Revolution. France’s administration of this empire was 
not perfect, Deschamps admitted: in some territories, the government had continued to enforce 
authoritarian principles. However, he implied, once the government embraced its republican 
heritage, the injustices that had at times characterized its empire would be swept away.174 
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citizenship rights. Finally, it replaced the Old Regime’s pacte coloniale with free trade. See ibid., 45. 
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Deschamps’ account of colonial administration was brief and did not account for 
complications. Notably, while he highlighted the fact that the Revolutionary government had 
freed the slaves and endowed them with the rights of citizenship, he did not discuss the rights of 
the indigenous peoples who made up the bulk of the population in the Third Republic’s new 
colonial empire. His contention that the Third Republic had embraced the principles of the 
Revolution and applied them to the colonies was instead based on the rights granted to the 
colonies’ settlers, the independence of their administrators, the establishment of French law, and 
the propagation of economic liberalism. Deschamps’ obfuscation of some of the differences 
between the First and Third Republic’s respective colonial empires was productive, however. By 
drawing out the ideological connections between them, he was able to describe colonial empire 
as central to republican politics. He further bolstered this celebration of colonial republicanism 
with a more exhaustive account of the ways in which France’s colonies contributed to its 
industrial, commercial, military, and political influence around the world.175  
 Deschamps promoted a more developed vision of republican colonial empire in his 
specialized work. In Histoire de la question coloniale en France, he insisted that the model of 
colonial empire embraced by the Third Republic was not only the most principled, but also the 
most effective. He claimed that the Old Regime’s colonial empire was failing by the late 18th 
century; the British had picked off most territories and those remaining had structural flaws.176 
He contended, moreover, that the Revolutionary government alone was “capable of saving the 
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colonial oeuvre of the Old Regime” and implied that its efforts might have been successful if it 
had not been overthrown.177  
 The problems with the Napoleonic government, Deschamps maintained, did not simply 
stem from the fact that it undid the Revolution’s reforms and restored the Old Regime’s 
administrative system. In fact, Napoleon was not only responsible for “losing the colonial 
empire;” he had also made France “lose the taste for colonization.”178 His unquenchable military 
ambitions and unending wars convinced both French politicians and the French people that they 
had to choose between the continent and the colonies. The urgency of his continental 
engagements – especially after he provoked most of the nations of Europe into attacking France 
– convinced even those who remained committed to France’s colonies to believe that they had no 
choice but to focus on defending France’s continental borders.179 This turn towards the continent 
had consequences that continued for more than fifty years; in the wake of Napoleon’s defeat, no 
government until the Third Republic turned away from the excessive – and ultimately futile 
focus – on France’s continental ambitions. As a result, he insisted, the politique de l’empire was 
responsible for not only destroying France’s old colonial empire – it had also prevented France 
from acquiring a new one to replace it for nearly fifty years.180 Moreover, even in the Third 
Republic, the continued reluctance among much of France’s population to commit to overseas 
endeavors had made France’s colonial expansion less successful than it might have been.181 
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 Despite the persistence of Napoleon’s imperial legacy, Deschamps argued, the Third 
Republic had experienced remarkable success overseas: unlike all of France’s previous 
governments, it had “dared to deliberately engage in colonial enterprise.”182 This success, he 
argued, reflected the fact that the Republic had turned away both from the Old Regime’s model 
for administrating colonies and from the Empire’s counterproductive commitment to continental 
politics. It had recognized the need to protect colonists’ civil and political liberties, promote 
commercial equality between colony and metropole, and establish administrative autonomy. At 
the same time, it recognized that France’s future lay overseas and not in European conflict.  
Deschamps’ tripartite opposition between Old Regime despotism, imperial continental 
politics, and Republican colonial empire further secured his contention that colonization was a 
republican enterprise. His narration of France’s colonial history demonstrated that the Old 
Regime’s colonial enterprise was doomed to fail and that Bonapartist imperialism contradicted 
the demands of colonial expansion. In fact, he contended, a successful and prosperous colonial 
empire was only possible if the metropolitan government embraced liberal institutions. The 
Republic’s colonial politics were thus not only distinct from their autocratic monarchical and 
Bonapartist predecessors; they represented the only viable form of colonial empire.183  
Tellingly, even Deschamps’ specialized account of France’s relationship with its colonial 
empire did not pay much attention to explaining how the empire’s indigenous population fit into 
this republican model. He praised the Republic’s commitment to “assimilating” indigenous 
people and noted that the Republic had endowed those who had adopted France’s civilization 
                                               
182 This act, he explained, had not only helped France establish an expansive colonial empire; it had also helped 
increase its international prestige. Countries across Europe had witnessed France’s colonial prowess with envy and 
decided to copy its policies. See Ibid., x. 
183 Here, too, Deschamps contended that the current problems with the republic’s colonial empire stemmed from the 
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with citizenship and political rights.184 However, the political and legal position of these different 
populations remained absent from his historical narrative of France’s colonial history and from 
his vision of republican colonial empire. He also left the question of the empire’s permanence – 
and the ultimate fate of colonized peoples - unsettled. 
Deschamps was not the only writer who situated the history of French colonization in the 
center of a longstanding debate over whether France should commit to extending its continental 
or colonial influence. Louis Vignon, a professor at the fledgling École Coloniale, similarly 
contended that the problems that had complicated France’s relationship with its colonies 
stemmed from the fact that the country had long been divided between politique coloniale and 
politique continentale.185 In some ways, Louis Vignon’s description of these two political 
orientations was similar to Deschamps'. He argued that historically, France had embraced both 
politique continentale and politique coloniale. This dual orientation, he insisted, reflected 
France’s geographic position and national character; it had also secured the nation’s military 
strength, economic wealth, and cultural prestige.186 In his work, he proposed to trace the 
relationship between “France’s politique continentale and coloniale from the 16th century to the 
present" while showing "the expansion of our country in Europe and outside of Europe.”187 By 
linking politique coloniale to politique continentale and framing both as strategies for increasing 
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France’s national influence and prestige, Vignon detached colonial policy from internal political 
debates and described it as an integral part of French history. But even as Vignon contended that 
politique coloniale had nothing to do with any particular French political party, he also narrated 
the history of France’s colonial empire in politicized terms.188 
Vignon’s description of France’s colonial history contended that most of France’s rulers 
had respected France’s “natural” dual continental and colonial orientation. However, three rulers 
had put both France’s continental and colonial security at risk: Louis XV, Napoleon I, and 
Napoleon III. Together, these men had destroyed France’s first colonial empire and weakened its 
continental position. Louis XV had begun the pattern of sacrificing France’s colonial holdings 
for the sake of its continental influence. Like Deschamps, Vignon argued that the Revolutionary 
government had attempted to reform the remainder of that colonial empire. However, Napoleon I 
had undone these reforms and focused even more exclusively on the continent. At the same time, 
he had unsettled the “equilibrium” in Europe – an act that would ultimately cause France to lose 
both its new continental borders and most of the remainder of its colonial empire.189 Napoleon III 
had made the situation even worse by sacrificing both France’s continental and colonial interests 
to fantastical dreams that could never be realized.190 This destructive obsession with continental 
expansion and the turn to flights of fancy had weakened France. It was not until the Third 
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Republic that the government turned definitively away from France’s misconceived dreams of 
continental domination and towards the more rewarding field of colonial empire.191 
If Vignon argued that France should focus on expanding its influence overseas, he did not 
contend that France should surrender its continental ambitions. Instead of “opting” for politique 
coloniale over politique continentale, he averred, France should instead “orient” itself towards 
colonial empire. In the colonies, France would find “certain success, the future, and riches.” As 
long as the Third Republic avoided “adventures” like Napoleon I’s, Vignon implied, France 
would be able to maintain and extend its expansive overseas territories and perhaps even its 
borders within Europe itself.192 Vignon thus promised his readers that this new republican 
colonial empire would not only enrich France, but also help the nation to compete within Europe. 
If Vignon thus tied successful colonial expansion and France’s colonial empire directly to 
its republican government, he did not necessarily link France’s republican ideology to its 
colonial policies in the same way as Deschamps and Girault had. While he praised the Republic 
for turning away from the obsessive focus on continental power struggles, he claimed that its 
colonial policies left something to be desired.193 Moreover, instead of suggesting that republican 
politicians turn back towards the Revolution for solutions to contemporary colonial problems, he 
argued instead that colonial administrators and legislators should look towards England, which 
had a much more populous and prosperous overseas colonial empire. By examining England’s 
policies and applying them to France’s colonies, he proposed, France would find the key to 
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improving its overseas possessions.194 Vignon’s history of colonization thus linked colonial 
empire to the Republic but not to republican political ideas or policies. 
Joseph Chailley-Bert, the secretary of the Union coloniale who had sought to define 
colonial empire by appealing to republican theory, also wrote historical narratives to secure the 
term. His deployment of politique continentale and politique coloniale was even less tied up in 
republican ideology. Unlike Deschamps and Vignon, who both associated politique continentale 
with Bonapartism and politique coloniale with republicanism, Chailley-Bert did not define the 
terms politically or ascribe them to particular regimes.195 Instead, he suggested that both were 
tactical strategies aimed at increasing France’s influence. France’s contemporary problems, in 
his view, stemmed from the fact that most of its rulers and governments had privileged politique 
continentale over politique coloniale. This imbalance had weakened France within Europe and 
overseas. According to Chailley-Bert, the Third Republic’s decision to devote more attention to 
politique coloniale had thus rectified a mistake – but even the Third Republic’s commitment to 
its colonial empire was more tenuous than it should be.196 If Deschamps and Vignon had both 
used an opposition between politique coloniale and politique continentale to bolster their 
respective visions of a republican colonial empire, Chailley-Bert thus used the same opposition 
to define colonial empire as an apolitical, national enterprise.  
 Other writers objected directly to the contention that Napoleon had abandoned politique 
coloniale for politique continentale. Henri Prentout, a professor of history at the University of 
Caen, argued in Île de France sous Decaen that Napoleon I practiced a distinct and unified 
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politique coloniale.197 As a result, Prentout insisted, Napoleon’s policies overseas deserved 
independent attention. However, his narrative of Napoleonic colonial history demonstrated that 
Napoleon’s colonial policies and ambitions were both similar to and intertwined with their 
European counterparts. In both Europe and the colonies, Prentout maintained, Napoleon aimed to 
extend the territory under his authority. Moreover, his expansionist goals in Europe and overseas 
were often interrelated. For example, Prentout explained, Napoleon hoped to use the Île de 
France (modern-day Mauritius) as a launching point to conquer India.198 Conquering India would 
have enabled Napoleon to establish a wealthy and powerful overseas colonial empire. But at the 
same time, he noted, it would have also served to weaken England in Europe.199 The failure of 
Napoleon’s colonial ambitions in the East Indies – which, as Prentout pointed out, also marked 
the end of France’s “first colonial empire” – was also bound up with Napoleon’s failures in 
Europe. Both stemmed, Prentout claimed, from an excess of ambition and a dearth of resources. 
Moreover, as Napoleon encountered setback after setback in Europe itself, he became unable to 
devote attention to France’s overseas territories.200 Failure in Europe thus led to failure in the 
colonies as well. 
According to Prentout, Napoleon’s administrative and political strategies also resembled 
their European counterparts; they were centralizing, “reactionary,” and focused on creating order 
                                               
197 Henri Prentout argued that this politique coloniale had often been overlooked by historians of the Napoleonic 
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while incorporating some revolutionary reforms. Napoleon’s goal in the colonies, Prentout 
contended, was to “restore [Old Regime] institutions while adapting revolutionary legislation.” 
This ideological framework, he noted, was similar to the one that had also structured his policies 
in France itself.201 The differences between the Napoleonic European and colonial regimes were 
thus a matter of degree: the colonies were less centralized, more independent, and more unequal 
than Napoleon’s European territories. But they remained part of the same imperial structure. 
Prentout’s narrative of Napoleon’s politique coloniale was in some sense contradictory. 
On the one hand, he structurally treated Napoleon’s overseas colonial empire as distinct from 
Napoleon’s European empire. But at the same time, he continually highlighted the similarities 
between them for his readers. This pattern implies that he saw “continental” and “colonial” 
empire as inherently distinct models that could share commonalities. Neither, moreover, 
belonged to a particular political system; both could be associated with a variety of political 
regimes. Like Chailley-Bert, Prentout thus implied that colonial empire was an enterprise 
embraced by all of France’s governments – even if they practiced it differently. 
Pierre Legendre’s Notre épopée coloniale similarly described France’s relationship to its 
colonial empire in national and at times racial terms. Legendre – the secretary of the Alliance 
française and a member of the Société de géographie de Paris - argued that the French race had 
shown its “colonial genius” beginning in ancient Gaul.202 The country’s first major colony was 
established in the 11th century, when the Normans conquered England. Even if England had not 
remained loyal to France, Legendre contended, the English nevertheless remained “the sons of 
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the first French colonists.”203 A few centuries later, the French embarked on an even more 
ambitious colonial endeavor: the Crusades. After this successful military expedition, France had 
maintained a colonial empire in the center of the Middle East for more than a century. When it 
fell, France turned its colonizing efforts overseas towards the New World. And even after 
England annexed this North American empire, France remained undaunted and created its 
contemporary colonial empire – its largest yet. This history, Legendre insisted, demonstrated that 
the French people were “tenaciously attached to the colonial idea” and had been committed to 
colonial enterprises throughout their ancient and modern history.204 France’s interest in 
establishing a colonial empire was thus not an expression of party politics. Instead, it stemmed 
from the national and natural character of the French people. In fact, he maintained, the 
“negligence, weakness, [and] cowardice” of France’s governments was responsible for all of 
France’s colonial challenges and disasters. Politics and political ideologies thus had not shaped 
France’s colonial practices; they had simply interfered with the French people’s natural instincts 
and endangered the country’s colonial empire. 
In addition to describing colonization and colonial empire as the simple expression of 
France’s national character, Legendre also situated his narrative of France’s colonial history 
within a discourse of evolutionary biology. He argued that colonization was central to “human 
evolution”: it had created modern European civilization and in the future, it would allow 
humanity to make further progress.205 Colonies were thus not simply a reflection of Darwinian 
                                               
203 Notably, throughout the work, Legendre warned his readers that France’s colonies had not and would not always 
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competition; they also were demanded by “humanitarian law,” which required civilized people to 
“create men” out of the uncivilized peoples that they encountered. Like Girault, Legendre 
deployed family metaphors in order to describe colonization’s evolutionary effects. He argued, 
“Just as the individual must create children, civilized peoples must create colonies.” Any nation 
that refused to colonize would find itself doomed to irrelevance and ultimately “the tomb.” Much 
like individuals who failed to have children, the nation’s legacy would disappear. By establishing 
a colonial empire, France was preserving its “soul and its spirit” and creating a place for itself in 
“eternal history.” The empire itself would not be permanent, however; in fact, each of its 
composite colonies would ultimately become independent. But the nation’s ideas and culture 
would be preserved in territories around the world even after the empire dissolved. For Legendre, 
then, France’s colonial empire reflected a national effort to contribute to human evolution and 
create a place for itself in human history.206  
Marcel Dubois and Auguste Terrier’s Les colonies françaises: un siècle d’expansion 
coloniale, published to accompany the Universal Exposition of 1900, echoed many of the themes 
published in these independent works. Dubois and Terrier, associated respectively with the 
Annales de géographie and the Comité de l’Afrique française, described colonial expansion and 
colonial empire as a “national strategy” that had little to do with internal French politics – much 
like Vignon, Chailley-Bert, and Legendre. 207 In fact, in the preface, the authors posited 
colonialism as a phenomenon that had characterized all of France’s governments during the 
nineteenth century by noting that they intended to describe the “colonial history of the Directory, 
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of the Consulate, [and] of the First Empire” in addition to the colonial history of later regimes.208 
Each of these governments, the authors insisted, had concerned themselves with France’s 
colonial empire – even if some had found themselves unable to defend it. 
Like Deschamps and Vignon, Dubois and Terrier assumed that the French Revolution 
and republican ideology had shaped France’s colonial empire to some extent. However, their 
enthusiasm for the Revolution’s effects on French territories was restrained. Like Deschamps, 
they contended that the Old Regime’s colonial empire had been on the brink of collapse in the 
years before the Revolution – in part because its wealthiest depended on slavery, an economic 
practice that was quickly becoming outdated.209 Despite the fact that the revolutionary 
government was under constant military threat, the authors argued, it nevertheless devoted 
remarkable attention to the colonies. The deputies abolished many of the inconsistencies and 
unnecessary injustices that had characterized the Old Regime’s colonial policy and thereby won 
the loyalty of their colonial subjects.210 At the same time, the authors noted with approval, the 
revolutionary government had applied new principles to the colonies with caution; deputies 
were, the authors insisted, more committed to maintaining “the French colonial tradition” than in 
remaining entirely wedded to revolutionary ideology.211 This narrative thus suggested that while 
moderate republican reforms could increase the health of the colonies, applying radical 
republican ideas to France’s overseas empire would undermine the nation’s hold over it. 
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210 Dubois and Terrier’s account of the Revolution’s politics drew heavily on Deschamps’. See ibid., 28. 
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Dubois and Terrier paired this tempered assessment of the revolutionary government’s 
effects on France’s colonial holdings with a more sympathetic account of Napoleon I’s 
relationship to colonial empire. They noted that Napoleon had lost the colonial empire largely 
due to the machinations of England; he had hoped to defend France’s overseas territories by both 
attacking England directly and by invading India. Neither of these plans came to fruition, and as 
a result, he left France with a colonial empire largely in tatters. If Dubois and Terrier thus faulted 
Napoleon’s policies for failing to produce results, they did not claim, like Deschamps and other 
writers, that Bonapartism itself was incompatible with colonial empire. Even the Second Empire, 
they contended, had maintained an active colonial strategy – but Napoleon III’s other 
commitments in Italy, Crimea, and Mexico had prevented him from acting on it.212 
Dubois and Terrier thus positioned France’s colonial expansion in the late nineteenth 
century as a return to “the French tradition.” It was not a new doctrine or theory, but “analogous” 
to the politique coloniale embraced under Colbert – even if it had a new “democratic essence.” 
Although it had been influenced by France’s different governmental regimes, it was not beholden 
to any of them. Like politique continentale, the authors contended, politique coloniale was 
simply an expression of “national interests.” In fact, Dubois and Terrier warned, for France’s 
colonial empire to become prosperous and stable, politique coloniale “must not have any more 
party politics.” Such politicking was destructive and inappropriate, as politique coloniale was an 
expression of France’s history and national identity – not its political debates.213 Dubois and 
Terrier thus tried to highlight the ways in which France’s new colonial empire lined up with 
                                               
212 They noted “the politique coloniale of the Second Empire was not, in sum, advantageous for our expansion. 
Certainly, it would be unjust to deny that our colonies received certain benefits from that intense commercial 
circulation that the treaties of 1860 began.” The authors argued that the Second Empire had hindered colonization in 
Algeria and focused too much on economics. Notably, they were skeptical of economic liberalism and argued that 
colonial economies needed to be managed to avoid “competition” between metropole and colony. See ibid., 276. 
213 Ibid., 380, 383. 
  409 
certain republican principles, while simultaneously describing empire as a uniting force that 
would connect the modern nation with its long history and transcend political divisions. 
During the 1890s and early twentieth century, a range of scholars and advocates for 
colonial expansion thus came together to write positive accounts of France’s colonial history. 
They acknowledged that France’s governments had sometimes made mistakes – although they 
did not identify or describe them in the same way – but they all argued that on the whole, 
France’s colonial history was impressive and inspiring.214 If all agreed that colonial empire was a 
positive attribute that had long distinguished the French state, however, they narrated its history 
in distinct ways. Some writers, like Deschamps and Vignon, differentiated sharply between 
modern colonization and its earlier antecedents. Both maintained that the Republic had 
reconstructed the colonial empire from earlier forms of administration. Chailley-Bert, Prentout, 
Legendre, and Dubois and Terrier, on the other hand, located France’s contemporary empire in 
an unbroken tradition of French colonization. Legendre and Dubois and Terrier in particular 
remained skeptical of the Revolution’s effects on France’s colonies and argued that the colonial 
empire should be understood in national terms instead of political ones. Deschamps and Vignon, 
conversely, positioned the Revolution’s effects as salutatory and were more critical of France’s 
longer traditions, although for different reasons. While Deschamps saw France’s non-republican 
colonizing practices as unjust, Vignon described them as ineffective, and in fact suggested that 
France should look towards Britain for more a successful colonial model.  
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Some of these works also reflect a growing interest in the history of the Napoleonic 
Empire and an effort to integrate it into a narrative of French colonial expansion – a move that 
seems to indicate that many republican authors were no longer afraid of associations with 
Napoleon I and Napoleon III.215 This change seems partly to reflect the Second Empire’s fading 
stigma in French political and historical discourse. But it also resulted from a widespread belief 
that continental and colonial empire were distinct enterprises, which meant that France could be 
republican at home and imperial abroad. Of course, these authors did not interpret Napoleonic 
Empire and its relationship with republican empire in the same way. While some writers 
described France’s contemporary colonial empire as a republican enterprise that had broken from 
its Napoleonic antecedents, others linked the new empire to Napoleonic predecessors.  
These authors’ varying stances on the colonies’ relationship to republicanism reflect the 
diversity that characterized republican visions of empire in the 1890s. While some described the 
republic and its empire as deeply interconnected, others worked instead to depoliticize the 
question of colonial expansion – and at times even remobilized Bonapartist strategies to give 
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shape to the empire they hoped to build. The variation between these understandings shows that 
the political implications of “empire” remained highly unstable during this period.  
These authors’ histories dealt less directly with the question of the ultimate fate of 
France’s colonial empire than some of the more theoretical works on the subject. However, by 
describing colonization as a strategy with deep roots in France’s history and demonstrating that 
the French nation had always maintained a colonial empire in some form, each of these authors 
positioned “empire” to some extent as a natural annex to France itself. Legendre in particular 
warned that France’s dominance over any particular colony would always be fleeting; he 
contended that all colonies were destined to become independent nations. But his narrative 
nevertheless implied that France would replace independent colonies with new ones in order to 
engage perpetually in the project of spreading its influence across the globe. In other words, even 
if these writers described colonial empire’s relationship to the republic in different ways, they 
nevertheless all positioned colonialism as a key historical characteristic of the French nation. 
 
IV. Conclusion: Popularizing Colonial Empire 
 Most theoretical and historical definitions of colonial empire addressed a relatively 
narrow audience of specialists, scholars, and politicians. But during the 1890s, a growing body of 
popular literature on colonialism also emerged that worked – albeit less directly – to define and 
defend “colonial empire” in wider public circles. Like their political and theoretical counterparts, 
these works did not define “colonial empire” in the same way. But they nevertheless popularized 
the term and highlighted its benefits for the French nation. 
 These popular representations of colonial empire took a number of different forms, 
including popular novels, histories aimed at schoolchildren, colonial exhibitions, and 
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encyclopedias and atlases.216 In 1896, for example, Maurice Wahl published “an illustrated 
history” of France’s colonial empire for schools that chronicled its establishment, described its 
expansiveness, and highlighted its benefits. France had largely established this empire, he 
acknowledged, randomly and through force. However, he insisted, the government had no time 
for reflection on strategy: all European powers were seeking to establish colonial empires in the 
contemporary world.217 France’s current task was to give shape to this conquered territory by 
educating administrators, implementing colonial institutions, encouraging emigration, and 
constituting a colonial army. Such measures, he claimed, would enable France to create a 
colonial empire that would enrich and strengthen the French nation.218 Wahl did not explain what 
shape this empire would take but described it as a permanent annex to the state that would enable 
France to spread its ideas and values across the world. Wahl’s vision of colonial empire thus 
reflected the views of colonial theorists and historians who treated empire as an expression of 
national interests that transcended questions of specific political values and ideologies. 
Les colonies françaises: petite encyclopédie coloniale, which was published in multiple 
editions during the early twentieth century, similarly aimed to popularize theoretical 
understandings of empire coloniale while acquainting its readers with the scope of France’s 
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colonial possessions. The goal was to help the general public understand the value of the 
colonies and thus support pro-colonial political leaders. In the introduction, François Bernard 
argued that colonial empire was a necessary political structure that contained the process of 
colonization. Colonization, he contended, was a “natural” human impulse that had defined 
human history. However, it was also oppressive and violent. States thus needed to oversee 
colonization in order to “regulate the relationship” between colonists and indigenous people.219 
By asserting sovereign authority over colonized territories and integrating them into an 
overarching imperial structure, France was thus protecting indigenous peoples while spreading 
its civilizing influence around the globe. After all, Bernard warned, if France did not conquer 
territories, England would continue to do so instead – and England was less adept at integrating 
and civilizing indigenous peoples than France.220 Ultimately, each of France’s colonies would 
gain an increasing degree of administrative autonomy – even as the indigenous peoples who 
lived there integrated progressively into French society.221 
 Like other contemporary French colonial theorists, the contributors to Les colonies 
françaises thus drew on the language of Darwinian competition in order to describe colonization 
as a process that defined human nature. At the same time, they posited the state’s involvement in 
that process – and the institution of empire itself – as a way of integrating morality, “civilizing” 
force, and liberal principles into encounters that otherwise would be destructive for indigenous 
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peoples.222 In this vision, “empire” organized colonized territories in ways that aligned with the 
republican discourse of universal rights and justice – even as it also strengthened the nation.223  
 Wahl’s and Petite’s accounts of France’s colonial empire certainly do not represent the 
scope of popular work published about colonial expansion at the turn of the century. But they 
show how debates over the relationship between colonialism, empire, republicanism, and the 
nation could creep into texts aimed at nonspecialist audiences. At the same time, they also 
demonstrate how the terminology of “colonial empire” structured France’s relationship with its 
colonies – even if writers and politicians often failed to agree on its meaning. 
 For much of the 1870s and 1880s, colonial expansion and colonial empire had remained a 
subject of political controversy: French politicians, writers, and intellectuals disagreed over its 
meaning, benefits, and consequences for France and many linked empire to the discredited 
regime of Napoleon III. Even in the 1890s, many of these debates remained unsettled. Writers, 
politicians, and intellectuals continued to argue about some of the same questions that had 
defined French discourse about colonization since the 1860s. Should the government assimilate 
colonies into the metropole? Should it subject them to the law of free trade? How should 
colonies be administered? Should the state promote settler colonization? How should France 
treat the indigenous peoples who fell beneath French rule? The range of responses to these 
questions continued to have consequences for those who lived beneath imperial rule and for the 
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structure of the imperial system. But the argument about colonial empire’s benefits for France 
and relationship to the legacy of Napoleon III seemed settled.224 Most writers had come to agree 
that colonial empire was necessary to the French nation, though France remained a Republic.  
 By the end of the 1890s, France’s writers and thinkers had thus begun to popularize the 
term “colonial empire” and highlight its importance to the French nation. But they had not 
necessarily defined it coherently. Indeed, they failed to agree on some basic points. They argued 
about whether the colonial empire would remain permanently annexed to France, eventually fold 
into the French nation, or ultimately break apart into new, independent nations. They also 
debated about whether the empire was in line with republican ideals or whether republican ideals 
were irrelevant to colonial politics. And they continued to disagree about the significance and 
legacy of earlier imperial models. Ironically, at the same time that thinkers articulated visions of 
colonial empire that escaped the charges of Bonapartism, despotism, incompetence, and 
decadence lobbied against it in the 1880s, some began to look sympathetically towards the 
Second Empire’s imperial system in order to describe the structure of its empire and its 
relationship to France. In other words, at the moment when most republican French politicians 
and intellectuals agreed that continental and colonial empire were unrelated, republican colonial 
theorists began to look again at continental imperial models and to find some value in the 
policies of Napoleon III.  
The growing number of republican colonial theorists and writers who turned away from 
trying to align France’s colonial empire with republican ideals and instead highlighted its 
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relationship with older colonial empires does not necessarily reflect the strength of the 
Napoleonic legacy in the early twentieth century. If anything, it seems to reflect a feeling among 
many of these writers that republican ideals interfered with and undermined the pursuit of 
colonial expansion. By trying to remove colonial empire from the center of political debate, they 
were thus not only trying to appeal to French people from across the political spectrum; they 
were also trying to remove it from republican discourse. This pattern suggests that despite all of 
the efforts to separate “republican colonialism” from earlier imperial regimes, the new advocates 
of colonial empire could never quite escape the contradictions of universal human rights and 
colonial conquests. Race theories, social Darwinism, and new nationalist themes all contributed 
to the justifications for colonialism and secured the popularity of colonial empire. But the 
theoretical and historical tensions never disappeared. 
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CONCLUSION: THE IMPERIAL PARADOXES OF FRENCH REPUBLICANISM 
 
 Over the course of the late nineteenth century, French understandings of “empire,” its 
relationship to metropolitan political questions, and its consequences for the nation steadily 
evolved. In the 1860s, Napoleon III had promoted a vision of empire that described the term 
simultaneously as a particular political system within France and as a way of organizing territory 
overseas. This vision positioned the French nation itself within an overarching imperial structure 
that also included other nations. Even during the Second Empire, this understanding of empire 
was both extremely unpopular and far from stable – in fact, Napoleon III himself backed away 
from it after 1865.1 Ironically, however, the controversy that engulfed Napoleon III’s use of the 
term and his proposed reforms in Algeria also secured its place in French political discourse. The 
angry settlers in Algeria who forged links with republicans in metropolitan France in order to 
thwart Napoleon III’s attempts to transform the territory simultaneously fixed the legacy of 
Napoleon III’s vision of empire in republican political thought. Over the next two decades, a 
variety of republican politicians, writers, and intellectuals – increasingly invested in building an 
empire of their own – would struggle to untangle Napoleon III’s “continental” empire from his 
“colonial” empire in order to promote a new vision of colonialism in line with republican 
                                               
1 As chapter 1 demonstrates, in the second half of the 1860s, Napoleon III increasingly argued that indigenous 
Algerians would slowly assimilate into French society instead of forming their own nation. After 1865, he began to 
describe indigenous peoples as “French nationals” who only eventually would be able to exercise the rights of 
French citizenship – thereby simultaneously abandoning the idea that Algeria would become an “Arab nation” and 
consigning indigenous peoples to an inferior legal status. Some scholars have in fact argued that this shift represents 
the moment when French law began to distinguish between “subjects” and “citizens” – a distinction that continued 
into the Third Republic and was used to deny colonized people access to political rights. See Frederick Cooper, 
“Alternatives to Empire: France and Africa after World War II,” in The State of Sovereignty: Territories, Laws, 
Populations, ed. Douglas Howland and Luise White (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2009), 94-123. 
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principles and free from the troubling memory of Napoleon III. The Empire would become a 
Republic after 1871, but the Republic would also become a new Empire. 
 Republicans’ relationship with the term empire became more complex in the wake of the 
collapse of the Second Empire and France’s embarrassing defeat in the Franco-Prussian War. On 
the one hand, republican politicians, propagandists, and popular writers promoted a vision of 
empire that defined it as a corrupt, despotic, decadent, and illegitimate form of political 
organization that contradicted France’s ideals of human rights and its national identity. They 
posited empire in direct opposition to the new Third Republic, which they argued could alone 
represent the French nation and enable it to recover from defeat. This opposition distanced the 
Third Republic from both the Second Empire and the Franco-Prussian War and helped shore up 
popular support for republican politics.2 At the same time, however, this line of argumentation 
complicated the new republic’s relationship with its overseas territories, partly because a number 
of writers and thinkers continued to associate “colonies” with “Empire.” The relationship 
between these terms was especially fraught in Algeria, because Napoleon III had treated the 
territory as the centerpiece for his vision of an empire that would rest on Bonapartist political 
principles and bind multiple nations together beneath one imperial structure at home and abroad. 
 In the years following the Second Empire’s collapse, republicans sought to resolve this 
problem by recasting France’s colonies – and especially Algeria – in republican terms. In Algeria 
itself, most French republicans denied that Algeria was a “colony” at all.3 Instead, they insisted 
that Algeria was simply an extension of the French nation across the Mediterranean. In this 
                                               
2 As chapter 2 demonstrates, the Third Republic was itself compromised by the events of the war and the Commune 
that followed it. See Lehning, To Be a Citizen, 6. 
3 Settlers did not necessarily share this opinion. As chapter 3 shows, some called for greater colonial autonomy and a 
federalized state – in part because they felt that the government in France would not respond to their demands. 
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formulation, republican Algeria had no relationship to “empire”; it was a constitutive part of the 
national body. But if this formulation of Algeria’s relationship to France thus enabled 
republicans to distance the territory from Napoleon III’s vision of a multinational Mediterranean 
Empire, it also introduced new tensions – at least in part because of the large indigenous 
population in this newly assimilated Algeria. Even as republican thinkers promoted 
“assimilation” as a democratic solution in line with republican principles, most also made it clear 
that Algeria’s indigenous population would not have access to political rights or citizenship. This 
tension may have posed a problem for republican thinkers, but it was also useful for a new 
conception of “republican empire” in which different groups held different legal and political 
rights. It enabled the Third Republic to claim that administration in Algeria was compatible with 
the republican ideals of equality and liberty while simultaneously denying most of the population 
access to both.4 The weakness of this model thus lay not in its contradictory definitions of rights, 
but in the fact that it did not apply to most of France’s other overseas territories.  
Even during the 1870s, some settlers and colonial theorists thus sought to articulate a 
broader model for describing France’s relationship with its overseas territories by developing 
theories of “colonization” that detached the term from Bonapartist politics. They avoided using 
the term “empire” and instead described “colonization” as an apolitical endeavor practiced by all 
civilized peoples throughout human history. At the same time, they promised that if managed the 
right way, the colonies would strengthen the French nation and align colonial institutions with 
republican principles. However, republicans continued to struggle to describe the nature of both 
the theoretical and institutional relationship between the nation, the republic, and the colonies. 
                                               
4 Gary Wilder, The French Imperial Nation-State: Negritude and Colonial Humanism between Two World Wars 
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2005), 6; Frederick Cooper and Ann Laura Stoler, eds., Tensions of 
Empire: Colonial Cultures in a Bourgeois World (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1997) 
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 During the 1880s, this conversation about colonization and its relationship to empire and 
republican politics came to the forefront in the form of an argument about France’s conquest of 
Indochina. During this period, republican proponents of colonial expansion defended this 
conquest by describing it as part of politique coloniale, a practice, they promised, which would 
strengthen France’s economy, international influence, and national character. At the same time, 
opponents of expansion on both the left and the right mobilized the memory of Napoleon III and 
the Second Empire to criticize politique coloniale and associate it with French defeat and 
imperial despotism.5 The strength of this opposition to colonialism pushed supporters of 
politique coloniale to construct a more robust defense of the practice, which they defined for the 
most part in explicitly republican terms. On the one hand, they differentiated between conquest 
in Europe and conquest in Asia and Africa by drawing on the language of racial or cultural 
inequality and appealing to the idea of the “civilizing mission.”6 At the same time, they argued 
that republican colonial conquest was distinct from its historical predecessors because it did not 
aim to exploit and destroy the peoples it conquered; instead, it would spread French culture and 
values and introduced conquered peoples to the principles of liberty, equality, and fraternity. 
They promoted these ideas not only in political pamphlets and theoretical texts but increasingly 
in popular publications as well. 
 Due both to the efforts of colonial propagandists and to the changing political climate in 
post-Napoleonic France, by the 1890s, the conflict and ambivalence surrounding colonial 
expansion – and even “empire” itself – seems to have largely dissipated. Indeed, republican 
                                               
5 This was partly because Napoleon III was associated with Indochina. See Jean-Pierre Pecquer, Indochine-France: 
Conquête et rupture, 1620-1954 (Paris: Alan Sutton, 2009), 41. 
6 As chapter 4 shows, republican politicians in particular used the language of racial inequality somewhat cautiously 
in 1885 – especially after it caused an uproar after the Chamber of Deputies, they often substituted “culture” for it. 
See Manceron, 1885: le tournant coloniale, 14. 
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politicians, colonial theorists, journalists, and writers increasingly used the term “colonial 
empire” to refer to France’s overseas colonies. The growing popularity of the term “colonial 
empire” partly reflected the degree to which the problematic memory of Napoleon III had faded. 
As a result, republicans were less concerned about possible associations between the republic’s 
overseas empire and Napoleon III’s Second Empire. But the emergence of the term also reflects 
the ways in which new scientific ideas and patterns of racialized thinking had drawn clear lines 
between conquest and empire in Europe and conquest and empire overseas. Even in the 1880s, 
some republican thinkers had associated the German Empire’s annexation of Alsace-Lorraine 
with the French Republic’s conquest of Indochina.7 But by the 1890s, such comparisons seemed 
increasingly remote. Race theory seemed to have solved the political conflicts over “empire” and 
its meanings. 
 If the term “colonial empire” had thus become ubiquitous by the end of the nineteenth 
century, the project of republican colonial empire nevertheless retained its contradictions. Even 
in the 1890s, colonial theorists and politicians continued to fail to agree on what exactly 
“colonial empire” meant, the nature of its relationship to republican politics, and its connections 
to the French nation. While some writers – like their predecessors in the 1880s – described 
France’s colonial empire in explicitly republican terms, others insisted that it was an apolitical 
national strategy that did not need to be reconciled with republican political principles. At the 
same time, they continued to disagree about whether the empire would fold into the French 
nation, remain permanently annexed to it, or eventually break off into independent nations. If 
“colonial empire” was thus for the most part no longer seen as problematic, the continuing 
debates about how to define it demonstrate the degree to which writers continued to struggle to 
                                               
7 Ibid., 117. 
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reconcile the republic’s theoretical commitment to democratic practices and national sovereignty 
with its commitment to dominating territory overseas. 
 The slow evolution in French understandings of empire and its relationship to 
republicanism and the nation did not take place in a vacuum. A range of ideological movements - 
including romantic nationalism, Saint-Simonianism, liberalism, race theories, and social 
Darwinism – influenced its development.8 The conversation was further shaped by the memory 
of the Franco-Prussian War, the loss of Alsace-Lorraine, and the demands and actions of settlers 
and colonized peoples. The growing European-wide interest in colonial conquest and expansion 
also played a role in French understandings of empire: it helped drive and legitimize the practice 
while disconnecting it from internal French political debates.9  
At the same time, this conversation about empire and its meanings was not simply shaped 
by other intellectual and political movements and specific historic events: it also had its own 
consequences. First, the conversation affected the conquered peoples living beneath French rule 
– in part because discourses of empire helped legitimize colonial conquest and economic 
exploitation in the first place. Moreover, because the debates about empire intersected with 
arguments about the policies of “association” and “assimilation,” the conversation also had 
implications for colonized people’s rights and identities. Indigenous groups occupied a very 
different place in Napoleon III’s multinational empire, the early Third Republic’s assimilated 
Algeria, and the later Third Republic’s expansive colonial empire. These distinct visions of 
                                               
8 Of course, these intellectual movements were not all equally influential, and they played different roles at different 
historical moments. But taken together, they provided a working vocabulary for many of the writers, politicians, and 
intellectuals who sought to define empire. 
9 In fact, the term “colonial empire” was probably borrowed from the British – both “empire” and “imperialism” 
were used to describe British colonies and the British empire before they were used to define their French 
counterparts. French colonial theorists also drew heavily on work by British thinkers. See Wolfgang Schivelbusch, 
The Culture of Defeat: On National Trauma, Mourning, and Recovery (New York: Picador, 2001), 213. 
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empire also promised colonized peoples very different futures. But if these alternative imperial 
models had important theoretical consequences for colonial administration, their actual policy 
effects remained more limited because of the complicated and fraught relationship between 
colonial theory, colonial policy, and colonial practice. Large gaps remained between the 
republic’s theoretical framework for treating the colonies as part of a civilizing mission and its 
actual practices on the ground.10  
The conversation about “empire” had more direct effects on the development of 
republican practice and thought over the course of the late nineteenth century. On the most basic 
level, republican writers, thinkers, and politicians were able to mobilize particular 
understandings of “empire” to secure republicanism’s political ascendancy.  In the 1860s and 
1870s, they promoted a negative vision of empire in order to discredit Bonapartism and promote 
republicanism as a more legitimate political model. “Empire” thus served as the foil against 
which they defended republican principles and politics. At the same time, especially in the 1880s 
and 1890s, republicans’ ability to articulate a new vision of “colonial empire,” associate that 
vision with republican ideals, and enact that vision by conquering large swaths of overseas 
territory helped them demonstrate the success and strength of republican policies in the court of 
French public opinion. 
“Empire” did not simply help republicans promote republicanism in late nineteenth-
century France, however. It also at times challenged the boundaries and content of republican 
                                               
10 As Alice Conklin, Emanuelle Saada, David Prochaska, and other scholars have made clear, colonial realities often 
had little to do with metropolitan theories. Moreover, practices on the ground – negotiated between colonized 
peoples, settlers, and colonial officials - often played a larger role in shaping administrative policies than theoretical 
reflections on colonial expansion published in the metropole. See Alice Conklin, A Mission to Civilize: The 
Republican Idea of Empire in France and West Africa, 1895-1930 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1997); 
David Prochaska, Making Algeria French: Colonialism in Bône, 1870-1920 (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 1990); Emmanuelle Saada, Empire’s Children: Race, Filiation, and Citizenship in the French Colonies 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2012) 
  424 
ideology. This was in part because empire could be associated both with Bonapartism and with 
overseas conquest for much of the nineteenth century. As a result, especially in the first decades 
of the Third Republic, critics of colonial expansion were able to discredit the republic’s colonial 
expeditions by associating them with the Second Empire and contending that they contradicted 
republican principles. Some went so far as to claim that advocates of colonial expansion were not 
republicans at all and instead simply represented a continuation of older autocratic traditions.11 In 
response to these accusations, republican supporters of colonial expansion had to demonstrate 
that colonial empire and republicanism were compatible – which they managed largely by 
incorporating the scientific language of racial inequality into political discourse. But if the charge 
that colonial empire was “not republican” temporarily subsided, the political instability of 
“empire” as a conceptual category persisted. This was problematic because  “republican 
ideology” itself was far from coherent in the late nineteenth century: republicans argued about 
the promises and dangers of democratic practices, the meaning and application of republican 
citizenship, and the republic’s relationship with war and conquest.12 These debates about empire 
and its relationship to France continued to illuminate and at times accentuate these tensions. 
Finally, debates about “empire” also had important consequences for French 
understandings of the nation and national identity. Throughout his reign, Napoleon III had 
embraced and promoted “the politics of nationality” and argued that each “people” should have 
its own nation-state.13 He reconciled his commitment to the “politics of nationality” with his 
                                               
11 Manceron, 1885, 68, 70, 81. 
12 Philip Nord, The Republican Moment: Struggles for Democracy in Nineteenth-Century France (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1995), 251. 
13 Napoleon III was arguably drawing on a “cultural” vision of national identity here instead of a “political” or 
“civic” one. He supported Italian and to some extent German unification because he felt that the peoples who would 
constitute those two nation-states had historical, linguistic, and cultural ties that bound them together. The 
republicans who came to power in 1870 rejected this model in part because they felt that it had strengthened the 
 
  425 
desire to build an expansive empire by describing that empire as an entity that would incorporate 
multiple nations within it. After the Franco-Prussian War, republicans identified Napoleon III’s 
commitment to “the politics of nationality” as one of the causes of French defeat.14 Instead of 
treating France’s overseas territories as semi-independent nations, they turned to the 
revolutionary republican universalizing vision of the French nation that envisioned it as an open 
political structure, which could incorporate territories and peoples located all over the world.15 
From the beginning, however, this expansive vision of the French nation had its limitations: even 
as republicans described the nation as universal, they insisted that indigenous peoples had to 
adopt cultural markers of Frenchness in order to join it. As a result, even in Algeria, most 
republicans never seriously considered incorporating indigenous peoples into the nation itself.16  
In light of these contradictions – which became increasingly obvious as the republic 
conquered a growing number of overseas territories – numerous writers, politicians, and theorists 
began describing France’s colonies as separate from the French nation. Instead of joining the 
national body, these colonies would exist beneath a separate imperial structure that would help 
other races “grow up.” This vision of the relationship between empire and nation had something 
                                               
Germans unnecessarily. At the same time, however, as recent scholars of nationalism have made clear, the 
republican model of nationalism was not simply based on a political project: instead, republicans continued to argue 
about the relationship between the importance of culture, ethnicity, and law in determining national identity. For a 
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trans. Catherine Porter (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2009). 
14 See, for example, C. Cambier, République, empire ou royauté (Paris: Victor Palmé, 1871), 19, 20; A. Neptune, Le 
Temps (16 July 1870), 1. 
15 Robert Aldrich, Greater France: A History of French Overseas Expansion (New York: Palgrave, 1996), 110; 
Naomi Schor, “The Crisis of French Universalism,” Yale French Studies, no. 100 (2001), 46. 
16 They were perceived as “not French enough” – reflecting the tension between the republican vision of the French 
nation as universal and the republican vision of the French nation as a specific cultural and ethnic entity. See, for 
example, René de Semallé, Projet d’organisation de l’Algérie (April 1871); Auguste Pomel, Les races indigènes de 
l’Algérie: Arabes, Kabyles, Maures et Juifs. Du rôle que leur réservent leurs aptitudes (Oran: Ve Daquier, 1871); 
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in common with Napoleon III’s. But while Napoleon III had envisioned France as a part of his 
empire – he positioned it as the central nation-state among others – most republicans envisioned 
the French nation as outside of the empire that they were constructing. They treated the empire 
above all as a political, economic, and cultural asset of the French nation; it was a sign of 
national strength, an opportunity for national commerce, and the symbol of France’s 
international prestige. By the late nineteenth century, empire had thus become a critical 
component of French national identity while remaining outside the boundary of the nation itself. 
This conversation about empire and its relationship to republicanism and national identity 
continued into the twentieth century. Especially in the decades after World War I, a new wave of 
criticism – originating both from the Communist party and from the colonies themselves – would 
highlight the contradictions between republican promises and imperial institutions.17 These 
voices remained relatively marginalized in the interwar years, but they would become much 
stronger after 1945, as colonized peoples increasingly demanded access to full citizenship 
rights.18 In response to this criticism, republicans would again seek to redefine the meaning of 
empire and rearticulate its relationship to the French nation – partly by turning away from the 
term “empire” itself and towards the alternative constructions of “France Overseas,” the “French 
Union,” and the “French Community.”19 In doing so, they would again renegotiate the complex 
relationship between the republic, the nation, and overseas territory. But because they failed to 
                                               
17 Richard S. Fogarty, “The French Empire,” in Empires at War: 1911-1923, ed. by Robert Gerwarth and Erez 
Manela (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), 129; Aldrich, Greater France, 117. 
18 As Frederick Cooper has made clear, between 1944 and 1960, a number of Africans proposed to restructure the 
empire in order to allow for political and social equality and cultural difference. See Cooper, “Alternatives to 
Empire,” 94-123. 
19 Pascal Blanchard, Sandrine Lemaire, Nicolas Bancel, and Dominc Thomas, “Introduction: The Creation of a 
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establish a political system that would effectively grant equal political rights to its diverse 
members, “empire” would once again become a problem for republicans instead of a source of 
political and national strength. The nineteenth-century conquests of Algeria, Indochina, and other 
distant peoples would lead finally to the collapse of the Republic’s politique coloniale in the 
1950’s and 1960’s. 
Over the course of the past twenty years, historians have argued about whether French 
republicanism itself is inherently imperialistic and oppressive. While some scholars have treated 
colonialism as a failure to apply republican universalist principles to overseas territories, others 
have claimed that the origin of republican colonialism lies in those universalist principles 
themselves and in the republic’s inherent inability to accommodate cultural difference.20 As this 
dissertation has shown, republican thinkers in the late nineteenth century did create a colonial 
model that was couched in universalist language specifically designed to prevent colonized 
peoples from exercising political rights. However, this model did not proceed simply from the 
internal contradictions of republican ideology. It was informed not only by republicans’ 
interpretation of universalist principles but also by conflicts with other political groups and an 
ongoing concern that republican ideals and “empire” were in fact incompatible. Republicans thus 
turned to a very particular reading of revolutionary thought in order to reclaim “empire” in 
republican terms. This reading of revolutionary ideas remained unstable, however – as the rise of 
alternative readings in twentieth-century anti-colonial movements makes clear. 
                                               
20 For examples of scholarship that treats colonialism as a failure of republicanism, see Conklin, A Mission to 
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